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INTRODUCTION

By Sebastian Elischer and Benjamin Smith

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This newsletter's symposium highlights the renaissance of military coups as an area of study in comparative politics (for an overview see Brooks 2019). Many had considered military coups as relics of the past, whose influence on contemporary politics were confined to a dwindling number of countries. Scholars working on hybrid regimes have largely focused on civilian-led sources of authoritarian control (for this argument, see Self 2022; for a prominent example, see Levitsky and Way 2011) and those working on authoritarianism broadly have focused equally on civilian autocrats. Indeed, much of the scholarly work on democratic collapse or erosion in recent years has focused on the actions of elected executives, even as those elected populists have often either made nostalgic reference to past military dictatorships (e.g. Jair Bolsonaro) or promised to use military force against civilian protesters (e.g. Donald Trump). Direct military seizure of power or rule has taken a back seat in our study of autocratization.

The rationale for the comeback of military coups in the comparative politics literature is manifold, and three developments have been particularly noteworthy in that regard. First, the Arab Spring demonstrated vividly that militaries can be facilitators but also obstructors of political liberalization attempts (Albrecht, Croissant, and Lawson 2016; Stepan and Linz 2013; Nepstad 2013; Hoyle 2019). Second, a growing number of scholars have debated the long-term implications of (military) coups for subsequent regime trajectories (Thyne and Powell 2016; Dahl and Gleditsch 2023; for a summary of the debate see Elischer and Hoyle 2023) and thus have bridged the gap between the literatures on civil-miliary relations and political regimes. Third, the recent coup surge in Africa and the military interventions in Myanmar and Thailand provided a powerful illustration that coups are indeed not a relic of the past (Elischer and Lawrence 2022). For better or (more likely) for worse, military rule has returned, and it is incumbent on comparativists to make sense of this latest wave.

It is impossible to do justice to all of the scholarly voices contributing to the recent wave of scholarship on coups. Nonetheless, this symposium brings together a diverse section of scholars who examine (failed) coups, coup aftermaths, and attempts to avoid coups (coup proofing).

In the first contribution, Holger Albrecht, Kevin Koehler, and Austin Schutz discuss the evolution of coup datasets and recent attempts to gather fine-grade data about the coup plotters—their backgrounds, their ranks, their positionality within the pre-coup regime, and their motives. By outlining the key features of the CAM and the COLPUS datasets, they discuss the current state of the art and illustrate the potential of both datasets to shape future scholarship on coups and their aftermaths.

In the second contribution, Salah Ben Hammou introduces the notion of civilian praetorianism. The concept enables scholars to capture the involvement of civilians in military coups as well as their capacity to influence the post-coup trajectory of their societies. His empirical distinction between civilians with access to the state versus civilians with power based on mass-social movements demonstrates that the defining features of the post-coup political landscape is not exclusively in the hands of the military.

In the third contribution, Erica De Bruin examines coup-proofing as an authoritarian survival strategy. Based on a wealth of empirical evidence, her work demonstrates that interfering in the state's security forces may not consolidate authoritarian rule but have the opposite effect: coup-proofing strategies can push countries toward a new

round of military intervention(s), provoke violence on large-scale, but also trigger democratization efforts.

In the final contribution, Risa Brooks and Theodore McLauchlin discuss the role of the United States military in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election. They argue that the military's public refusal to become involved in a domestic dispute in the months prior to the election shaped the post-January 6 events. Two carefully crafted counterfactuals demonstrate the effect of this public refusal.

Together, this collection of reflections by scholars of civil-military relations reorients our focus on the challenges to military subordination to civilian authority, how polities evolve following military interventions, and on the fact that, even in long-lived democracies, the allure of calling on military force to shape domestic politics remains a "live" question. As we put this issue into press at the end of 2023, we extend to you all our best wishes for 2024.

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ADVANCING RESEARCH ON MILITARY COUPS

THE INTERNAL EXPANSION OF QUANTITATIVE DATA

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Research on military coups seemed to be an anachronism for social scientists interested in contemporary global politics. From the 1990s until very recently, democracy and rule-based governance were on the rise. In the past decade, popular mass uprisings around the globe reminded scholars and political decision makers that ordinary people could ultimately take matters into their own hands. That officers would step out of the barracks to take political power appeared to be a notion of the past. Yet, coups as a global phenomenon have proven sticky with multiple recent episodes occurring in political contexts as diverse as the Sahel, Egypt, Turkey, Sudan, Myanmar, and Thailand. Not only is the empirical phenomenon likely to continue shaping politics in the Global South, but scholarship on military coups, based on large-N event-level data, also emerged as a large and vibrant body of research. We take stock of this body of research and juxtapose a classical period of research on military coups with a subtle but consequential shift in this literature over the past decade

FROM COUP INCIDENCE TO INTERNAL EXPANSION

The classical period for large-N comparative research on military coups lasted roughly from the late 1970s to the early 2010s. Both the beginning and the end of this period introduced substantial methodological and empirical innovation. By the late 1970s, scholars with an empirical interest in sub-Sahara Africa "went quant" (e.g., Jackman 1978; Johnson, Slater and McGowan 1984), at a time when most research in Comparative Politics still rested on qualitative analysis. This research program quickly expanded empirically beyond individual regions, facilitating a global perspective that necessitated an external expansion of coup datasets beyond specific geographical areas or time periods (e.g., Thompson 1980; O'Kane 1981). Yet, works about coups remained somewhat limited to studying the *determinants of coup incidence and success*, systematically testing macro-dynamics external to the event itself: socio-economic factors, the type of the polity, civil-society dynamics, and various forms of political instability.

Ultimately, scholars' attention was on coups as dependent variables in causal analyses and countries' exposure to coup risk (Belkin and Schofer 2003; Powell 2012), less so on their inner dynamics, mechanisms, or consequences. Coups were treated in these studies as a "black box," a disruption of politics as normal but with little contextual detail about the event itself. The classical period culminated in the consolidation and ultimate improvement of prior efforts through the work of Powell and Thyne (2011). The impact of their dataset cannot be overestimated: while previous efforts frequently began with collecting their own data, they brought the field one step closer to the ideal of the cumulative generation of knowledge on coup incidence and success. Subsequent data collections thus frequently built their efforts on the Powell and Thyne data but aimed at the *internal expansion* of coup data. Both the CAM and COLPUS datasets (Albrecht, Koehler and Schutz 2021; Chin, Carter and Wright 2021), for example, are based on candidate lists drawn from various existing sources including the Powell and Thyne data, adding information on individual and collective characteristics about coup plotters, types of coups, violence, and regime trajectories. New data collection efforts have thus further consolidated the Powell

and Thyne data, screening out a number of non-coups and adding a set of additional observations (for a comparison of CAM and the Powell and Thyne data, see Albrecht, Koehler and Schutz 2021, 1061).

Novel coup data often begins with agency. Despite significant differences regarding coding strategies and outcomes, multiple research teams have focused on details about coup plotters to increase knowledge of the internal dynamics and mechanisms of military coups (Eschenauer-Engler and Herre 2023; Peyton et al. 2023; Albrecht, Koehler and Schutz 2021; Chin, Carter and Wright 2021; Bjornskov and Rode 2020; De Bruin 2019; Singh 2014).[1] Particularly influential in the development of this broad trajectory is Naunihal Singh's *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups* (2014) which argues that coup attempts are shaped by the military rank of their plotters. Seizing Power established two main epistemological driving forces for subsequent data efforts: greater granularity, that is, collecting more data about the coup event itself; and introducing variance between different types of coups, here distinguished by different agents in the military hierarchy.

Works in this emerging research strand have pointed at the importance of coup agents situated within the military hierarchy and political institutions (Chin, Carter and Wright 2021; Bjornskov and Rode 2020; Albrecht and Eibl 2018). Scholars have studied the degree of violence not only as a circumstantial phenomenon but an integral, causal mechanism of coup attempts (Singh 2014; De Bruin 2019). Yet other works have begun to question ideological commitments of coup plotters amid their power grabs (Yukawa et al. 2023); and other relevant data collections on military organizations have emerged, such as on purges (Sudduth 2021), recruitment patterns (Asal, Conrad and Toronto 2017; Margulies 2021), and officers' communal identities (Harkness 2016; Johnson and Thurber 2020).

HOW HAS INTERNAL EXPANSION HELPED US UNDERSTAND COUPS?

We illustrate the impact these new data collection strategies have had on the research program's more recent thematic direction. In so doing, we highlight contributions based on our own dataset from the Coup Agency and Mechanisms (CAM) project. Our contributions illustrate two distinct directions other scholars have adopted as well over the past decade: variance among coup incidents to distinguish between specific coup types and coups as independent variables.

[W]e unpacked endgame coups as a discrete type of military coups where elite officers intervene in politics to subvert a revolutionary dynamic and sustain their participation in authoritarian elite coalitions. Rather than a convergence of interests between revolutionaries and officers, endgame coups feature conservative interventions to sustain autocracy and render future democracy less likely.

Our data collection for CAM was inspired by two main aims: coding validity and internal expansion. We began with using existing data collections for a candidate list, namely Powell and Thyne (2011) and Marshall and Marshall (2022). We cross-checked this candidate list through queries in ProQuest Historical Newspaper archives, Google, and scholarly sources for each case. This prompted us to add some episodes and remove others, in particular where we were unable to find robust information meeting our defining criteria of military coups. The innovation of our project came from coding additional variables, namely agency, the degree of violence inherent in coup processes, and plotters' ideological backgrounds. This followed a process similar to corroborating our initial candidate list, using existing sources, additional ProQuest Newspaper searches, and scholarly sources to code these variables.

Focusing on agency and increased granularity in empirical data collections allows for dis-tinguishing different coup types. CAM introduced a fundamental distinction between coups "from below" perpetrated by low-ranking officers and coups "from above" by high-ranking officers who are members of the political elite (Albrecht, Koehler and Schutz 2021). One immediate finding emerging from this exercise is that coup success is not as close to a coin-flip as it might appear from the aggregated data, but centrally depends on agency. Coups from above are successful in 76 percent of cases, while coups from below reach a success rate of only 29 percent (Albrecht, Koehler and Schutz 2021, 1055).

Yet, the distinction has effects far beyond coup success. Albrecht and Eibl (2018), for example, found that the effectiveness of coup-proofing strategies as well as coup risk in reaction to political liberalization varies by coup agency. While counterbalancing and increased defense spending reduced the risk of plots from above, the likelihood of coups from below was instead reduced by increased social spending. Similarly, political liberalization increased the risk of coups from above but decreased the chances of plots from below. This points to varying incentives, opportunities, and capacities among coup plotters with different positions within the military hierarchy: top-ranking officers in authoritarian regimes are often part of the political elite, while low-ranking officers perceive military service as a professional job.

The distinction between coups from above and below also matters for military intervention in the context of mass uprisings. Such "endgame coups" tend to be overwhelmingly staged by elite officers and have negative effects on mid-term prospects of political stability and democratization (Koehler and Albrecht 2021). Contributing to a larger literature on the role of militaries in mass uprisings (Bou Nassif 2021, Degaut 2019; Koehler 2017), we unpacked endgame coups as a discrete type of military coups where elite officers intervene in politics to subvert a revolutionary dynamic and sustain their participation in authoritarian elite coalitions. Rather than a convergence of interests between revolutionaries and officers, endgame coups feature conservative interventions to sustain autocracy and render future democracy less likely.

