

Comparative Politics Newsletter

The Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association

Editors: Matt Golder (mgolder@psu.edu), Sona N. Golder (sgolder@psu.edu)

Editorial Assistant: Charles Crabtree, Jinhyuk Jang

Editorial Board: Molly Ariotti, Xun Cao, Elizabeth C. Carlson, Yaoyao Dai, Kostanca Dhima, Amanda Fidalgo, Vineeta Yadav, Joseph Wright

Contents

Letter from the Editors by Matt Golder and Sona N. Golder	2
I. Symposium: Race and Ethnic Politics in Comparative Perspective	
Cognitive Biases in Ethnic Politics by Claire L. Adida and Gwyneth McClendon	4
Diversity and Economic Outcomes: Evidence from Poland by Volha Charnysh	11
Immigration and Ethnic Politics in Europe: Fertile Ground for Interdisciplinary Research and Theory Building by Rafaela Dancygier .	17
Misfit Politics: Identity Construction and Vote Choice by Adam Harris	22
Bringing Together Studies of Ethnic Prejudice and Ethnic Conflict in China by Yue Hou	28
Preserving White America: White Racial Identity and Support for Nationalist Policies by Ashley Jardina	31
From Racial Democracy to Racial-ized Democracy in Latin America by Marcus A. Johnson, Jr.	37
Electoral Institutions and Ethnic Clientelism by Kristen Kao	44
Studying Minorities in the Middle East: The Kurdish Case by Ekrem Karakoç	50
China's Local Ethnic Exclusion: Cross-region and Within-region Patterns in Tibet and Xinjiang by Chuyu Liu	55
Ethnicity, Parties, and Electoral Violence in Developing Democracies by Aditi Malik	61
Europe's Urban-Rural Divide on Immigration by Rahsaan Maxwell	67
South Asian Americans in the post-9/11 United States: Panethnicity and Religion by Sangay Mishra	71
Race, Ethnicity, and the Participation Gap: Comparing Australia with Canada and the United States by Juliet Pietsch	76
Ethnic Visibility by Amanda L. Robinson	79
Revisiting the Relationship between Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Provision by Prerna Singh and Matthias vom Hau	89
Identity and Political Attitudes: What Insights Can an Alternative Measurement Strategy Provide? by Amber D. Spry	96
II. Dataset	
Democratic Electoral Systems around the World, 1946-2016 by Nils-Christian Bormann, Adina Pintilie, and Jack N. Smith	100
III. Other	
Call for Bids: New Editorial Team for the Comparative Politics Newsletter	104
Contributors	106

Letter from the Editors

by **Matt Golder & Sona N. Golder**

The Pennsylvania State University

Welcome to the Fall 2017 issue of the Comparative Politics Newsletter. Our current issue includes a symposium on Race and Ethnicity in Comparative Perspective and a brief overview of the latest update to the **Democratic Electoral Systems (DES) dataset**. It also includes a call for bids for those interested in taking over the editorship of the Newsletter.

I. Symposium on Race and Ethnicity in Comparative Perspective

In this issue of the Comparative Politics Newsletter, we wanted to highlight the interesting research being conducted by primarily, but not exclusively, junior scholars in the area of race and ethnicity. In total, we have seventeen contributions, all of which address important topics in the race and ethnicity literature in regions as diverse as Europe, Africa, South America, Asia, the Middle East, North America, and Australasia.

Diversity and Public Goods Provision. Two of our contributions challenge the consensus belief in the literature that ethnic diversity is bad for public goods provision. In her contribution, **Volha Charnysh** (Princeton University) argues that ethnic homogeneity can be beneficial for public goods provision when formal institutions provided by the state are weak but that it can be harmful when formal institutions are strong. This is because the informal mechanisms that promote cooperation in homogenous societies are 'second best' and can limit competition and breed corruption when the state is sufficiently strong to provide public goods such as law and order. She presents evidence in support of her argument by looking at the historical record of public goods provision in Poland's 'Recovered Territories' — the former German territories that became part of Poland at the end of World War II. In the second contribution, **Prerna Singh** (Brown University) and **Mattias vom Hau** (Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals) provide a more general critique of those studies reporting a causal link between ethnic diversity and poor public goods provision. In particular, they highlight the ahistoricity of these studies and raise concerns about the decision to treat ethnic diversity as exogenous rather than as an endogenous outcome of the historical nation-state building process and prior levels of public

goods provision.

Ethnic Visibility. Two contributions touch on issues related to ethnic visibility. In one contribution, **Amanda Robinson** (Ohio State University) notes that most theoretical accounts linking ethnicity to political outcomes assumes, at least implicitly, that ethnicity is 'visible.' As she notes, though, ethnicity is often not as visible as many of these theories assume. If there is variation in the extent to which ethnicity is visible, then this has implications for when and how we should expect to see ethnicity affect things like interethnic trust, political participation, ethnic party support, and politically relevant identification. Amanda describes several of her research projects looking at the effect of variation in ethnic visibility with respect to different political outcomes in Africa and the United States. **Adam Harris** (University of Gothenburg) addresses ethnic visibility from a slightly different perspective. In his contribution, Adam argues that group members who look visibly different from the modal group member are less likely to take actions in line with their group. To evaluate his empirical claims he examines how 'racial distance' in skin tone from the modal group member modifies the impact of group membership on 'group voting' in South Africa, Brazil, and the United States.

Ethnic Violence. We have three contributions that discuss ethnic violence. Two of these contributions examine ethnic conflict in China. In one contribution, **Yue Hou** (University of Pennsylvania) argues that there should be more interaction between the literature addressing ethnic prejudice and the literature addressing ethnic conflict. In doing so, she highlights recent developments in these literatures as they relate to the Xinjiang province in China. In a second contribution, **Chuyu Liu** (Pennsylvania State University) examines local patterns of ethnic exclusion in Tibet and Xinjiang. Among other things, Chuyu shows that the Chinese government has responded in very different ways to the threat of ethnic conflict in these two regions. Our third contribution on ethnic conflict comes from **Aditi Malik** (College of the Holy Cross), who examines how volatility in the party system influences ethnic electoral violence. Drawing on empirical evidence in India and Kenya, Aditi argues that (ethnic) electoral violence is more likely in unstable party systems where party leaders have shorter time horizons and where they worry less about voter sanctions for engaging in violence.

Group Identity and Group Consciousness. Four contributions address various aspects of group identity and group consciousness. In one contribution, [Ashley Jardina](#) (Duke University) discusses white racial identity in the United States and its connections with nationalist policies. She argues that white racial identity is not strongly associated with out-group animus or prejudice, but it is strongly linked to support for nationalist policies relating to immigration, outsourcing, and foreign intervention. In a second contribution, [Amber Spry](#) (Columbia University) discusses different measurement strategies for analyzing the relationship between group identity and political attitudes in the context of the United States. In particular, she argues that scholars should employ a multidimensional and intersectional approach to identity that takes account of an individual's self-reported attachment to their race, gender, class, religion, and so on. In his contribution, [Sangay Mishra](#) (Drew University) discusses South Asian diversity and panethnicity in the aftermath of 9/11 in the United States. Standard theories of panethnicity predicted that post-9/11 racial hostility towards South Asians would strengthen an emerging South Asian panethnicity. As Sangay notes, though, religious divisions among South Asians meant that this did not happen. By deliberately emphasizing their religious identity, South Asian Hindus and Sikhs, among other religious groups, attempted to distance themselves from South Asian Muslims. The result was a weakening, rather than a strengthening, of a panethnic South Asian identity. In a fourth contribution, [Marcus Johnson](#) (University of Maryland) examines the role that race plays in Latin American politics. Many scholars have reported that there is little explicit black identity mobilization in Latin America. As Marcus notes, though, the prerequisites for black consciousness are clearly present and so one must examine why racial cleavages remain politically inactive despite their social salience. This causes Marcus to focus on the strategic choices of party leaders, state actors, and other political entrepreneurs.