Coup agency also remains a decisive factor where we are interested in long-term post-coup developments, such as democracy and the nature of state-society relations in authoritarian regimes. Paul Collier (2009) argued that "coups and the threat of coups can be a significant weapon in fostering democracy," and a significant body of subsequent research has attempted to verify this with mixed results (Derpanopoulos et al. 2016; Thyne and Powell 2016; Miller 2012). As we show in the article introducing the CAM data (Albrecht, Koehler and Schutz 2021), these inconsistencies are mainly due to scholars lumping together different types of coups— that is, military interventions by leading elite officers vs. rank-and-file officers. The chances of adverse regime change increase after both types of coups, but the chances of democratization increase only after combat officer coups—providing evidence to the distinction between coups that alter elite coalitions and regime-change coups (Chin, Carter and Wright 2021; Bennett, Bjornskov and Gohmann 2021).

WHERE TO GO FROM HERE?

Our last comments highlight three possible directions for scholars. These are the further internal expansion of coup data, exploring un(der)utilized sources of data; second, emphasizing the domestic political processes that interact with, precede, or emerge out of coups and coup attempts. Third, coup research could emphasize experience. By this, we mean what it is like to live through and after coups. All of this has been done in the past, but new data could generate additional insights, including in ways that add nuance to previous theories.

FURTHER INTERNAL EXPANSION

We have not reached the end of the road regarding the internal expansion of coup data. In fact, there are good reasons to assume that specific characteristics of coups could shape important outcomes beyond prospects for democracy. Questions in this category include the following: does it matter if coup plotters espouse specific ideological agendas? Do such factors shape the degree of post-coup repression and political violence? And how do coups impact on economic prosperity and development? Some of these questions can be explored with the da-

ta we, and others, have already collected. Others require additional efforts, which leads us to reflect on data collection strategies and quality.

Quantitative coup data typically come from the same type of sources: newspaper articles contemporary with the coup in question. This strategy is inherently limited by the reliability and availability of news sources at the time of occurrence. Some coups happened during times when news traveled slowly; others in places where international news outlets did not have a journalistic presence. Ben Hammou, Powell, and Sellers (2023) point out that overreliance on Western media results in the omission of numerous coup plots from datasets, while coup outcome is unlikely to suffer from systemic bias. We do, however, support their call to gather data from non-Western media sources, including in cases where sufficient sources appear to exist.

What kind of new data can we gather, and where can we find it? The first, and easiest, answer is to find additional information in existing news sources and scholarly publications. These are primarily international newspapers, complemented by internationally available regional newspapers, scholarly journals, and academic books. This strategy is especially appealing because it is most accessible to scholars whose access to funding and research time is limited. The second is archival materials from government agencies and other sources (e.g., declassified CIA documents, government press releases, documents saved by coup plotters/perpetrators, congressional minutes, and more). While this provides a valuable source of additional information, there are potential shortcomings. First, these data sources—much like with western media accounts—suffer from variance in the extent and quality of available information. Second, these sources of data will require a greater degree of interpretation than coding efforts aimed at occurrence and outcome, which increases requirements in data and coding transparency.

Several other sources of data could bolster our understanding of coups. Efforts to include regional experts could result in more accurate tallies of coups, coup attempts, and coup plots. Regional expertise could also provide more contextual information. Infor-

mation from citizens—whether emerging from large-N surveys or qualitative interviews—could help us better understand the interaction between coups and civilian life. Similarly, information from coup plotters, perpetrators, and members of the military, whether from interviews, archives, or surveys, could also be a valuable source of expansion.

THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF COUPS

Quantitative coup research has not yet examined domestic political processes, which are local in character, or isolated specific parts or processes of central governments (rather than macro-questions like democratization). Qualitative coup research, with its emphasis on particular cases and historical trajectories, has been more fruitful in this regard. How coups intersect with elections at the local level, how coups reshape sub-national conflict dynamics during civil wars, the effects of elite shuffling on coup risk and the concomitant reshaping of elite networks after coups and coup attempts are all questions that can be explored with existing data.

There are good reasons to assume that such processes of elite conflict matter a great deal. Efforts to code the ethnic composition of armed forces in Africa (Harkness 2016) or the Middle East (Johnson and Thurber 2020) are but one example of how scholars have explored the relationship between military coups and processes of elite recruitment and conflict. Another is research on regime militarization as the consequence of secessionist conflicts which tend to pit the opinions of political and military elites against each other (Eibl, Hertog and Slater 2021). Following examples such as these, quantitative coup research could do more to embed coups in their domestic political contexts. Coups are not just expressions of political instability caused by macro-level, structural variables (such as autocratic rule, low levels of economic development, or institutional weakness), but they are also the expression of concrete political dynamics.

Focusing on such political processes in coup research has the potential to be just as influential for our area of study as the focus on local conflict dynamics was for the study of civil wars and genocide. This movement toward the domestic politics of coups will allow quantitative research to better compliment

qualitative work, especially owing to the strength of qualitative research in providing thick contextual information and tracing processes before, during, and after coups. As data on such processes is gathered and analyzed, we expect to see areas of convergence between quantitative and qualitative research even as the strengths of different methodologies leverage data in ways unique to them.

EXPERIENCE MATTERS

If conflict research is a vocation, its aim must be to increase knowledge for the resolution of current and future conflicts, and the amelioration of suffering for those who survive violence. Understanding why people perpetrate coups, how they do it, and what they do afterward helps answer the "why do" and "how do" questions, but the question of experience is incomplete without more information, much of which is not specific to coup perpetrators. Qualitative research is, in many ways, better situated to answer questions such as those: how does it feel to experience a coup? Or, in what ways was your life shaped by post-coup violence? Yet, quantitative data can offer its own insights about how people experience coups and post-coup dynamics like civil conflict, democratization, economic development, and repression. Rather than focusing just on how coups themselves shape post-coup trajectories, we hope to see research that emphasizes how civilian actors contribute to and navigate "the coup" and its aftermath (e.g., Ben Hammou 2023).

One example of such a research direction is to examine the sources of social support for military interventions and to ask what coups do to popular perceptions of the armed forces. For example, experimental evidence from Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia suggests that there is a "coup taboo" with support for hypothetical military interventions decreasing significantly if it is labelled a coup (Grewal and Kinney 2022); similarly, the mere fact that coup leaders often find it necessary to justify their intervention as temporary and transitional suggests that they, too, perceive a legitimacy deficit (Yukawa et al. 2023; also see Grewal and Kureshi 2019). On the other hand, some coups can draw on significant support outside of the military institution (Kinney 2021). Ultimately, militaries across the world remain among the most trusted institutions in the world, prompting large parts of populations to develop preferences in favor of their intervention in politics (Albrecht, Bishara, Bufano and Koehler 2022).

NOTES

[1] See Ben Hammou, Powell, and Sellers (2023) for an overview of contemporary data sources on military coups.

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CIVILIAN PRAETORIANISM & THE AFTERMATH OF MILITARY COUPS

By Salah Ben Hammou

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Two questions spring to mind in the wake of a military coup. First, can the coupists and their agents *initially* retain power in the face of domestic and international opposition? Second, will the coupists and their agents allow the development of a democratic order, or will some form of authoritarianism emerge? Making sense of these questions is critical as coups have seen a significant resurgence within the last three years. While some of these events have seen coupists and their affiliates entrench themselves such as in Chad (April 2021) and Myanmar (February 2021), others have witnessed chronic instability, defined by countercoups such as in Burkina Faso (January 2022, September 2022) and Mali (August 2020, May 2021), and the outbreak of civil war as seen in Sudan (April 2023). The chance for democracy in the immediate future appears slim across all cases.

Extant scholarship offers several explanations for different post-coup trajectories. Some studies emphasize the importance of the international community as a key actor in pressuring coupists to cede power as well as facilitating transitions to democracy (e.g., Marinov and Goemans 2014; Thyne and Powell 2016; Thyne et al. 2018; Yukawa et al. 2022; Dahl and Gleditsch 2023). Other studies focus on the social composition of the coupists physically seizing power. These indicators range from coupists' military rank (junior vs. senior officers) to whether the coupists are from the dominant or excluded ethnic group, and whether conscripted or volunteer forces make up the military (e.g., Harkness 2018; Vasquez and Powell 2021; Albrecht et al. 2021).

This essay argues that scholarship overlooks the importance of *civilians* in post-coup politics. To the extent that these actors are addressed, scholars portray them as the opponents of coups (e.g., Elischer and Hoyle 2023; Dahl and Gleditsch 2023). However, a growing body of research shows that civilians play an active and often critical role in the occurrence and consolidation of military coups (e.g., Kinney 2019, 2021a, 2021b; Ben Hammou 2023). I build on these perspectives by arguing that the involvement of different types of civilians in a coup coalition can shape distinct trajectories, namely through regime formation. When popular but marginalized civilian groups back a coup, their efforts to consolidate the post-coup regime can help prompt the emergence of a revolutionary, personalist-based regime. Conversely, when besieged political elites implore the armed forces to seize the reins of power, we should expect a counterrevolutionary military junta—one based on collegial rule—to emerge.

Conceptualizing Civilian Praetorianism

In a recent article published at *Armed Forces & Society* (Ben Hammou 2023), I advanced the concept of civilian praetorianism[1][2] or the process in which civilians take actionable steps to instigate and/or consolidate military coups. Who qualifies as a "civilian"? Civilians are domestic actors who—at the time of analysis—are not current members of the state's security apparatus. In other words, civilians are individuals within a given state that do not have formal access to the state's monopoly over legal violence. While admittedly broad, this conceptualization allows us to accomplish two goals. First, by understanding how civilians of different backgrounds, resources, and ideologies wield coups as political tactics, we are better able to contextualize coups as part of broader so-

cio-political conflicts within a polity. Second, we can leverage important sources of variation between civilian coup allies and link them to broader questions in the study of coup politics.

I used the variation in civilians' sources of power to explain their divergent tactics in the practice of praetorianism. I built on a recent wave of scholarship showing that military coupists' rank and identities shapes their tactics and behavior in the conduct of coups (e.g., Kandeh 2004; Singh 2014; De Bruin 2018, 2022; Koehler and Albrecht 2021; Sudduth 2021; Albrecht et al. 2021) and asked how a similar logic might shape civilian conduct. I divide civilian power into two ideal-typical categories: power based on access to the state and power based on mass-based, social networks. Civilians endowed with the state's elite resources have the capacity to *instigate* coups, whereas civilians with sway over mass-based networks have the capacity to *consolidate* coups. In the former, access to the political establishment provides civilians with institutional mandates and/or alliances of like-minded higher-ranking officers, which are valuable tools to initiate coup conspiracies. In the latter, access to mass-based groups in broader society—professional organizations, religious institutions, labor unions, and ethnic networks—allows pro-coup civilians to mobilize their clout and manpower to shore up fledgling juntas against initial forms of opposition. When civilians carry substantial access to both state and societal power, they wield the dangerous ability to instigate *and* consolidate military coups.

Civilian consolidation is especially pertinent to this symposium's focus on coup aftermaths. Putschist officers face a constellation of domestic and international challenges after initially grabbing power. In highly fragmented societies where civilian coup involvement is commonplace (Kinney 2019, 2021), different factions can mobilize their supporters to challenge a new junta's authority, especially through mass protests. An alliance with sympathetic civilians tied to other social constituencies can serve to counteract these threats by organizing pro-coup demonstrations and even violently engaging with other civilian opponents. In addition, civilian coup allies can leverage their social networks to

stack the bureaucracy, take on the state's administrative tasks, and even offer relatively unknown coupists their ideological or policy platforms. This can also serve as a legitimation tactic in the face of international condemnation, particularly in the post-Cold War period. As international reactions to coups have increasingly hardened, a civilian presence in the post-coup period can serve as a bulwark against demands for "civilian-led" rule.

Soldiers do not have a monopoly over the use of coups as a political tactic nor are they the only actors with the ability to significantly shape their aftermaths. Civilians play a vital, if not understudied, role in coup politics—from their instigation to their consolidation.

How Civilian Praetorianism Shapes Post-Coup Regimes

Civilian praetorianism can also profoundly influence a political regime's formation—after *initial* consolidation—along two critical and observable dimensions. First, the participation of different types of civilians can signal whether the new regime will seek to *redistribute* or *preserve* power and privileges within the state's socio-political hierarchies. In other words, will the new regime be *revolutionary* or *counterrevolutionary* in orientation? Second, the degree of cohesion among civilian coup allies can help facilitate whether the post-coup executive is able to accumulate enough power to rule *unconstrained* or will be constrained by other officers and elites. Will the new regime be *personalistic* or *collegial in character*? I anchor these expectations in a coalitional approach (O'Donnell 1973; Slater 2010) to coup politics. Simply put, I contend that coup collaboration by a specific set of civilians reflects the ascension of a specific societal coalition in the broader struggle for state power.

When mass-based civilian groups previously excluded from power coalesce to consoli-

date a coup, their efforts contribute to the development of a *revolutionary* and *personalist* regime. The participation of such civilians generally reflects the ascension of an outsider coalition within the armed forces that is unable and/or unwilling to tap into support from existing elite networks. Outsiders often aim to eradicate and replace such networks but face the threat of retaliatory violence by elements associated with the former order. Drawing on the "downtrodden" or marginalized civilians with different support bases becomes a critical strategy amid reactionary hostilities. During the 1970s-80s, coupists in West Africa, for instance, "made appeals to (…) activist groups (…) urban workers (…) ideologues" to "bypass existing parties (…) to create links with excluded social formations, and (…) establish new bases of support" (Bienen 1985, 365-366).

Courting a constellation of mass-based civilian groups, however, increases the likelihood that factionalism will define the post-coup order. Research on revolutionary and social movements notes a tendency for severe divisions to develop among "negative" coalitions, which see diverse groups unite to dislodge the existing elites (e.g., Dix 1984; Beissinger 2013; Clarke 2023). While different civilian constituencies might unite to consolidate a coup in hopes of gaining leverage in the new regime, their contradictory objectives become serious points of contention.

Iraq's post-coup situation in 1958 demonstrates the issue. Following the Free Officers' ascension, movements opposed to the monarchy such as the Ba'athist, Arab nationalist, and Communist parties threw their support behind the coupists to broadly participate in "a radical assault on the systems of privilege and exclusion" (Tripp 2007, 143). However, "a united front [would] not come to pass" (Dawisha 2009, 173) as the different parties sharply diverged over the prospects of unification with Gammal Abdel Nasser's Egypt. It is worth noting that the conditions prompting cohesion in other variants of rebellion are rarely present in revolutionary coups. For example, participants' shared experiences in the face of a protracted military threat and in rebuilding the state are often cited as necessary conditions for producing cohesive post-revolutionary regimes (e.g.,

Huntington 1968; Levitsky and Way 2013; Lachepple et al. 2020). Revolutionary coups are shorter events that rarely see the same level of violence or efforts to completely rebuild the state and society from scratch. Alliances here are usually more opportunistic and thus prone to salient divisions when the dust settles.

This situation sets the stage for a post-coup executive to personalize decision-making by producing incentives for certain civilian allies to empower a junta leader vis-à-vis his peers and by recalibrating the leader's threat environment. While a coup's principal civilian allies may pursue compensation for their support, balancing different demands invariably leads to the exclusion of some allies. This trade-off can splinter soldiers in the ruling junta based on their own material or ideational incentives. In Iraq, an intractable conflict emerged between junta members Abdel Karim Qassim and Abdel Salam Aref after the former aligned with the Communists at the expense of the Ba'athists and Arab nationalists, the preferred allies of the latter (Dann 1969; Khadduri 1969). In turn, the Communists sought "to exploit the internal conflicts" until the regime "was eventually fully made up of [their] elements…and the country would fall under their influence" (Khadduri 1969, 120). As the example suggests, civilians aligned with the junta leader can exploit cleavages within the ruling arrangement to liquidate their rivals and strengthen the leader's position vis-à-vis his peers. In practice, this includes leveraging their networks to cultivate a personal base of support for the junta leader, a strategy that complements prior findings that show would-be personalists are more likely to develop a support party (e.g., Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018). Personalism is also more likely when former civilian allies take actions that redefine a junta leader's threat environment such as assassination attempts and instigating coup attempts. If these efforts fail to oust or kill the junta leader, they can mark a formal shift in his threat environment–previously shaped by ancient threats–and provide him with a window of opportunity to "clean house" in wide-reaching and dramatic ways (Powell, Chacha, and Smith 2018; Timoneda 2020; Timoneda, Escriba-Folch, and Chin 2023). Examples include violent purges of junta members alleg-

edly associated with the civilian perpetrators, a restructuring of the state apparatus with his own civilian allies and increasing his ability to monitor other junta members.

Conversely, when besieged civilian elites turn to their military allies to instigate a coup, their efforts are more likely to produce a system defined by *counterrevolutionary* aims with a *constrained* post-coup executive. The coalitions here are, by definition, insiders often composed of the military's senior officer corps in league with at least a portion of embattled civilian elites. They face a wide range of threats including mass protests as discussed by Koehler and Albrecht (2021) but also serious insurgencies and coup plots by disenchanted junior officers. Prior to instigating to Sudan's 1958 coup, senior officials in the ruling Umma party saw outsider threats proliferate in the form of urban strikes by leftist trade organizations, secessionist movements in the South, and various coup plots by Free Officers-inspired junior officers (Niblock 1987; Ben Hammou 2023). Ultimately, Prime Minister Abdalla Khalil "favoured reliance on the military (…) as a force which would take over the functions of government" and "maintain the existing socioeconomic structure" (Niblock 1987, 205). Following Khalil's orders, General Ibrahim Abboud dissolved the government, suspended the constitution, and headed the Supreme Military Council–but as a constrained executive.

The seeds of personalism are often absent within insider coalitions. Relative to outsider coalitions, insiders are less likely to see significant factionalism as they generally tout narrower interests. We can attribute this to the fact that insider coup coalitions seek the *preservation* of state power, not its capture, and do not require the same level of consolidation as outsiders. After all, counterrevolutionaries can rely on much of the previous administration's set-up, reducing the need to overhaul the civil service and bureaucracy (Slater and Smith 2016, 1485). Further, any pre-existing divisions should decrease in salience as the costs of tolerating outsider threats increase. The more that elites collectively must lose (such as their lives), the less likely it is that their differences matter. As Slater and Smith (2016, 1483) aptly point out,

efforts at counterrevolution "must unify elites to prevail." As such, we should expect a preference *against* factionalism and for unity to emerge within the coalition, which can serve to check against the predations of a would-be personalist. Incentives to collectively punish a leader who attempts to overextend their influence increase. The prevalence of "reshuffling coups" during collegial military rule often reflects this dynamic (e.g., Kim and Kroeger 2018; Sudduth and Kim 2021). As Kim and Sudduth (2021, 1599) write, junta members here often "seek to oust opportunistic leaders while maintaining (…) their own power."

Conclusion

Numerous commentaries treat civilian support as an abnormality in the resurgence of military takeovers (e.g., Rivero 2023; Aina 2022). While intuitively puzzling, this line of questioning misrepresents the complex politics at the heart of military coups. Soldiers do not have a monopoly over the use of coups as a political tactic nor are they the only actors with the ability to significantly shape their aftermaths. Civilians play a vital, if not understudied, role in coup politics–from their instigation to their consolidation. As I have argued here, they can even influence a coup's long-term consequences by shaping important features in the emergent regime.

The framework laid out here and in Ben Hammou (2023) offers several avenues for future research on post-coup politics. First, how does the participation of different types of civilians influence international responses to coups? Are international and regional actors more likely to condemn coups sponsored by civilian elites, but more likely to sympathize with coups ostensibly shrouded in "people power"? Second, under what conditions can civilian involvement promote post-coup democratization? My argument lays out staunchly authoritarian pathways but does not address the conditions for democratic transitions. Future research can incorporate other factors beyond civilian identities and power to explore when democratization is possible, if at all. Third, what are the distinct triggers that prompt civilian elites to instigate coups vs. marginalized civilians to consolidate coups? Current research suggests that these distinct actors undertake these actions

as a function of their own resources, but what are the distinct conditions that prompt their involvement in the first place? Fourth, how have civilian strategies to shore up post-coup regimes changed over time? While the civilianizing feature of military regimes has been discussed (e.g., Be'eri 1982), recent scholarship suggests that coupists can use elections to shore up their power (Elischer and Hoyle 2023). More attention to the civilian proxies in these context is needed.

Notes

[1] I use civilian praetorianism interchangeably with civilian coup involvement/participation.

[2] Praetorianism here follows Perlmutter's (1969, 383) conceptualization as a condition in which "the military intervenes and potentially could dominate the political system."

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COUP-PROOFING IN THE AFTERMATH OF COUPS D'ÉTAT

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Leaders adopt a wide array of tactics to "coup-proof" their regimes. Some counterbalance the regular military with presidential guards, militarized police, or other security forces (Horowitz 1985; Quinlivan 1999; Belkin and Schofer 2003; De Bruin 2018, 2020). Others seek to "stack" the military with co-ethics or sectarians (Harkness 2018, 2022; Roessler 2016; Allen 2020; Allen and Brooks 2023) or purge it of regime opponents (Sudduth 2017; Boutton 2019; Goldring and Matthews 2023). Indoctrination, bribery, the frequent rotation of commands, or starving the military of resources may also be among the strategies used (Farcau 1994; Belkin 2005). Alternatively, civilian elites might strike a "grand bargain" that accommodates military leaders' desires (Brooks and White 2023).

Whatever form it takes, the central aim of coup-proofing is straightforward: to help rulers remain in power. Some tactics of coup-proofing do this by alleviating military grievances, others by making coups d'état more difficult to carry out successfully. Coups remain the most common way autocrats leave office (Svolik 2008; Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza 2009). And existing scholarship concludes that, in important respects, coup-proofing works to keep rulers in power (e.g. Powell 2012; Rwengabo 2013; Böhmelt and Pilster 2015; Albrecht 2015; Easton and Silvers 2018; Harkness 2018; De Bruin 2018, 2020), even as it may hinder military effectiveness (Talmadge 2015; Brooks 1998; Bausch 2018) and create incentives for repression (Greitens 2016).

But as my own work shows, coup-proofing can also shape the political trajectories of states following a coup, increasing the likelihood the coup results in more sustained violence. It may also affect post-coup democratization in more nuanced ways. At the same time, coup attempts affect the ability of rulers to impose their own coup-proofing efforts without a provoking a backlash from the militaries. In what follows, I discuss what we know about the consequences of coups for coup-proofing, as well as how coup-proofing affects the political aftermath of coups.

FAILED COUPS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO COUP-PROOF

The central challenge for leaders seeking to coup-proof their regimes is that efforts to do so can provoke the very coups they were intended to prevent. Coup-proofing infringes upon the institutional interests of the military, particularly where it erects barriers to intervention that officers anticipate will reduce their capacity to stage a coup in the future (Needler 1975; Horowitz 1985). As a result, coup-proof measures can "prompt the elites to launch a countercoup to replace the leaders before losing their abilities to conduct a coup" (Sudduth 2017, 1769).

In *How to Prevent Coups d'État*, I explore the challenges several leaders faced in attempting to counterbalance their militaries. Take the case of Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah. In the 1960s, he took several steps to coup-proof his regime, including transforming what had been a largely ceremonial presidential guard unit into a formidable counterweight. As one of the coup-plotters who eventually ousted Nkrumah's from power put it, "Nkrumah was building a militia. Who can tolerate that?" (quoted in Nkrumah 1968, 47). Likewise, in Mali, President Modibo Keita sought to establish a civil militia as a counterweight, an effort that resulted in a military coup to disband it (De Bruin 2020). Indeed, the hostility of the military to counterbalancing was the reason that some early scholars of coup-proofing suggested that it might only be possible following cata-

strophic events that completely upends a state's military (Farcau 1994; Frazer 1994).