Ethnicity and Motivated Reasoning. In their contribution, [Claire Adida](#) (University of California, San Diego) and [Gwyneth McClendon](#) (New York University) examine motivated reasoning with respect to ethnicity in Africa. The existing literature on motivated reasoning has focused primarily on partisan motivated reasoning in the United States. As Claire and Gwyneth note, it is surprising that insights about motivated reasoning have not been tested in a more comparative context, par-

ticularly with respect to identity politics in developing countries. Drawing on an experimental study in Benin, Claire and Gwyneth find evidence of ethnically motivated reasoning with respect to how individuals evaluate incumbent legislators. Specifically, they find that information about incumbent legislative performance amplifies positive (negative) views of coethnic (non-coethnic) incumbents. Many scholars have argued that ethnic voting is a product of low-information environments. Claire and Gwyneth's study suggests, though, that ethnic ties might condition information processing, with the implication that access to more political information may reinforce, rather than reduce, ethnic voting.

Europe. We have two contributions that examine race and ethnicity in Europe. In one contribution, [Rahsaan Maxwell](#) (University of North Carolina) discusses the growing urban-rural divide in Europe which sees big city Cosmopolitans who value immigration, cultural diversity, open labor markets, globalization, and Europe pitted against rural Nationalists who oppose immigration, who hold negative views on cultural diversity, who support protectionist policies, and who are overwhelmingly anti-Europe. Rahsaan argues that this urban-rural divide is the result of compositional effects — the types of people who live in cities and rural areas — rather than the result of contextual effects — the act of living in urban or rural areas. In a second contribution, [Rafaela Dancygier](#) discusses the impact that the political inclusion of rural-origin migrants in many cities has had on European party systems. Rafaela notes that the existing literature on immigration and ethnic politics in Europe has tended to focus on the nativist electoral backlash to immigrant communities and has ignored the transformative changes that have occurred in party systems as a result of the behavior of immigrants themselves. In particular, Rafaela emphasizes how the migration of families from Muslim-majority countries with mostly rural origins “has been accompanied by the replication of clan-based hierarchies, village ties, and home country social norms in European cities.” Political parties have exploited these changes with the result that ethnicity and kinship have become central features of election campaigns and class-based issues and alliances have been sidelined. According to Rafaela, these changes, and the challenge that they pose to left-wing parties in particular, have the potential to radically transform European party systems.

Middle East. Two of our contributions touch on race and ethnicity in the Middle East. In one contribution, [Ekrem Karakoç](#) (SUNY Binghamton) argues that it is hard to understand relations between different ethnicities in the Middle East without taking account of the historical nation-building process in each country. He then uses survey data to look at how state policies in Turkey promoting a hierarchy in social identities has affected attitudes towards and among the Kurds. In a second contribution, [Kristen Kao](#) (University of Gothenburg) exploits the fact that Jordan elects some of its legislators in single-member districts and others in multimember districts to examine the effect of electoral rules on ethnic clientelism. Drawing on the casework logs of individual legislators, Kristen finds that legislators elected in multimember districts are more likely to engage in ethnic clientelism than their counterparts in single-member districts.

Australia. Our final symposium contribution comes from [Juliet Pietsch](#) (Australian National University), who compares the descriptive representation of minorities in Australia to that in Canada and the United States. Although Australia has a similar immigrant history to other settler countries — particularly in terms of Asian migration — Juliet shows that Australia has lagged behind countries like Canada and the United States when it comes to the political representation of minorities. She argues that “while there are a number of historical, electoral, and party-political barriers, the strongest determinant of the political under-representation of immigrants and ethnic minorities [in Australia] is an underlying low level of pervasive discrimination which blocks the entry of non-white immigrants and ethnic minorities into national-level politics.”

II. Datasets

This issue of the Comparative Politics Newsletter also includes an overview by [Nils-Christian Bormann](#) (University of Witten-Herdecke/University of Exeter), [Adina Pintilie](#) (University of Exeter), and [Jack N. Smith](#) (University of Exeter) of the latest update to Bormann and Golder’s (2013) [Democratic Electoral Systems \(DES\) dataset](#). The updated data includes information on all national-level democratic elections that have occurred in the world from 1946 through 2016. This amounts to information on 1,341 legislative elections and 498 presidential elections. The DES dataset is an invaluable source of information for social scientists interested in

the origins and consequences of electoral rules.

III. Call for Bids: New Editors for the Comparative Politics Newsletter

Our time as editors of the Comparative Politics Newsletter is coming to an end. We have two more issues left, Spring 2018 and Fall 2018. The President of the Comparative Politics Section of the American Political Science Association, Cathie Jo Martin, has included a [call for bids](#) at the end of the Newsletter for those individuals and institutions who would like to take over as the new editorial team. The call for bids includes information on what is expected in any application and an overview of the responsibilities of the successful editorial team. We encourage you to consider applying. If anyone wishes to contact us to discuss our experience running the Comparative Politics Newsletter, you should feel free to contact us at sgolder@psu.edu or mgolder@psu.edu.

We hope that you enjoy this issue of the Comparative Politics Newsletter. If you have ideas for possible symposia or special topics, or would like to publicize a dataset of broad appeal, please contact us. As always, you can contact us through the Contact page of the Newsletter webpage at <http://comparativenewsletter.com/contact> or simply use our Penn State email addresses: (sgolder@psu.edu, mgolder@psu.edu).

Matt and Sona

Symposium: Race and Ethnic Politics in Comparative Perspective

Cognitive Biases in Ethnic Politics

by [Claire L. Adida](#)

University of California, San Diego

and [Gwyneth McClendon](#)

New York University

The election of Donald Trump and the vitriolic campaign preceding it have drawn greater attention to a phenomenon that some social scientists believe sustains sociopolitical polarization in the United States — motivated reasoning. Motivated reasoning — the mecha-

nism by which individuals selectively process new information to accommodate their prior beliefs and affirm their social identity loyalties — has turned even the most basic facts into questions of partisan debate (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2014; Kunda, 1990, 1987).¹

Comparative politics scholars generally agree that social identity (including ethnicity and race, as well as partisanship) is important in most countries. So it is surprising that insights about motivated reasoning have not been tested extensively outside of the United States and have been particularly absent from the study of identity politics in the developing countries. Much research in comparative politics relies on insights from Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), which argues that people derive self-esteem and wellbeing from the status of their ethnic, racial, and other social identity groups.² A theory of motivated reasoning is compatible with this line of argument. If people indeed derive psychological wellbeing from group status, they might process political information in ways that allow them to affirm positive views about in-groups and negative views about out-groups. It seems quite plausible that motivated reasoning, and other similar forms of cognitive bias, would have implications for political reasoning and behavior around the world (not just in the U.S.) and in the presence of ethnic, racial, and other social identity cleavages (not just partisan ones).