However, failed coups also present an important opportunity to institute new coup-proofing practices. This is because, as Sudduth (2017, 1770) describes, "immediately after a new dictator comes to power via coup, the number of elites who would be willing to challenge the new dictator via coup becomes temporarily small." As a result, in the aftermath of a failed coup, leaders frequently purge from the government members of the group that staged the coup. In Ghana, for example, following two failed coups in the mid-1970s, the surviving regime "immediately embarked on their project of bloody house cleaning. Executions, trials, asset seizures, long prison sentences, and public whippings were doled out with gusto" (Harkness 2018, 164).

COUP-PROOFING AND POST-COUP VIOLENCE

Once in place, coup-proofing measures can increase the likelihood of post-coup violence in several ways. In *How to Prevent Coups d'É-tat*, I show that counterbalancing can increase the risk that coup attempts escalate to civil wars. A coup is understood to escalate into a civil war when its participants broaden to include non-state actors, and it results in significant amount of violence. For coups to escalate to civil war, armed resistance is required. Where rulers counterbalance the military with other security forces, such resistance is more likely to materialize. This is because independent forces develop distinct institutional interests that may not be served by a coup initiated by another force. Moreover, while soldiers within the regular military may prioritize avoiding intra-military violence that might damage morale or cohesion, these concerns may be less pressing for soldiers in other forces (De Bruin 2020).

The violence that broke out in Sudan in April 2023 illustrates this dynamic well. Since a coup in 2019, Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary a counterweight, has shared power with the regular military. But the transition to civilian governance the military pursued called for the RSF to be integrated into the regular military, a move that would result in the force eventually being disbanded. In April 2023, the RSF launched a coordinated

attack against the presidential palace, army headquarters, airport, and state-run TV station to forestall the transition (Taub 2023). The army resisted, and the violence spiraled into a broader conflict in which more than one million people have been displaced (IOM 2023).

In some cases, efforts to institute new coup-proofing tactics (or undo those of the previous regime) can also facilitate rebellion in the aftermath of successful coups. Groups recently purged from the government have greater capacity to mobilize against it. As a result, coup-proofing can substitute the risk of a coup for that of civil war (…)

Second, where coups succeed in removing leaders from power, counterbalancing can also provide a "ready-made" rebel army that helps them challenge the new, coup-installed regime (De Bruin 2020). In Yemen, for instance, Imam Muhammad al-Badr was ousted from power in a 1962 coup. While coup plotters initially claimed that al-Badr had been killed during the coup, he managed to escape. When al-Badr resurfaced in northwestern Yemen several weeks after the coup, he announced his intent to wage war on the new regime. The tribal militias al-Badr and his predecessor relied on as counterweights regrouped and formed the core of his rebel army (De Bruin 2020, 125-130; also see Corstange 2007; O'Balance 1971).

In some cases, efforts to institute new coup-proofing tactics (or undo those of the previous regime) can also facilitate rebellion in the aftermath of *successful* coups. Groups recently purged from the government have greater capacity to mobilize against it. As a result, coup-proofing can substitute the risk of a coup for that of civil war (Roessler 2016; Powell 2015, 2019). Take the example of rebel formation following the ouster of Idi Amin from power in Uganda. Amin had stacked his military with co-ethnics (Brett 1995). When he

was overthrown in a 1979 coup, the new, coup-installed regime dismissed members of his ethnically-stacked military who went on to form rebel groups including the *Kikosi Maalum*, Former Ugandan National Army, and Holy Spirit Movement (Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020).[1]

RETURNING TO THE BARRACKS? COUP-PROOFING AND POST-COUP DEMOCRATIZATION

The form of coup-proofing a regime adopts can also influence whether a coup that overthrows it ends up serving as a catalyst for democratization or brings another autocratic regime to power. Scholars have long debated the extent to which coups might be "good for democracy." Some studies have found that coups increase the likelihood of transitions to democracy (e.g., Thyne and Powell 2016; Miller 2016); others have concluded that the most common outcomes is further autocracy (e.g., Derpanopoulos et al. 2016, 2017). More recent work has emphasized that the effect of coups may be conditional on their context. Dahl and Gleditsch (2023), for example, find that coups occurring within four years of popular mobilizations have a positive effect on change in the country's Polity score.

Yet the effect of coups that occur during mass mobilizations may in turn depend on the form or extent of coup-proofing the prior regime has in place. Where civilian elites have struck a grand bargain with the military (Brooks and White 2023), consolidating their political-military relations, coups that oust long-serving dictators in the context of mass protest tend to be conservative ones. Undertaken by senior officers, such coups are intended to ensure the interests of the armed forces are protected through political transition. For this reason, they are more likely to result in political instability and subsequent autocratization that usher in transitions to democracy (Koehler and Albrecht 2021). In contrast, counterbalanced and/or ethnically stacked security forces may face a worse post-transition fate (Paine 2022), and thus be less able to steer post-coup politics.

CONCLUSIONS

While coups are not as common as they once were, there has been a resurgence in recent

years, with more than a dozen coup attempts globally since 2020. It is thus perhaps no surprise that leaders continue to attempt to coup-proof their regimes. Yet as this essay has argued, the tactics rulers adopt to prevent coups can impact the political trajectories of their countries long after their regimes end. This suggest an important concern for future research should be understanding the how coup-proofing can be dismantled without provoking futher violence.

Notes

[1]Outside of the contexts of coups, McLauchlin (2023) has also shown that better coup-proofed regimes are more likely to face "army-splinter rebellions" as the challenges of staging a coup against a coup-proofed regime means that disgruntled soldiers turn to alternate means to address their grievances.

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WHY THERE WAS NO MILITARY COUP IN THE U.S. IN 2020 (AND WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN INSTEAD IN 2024)

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In 2020, after Donald Trump lost the presidential election to Joe Biden, a debate emerged among scholars about whether his efforts to overturn the outcome amounted to a coup (De Bruin 2021). Much of this focused on the events of January 6, when Trump's supporters stormed the Capitol in an effort to suspend the certification of the election. Many scholars agreed that Trump's tactics in encouraging his supporters perhaps constituted an *autogolpe* (an executive seizure of power), or backing of an insurrection (Pion-Berlin, Bruneau, and Goetze 2022). Yet, most experts argued against the idea that there had been a classic coup attempt, involving the military removing a political leader and installing another in its place.

We argue that while this view is accurate, it is also incomplete. It neglects the signaling that the US military did in advance of the election and its concerted efforts to set the agenda and convey its opposition to being pulled into any electoral dispute. Retired senior officers, former Secretaries of Defense, commentators with ties to the US military and even the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, repeatedly stated that the military should (and by implication, would) have no role in adjudicating any election outcome. Hence, by the time that advisors within Trump's close circle proposed to use the military in some capacity to challenge the election in the weeks following his loss, such as in a declaration of martial law or to confiscate ballot boxes, it was clear where the military leadership stood. In short, while there was no coup involving the military, that does not mean that the military played no role in the dispute. To the contrary, its efforts to anticipate that it might be called upon in such a moment may have preempted any such coup attempt.

The fact that there was no overt coup plot involving the military is important, and scholars are right to highlight that point. Nevertheless, the events of 2020 underscore a broader methodological point relevant to the study of coups and, more practically, to understanding the US case. Focusing on actual evidence of plotting neglects the coups that are contemplated, or might be seen as potential options, but not attempted because a potential perpetrator judges that military support is lacking. Studying negative cases, of the kind observed in 2020, can help address a selection effect in the strategic interaction around coup attempts, as well as illuminate the significance and mechanics of military signaling about its leaders' preferences. By making its stance clear before a plot is contemplated, the military can condition civilians' expectations about military cooperation–and therefore whether they attempt a coup or not in the first place. In other words, coups may fail long before a manifest plot is observed.

The tactics that Milley used help illuminate this conceptual point, as well as shed light on what precisely happened in 2020. They also have important implications for understanding the past and future of any effort by politicians–principally Trump and his allies–to encourage the military to act in support of anti-democratic actions. They tell us something important about why a coup involving the military did not happen in 2020 and what might happen in the case that Trump loses a bid for the presidential election in 2024.

The military's distancing in the 2020 election and its aftermath

While most people focus on the events of January 6, the military's efforts to distance itself from being pulled into domestic political disputes, and possible involvement in the 2020 election, began long before that and were led by General Milley. His role is notable given that as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Milley is the public figurehead of the US military (although the chairman is not in the operational chain of command, the person in that role is designated as the president's top military advisor). One notable moment in the distancing effort occurred on June 1, 2020, when Milley walked in uniform with Donald Trump across Lafayette Square in front of the White House, after Park Police had forcibly cleared social justice protesters. On June 11, Milley publicly apologized for his presence, and said he should not have been there because it created an undue impression that the military had a role in partisan politics. In so doing, he set baseline expectations about his willingness to have himself and the military politicized for this purpose.

In turn, according to journalists who interviewed Milley, following these events, he became more concerned that the military might be drawn in to the presidential 2020 election (Baker and Glasser 2022, 468–69, 566–67). Thereafter, Milley issued repeated statements that the armed forces would play no role in the election, including in response to questions from members of Congress (Browne 2020; Silva 2020). As he put it in August 2020, nearly three months before the election, "The Constitution and laws of the US and the states establish procedures for carrying out elections, and for resolving disputes over the outcome of elections (…) I do not see the US military as part of this process," In addition, Milley added, "In the event of a dispute over some aspect of the elections, by law US courts and the US Congress are required to resolve any disputes, not the US Military" (Browne 2020). Similar sentiments were repeated as election day approached (Ryan 2020).

Other military-connected actors intervened along similar lines. Notably, all 10 living former Secretaries of Defense, from Donald Rumsfeld to Mark Esper, warned on January 3, 2021 of the dangers of further contestation of the election results (Carter et al. 2021). Some observers interpreted the statement as a sign that the former Secretaries of Defense were concerned that the military could be drawn into a dispute over the election (Lamothe 2021). Following the events of January 6, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a Memorandum for the Joint Force. This memo condemned the riot; reminded service members of their role in defending the Constitution; and affirmed that President-Elect Biden would be inaugurated on January 20 (Milley et al. 2021).

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These fears of instrumentalizing the military were well founded. Alongside their other efforts to overturn the election (such as lawsuits, challenges to legitimate electors, and pressure on civilian officials), Trump's advisors proposed several measures that would involve the armed forces in challenging the election outcome. Retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn publicly floated the idea of imposing martial law. He and Trump lawyer Sidney Powell advocated ordering the armed forces to seize disputed voting machines and ballot boxes (Baker and Glasser 2022, 574, 586), a move that not only would have directly interfered with the election, but would also have signaled military complicity in that effort. Finally, according to Mark Milley (as reported to Baker and Glasser), on January 2, 2021, Trump apparently had a meeting with Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller in which the President asked Miller for a military presence to protect the protestors mobilizing for January 6. The Guard did not deploy

(Baker and Glasser 2022, 599).

Two counterfactuals

Without access to behind-the-scenes deliberations, it is hard to know how Trump and his advisors interpreted the military's distancing statements. There are nonetheless intriguing clues that the signaling might have mattered in Trump's assessment of military backing for election interference. In a statement in July 2021, responding to a report about Milley's fears of a coup in 2020 and early 2021, Trump denied accusations that he had contemplated a coup in January 2021, adding that "If I was going to do a coup, one of the last people I would want to do it with is General Mark Milley." Trump further declared that Milley's apology for the Lafayette Square photo-op had made a difference: "I saw at that moment he had no courage or skill, certainly not the type of person I would be talking 'coup' with (…) I'm not into coups!" (Breuninger 2021).

While Trump said he was not "into coups" this may well have been a self-serving statement, reflecting the fact that there were not willing offers on the table. In order to see how events could have evolved differently, and to see the potential importance of the military's signaling, it is helpful to consider two counterfactuals.

The first pertains to what might have happened if the military had not tried to overtly distance itself from potential involvement and remained quiet instead. Such passivity would have provided less information, and therefore less certainty, about how the military leadership might act if asked to participate in some unconstitutional action, let alone maintain Trump in office by preventing Biden from assuming it. We know from accounts of events that transpired in the post-election period that Trump was willing to take extreme actions to maintain himself in office. These included allegedly trying to get the Secretary of State in Georgia to manipulate the counting of ballots, attempting to convince civilian officials to refuse to certify the Electoral College results, and calling for a "wild" rally on January 6 to increase the pressure to that effect (Fausset and Hakim 2023; Hammond et al. n.d.). We also know that Trump had no qualms about trying to install civilian officials with close personal ties and

little experience on the civilian side of the Department of Defense (Feldscher 2020). While there is no evidence that these particular individuals pursued election interference, the actions demonstrate that Trump was perfectly willing to politicize the military for his own self-interested purposes, including obstructing the transition period to the Biden administration.

Hence, had the military not actively distanced itself from a role in an election dispute, there would have been more uncertainty about what military leaders might be willing to do if called upon to take unconstitutional action, along the lines of that proposed by his advisors, or worse. In other words, it is plausible that had the military not distanced itself, there is no reason to think that Trump would have had any moral or ethical compunction preventing him from using the military to abet his effort to overturn the election.

Even more compelling is the second counterfactual, in which the military might have signaled not opposition, but support–even very ambiguous support–for carrying out some kind of unconstitutional action. To be clear, this is not what happened, but it is nonetheless useful to consider the hypothetical in order to see how the military's distancing actions might have shaped Trump's options. Imagine, for example, that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs had said nothing about military non-involvement in the election, and had not apologized for his appearance alongside Trump at Lafayette Square. Imagine further that, at some politically sensitive moment, he had declared that the armed forces would carry out any lawful order issued by his Commander-in-Chief and that they were firmly beholden to civilian control. This seemingly anodyne statement of principle–a principle that democratic militaries typically do and should uphold–would have taken on another meaning in the electoral crisis of 2020 and early 2021. Worse, had a Chairman been in place who was willing to issue a political statement of some kind–even an equivocation along the lines of "I don't know who won the presidential election"–it would not have been hard to imagine Trump seizing on this as an opportunity. There is no evidence to suggest that Trump would have had any reservations against following through on his advisors' suggestions or pursuing some alternative

scheme. Perhaps Trump would have more seriously entertained suggestions that the military be used in some capacity to maintain him in office.

In either of these scenarios, military leaders would likely have refused any orders that Trump issued that blatantly interfered in the election in some capacity, because the commitment to support and defend the Constitution is a deeply held value. To be sure, the outcome of more ambiguous, "lawful but awful" orders that were anti-democratic in spirit but appeared to be legal, such as a domestic deployment under the Insurrection Act, might have been less clear (see Hodges 2022). Our central point, nevertheless, is that the overt distancing the military did prior to the election rendered it less likely that Trump would even propose either thing.

IMPLICATIONS FOR POTENTIAL MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN 2024

What implications does this have for the prospect of military involvement on Trump's behalf in the event of a failed election bid by him in 2024?

First, there is no evidence that the U.S. military's current senior leadership would participate in any unconstitutional action. The fact that Trump is not currently in office makes this even more unlikely, as the military leadership submits to the current commander in chief, President Joseph Biden (this would continue in the event Biden won reelection). Trump as the challenger in a failed election bid would have no status to issue orders to the military. Even so, the senior military leadership will need to continue to signal their commitment to support and defend the Constitution and ensure that their position remains clear.

This is because there are still serious risks, even if Trump is not in position to issue unconstitutional orders. Since he first came to office, there has been a concerted effort by Trump and his allies to politicize the military and even to undermine the legitimacy of the senior officer corps. They have singled out general and flag officers for criticism up to and including characterizing Milley as treasonous and worthy of a death penalty, while praising the enlisted ranks as the country's true patriots. In addition, many Republican

politicians who support Trump they have implicated the senior military officers as agents in some alleged ideological campaign to spread, as they put it, "wokeness" in the US military (Brooks 2022; 2023; Milonopoulos 2023).

These tactics pose various risks that could have some impact in 2024 or beyond. First, they are potentially corrosive to trust in the chain of command and to unit cohesion, and could lead to incidents of breakdowns in good order and discipline within the ranks. Purely on demographic grounds, given that military personnel reflect ideological cleavages in society, there is likely a sizable number of military personnel who support Trump and may be receptive to his messages. Even if some military personnel are sympathetic to his election denialism and other falsehoods, nevertheless, there has been no sign heretofore that military personnel are willing to buck their chain of command, conspire to support him, or otherwise participate in anti-democratic action. But if Trump calculates that his tactics to divide and politicize the military are working, he may have greater incentive to try elicit support within the military for these purposes in 2024.

Accordingly, while the possibility that miliary personnel would try to abet Trump in some kind of coup-like armed takeover of government remains unlikely, a more worrisome possibility is that he could appeal to "patriotic" officers to "stop the steal." There could well be some in the military who break ranks and speak out in support of Trump in 2024 in the event he loses the election–or, worse, support the extremist armed groups that have actively sought to recruit military personnel. The risks would increase in the event that National Guard troops were deployed to help police mass protests following a fractious election. Tensions would be especially high, and protests likely intense and even potentially violent, in the event that an election outcome was very close in one or more states, and the electoral votes of those states proved pivotal to determining the election outcome.

In short, the odds of a classic coup attempt in 2024 remain small. However, Trump has set the table for significant trouble within the armed forces in this election. Military leader-

ship would do well to solidify the norms and rules against any participation in unconstitutional action.

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DISSERTATION SPOTLIGHT

THE ORIGINS OF NATIONALIST CONSTITUENCIES:
THE INTERESTS THAT MOBILIZED THE PASSIONS
By Lotem Halevy[1]

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In 2013, Peter Mair spoke of the democratic deficit in parliamentary politics today as politicians struggle to "rule the void" of unattached voters. In this piece, I go back in time to a period of mass disenfranchisement–a historical void in politics, to see what we can learn about how political parties formed constituencies in mass society. How did everyday people start associating with political parties?

During democratization, incumbent political parties struggled with "ruling the void" of a diverse and changing society, but some emergent parties managed to carve out constituencies in civil society.[2] Unlike the democratic constituencies in much of Western Europe, which largely fail to represent the democratizing experiences of much of the religiously, ethnically, and nationally diverse world, I travel to democratizing Hungary (1867-1914), to understand how parties filled the void of politics with *nationalist* politics. When the state does not provide for its people, sectarian parties rise from civil society to fill the gap.

How do sectarian parties succeed? I propose a process inspired by historical events, which highlights how new parties form constituencies with widespread disenfranchisement. History is not a crystal ball which reveals the future, but we can learn from the past to try and unpack our future.[3]

IN A NUTSHELL

In the period before free and fair elections, parties with restricted access to parliaments formed linkages with unattached people in the Kingdom of Hungary. While civil society was less developed in Hungary than its Western neighbor, Austria, voluntary associations were opening rapidly. Between 1862 and 1878 the number of associations registered with the state increased from 579 to 3995 (Mannová 2006, 64).[4] I show how

non-state actors, in this case emergent political parties, cultivated constituencies through the construction of voluntary associations in civil society.

In an era of low provision of social services and goods by the state, some associations provided necessary services to the disenfranchised populace. Parties from across the ideological spectrum cemented themselves into civil society, but civil society was itself fragmented. Through *de jure* and *de facto* restrictions on access to associations based on socio-economic and national identity, requisites defined access to civil organizations. Nationalist leaders had access to a group of dependent everyday people who regularly visited a physical location and were easily mobilized out of need for necessary goods and services (Cammett 2014, 59).[5]

HOW ASSOCIATIONS FORM LINKAGES

Civil associations transmit social, political and cultural norms, which can mobilize everyday people into politics, and often affect the nature of the emergent state (e.g. Berman 1997; Butugli 2022; Charnysh and Peisakhin 2022; Lankina 2021; Jamal 2009; Varshney 2003). But the first stage underlying the transmission-of-norms-process, assumes that linkages, networks, or brick-and-mortar associations exist in the first place to foster and facilitate the transmission of these values.

In Making Democracy Work (1994), Putnam excluded Italian clientelistic associations when explaining why democracy in Northern Italy is more robust than in Southern Italy. In her corresponding study about the "dark side" of social capital, where associational density does not lead to the proliferation of democratic norms, Jamal (2009) focuses on clientelistic associations. She shows that the *context* where linkages and social capital

are cultivated matters for the development of interpersonal trust among individuals (or a lack thereof), which in turn affects support for democratic institutions.

But ties between emergent political organizations form without widespread electoral participation. This severely limits the explanatory power of the social capital hypotheses tested against the backdrop of elections (though not necessarily free and fair), as well as theories of vote-seeking parties in ethnically diverse patronage democracies (Chandra 2004; Huber and Suryanarayan 2015; Thachil 2014).

This is where I turn to the social policy literature. Across regions and regimes, there is widespread consensus that the state is not the sole provider of social services throughout history and in the contemporary period (e.g. Cammett 2015; Cammett and MacLean 2014; Post et al. 2017; Tsai 2007; Ansell and Lindvall 2021). Here, but more thoroughly in my dissertation, I argue that emergent parties' provision of goods and services *through meso-level associations* created organized constituencies from previously disorganized mass society. Linkages form from a need that is fulfilled by an emergent political party or movement. The aggregation of individual linkages creates constituencies and these constituencies can be mobilized through the transmission of social norms.

Associations in civil society can provide social services such as employment protections, childcare, food, and shelter. Many of these service-providing associations are affiliated with emergent political parties and social movements (Cammett and MacLean 2014).[6] But in the multinational state of Hungary, and many religiously and ethnically diverse states today, access to associations, and therefore services, was reserved for members of the religious or national ingroup.[7] This meant that the provision of services created and defined constituencies according to national and/or religious identity.

Civil associations transmitted norms and cultivated social capital among groups that ultimately became constituencies, but first, they served a functional purpose for the disenfranchised populace.

Europe was ruled by nationalist leaders before and after the institution of free and fair elections. These leaders evoked a strong sense of an exclusive national identity based on religious, ethnic, or racial principles, claiming to protect their territory from perceived threats to "the nation." When parties can point to their history of nation-building they receive an electoral boost following the democratization (Grzymala-Busse 2011, 330). My argument is that social-service provision is part of the nation-building process, a part that creates interest-based constituencies which are later easily mobilized through exclusionary nationalist appeals.

Nationalist leaders, as Wimmer writes, believe that "members of the nation, understood as a group of equal citizens with a shared history and future political destiny, should rule the state, and (…) they should do so in the interests of the nation" (2019, 27). Nationalist constituencies are therefore mobilized to protect the national ingroup. This happens during elections but also in their absence. Once mobilized out of need (interest) into politics, nationally defined constituencies can easily turn nationalist social divisions (passions) into political divisions.[8]

WELFARE ACTIVISM IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE FORMATION OF IDENTITY-BASED CONSTITUENCIES

The most powerful constituencies are those that, once mobilized, are sufficiently large to influence policy. But, unlike policies, constituencies are created from everyday people. In the period before mass enfranchisement, the average person was poor and disenfranchised from the state and any of the minimal services it provided.