Yet, as we discuss below, comparative politics research on the cognitive implications of ethnic politics is nascent. Important existing scholarship argues that ethnic politics is a function of information scarcity (Kristín Birnir, 2007; Chandra, 2004; Conroy-Krutz, 2013; Ferree, 2006). Motivated reasoning points to an alternative conception of how identity politics might work: it suggests that, at least in some contexts, identity politics affects how people process information.³ Consequently, social identity attachments might not be reduced, and might even be reinforced, by greater access to political information. These insights merit theoretical development and rigorous empirical investigations throughout the world.

In this article, we review research on motivated reasoning in the U.S., explore its applications in comparative contexts, and suggest avenues for further investigation.

I. Connections to American Politics Research

Scholars of American politics have argued that partisan motivated reasoning manifests in people's evaluations of a variety of issue areas, from the consequences of healthcare reform (Nyhan, Reifler and Ubel, 2013), to the deterrent efficacy of capital punishment (Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979), to the pros and cons of vaccination (Nyhan et al., 2014), to the sources of climate change (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith and Braman, 2010), and to the unemployment rate (Schaffner and Roche, 2017). Partisan motivated reasoning was prominently on display in the last presidential campaign and election, as partisans disagreed about descriptive facts, such as the number of people who attended President Trump's inauguration ceremony (Schaffner and Luks, 2017; Khazan, 2017).

The theory of motivated reasoning contends that people possess both accuracy and directional goals when processing new political information. One directional goal is to maintain or enhance positive views of in-groups, and where attachment to social identity groups is very strong, this directional goal can dominate. A variety of mechanisms can then connect this directional goal to inaccurate processing of new political information. For example, individuals may reject as irrelevant information that contradicts positive views of their in-group and accept as relevant information that confirms their positive views of their in-group. Or people may take confirming evidence at face value, while scrutinizing contradictory evidence to a greater degree (Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979). Research to date has not fully untangled these possible mechanisms, finding evidence for many of them both in the lab and in real-world settings (Ross, 2012).

Research on partisan motivated reasoning in the U.S. is not without its skeptics. Some scholars question whether motivated reasoning shapes actual political be-

¹ See Bullock et al. (2015) and Coppock (2016) for a more skeptical view of partisan motivated reasoning in U.S. politics.

² See Charnysh, Lucas and Singh (2014), Shayo (2009), and Lieberman (2009, 2003) for examples of comparative politics research drawing explicitly on Social Identity Theory.

³ Some scholars have argued that there is an emotional basis underlying ethnic attachments (Horowitz, 1985), but without offering theoretical elaboration or rigorous empirical evaluation. In recent years, political scientists studying ethnic politics have turned away from this emotional perspective and argued instead for a purely rational basis underlying ethnic identity and ethnic politics (Bates, 1983; Posner, 2005; Chandra, 2004).

havior or merely manifests as expressed preferences in a survey: the evidence-base for motivated reasoning can be fragile in this way (Coppock, 2016), and survey respondents have sometimes abandoned motivated reasoning when they have been offered even small monetary incentives to process information accurately (Bullock et al., 2015). These areas of skepticism underscore the need for more rigorous tests of the behavioral implications of motivated reasoning.

Comparative politics scholars generally agree that social identity (including ethnicity and race, as well as partisanship) is important in most countries. So it is surprising that insights about motivated reasoning have not been tested extensively outside of the United States and have been particularly absent from the study of identity politics in the developing countries.

Yet, if further rigorous testing supports it, the implications of partisan motivated reasoning for our understanding of U.S. politics are potentially profound. Partisan motivated reasoning helps explain why some voters in the U.S., across the partisan spectrum, are not *uninformed* but rather *misinformed* about political issues (Flynn, Nyhan and Reifler, 2017). It helps explain why providing more information about political issues does not necessarily reduce partisan disagreement about basic facts (Nyhan, Reifler and Ubel, 2013).⁴ Partisan motivated reasoning may even lead voters to *increase* their support for preferred candidates upon learning negative information about them (Redlawsk, 2002). Some experts thus worry about the implications of partisan motivated reasoning for polarization and democratic stability (Achen and Bartels, 2016).

II. A Nascent Comparative Politics Literature

In the United States, motivated reasoning has largely been studied along partisan lines, because partisanship is such a strong social identity there. But motivated reasoning could plausibly manifest along other salient social cleavages. All that is required for motivated reasoning to operate is that individuals derive benefits from

continuing to view their in-group in a positive light relative to out-groups. As comparative politics scholars have argued (Lieberman, 2009; Shayo, 2009), racial groups, ethnic groups, and class can all function in this way in places where such social identities are socially salient. Indeed, in the U.S., one might expect motivated reasoning to also occur along racial lines. For example, although black and white Americans seem to agree on O.J. Simpson's guilt today, they were completely *divided* in the midst of his trial, with a majority of white Americans believing he was guilty while a majority of black Americans believed he was not.

If individuals engage in motivated reasoning to affirm their social identities, we should expect to observe motivated reasoning in any society with salient social cleavages — that is, in most societies. After all, comparative scholars who study identity politics have shown that in many parts of the world, individuals place significant emphasis on social identities such as ethnicity, caste, or race, and that those social cleavages shape politics in important ways (Bates, 1983; Posner, 2005; Ferree, 2011).

Yet the literature on motivated reasoning in comparative politics is nascent. Comparative politics scholars studying social identity in developing democracies have paid little attention thus far to the effects of social identity on information processing. Comparativists have also tended to assume that access to political information would straightforwardly increase accountability. They have not considered that social identity might *condition* the relationship between information and political behavior.

There are exceptions, of course. In Venezuela, Svoblik (2017) uses cross-national data and a survey experiment to show that partisans are willing to compromise democratic norms for partisan interests. In Tunisia, Bush and Prather (2017) show evidence of motivated reasoning in people's beliefs about the credibility of their first parliamentary election subsequent to statements made by election observers. In Uganda, Carlson (2016) provides evidence that partisans of the incumbent consistently overestimate government performance whereas supporters of the opposition consistently hold more negative views of government performance than they should based on objective measures. Horowitz and Long (2016)

⁴Nyhan, Reifler and Ubel (2013) found that corrective information backfired specifically among otherwise politically knowledgeable Americans.

argue that motivated reasoning in Kenya, combined with geographic clustering of ethnic groups, leads voters systematically to overestimate the viability of their preferred candidates. In some cases, comparative politics scholars have tested for motivated reasoning specifically along partisan lines and found little evidence for it. For instance, [Conroy-Krutz and Moehler \(2015\)](#) conducted a field experiment in Ghana in which they found that citizens were fairly easily persuaded by media of a different partisan bent.

These recent studies are important because they point to the generalizability of motivated reasoning to disparate political contexts. Some studies, such as the one by [Conroy-Krutz and Moehler \(2015\)](#), also suggest that we would do well to look beyond *partisan* motivated reasoning in order to examine the cognitive implications of other salient social identities. Perhaps as a testament to how novel this line of inquiry is in a comparative context, these studies also largely rely on survey outcomes in which individuals express a policy or political preference. As such, they are subject to the same critique others have leveled at motivated reasoning research in the American context ([Bullock et al., 2015](#)); that is, we cannot know if we have found evidence of motivated reasoning's effects on political *behavior*.