Early welfare in Central Europe largely depended on how the central government sought to manage the many nationalities residing in the region. After the Compromise of 1867, which created the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, the federal-like arrangement in Austria gave German and Czech nationalist movements relative freedom to improve the well-being of the nation through a series of initiatives (Zahra 2006, 1381). The nationally segregated social welfare system spread through the Bohemian and Moravian lands in the Austrian half of the Empire, gradually becoming an explicit model for a "separate but equal" welfare system for the German and Czech populations.

While the emergent Austrian federal state was structured in a way that gave peripheral governments and authorities purposeful freedom in establishing systems of care, the Eastern half of the Empire–the Kingdom of Hungary, took a more liberal approach to welfare (Neumann 2003, 866).

The Kingdom was nationally divided without a majority group.[9] Hungarian parliamentary elites worked on one hand to suppress the Slovak, Serbian, Romanian and Ruthenian nationalist movements mainly through rule-of-law,[10] but on the other hand, limited provision of short-term relief to the most vulnerable people in Hungary meant that even the ingroup was not cared for by the state.[11] The individualist attitude towards welfare in the emergent Hungarian during the Dualist period (1867-1914), created a window of opportunity for social movements to establish their own institutions in place of state-run welfare associations. Examples include: the Serbian Industrialists' Association (*Szerb Iparosok Művelődési Egylete*), the National Union of Catholic Young Craftsmen and Workers (*Keresztény Ifjak Országos Egyesülete*), the Aid Association for Sick Hungarian Craftsmen (*Magyar Iparosok Betegsegélyező Egyesülete*), and the Slovenska Jednota–the first chain of credit unions in Europe which opened in 1845 in Upper Hungary to support Slovak innovation and spread throughout Slovak enclaves across the rest of Hungary.

Like much of Europe, social care remained the responsibility of religious institutions until the 19th century (e.g. Ansell and Lindvall 2021; Esping-Andersen 1989; Morgan 2006; Van Kersbergen and Manow 2009; van Molle 2017). In Hungary, provision increased over the turn of the century but remained fragmented across national groups, with religious institutions and charitable societies shouldering most of the care for the mostly rural and poor Hungarian ingroup (Kušniráková 2017, 850). Similarly, economic protections for workers and their families came from civil associations, many with a religious or national affiliation. Throughout democratization, non-state organizations remained the main providers of social services and benefits to the average Hungarian agricultural and industrial worker.

Figure 1, Associations Opened in the Kingdom of Hungary 1880-1910, by Religious Affiliation: raw scatterplot for the number of associations opened in the Kingdom of Hungary (1880-1910), overlayed with a line of best fit that tracks the relationship over time. Data digitized from Pór (1988). Religious categories do not necessarily mean that goods and services were exclusive to the members of the ingroup, but rather the figure breaks down the growth of Hungarian associational life by religious subgroup.

TYPES OF ASSOCIATIONS

To be expected of Europe during this period, and especially after the Rerum Novarum issued in 1891, most associations had some sort of religious affiliation. Some of the associations, mainly those constructed during the interwar period, such as the National Corps of Catholic Agrarian Youth Associations (*Katolikus Agrárifjúsági Legényegyesületek Országos Testülete, KALOT,* 1935-1946), were multi-denominational, yet they were decisively designed to cater to the needs of Christian Hungarians living in the rural countryside.[12] During its time, the chain grew to include over 3,000 associations and aimed to create a better-educated peasant youth in order to raise the living standards of the rural poor (Farkas 1988, 298 quoted in Wittenberg 2006, 79). KALOT and its sister organization, the Association of Catholic Women and Girls (*KALÁSZ, Katolikus Leánykörök Szövetsége,*

1935-1946) as well as its predecessor the National Association of Christian Youth (*KIOE, Katolikus Iparos és Munkásifjak Országos Egyesülete,* 1923-1946), organized various programs and initiatives for young men living in rural Hungary starting as early as 1935, including vocational workshops, and community-building events.[13] The associations, through the Catholic Church, established co-operative societies to help young men access affordable credit and other resources necessary for agricultural production.

While the KALOT associations were not directly affiliated with a political party during the interwar period, other associations including their predecessor KIOE, were. For example, railway workers' families received the earliest form of insurance for fatal workplace accidents from the National Economic Association of Hungarian Christian Socialist Railway Workers (*Magyar Keresztény Szocial-*

ista Vasutasok Országos Gazdasági Egyesülete), which was associated with the emergent People's (Christian Socialist) Party (*Katolikus Néppárt,* 1894-1918). The association provided free legal aid to members, arranged vocational exercises for members and gave members' children free study and group family vacations to the Lake Balaton district in Hungary. Further, the Christian Socialist Party had People's libraries, women's circles, and farmer's cooperatives across the Kingdom during the Dualist period, while Serbs, Slovaks and Jews created a duplicated system of provision with beautification associations (for Jews Chevre Kadisha associations), libraries, Sunday schools, youth groups, hospitals, and sick funds, as well as credit unions and worker organizations.[14]

In the figure below, we can see the associational growth in the Kingdom of Hungary by religious denomination. Figure 1 tracks the

Figure 2, Associations Opened in the Kingdom of Hungary 1880-1910, by Political Party Family: raw data scatterplot for the yearly trend of associations opened in the Kingdom of Hungary (1880-1910), overlayed with a line of best fit that tracks the relationship over time. Data digitized from Pór (1988). Note that the count on the y-axis is different for every plot.

number of new associations (the Y-axis) opened in each year by religious affiliation. Please note that the Y-axis is different for every panel.

The data are from a newly digitized directory of all known voluntary associations in Greater Hungary constructed from 1848 to 1945 (N=18,488).[15] The directory was compiled by the Hungarian Cultural Institute under Edit Pór in 1988. The directory includes reading circles, child welfare associations (kindergartens), women's circles, smallholder cooperatives, working men's and women's clubs (by national and religious denomination), singing circles, youth groups (by gender, religion and nationality), professional circles (for teachers, doctors, and lawyers), trade union associations (by gender, religion, and nationality), casinos, and language circles. The directory lists the year the association was founded in the village (*falu*). Physical addresses are not provided, and neither are dates of closure. Therefore, I do not calculate

the cumulative count of associations in this descriptive analysis to avoid any assumptions about how long associations stayed open during the 19th and early 20th centuries. After the collapse of the Empire, the Kingdom of Hungary split into several new emergent states which include parts of contemporary Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine, Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Croatia.

But the process which creates the initial incentive for constituencies to form so that leaders can politicize and later mobilize everyday people, is more than presence. Instead, the provision of public goods and services by meso-level associations increases the probability that mobilization *can* occur. During a period of mass disenfranchisement from the state, rising political parties infiltrated civil society with ideas and norms but *first* they created groups of people incentivized to participate in civil society through initial engagement with civil associations.

CONSTITUENCY FORMATION:
SERVICE-BASED MOBILIZATION
AND FRAGMENTED ACCESS

For brevity, in the descriptive analysis below I link an association to at most one political party. I relax this assumption in other work. Often a party affiliation is identified from the name of the association. For example, the Matica Slovenská (Slovak Foundation) was affiliated with the Slovak National Party (*Slovenská Národná Strana*, 1871-1938).

But in most cases, associations bore names without a clear connection to their party or social movements. I searched the digital archives of the National Hungarian Archives and several other archival databases for Hungarian newspapers from the time for mention of associations in party materials.[16] Party newspapers mentioned associations where party leaders spoke, in some instances, donations from transnational communities and donors were celebrated in newspapers, and

Figure 3, Associations Opened in the Kingdom of Hungary 1880-1910, by Service Provision: The two-sample t-test confirms that we can reject the null and confirms there is a significant difference between the means of the two distributions ($\mu 1$= 24.39 $\mu 2$=21.20; t=16.98, p<0.001). Line of best fit plotted with 95 percent confidence intervals. Additionally, the lines are statistically different from one another (p<0.001). One-sided p-value reported.

services such as sick funds, hospitals, and orphanages were most often the direct result of these donations.

While a total of 2,834 associations are affiliated with a political party, no link could be made for the majority of the sample. This means that most associations were not affiliated with a political party, although that does not mean they were necessarily apolitical. Figure 2 shows which parties opened associations during the democratizing period. Please note that the range of the Y-axis is different across the four panels. From Figure 2, we can see that parliamentary parties are less active at constructing civil associations compared to their extra-parliamentary counterparts.

The rate of openings was also not the same across parties. Notably, associations affiliated with the Catholic parties open throughout the time-series. Figure 2 plots the total number of associations and does not differentiate between associations that provided services and those that did not.

Coding services: I code the primary func-tion of each association using a dummy variable: was the association delivering services or goods? Reading circles, choirs, casinos, cultural, and student/alumni associations are coded as zeros (0). Meanwhile, associations such as food canteens, aid societies, burial societies, agricultural cooperatives and credit unions, associations meant for the training of craft and industrial workers, libraries, language teaching circles, and child welfare associations, are coded as ones (1). I only consider the provision of club goods, those goods and services that are excludable.

In Figure 3, we see that as time goes on, more associations in civil society open to provide social services. This marks the emergence of the welfare state by non-state actors in Hungary. After the collapse of the Empire and the passing of the Treaty of Trianon, which saw Hungary lose two-thirds of its population and land, many of the movements and parties that provided social services during the democratizing period entered parliaments. The provision of goods and services by emergent parties provides a partial explanation for why the dominant parties of the old regime were fully replaced in the interwar period with the parties which rose to fill the void during the Dualist period. During democratization, extra-parliamentary parties created constituencies by fulfilling the needs of everyday people who were disenfranchised from the state.

CONCLUSION

The historical development of the Hungarian welfare state by *non-state actors*–parties who rose to represent the *needs* of the disenfranchised populace–speaks to the interplay between political, social, and religious factors shaping the provision of social services in diverse states. The process highlighted above shines a light on the mixed results of small-N and large-N studies that contradictorily finds that a mobilized civil society can be both good and bad for democracy (Berman 1997; Bernhard et al. 2020; Ekiert and Kubik 2001; Riley (2010) 2019). *How* constituencies form determines which, if any, bad actors can infiltrate their ranks (Chambers and Kopstein 2001).

The case of Hungary demonstrates the dou-

bled-edged sword of the emergent welfare state. The void left by the state led to the fragmentation of social care financing and delivery, and made it easy for emergent parties to mobilize, by providing for the needs and interests of everyday people disenfranchised from the state. Emergent parties created constituencies ripe for nationalist mobilization. This mobilization, in turn, influenced the development of the Hungarian inter-war state, and party system.

Many countries across the world experienced a rise in nationalist politics in the 21st century: Trump in the US, Orbán in Hungary, Netanyahu's far right-wing coalition in Israel, and the new dominance of the Bharatiya Janata Party across much of India. Exclusionary identity-based appeals are part of the package that helps these parties win elections and dismantle liberal democratic institutions. Yet, these appeals are only possible because parties first cultivated homogenous need-based constituencies.

Huntington (1968) argued that political parties are key to understanding the nature of political order during moments of institutional development. They allow for the steady absorption of mobilized masses which would otherwise be tempted by corruption or violence. This might be true, but political parties both construct institutions and mobilize constituencies cultivated from mass society. Parliamentary parties during moments of political change constructed political institutions, but parties barred from political power created the masses. Ideas, trust, and social capital spread through networks, but the way these networks formed, linked with governing actors, and were or were not sustained through regime change, deserves further attention.

NOTES

[2] The most successful of these parties in Western Europe would be the Social Democratic parties that emerged at the turn of the 20th century (Bartolini 2000).

[3] There is no persistence argument in this short piece. I study political processes throughout history to study how democratization interacted with ethnic and national diversity for the sake of understanding the original dynamics, not because I necessarily want to predict the future.

[4] Though there was nearly 600 percent increase in the number of associations over a 12-year period, one must interpret this statistic with caution because registration of associations during the period before the 1867 Compromise was far from complete. Unlike Austria, Hungary did not have a ban on associational life during any of this time-period.