III. An Experiment on Information and Ethnic Voting in Benin

In a study forthcoming in the *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* ([Adida et al., Forthcoming](#)), we, with Jessica Gottlieb and Eric Kramon, continue to advance comparative research on the relationship between ethnic politics and information processing through a field experiment around the 2015 National Assembly elections in Benin. In that experiment, we provided citizens in randomly selected treatment villages with information about the legislative performance of incumbent candidates, and subsequently measured expressed candidate preferences and actual vote shares in treated and control villages. Our results are consistent with ethnically motivated reasoning: access to information *reinforced* voter approval of coethnic politicians as well as voter disapproval of non-coethnic candidates. We find these results not only in the survey measures of voter

preferences but also in measures of information uptake and in actual electoral returns.

Benin is a West African democracy that has held relatively free and fair elections since the 1990s. Partisanship is weak there but ethnic identities (regional and linguistic-tribal identities) are highly politically salient ([Adida, 2015](#); [Koter, 2013](#); [Wantchekon, 2003](#)). Within our experimental sample, we had naturally occurring variation in whether voters viewed themselves as coethnics or as non-coethnics of their incumbent legislator.⁵ We were thus able to look for patterns consistent with motivated reasoning along ethnic cleavages.

Complete details about our experimental design, which is part of a larger [Metaketa initiative](#) to accumulate experimental evidence about information and accountability across different contexts, can be found in our [article](#). But, in brief, we designed four treatment arms to test whether and under what conditions performance information might shape political behavior. The first treatment arm provided participants with information about their incumbent legislator's performance in his official duties — measured as the legislator's attendance and participation in plenary and committee sessions — relative to a local average (the average for all legislators in the *département*). We then designed additional treatment arms to test the intuition that, in a clientelistic democracy, performance information shapes political behavior if voters (i) believe it is relevant to their wellbeing and (ii) can coordinate with others to vote along this performance dimension. Our findings confirm that salience and coordination are important moderators of the relationship between information and accountability.

To test for ethnically motivated reasoning, we pooled all treatment arms together to investigate the extent to which social identity conditioned the effect of information on accountability.⁶ Although our conditioning variable, coethnicity, is not externally manipulated, the effects we identify are plausibly causal for the following reasons. First, our measure of coethnicity is self-reported and pre-treatment. Second, our period of study was relatively short (1 month), such that sorting across ethnicities as a result of our treatment is

⁵The National Assembly in Benin is elected through proportional representation in multi-member districts. However, there are about the same number of communes (one level below the constituency) in each constituency district as there are representatives and, in practice, each representative is assigned a commune to take care of. Through our partner organization and through focus groups, we verified this one-to-one matching of incumbent to commune in 30 communes and used these 30 communes as our experimental sample.

⁶We test the effects of each treatment arm in a companion paper.

unlikely. Finally, we include in our estimations controls for a number of variables that might be correlated with coethnicity, such as prior beliefs about incumbent performance and prior vote choice in the 2011 election.

We found that voters responded to positive information (information that an incumbent was a relatively strong legislator) *only* if they viewed themselves as coethnics of the incumbent; by contrast, they responded to negative information (information that an incumbent was a relatively poor legislative performer) *only* if they viewed themselves as a non-coethnic of the incumbent.

Although many important theories of ethnic voting argue that it is a product of low-information environments, the findings from our study suggest that ethnic ties might *condition* information processing. The implication is that access to more political information may not necessarily reduce ethnic voting; in fact, it may reinforce it.

We demonstrate these patterns using both surveys and official voting data. In the survey, only coethnics of the incumbent expressed greater support for him in response to information that the incumbent is a strong legislative performer; and only non-coethnics of the incumbent expressed lower support for him in response to information that the incumbent is a weak legislative performer. However, these survey results could have been due to respondents wanting to ‘cheer’ for their preferred candidates in front of enumerators. We therefore also show that the strongly performing incumbents’ *voteshares* increased only in coethnic villages and that weakly performing incumbents’ *voteshares* decreased only in non-coethnic villages. Figure 1 presents the average treatment effect (and two standard errors above and below the estimate) in four subgroups: coethnic villages with strongly performing incumbents, non-coethnic villages with strongly performing incumbents, coethnic villages with poorly performing incumbents,

and non-coethnic villages with poorly performing incumbents. In this figure, coethnic villages are those where 90% of respondents viewed themselves as coethnics of the incumbent.⁷ The figure shows an increase in incumbent voteshare only where positive information was provided to coethnics and a decrease in incumbent voteshare only where negative information was provided to non-coethnics.

Moreover, we show not only that people altered their levels of incumbent support in ways consistent with ethnically motivated reasoning but also that people *processed* the information in ways consistent with it. In our study, we conducted a comprehension survey with a randomly selected subset of the treatment group *directly after* the information was provided. The first and fourth columns of Table 1 show that coethnics of the incumbent who received positive information were able to answer factual questions more accurately than non-coethnics who received positive information; and coethnics of the incumbent who received negative information were *less* able to answer factual questions more accurately than were non-coethnics of the incumbent. Additional results are reported in the [article](#).⁸

In other words, information *amplified* positive (negative) views of coethnic (non-coethnic) incumbents because voters were less likely to *process* information that contradicted positive (negative) views of their in-group (out-group). All of this suggests to us that comparative politics scholars should continue to evaluate our assumptions about the relationship between information and ethnic voting. Although many important theories of ethnic voting argue that it is a product of low-information environments, the findings from our study suggest that ethnic ties might *condition* information processing. The implication is that access to more political information may not necessarily reduce ethnic voting; in fact, it may reinforce it.


IV. So What? And Where Do We Go from Here?

Our study and the nascent comparative literature on motivated reasoning outside of the U.S. demonstrate the

⁷We show that the results are robust to different definitions of ‘coethnic’ villages (e.g., using a 50% of the population cut-off, a 70% cut-off, and a 90% cut-off). We use within-commune block fixed effects to derive estimates, and there is one incumbent per commune, so our findings are driven by differences between respondents/villages that share the same incumbent.

⁸For instance, although Table 1 shows no difference in the ability of coethnics and non-coethnics of the incumbent to answer factual questions correctly (rather than incorrectly) after receiving bad plenary performance information, we show in the article that coethnics of the incumbent are more likely to say they “Don’t Know” in response to factual questions about plenary performance when the plenary performance information was bad.

Figure 1: The Effect of Information on Incumbent Voteshare, Conditional on Ethnic Connection and Level of Performance, Official Results Data



Note: The black circles in Figure 1 show the average treatment effects of providing information about the performance of the incumbent legislator (good or poor) on incumbent voteshare in coethnic and non-coethnic villages in Benin. The black vertical lines indicate two standard deviations above and below the average treatment effects.

Table 1: The Effect of Coethnicity on Respondent Comprehension of Treatment Information

	Good Performance Information (Plenary)	Bad Performance Information (Plenary)	Good Performance Information (Committee)	Bad Performance Information (Committee)
Coethnic with Incumbent	0.110 (0.046)	0.073 (0.054)	0.012 (0.043)	-0.188 (0.051)
Correct Prior on Plenary Performance	0.250 (0.059)	0.224 (0.063)		
Correct Prior on Committee Performance			0.423 (0.065)	0.219 (0.061)
Constant	0.357 (0.037)	0.404 (0.047)	0.312 (0.035)	0.455 (0.045)
Observations	474	403	475	401
R-squared	0.046	0.033	0.082	0.072

Note: Table 1 reports coefficients from a logit model in which the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent accurately reported the incumbent's performance score in plenary and committee during the comprehension survey immediately following the treatment, 0 otherwise. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample only includes those who were randomly selected to participate in the comprehension survey.

importance of paying broad attention to cognitive biases generated by ethnic and other salient social identity attachments. Although much comparative attention has been paid to the expressive functions of ethnic identities, as well as to their material and strategic uses by both politicians and voters, less attention has been paid to how ethnic identities condition information processing. And yet the effects of social identity on information processing, and perhaps on other cognitive and emotional aspects of political decision-making, likely have important implications. They may explain the persistence (and even hardening) of social identity divisions in the face of greater information access; they may explain how members of different groups come to hold very different views of the political world. Such patterns are likely to have implications for political debate, policy making, and accountability. At the very least, they mean we should not assume a straightforward relationship between information provision and political behavior.

Together with ongoing research on motivated reasoning in the U.S., our study also raises important questions to be addressed in future work. For instance, once we have explored the prevalence and reach of motivated reasoning, we need to understand more about the *conditions* under which it occurs. Does it inevitably flow from the presence of salient social identity cleavages? Are there systematic contextual factors that weaken and strengthen motivated reasoning? When do social identities condition information processing and when do they lead simply to expressive cheerleading for the in-group? How might untangling the mechanisms underlying motivated reasoning help us to answer these questions about variation? American politics scholars recognize that these next steps are necessary in the literature on partisan motivated reasoning in the U.S. (Flynn, Nyhan and Reifler, 2017). Juxtaposing research from the U.S. with more comparative research on these issues can strengthen scholarship in both subfields. The juxtaposition also underscores the promise of thinking about ethnicity as part of a larger family of social identities, ones that can have similar implications for political cognition and decision-making.

References

- Achen, Christopher H. and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Adida, Claire L. 2015. "Do African voters favor coethnics? Evidence from a survey experiment in Benin." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 2(1):1–11.
- Adida, Claire L., Jessica Gottlieb, Eric Kramon and Gwyneth McClendon. Forthcoming. "Reducing or reinforcing in-group preferences? An experiment on information and ethnic voting." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*.
- Bates, Robert H. 1983. *Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bolsen, Toby, James N. Druckman and Fay L. Cook. 2014. "The influence of partisan motivated reasoning on public opinion." *Political Behavior* 36(2):235–262.
- Bullock, John G., Alan S. Gerber, Seth J. Hill and Gregory A. Huber. 2015. "Partisan bias in factual beliefs about politics." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 10:519–578.
- Bush, Sarah S. and Lauren Prather. 2017. "The promise and limits of election observers in building election credibility." *Journal of Politics* 79(3):921–935.
- Carlson, Elizabeth. 2016. "Finding partisanship where we least expect it: Evidence of partisan bias in a new African democracy." *Political Behavior* 38(1):129–154.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Charnysh, Volha, Christopher Lucas and Prerna Singh. 2014. "The ties that bind: National identity salience and pro-social behavior toward the ethnic other." *Comparative Political Studies* 48(3):267–300.
- Conroy-Krutz, Jeffrey. 2013. "Information and ethnic politics in Africa." *British Journal of Political Science* 43(2):345–373.
- Conroy-Krutz, Jeffrey and Devra C. Moehler. 2015. "Moderation from bias: A field experiment on partisan media in a new democracy." *Journal of Politics* 77(2):575–587.
- Coppock, Alexander E. 2016. "Positive, small, homogeneous, and durable: Political persuasion in response to information." Ph.D. Thesis Columbia University.
- Ferree, Karen E. 2006. "Explaining South Africa's racial census." *Journal of Politics* 68(4):803–815.
- Ferree, Karen E. 2011. *Framing the Race in South Africa: The Political Origins of Racial Census Elections*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Flynn, D. J., Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler. 2017. "The nature and origins of misperceptions: Understanding false and unsupported beliefs about politics." *Political Psychology* 38(S1):127–150.
- Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Horowitz, Jeremy and James Long. 2016. "Strategic voting, information, and ethnicity in emerging democracies: Evidence from Kenya." *Electoral Studies* 44:351–361.
- Kahan, Dan M., Hank Jenkins-Smith and Donald Braman. 2010. "Cultural cognition of scientific consensus." *Journal of Risk Research* 14(2):147–174.

Khazan, Olga. 2017. "How to overcome political irrationality about facts." *The Atlantic* January 26.

Koter, Dominika. 2013. "King makers: Local leaders and ethnic politics in Africa." *World Politics* 65(2):187–232.

Kristín Birnir, Jóhanna. 2007. "Divergence in diversity? The dissimilar effects of cleavages on electoral politics in new democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(3):602–619.

Kunda, Ziva. 1987. "Motivated inference: Self-serving generation and evaluation of causal theories." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 53(4):636.

Kunda, Ziva. 1990. "The case for motivated reasoning." *Psychological Bulletin* 108(3):480.

Lieberman, Evan S. 2003. *Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Brazil and South Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lieberman, Evan S. 2009. *Boundaries of Contagion: How Ethnic Politics Have Shaped Government Responses to AIDS*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lord, Charles G., Lee Ross and Mark R. Lepper. 1979. "Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 37(11):2098.

Nyhan, Brendan, Jason Reifler and Peter A. Ubel. 2013. "The hazards of correcting myths about health care reform." *Medical Care* 51(2):127–132.

Nyhan, Brendan, Jason Reifler, Sean Richey and Gary L. Freed. 2014. "Effective messages in vaccine promotion: A randomized trial." *Pediatrics* 133(4):835–842.

Posner, Daniel N. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Redlawsk, David P. 2002. "Hot cognition or cool consideration? Testing the effects of motivated reasoning on political decision making." *Journal of Politics* 64(4):1021–1044.

Ross, Lee. 2012. Perspectives on disagreement and dispute resolution: Lessons from the lab and the real world. In *The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy*, ed. Eldar Shafir. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Schaffner, Brian F. and Cameron Roche. 2017. "Misinformation and motivated reasoning: Responses to economic news in a politicized environment." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 81(1):86–110.

Schaffner, Brian and Samantha Luks. 2017. "This is what Trump voters said when asked to compare his inauguration crowd with Obamas." *The Washington Post* January 25.

Shayo, Moses. 2009. "A model of social identity with an application to political economy: Nation, class, and redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 103(2):147–174.

Svolik, Milan W. 2017. "When polarization trumps civic virtue: Partisan conflict and the subversion of democracy by incumbents." Working Paper, Yale University.

Taber, Charles S. and Milton Lodge. 2006. "Motivated skepticism

in the evaluation of political beliefs." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3):755–769.

Tajfel, Henri and John C. Turner. 1979. "An integrative theory of intergroup conflict." *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations* 33(47):74.