[5] For a provocative take on how Catholic worker associations at a time of internal migration (industrialization) facilitate the rise of Catholic parties in German-speaking Switzerland, see the innovative work of Walter (2022). However, Walter's focus on decentralized federal Switzerland, which democratized in 1848, is quite different than the democratizing experience of not only Europe, but much of the world.

[6] In much of Western Europe labour and Socialist organizations filled this role as well

[7] Here I adopt a conservative view of access, where associations are either exclusive or inclusive towards members of outgroups.

[8] The politicization of everyday people and the formation of nationalist constituencies can be explained by a host of variables. The process is not monocausal.

[9] Hungarians (Magyars) represented 41.2 percent of the 15,642,102 person population. Romanians comprised 15.4 percent; Croatians and Serbians 15 percent; Germans 12.5 percent; Slovaks 11.9 percent; Ruthenians 2.3 percent. The measure for nationality in the census was mother tongue which made it hard to classify groups such as Jews, who were variably seen as part of the ingroup and assimilated into the ingroup differently dependent on denomination.

[10] The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 saw a renewal of the Magyarization campaigns of the late 1800s, and education was under attack once again by elites who were trying to assimilate minorities through language and education policy.

[11] Although interesting to the extent that any services existed, they worked to advance the interest of the nation over the individual. Most of the state-run services administer through the Hungarian state during the Dualist period were assimilative over protectionist, as they targeted education and language (Kwan 2012; Judson 2006).

[12] The ingroup Hungarians, or Magyar ingroup, were religiously diverse, divided between Calvinism and Catholicism.

[13] Critically, the first brick-and-mortar manifestation of the association was constructed in 1942, and that is unfortunately when it was first included in the source that was digitized for these analyses. The inclusion criteria used by the author of the source Edit Pór, makes it such that this is a limitation of the source and consequently of the data used in the descriptive figures above. The inclusion criteria are described in the preface to the volumes (1988, 3-12).

[14] For more on the Christian Socialist associations in what is today Slovakia and then was part of Upper Hungary including the associations political limitations and legacies see: Lorman (2019, 73-99).

[15] The data are far from even and complete. A discussion of data issues and how I deal with them is beyond the scope of this piece but can be found in the data appendix of my dissertation and will be available on my website when the digitized data are made public. To my knowledge the secondary source presents the most complete collection of voluntary associations to date that includes associations from a diverse array of religious, national, and ideological groups. The appendix of the volumes (1351-1353), highlight why and how the data were compiled by the researchers. The data exclude charity organizations which redistributed money. Almost all charity organizations were affiliated with specific religions and redistribution occurred through Churches and synagogues. The inclusion of such charities, not associations, would therefore count religious infrastructure and not civil associations. The directory does include charity organizations (affiliated with a party and otherwise) which were constructed to aid women, children and the poor which redistributed goods and services. The researchers which compiled the directory, note that they cannot discern the date that an association closed but are able discern the year

it opened (1349) and for that reason I code the year the association opened.

[16] Online archives accessed through Arcanum Digitheca, Hungaricana and The National Hungarian Archives online database. Documents pertaining to the Jewish associations in Hungary are kept in the Hungarian Jewish Museum and Archives in Budapest, since documents are not digitized, fieldwork was conducted in December 2022.

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DISSERTATION SPOTLIGHT:
A RESPONSE TO LOTEM HALEVY
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When it comes to Eastern Europe, we take for granted the primacy of nationalism as the empires that had ruled the region prior to World War I gave way to nominal nation-states in the interwar period. Lotem Halevy's "The Origins of Nationalist Constituencies: The Interests that Mobilized the Passions" offers a revealing new interpretation of how this nationalist primacy came about. Through a deep dive into the politics of Dualist Hungary, where the masses were electorally disenfranchised, she argues that the state's reluctance to provide social services to its diverse populations gave an opening to emergent sectarian (nationalist) political parties, who sought to foster mass loyalty through civil society organizations engaged in apolitical service provision. Once these constituencies were bound by common interest through an organization, Halevy argues, they became sites of exclusionary nationalist appeals. The result was the post-World War I predominance of nationalist parties in areas within the Kingdom of Hungary's former territory.

Halevy deserves credit for recognizing the importance of non-state social service provision, and with it the creation of interest-based groups, to nation-building in only minimally democratic countries such as Hungary prior to World War I. Her focus on the relationship between welfare and nation-building is uncommon in contemporary political science but does harken back to a regrettably forgotten older literature that documented, mainly through case studies of Western Europe, the way in which political parties established links with such associations and thereby created stable ideological constituencies. One of Halevy's novel contributions is her discovery and analysis of a comprehensive database of voluntary associations for the Kingdom of Hungary during the Dualist period. Among other things this allows her to distinguish between associations that provide services, and thereby create an interest-based group where successful nationalist mobilization is more likely, from other kinds of associations.

I do have one important quibble with the argument, at least the newsletter version of it, and it relates to the implications. Halevy states that, "[t]he provision of goods and services by emergent parties provides a partial explanation for why dominant parties of the old regime were replaced in the interwar period with the parties which rose to fill the void during the Dualist period." I assume based on the reference to dominant parties that the interwar territory under consideration is that of post-Trianon Hungary rather than minority-inhabited territories of the Hungarian Kingdom that were awarded to neighboring countries. (There were no dominant non-ethnically Hungarian parties during the Dualist period.) It's true that the old dominant parties played little to no role in interwar Hungary, but that has far more to do with their being held responsible for the dismemberment of historic Hungary than any effort other parties made to mobilize their relatively modest constituencies. A more compelling argument might be made for the emergent Dualist-era ethnic minority parties, which might well have leveraged their decades of mobilization activities to enter the new parliaments in the Habsburg successor states.

WINNER OF GREGORY LUEBBERT PRIZE FOR THE BEST BOOK PRIZE IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

THE REVOLUTIONARY CITY:
URBANIZATION AND THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION OF REBELLION
An interview with the author, Mark R. Beissinger

WHAT MOTIVATED THIS PROJECT?

To many, the study of revolutions seemed to have reached an impasse in recent years. The field had grown fragmented and overwhelmed by the diversity of cases it has confronted. It was characterized by an artificial division between "violent" and "nonviolent" revolt and by an excessive emphasis on revolutionary processes rather than on the deeper factors motivating revolutionary challenges or structuring their occurrence and outcomes. Too little attention was paid to the aftermaths and consequences of revolutions. As many recognized, by the late 20th century social revolutions had grown marginalized. Yet, at the very time that social revolutions declined, new forms of revolution proliferated in cities. There had been little theorization of how the context of the city mattered in revolutionary politics, or how the changing nature of cities had altered revolutionary politics. Studies also tended to limit themselves to a relatively small number of cases without taking into consideration the broader revolutionary universe within which these cases were ensconced, or how (and why) revolution as a political practice had changed over time.

The book was motivated by these issues. It sought to address them by examining the factors that have influenced the evolution of revolution over the past century, drawing attention in particular to the effects of urbanization on the incidence, practice, and consequences of political revolutions. It contemplates cities as nerve centers of power and as the ultimate prizes that revolutionary oppositions seek to capture. It analyzes how proximity to or distance from urban centers of power influences revolutionary processes and considers the ways in which the concentration of people, power, and wealth in cities over the past century has altered the practice of revolution. It details how urbanization has given rise to new forms of revolt in central urban spaces that are based on the power of numbers (what I call "urban civic revolutions") rather than the power of arms. And it investigates the politics that has accompanied this reliance on the power of numbers and its consequences for post-revolutionary governance. The book also sought to bring new forms of information to the study of revolution at multiple levels of analysis: the cross-national, the episodic, and the individual.

WHAT SURPRISED YOU MOST AS YOU WERE DOING THE RESEARCH FOR IT?

The research was a constant project of discovery. Some of the more surprising findings were: the growing incidence of revolutionary contention around the world since 1900; the number of states in the world that have experienced at least one episode of revolutionary contention in the course of their histories; the ways in which most models of revolutionary outbreak seriously overpredict the incidence of revolution; the importance of human error in affecting the outcomes of revolutionary contention, especially in cities; the weak commitment to democratic values among those participating in revolutions often framed as "democratic" (and the degree of fragmentation among them); and the myriad ways in which regimes have shaped the built environment of the city in order to prevent or undermine revolutionary challenges.

WHAT DO YOU HOPE WILL BE THE MOST LASTING CONCLUSION FROM THIS BOOK IN 10 OR 20 YEARS?

My hope is that there will be several, but probably the most lasting will be the book's theorization of how space structures revolutionary processes. What I call the "proximity dilemma" that revolutionaries encounter, the trade-offs this involves, and the ways in which this shapes revolutionary processes has broad implications for understanding revolution at both the micro and macro levels, as well as for understanding how regimes seek to prevent and counter revolutionary challenges.

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WINNER OF GREGORY LUEBBERT PRIZE FOR THE BEST BOOK PRIZE IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

THE RISE AND FALL OF IMPERIAL CHINA:
THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF STATE DEVELOPMENT
An interview with the author, Yuhua Wang

WHAT MOTIVATED THIS PROJECT?

I was motivated by a profound fascination and two distinct frustrations. I have been fascinated by Chinese history since childhood. Tales of emperors, officials, military generals, and the everyday lives of ordinary citizens have captivated me. However, my enthusiasm is tinged with frustration regarding the treatment of Chinese history by the English-speaking world of social sciences. First, there's a notable oversight as much of Chinese history remains overshadowed by a predominant focus on European narratives. Second, even as there emerges a renewed interest in harnessing Chinese history to answer social scientific queries, the scope remains limited. Most of these studies either delve into the genesis of the Chinese state some 2,000 years ago or probe China's economic and fiscal downturn during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Notably, a significant portion of this research stems from economic historians keen on uncovering the origins of the "Great Divergence" in economic trajectories between China and Europe. My curiosity, however, leans towards the political narrative. I yearn to comprehend why the elites failed to champion policies that fostered economic growth and fiscal robustness. Was it a lack of capability or simply a lack of will? Additionally, the expansive timeline between the inception and decline beckons a deeper exploration. I'm driven to bridge these historical gaps and connect the dots.

WHAT SURPRISED YOU MOST AS YOU WERE DOING THE RESEARCH FOR IT?

The prevailing belief characterizes China as an "oriental state," its formation primarily rooted in flood control and irrigation management. This perspective paints the Chinese state as a tyrannical entity that has languished in an unfavorable state since its origins. Led by an undemocratic ruler, this overly centralized and potent state is said to have oppressed its society for over two millennia, leading many to deem its eventual downfall as inevitable. However, my research has unveiled a different narrative. Contrary to popular belief, China, for a significant period, was supported by a robust aristocracy that markedly limited the monarchy's authority. Furthermore, even after the medieval aristocracy's decline, Chinese emperors did not enjoy unrestricted power in bureaucratic appointments. The stringent imperial civil service examinations restrained their choices, preventing them from appointing personnel at will. In essence, history doesn't condemn China to an eternal fate of authoritarian governance.

WHAT DO YOU HOPE WILL BE THE MOST LASTING CONCLUSION FROM THIS BOOK IN 10 OR 20 YEARS?

The book's most important conclusion is that Chinese rulers faced a fundamental trade-off in state building, which I call the sovereign's dilemma: a coherent elite that could take collective actions to strengthen the state was also capable of revolting against the ruler. This dilemma existed because strengthening state capacity and lengthening ruler duration required different elite social terrains–the type of social networks in which the central elites were embedded. In the beginning, China's social terrain featured central elites with an encompassing interest in strengthening the state, but they were also coherent enough to topple the emperors. Large-scale violence in the medieval era destroyed the old elites and provided an opportunity for the ruler to reshape the elite social terrain to one in which the central elites were fragmented enough for the emperor to divide and conquer; but they pursued their own narrow interests and sought to hollow out the state from within. Long reigning emperors ended up ruling a weak state. In essence, over two thousand years of China's state development can be boiled down to the history of its rulers struggling with the sovereign's dilemma–pursuing state capacity or personal survival. The emperor's unyielding quest for power and survival, achieved by dividing the elites, is the ultimate cause for the decline of imperial China, and potentially other regimes too..