Wantchekon, Leonard. 2003. "Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin." *World Politics* 55(3):399–422.

Diversity and Economic Outcomes: Evidence from Poland

by Volha Charnysh
Princeton University

Diversity — ethnolinguistic, religious, or social — is often posited as an obstacle to economic and political development. The claim that diversity undermines public goods provision has even been described as "one of the most powerful hypotheses in political economy" (Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan, 2005, 636). Numerous studies have found that the greater the level of diversity in a society, the less likely its members are to cooperate in order to provide public goods, from the protection of property rights to education and infrastructure (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2013).

A common limitation of empirical studies supporting this claim is their treatment of diversity as exogenous and their analysis of the relationship between diversity and development at one point in time (Singh and vom Hau, 2016). This approach stands at odds with the evidence that most contemporary states were initially diverse and became homogeneous through nation- and state-building efforts (Darden and Mylonas, 2016; Wimmer, 2016). Another limitation of existing studies is their focus on informal norms and networks, which are more relevant for cooperation within small social groups, and the resulting lack of attention to formal institutional arrangements that facilitate economic exchange in modern industrialized societies (Acemoglu, 2009).

I seek to overcome these limitations by tracing social and economic development in communities at different levels of heterogeneity over an extended period

¹I use Laitin and Weingast's (2006, 16) definition of a cultural group as "a well-defined set of people who can readily identify one another as members of the group and others as not; and who through descent or high levels of interaction share a set of symbolic practices,

and across varied institutional settings.¹

I. Diversity, Institutions, and Development

My research poses two central questions: (i) Does the cultural composition of a community affect how cooperation is enforced? and (ii) Do differences in cooperation strategies in heterogeneous and homogeneous communities have divergent economic implications?

To address the first question, I distinguish between two broad ways to secure cooperation, one through informal norms and networks and the other through third-party enforcement. Homogeneity confers a comparative advantage to informal enforcement mechanisms and reduces the demand for alternative cooperation strategies (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Habyarimana et al., 2009). Heterogeneous communities, on the other hand, lack dense intergroup ties and shared norms and thus have more to gain from adopting third-party enforcement.² This makes them more likely to forge links to state actors (Pepinsky, 2016) and to rely on state institutions to contain opportunistic behavior. Thus, the quality of endogenous informal institutions in one period will be inversely related to the demand for exogenous public-order (formal) institutions in the subsequent period (Greif and Tabellini, 2017, 72).

This means that economic outcomes in diverse communities will depend on the quality of formal institutions and the resulting levels of state provision of key public goods, such as the rule of law. When state institutions are weak or predatory, informal institutional mechanisms in more homogeneous societies provide a superior substitute (McMillan and Woodruff, 2000). Yet following the introduction of effective formal institutions, the persistence of informal arrangements from previous periods may limit competition and breed corruption. By contrast, greater reliance on effective formal institutions in diverse communities can facilitate economic development by enabling arm's length transactions and encouraging entrepreneurship. In general, informal enforcement strategies are less efficient in developed market economies because they create barriers

to outsiders and perpetuate inequalities (Ogilvie and Carus, 2014; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004).

Importantly, shifting from a reliance on informal cooperation mechanisms to an equilibrium where formal institutions prevail will be difficult because institutions are self-reinforcing (Greif and Kingston, 2011, 31). Because heterogeneous communities come to rely on formal institutions to a greater extent than homogeneous communities early on, they are better able, in the subsequent period, to adjust to the improvement in the quality of public-order institutions.

To sum up, poor quality informal institutions in diverse settings may facilitate the adoption of public-order institutions, which in turn may lead to greater entrepreneurship and wealth in high-capacity states that protect property rights and enforce contracts.

II. Evidence from the Post-WWII Population Transfers in Poland

I provide evidence for this argument using an original historical dataset on the size and diversity of the migrant population resettled in the aftermath of WWII in Poland. In 1945, Poland's borders were shifted westward. The country ceded 46% of its prewar territory to the Soviet Union and gained an equivalent 26% of its prewar territory from Germany — the “Recovered Territories” (*Ziemie Odzyskane*) — to justify the new status quo. The redrawing of borders was followed by population transfers. Nearly eight million Germans fled or were expelled, and the area was repopulated by over five million Polish citizens, a diverse group originating from the territories annexed by the Soviet Union, central Poland, and a number of southern and western European states.³ By 1948, when the population transfers were completed, immigrants accounted for 81% of the population in the “Recovered Territories.” Arbitrary resettlement procedures adopted by the authorities produced varying degrees of heterogeneity. Some localities were settled by Polish migrants from the same region, while others were populated by migrants of different origins. Groups relocated earlier in the process were

such as language, religion, artistic forms, and rituals.” This definition emphasizes shared group norms and networks that sustain these norms and thus fits well with the predominant explanations for the failure of cooperation in heterogeneous settings while being agnostic regarding the type of cleavage.

²Historically, third-party enforcement was provided by a variety of actors and organizations, including merchant guilds, such as the German Hansa, and the Community Responsibility System. Today, the primary provider of third-party enforcement is the state.

³Only the Slavic minorities in Silesia and Mazuria regions, numbering one million, were allowed to stay in their homes following the shift in the Polish-German border. Communities where they constituted a majority after the war are excluded from the analysis.

able to stay together upon migration while groups relocated at later stages were dispersed. The resulting variation in cultural diversity at the community (*gmina*) level is presented in Figure 1.

III. Cooperation in Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Communities

The area transferred from Germany was settled by people who, despite being Polish on paper, arrived from regions with different cultures and saw each other as culturally distinct.⁴ Reports of conflicts and misunderstandings between different migrant groups were ubiquitous in the memoirs of settlers and in the accounts of local officials. A pastor in the Wroclaw diocese described his parish as follows: “[A]n agglomeration of marked regional antagonisms and of distinct, self-regulating groups of people. People from central Poland dubbed all those who came from the east ‘Ukrainians’, whereas the parishioners from the east looked with suspicion and distrust at the so-called ‘Centralists’ ” (Urban, 1965).

To sum up, poor quality informal institutions in diverse settings may facilitate the adoption of public-order institutions, which in turn may lead to greater entrepreneurship and wealth in high-capacity states that protect property rights and enforce contracts.

The combination of societal and state weakness resulted in high levels of violence, giving the Recovered Territories the moniker of the Polish ‘Wild West’. No systematic data on crime rates in the 1940s exist, but statistics from the subsequent decades paint a vivid picture. In 1955, juvenile delinquency rates reported in the resettled provinces were nearly 50% higher than elsewhere in Poland.

And yet, even in the formerly German territories, the extent of social disintegration varied from one locality to another. Communities settled by migrants

from the same region could rely on shared norms and, in many cases, shared networks, unlike the communities settled by diverse migrant groups. The benefits of homogeneity were evident in the creation of the first schools, in the restoration of destroyed churches and infrastructure, and in the establishment of village militia and volunteer fire brigades in the immediate postwar years (Charnysh, 2017).

To compare voluntary public goods provision in diverse and homogeneous communities, I collected data on volunteer fire brigades (*Ochotnicza Straz Pozarna*, OSP), which provide a local public good and were the first organizations to arise following the resettlement. Importantly, most OSPs established after the war still operate today (Klon-Jawor, 2013).

I measure diversity using the Herfindahl concentration formula on the shares of migrants from central Poland, the USSR, and Western and Southern Europe.⁵ Since migrant assignment was not truly random, I include pre-treatment covariates such as the distribution of land, urbanization and industrialization levels, distance to Germany, population size, and time-invariant regional characteristics. Regression analysis indicates that communities settled by migrants from the same region have, on average, three more volunteer fire brigades per 10,000 people than communities settled by diverse migrant groups, which amounts to a difference of over one half of a standard deviation. Regression analysis using village data on migrant origins in the south-west province of Opole suggests that homogeneous villages are 20% more likely to create OSPs than heterogeneous villages (Charnysh, 2017).⁶

Did lower levels of voluntary cooperation in more heterogeneous communities translate into greater demand for state enforcement? Polish researchers have argued that in such communities formal institutions “not only represented state authority, but also served as an intermediary between different cultural groups” (Stasieniuk, 2011, 154). Unfortunately, attitudes and behaviors vis-à-vis formal institutions at the community level cannot be measured systematically during the Communist period. The reform of local governance in

⁴This is because Poland existed as an independent state for a mere twenty years between WWI and WWII. Before 1918, its territory was governed by the Prussian, Habsburg, and Russian empires.

⁵The index estimates the probability that two migrants randomly drawn from the population came from different regions, which is appropriate for testing the hypothesis that weak norms and networks increased demand for third-party enforcement. Using the polarization index does not change the results.

⁶Village-level data on the origins of migrants are not available for other resettled provinces.

the 1990s, which enabled communities to assume partial responsibility for maintaining law and order, allows me to examine the preferences for third-party enforcement today. Regression analysis indicates that communities settled by a heterogeneous population are 10% more likely, on average, to devote fiscal resources to the creation of a municipal guard than homogeneous resettled communities. The estimate is conditional on the levels of urbanization and industrialization, distance to Germany, population size, and proximity to the regional police command. Overall spending per capita, which does not vary with the level of heterogeneity, cannot explain this finding. Additional evidence comes from the 2010 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Life in Transition survey: heterogeneity is associated with greater confidence in courts and the police in a multilevel regression analysis (Charnysh, 2017). Although the establishment of the municipal guard and confidence in state institutions in 2010 may be the product of economic differences in the 1990s and 2000s, these findings support the hypothesis that the demand for third-party enforcement is higher in historically more diverse communities.

IV. Economic Implications of Diversity Before and After 1989

Poland's complicated history allows for comparing economic outcomes in homogeneous and heterogeneous communities in the Communist period, when formal legal institutions were weak and predatory, and in the post-Communist period, when the state began to protect property rights and enforce contracts.⁷ I hypothesize that in the first period, greater reliance on state enforcement in communities settled by diverse migrants carried no advantages, while homogeneity facilitated participation in the informal economy. In the second period, the advantages of formal and informal enforcement strategies should be reversed, with heterogeneous communities more likely to succeed in a market economy.

To test these hypotheses, I collected data on private economic activity at the *gmina* level in the 1980s and 1990s. As a proxy for income, I use (i) the number of TV subscribers per 1,000 people in 1980 and (ii) personal income tax per capita in 1995 and later years. To

measure entrepreneurship, I use the number of (i) private shops in 1982 and (ii) all private enterprises in 1995 and later years, per 1,000 people.⁸

Many findings in the Polish data confirm existing research: homogeneous communities are better at voluntary public goods provision than heterogeneous communities. The important caveat, however, is that the reliance on informal norms and networks is often suboptimal because states and other third parties have a comparative advantage over small communities in providing many types of public goods.

I find no statistically significant relationship between cultural diversity and economic outcomes prior to the onset of market reforms in the early 1980s (see Table 1). However, in the analyses using the economic indicators from the mid-1990s and later years, the coefficient on cultural diversity is consistently positive and statistically significant. In 1995, the predicted differences in per capita personal income tax collected by the most heterogeneous communities and most homogeneous communities amount to 22 Złoty, or one standard deviation, on average. Homogeneous communities are also estimated to have fewer private enterprises (a decrease of five entities per 1,000 people, on average). Elsewhere I show that these economic differences cannot be explained by levels of human capital, the distribution of state farms and factories, or divergent state policies. Thus, following the improvement in the quality and quantity of state enforcement, communities settled by migrants of diverse origins had higher incomes and entrepreneurship rates than communities settled by migrants from the same region.


V. Broader Implications

Three main conclusions emerge from the comparison of communities settled by diverse and homogeneous migrant groups in post-WWII Poland. First,

⁷ Although the opportunities for private initiative gradually improved from the late 1940s to the 1980s, the size and profits of private firms were restricted and the risk of expropriation was high during the Communist period. The situation changed after 1989, when the Polish parliament approved a free market reform program and abolished all restrictions on private initiative.

⁸ These choices of dates and proxies are influenced by data availability. Data on involvement in the shadow economy is unavailable.

Figure 1: Cultural Diversity at the Level of 1948 Communities (*gmina*) in Poland.



Note: Cultural diversity (Herfindahl-Hirschman index) is calculated using the shares of migrants from central Poland, the Soviet Union, and Western and Southern Europe. The index estimates the probability that two migrants drawn from the population come from different regions. Higher values indicate greater cultural diversity. The borders of the formerly German states are marked in red.

Table 1: The Effect of Cultural Diversity on Economic Outcomes before and after 1989 in Poland's 'Recovered Territories'

	Dependent variable:			
	log(TVs) 1980-82	Private Shops	log(Income Tax)	log(Private Enterprises) 1995
Cultural Diversity	0.052 (0.060)	-0.373 (0.425)	0.353*** (0.081)	0.334** (0.170)
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
Region fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	480	491	499	499
R ²	0.316	0.255	0.378	0.487
Adjusted R ²	0.290	0.228	0.356	0.469

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Table 1 reports coefficients from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *Log(TVs)* and *log(Income Tax)* are proxies for income, while *Private Shops* and *Private Enterprises* are proxies for entrepreneurship. Covariates include the distribution of land, urbanization and industrialization rates, the distance to Germany, population size, and time-invariant regional characteristics. Communities where migrants did not constitute the majority of the population in 1948 are excluded.

heterogeneity indeed undermines the voluntary provision of public goods: shared norms and networks played a key role in the ability of homogeneous communities to establish volunteer fire brigades when state institutions were weak. Second, the weakness of informal cooperation mechanisms in heterogeneous communities increases the demand for alternative, third-party enforcement mechanisms: heterogeneous communities in Poland are more likely to establish a municipal guard. Third, in the presence of well-functioning property rights institutions, low social capital does not undermine economic development in heterogeneous communities. Paradoxically, the uprooting and mixing of the population in post-WWII Poland produced a wealthier and more entrepreneurial society more than half a century later.

Can lessons from the Polish case apply elsewhere? Generalizability may be limited by the fact that migrants uprooted by the 1945 border changes shared Polish nationality and the Roman Catholic faith. In this respect Poland differs from the ethnically and religiously diverse African states, where the impact of diversity on economic development has been evaluated as especially negative. Yet what matters most for extrapolating from the Polish case is not the type of cleavage but whether the cleavage represents a salient social identity in a given context (Posner, 2004). Indeed, many findings in the Polish data confirm existing research: homogeneous communities are better at voluntary public goods provision than heterogeneous communities. The important caveat, however, is that the reliance on informal norms and networks is often suboptimal because states and other third parties have a comparative advantage over small communities in providing many types of public goods (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004).