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WINNER OF SAGE PAPER PRIZE

The Representation Trap:
How and Why Muslims Struggle to Maintain Power in India
An interview with the author, Feyaad Allie

WHAT MOTIVATED THIS PROJECT?

This paper is part of my broader book project that studies the causes and consequences of the political inclusion of marginalized groups with a focus on Indian Muslims. This project was motivated by a combination of a perceived gap in existing research and insights from fieldwork. Theoretically, I was motivated to focus on Indian Muslims because they have received comparatively less attention in quantitative political science research. Instead, research has focused a great deal on groups in India such as Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and women, all of whom have institutional protections at some level of government to help them gain political power. My takeaway was that we know a lot less about the causes and consequences of power among groups that do not have safeguards in place to help them win elected office. This interest was further solidified during fieldwork, where I was struck by how varied the political experiences of Indian Muslims were even while there was a general narrative of rising majoritarianism in the country. While most popular accounts and existing research often conceptualized Indian Muslims as a homogenous voting bloc that acts collectively, my fieldwork revealed a large amount of heterogeneity in how they thought about and approached politics. Ultimately, I thought that we needed to understand Indian Muslims in their own right and think deeply about what their representation means in a country where they experience marginalization.

WHAT SURPRISED YOU MOST AS YOU WERE DOING THE RESEARCH FOR IT?

The most surprising part of my research was my findings on how gaining power could divide the Muslim population. A great deal of research notes how dominant groups can backlash against minorities who gain power, but the effects of descriptive representation on dynamics within minority groups themselves were less clear. My quantitative analysis of elections and subsequent interviews with Muslim voters and elites highlighted how power can divide groups. The more I investigated this idea, the more apparent sub-divisions within the Muslim community became and the more I realized that identities that have been understudied in India (caste among Muslims and Islamic sect) were an important part of the story of political exclusion in the world's largest democracy.

WHAT DO YOU HOPE WILL BE THE MOST LASTING CONCLUSION FROM THIS ARTICLE IN 10 OR 20 YEARS?

As social scientists, we have identified the ways that representation can produce positive outcomes and the ways that it can also produce backlash from outgroups. I hope that the most lasting conclusion of this work would be that there can be a dark side to descriptive representation and it can play out within the marginalized group itself. I further hope this project will serve as a starting point to understand the ways that representation affects dynamics within marginalized groups. Delving into divisions within marginalized groups often involves collecting new observational and survey data that can be disaggregated in different ways and engaging in deep qualitative work with minority communities. I hope that this project is viewed as a key piece of work in the broader research agenda on the politics of marginalized groups.

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WINNER OF LIJPHART/PRZEWORSKI/VERBA PRIZE FOR BEST DATASET

Lok Dhaba Database on Indian Elections
An interview with the authors, Francesca R. Jensenius & Gilles Verniers

WHAT MOTIVATED YOU TO BUILD THIS DATASET?

We were motivated by the lack of publicly available data on Indian election returns, which made it hard for both academics and journalists to systematically study elections . Before Lok Dhaba, researchers and journalists only had access to statistical reports in PDF produced by the Indian Election Commission, which often was only published after a long time. Now, a soft copy of the data is available within hours of the declaration of the last seat of every state or general election, which can easily be merged by data from previous elections, making it easy to look at patterns across the country and trends over time.

Francesca compiled the first time-series of election results for her PhD, and we then started collaborating to expand it with every new election. The dataset really became a public good after the creation of the Trivedi Centre for Political Data (TCPD) at Ashoka University in India, where a team of engineers, computer scientists and social scientists collectively worked to expand the scope of the data collection and build the online interface.

We must emphasize that we have not at all been alone in the efforts to build this dataset. Many people deserve to be mentioned here, but we particularly want to high-light the role of Sudheendra Hangal, the co-founder and co-director of TCPD, who was key to the conceptualization of the data interface and to its development, as well as the development of Surf, an Entity Mapping and Resolution System for Indian Names used to assign a unique identification number to each election candidate. Another shout-out goes to Priyamvada Trivedi, who defined the protocols for data collection, and to Mohit Kumar and Puneet Arya, who were essential to the development and maintenance of the platform and all data systems. In addition, numerous collaborators, Ashoka students, and research assistants contributed to data collection, cleaning, and to improve our data systems and processes.

DO YOU HAVE PLANS FOR A NEXT RESEARCH PROJECT USING THESE DATA? IF SO, COULD YOU TELL US ABOUT IT?

These data are already used on a large number of research projects by ourselves and others, and there is still a lot of unexplored parts of the data. Election results are raw material for many fields of enquiry, including political representation, gender and politics, the geography of public spending, the linking of election results with all kinds of policy and socio-economic outcomes.

In terms of developing the data itself further, the plan is to continue updating and developing it, and to make it easier to merge it with other existing datasets. The Lok Dhaba dataset is already linked with another dataset profiling candidates and elected representatives, but we would also like to do more to link it to for example socio-economic datasets.

WHAT DO YOU WISH YOU HAD BEEN ABLE TO INCLUDE IN THE DATASET THAT YOU WEREN'T?

The Lok Dhaba dataset does not contain much information on constituencies, or districts, such as their demographic composition by caste, religion or language. These data are hard to find and usually incomplete. As far as other socio-economic data is concerned, we have already worked to match constituencies to Indian Census data over time, but as there has been no census in India since 2011, these matches are starting to get outdated.

For this reason, the Lok Dhaba does not contain information about variables such as the the the share of urban and rural population within constituencies. The plan now is to work with Ashutosh Varshney and others at the Saxena Centre for Contemporary South Asia at Brown, to create a new measure of urbanization, using satellite population density measures. India is urbanizing rapidly and most of urban growth takes place within rural areas, rather than being concentrated around large metropolises. This may have effects on voting behavior and electoral outcomes that we currently do not measure well. We are very excited about working on this in the near future

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WINNER OF THEDA SKOCPOL PRIZE
FOR EMERGING SCHOLARS

Dawn Langan Teele
An interview with the author

WHAT LED YOU INTO A CAREER AS A COMPARATIVIST?

Around the time I graduated from Reed College in 2006, I won a Thomas J. Watson Fellowship to travel to areas hit by the 2005 tsunami and learn about disaster recovery efforts. At that point I believed I was starting a career in international development, and my hope was to get a (free) master's from Princeton and then go work in DC. During my year alone with a backpack in South and Southeast Asia, however, I became more familiar with the bureaucracy and dashed hopes of the development-industrial complex, which sent me back to the drawing board of life. I spent the next two years as a full-time research assistant for development economists at Yale. That experience was eye-opening. Whereas at Reed all the economics professors were women, at Yale there was barely a woman in the room. In 2006 Yale Economics had *never* internally tenured a woman. So, I started hanging out in the political science department, going to workshops and conferences and parties, and I never left.

A year later, when I matriculated into the PhD program I was immediately drawn to the big books in comparative politics: State Formation! Nationalism! Democratization! What struck me then was the fact that all these great texts made barely any mention of women. In the democratization literature, in fact, there was often an asterisk or a footnote saying that the theory under development explained men's enfranchisement only, as women's political inclusion was merely a result of economic modernization – a reform whose time had come. This notion struck me as absurd and inspired all my early work on the political logic undergirding women's suffrage.

Somewhat unusually, my first book, *Forging the Franchise*, and other projects, were either implicitly or explicitly engaged with understanding the American case. Yet to me, the reason to cast my lot with comparativists is that comparative politics is about a frame of mind, rather than about the specific parts of the world that one studies. The comparative sensibility wants to know the answer to the question "what is this case a case of?" and comparativists often have macro-level pretensions even if their evidentiary base is on the micro level. Thus a desire to understand broad patterns and variation across cases cemented my path as a comparativist.

WHAT BIG UNANSWERED QUESTIONS ARE YOU PLANNING TO TACKLE NEXT?

Ten years after I started my dissertation, I still have more to learn about the causes and consequences of women's enfranchisement. Two recently accepted articles, "The Political Geography of the Gender Gap," (*JOP* forthcoming) and "Gender and the Impact of Proportional Representation," (*APSR* 2022) challenge our understanding of the turnout behavior and political preferences of the first women voters. These articles are related to my new book project–*Political Woman*–which leverages micro-level electoral data from more than ten countries to understand the impact of women's votes after suffrage. *Political Woman* describes and then dismantles three founding claims about the first women to cast ballots, namely that they were apathetic, conservative, and ineffective advocates for policy reform. These narratives emerged from the earliest behavioral research, including the work of Herbert Tingsten and Maurice Duverger, and then circulated in classic texts like Almond and Verba's *Civic Culture*, Stokes et al.'s *American Voter* and Paul Lazarsfeld's work. Recently, these ideas have congealed into arguments about the transition from the "traditional" to the "modern" gender gap. *Political Woman* shows that each of these founding claims is either incorrect or misguided: women may have turned out at lower rates than men after suffrage, but in most countries they were the single largest group of people that actually cast ballots. Given the weight of their votes, which often tilted toward urban areas, women in the early twentieth century could not have been more conservative than men in countries where social democracy emerged (see the forthcoming *JOP*). Finally, though many marquee policy reforms that suffragists fought for were conceded prior to suffrage, I show that suffrage led to the expansion of welfare state policies, especially related to education spending. At the broadest level, this work, which produces macro-level insights using micro-level data, casts doubt on developmentalist theories of gender equality.

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WINNER OF LUEBBERT BEST ARTICLE PRIZE

How the Party Commands the Gun:
The Foreign-Domestic Threat Dilemma in China
An interview with the author, Daniel Mattingly

WHAT MOTIVATED THIS PROJECT?

The military is a key player in the politics of authoritarian regimes. For example, in China – which is the case that I spend most of my time thinking about – the military has historically been a pivotal player in elite politics. For example, during the Cultural Revolution the People's Liberation Army (PLA) used force to quell the Red Guards and ensure Mao Zedong's political supremacy. And in 1989, the PLA was used to put down a nation-wide protest movement and ensure the leadership's survival. Yet there has been relatively little research on the role of the military in China's elite politics, especially relative to its importance. I was genuinely puzzled how China's leadership controls the military and what role it plays in elite politics.

WHAT SURPRISED YOU MOST
AS YOU WERE DOING THE RESEARCH FOR IT?

For this project, I collected data on over 12,000 appointments to the PLA from the Mao Era to the present day. In one part of the analysis, I showed that career ties to the top leader are correlated with promotion. However, there was a lot of variation. Some leaders, like Xi Jinping, were very successful in bringing members of their network into the top echelon of the military. Yet other leaders, like Hu Jintao or Jiang Zemin, were much less successful at promoting officers in their network to top positions. This is the case even though on paper leaders like Hu and Jiang held the same party and military posts as Xi. I found this difference interesting, and it helped to launch a book project.

WHAT DO YOU HOPE WILL BE THE MOST LASTING CONCLUSION FROM THIS ARTICLE IN 10 OR 20 YEARS?

The article is centered around the idea that the leaders of authoritarian regimes have to balance between foreign and domestic threats when shaping their militaries. A lot of the literature on authoritarian regimes, including a lot of my own work, mostly focuses on the role of domestic factors in politics. I hope that this article is part of a growing literature that seeks to understand how international forces shape the politics of authoritarian regimes – and is part of a growing and vibrant literature on the role of the military in domestic politics.

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