Why did so many other studies fail to uncover a similarly positive relationship between diversity and economic activity? One reason, as suggested above, is the prevalence of ahistorical analyses, which examine the relationship between diversity and development at one point in time. This approach would produce misleading results were cultural diversity a consequence rather than a cause of poor institutional and economic outcomes (Singh and vom Hau, 2016). It is no coincidence that many diverse societies today are located in Africa, where high ethnolinguistic diversity and weak state institutions may both be the products of colonialism (Leeson, 2005). In Poland, state schooling assim-

ilated the most diverse communities to the national culture and identity over time; only the most homogeneous communities in the Recovered Territories have retained distinct identities, dialects, and customs.

Another reason may be insufficient attention to the spatial distribution of cultural groups (Enos and Gidron, 2016). At the micro level, many culturally heterogeneous states are actually homogeneous as groups cluster in space. In a segregated setting, out-group interactions are rare, and the incentives to rely on formal institutions are low. Instead, communities may opt for strategies such as in-group policing, whereby each community relies on informal norms and networks to punish its own members for cheating non-members (Fearon and Laitin, 1996). Cultural diversity in this setting is unlikely to produce beneficial outcomes. Low segregation at the micro level is thus an important scope condition for my argument.

References

- Acemoglu, Daron. 2009. *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir and William Easterly. 1999. "Public goods and ethnic divisions." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114(4):1243–1284.
- Ayyagari, Meghana, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic. 2013. "What determines protection of property rights? An analysis of direct and indirect effects." *Journal of Financial Econometrics* 11(4):610–649.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, Lakshmi Iyer and Rohini Somanathan. 2005. "History, social divisions, and public goods in rural India." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 3:639–647.
- Charnysh, Volha. 2017. *Migration, Diversity, and Economic Development: Post-WWII Displacement in Poland*. PhD thesis Harvard University.
- Darden, Keith and Harris Mylonas. 2016. "Threats to territorial integrity, national mass schooling, and linguistic commonality." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(11):1446–1479.
- Durlauf, Steven N. and Marcel Fafchamps. 2004. Social capital. In *The Handbook of Economic Growth*, ed. Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Enos, Ryan D. and Noam Gidron. 2016. "Intergroup behavioral strategies as contextually determined: Experimental evidence from Israel." *Journal of Politics* 78(3):851–867.
- Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 1996. "Explaining interethnic cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 90(4):715–735.
- Greif, Avner and Christopher Kingston. 2011. Institutions:

Rules or equilibria? In *Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting*, ed. Norman Schofield and Gonzalo Caballero. Heidelberg: Springer Science & Business Media.

Greif, Avner and Guido Tabellini. 2017. "The clan and the corporation: Sustaining cooperation in China and Europe." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 45(1):1–35.

Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2009. *Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Klon-Jawor. 2013. *Ochotnicze Straze Pozarne w Polsce. Research Report*. Stowarzyszenie Klon-Jawor.

Laitin, David and Barry R. Weingast. 2006. "An equilibrium alternative to the study of culture." *The Good Society* 15(1):15–20.

Leeson, Peter T. 2005. "Endogenizing fractionalization." *Journal of Institutional Economics* 1(1):75–98.

McMillan, John and Christopher Woodruff. 2000. "Private order under dysfunctional public order." *Michigan Law Review* 98:2421–2458.

Miguel, Edward and Mary K. Gugerty. 2005. "Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public goods in Kenya." *Journal of Public Economics* 89(11):2325–2368.

Ogilvie, Sheilagh and A. W. Carus. 2014. Institutions and economic growth in historical perspective. In *The Handbook of Economic Growth*, ed. Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Pepinsky, Thomas B. 2016. "Colonial migration and the origins of governance: Theory and evidence from Java." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(9):1201–1237.

Posner, Daniel N. 2004. "The political salience of cultural difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are allies in Zambia and adversaries in Malawi." *American Political Science Review* 98(4):529–545.

Singh, Prerna and Matthias vom Hau. 2016. "Ethnicity in time: Politics, history, and the relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods provision." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(10):1303–1340.

Stasieniuk, Zaneta. 2011. Wybrane Społeczno-kulturowe Uwarunkowania Integracji Zbiorowości Ziemi Zachodnich i Północnych Polski. In *Polskie Ziemi Zachodnie. Studia Socjologiczne*, ed. Andrzej Michalak, Andrzej Sakson and Zaneta Stasieniuk. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni.

Urban, Wincenty. 1965. "Archidiecezja Wrocławska w latach 1945–1965." *Nasza Przyszłość: Studia z Dziejów Kościoła i Kultury Katolickiej w Polsce* 22:10–68.

Wimmer, Andreas. 2016. "Is diversity detrimental? Ethnic fractionalization, public goods provision, and the historical legacies of stateness." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(11):1407–1445.

Immigration and Ethnic Politics in Europe: A Fertile Ground for Interdisciplinary Research and Theory Building

by [Rafaela Dancygier](#)

Princeton University

The study of immigrant politics in contemporary Europe raises a number of exciting questions and opens up research agendas with potentially wide-ranging theoretical implications spanning disciplinary boundaries. In this brief essay, I will draw attention to two interesting developments and use them to formulate a series of testable implications and research questions.

First, the political inclusion of rural-origin migrants in many European cities has revealed that ostensibly pre-modern behaviors and traditions can be grafted quite easily onto modern electoral institutions. The type of ethnic, tribal, and kin-based politics that operate across Africa ([Posner, 2005](#)) or India ([Chandra, 2004](#)) are also salient in European cities, even though European states do not deliver the same type of patronage that is said to sustain such politics elsewhere.

Second, in light of this ethnically-based style of political inclusion, the participation of immigrant-origin minorities in European electoral politics has the potential to reshape party systems, and not only because of a nativist electoral backlash. Arguments about the re-ordering of party systems in Europe typically refer to the preferences of native, majority populations. Globalization and immigration open up new axes of political competition, dividing electorates into progressive cosmopolitans on the one hand or conservative nationalists on the other. Yet, this account is incomplete because it ignores the transformative change that stems from the behavior of immigrants themselves.

In making these points, I draw on arguments and empirical tests that I have developed in a recent book, *Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics* ([Dancygier, 2017](#)). The book fleshes these ideas out more fully (and includes a more complete set of references). It contains research about migrants to Western Europe (concentrating mainly on Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Great Britain) originating from Muslim-majority countries, with a focus on Bangladesh, Morocco, Turkey, and Pakistan. For stylistic reasons, this

essay refers to “immigrants” or “Muslims” throughout rather than to “immigrants from Muslim-majority regions.” Moreover, below I mostly deal with migrant communities in dense enclaves whose spatial concentration makes them electorally attractive.

The political inclusion of rural-origin migrants in many European cities has revealed that ostensibly pre-modern behaviors and traditions can be grafted quite easily onto modern electoral institutions. The type of ethnic, tribal, and kin-based politics that operate across Africa or India are also salient in European cities, even though European states do not deliver the same type of patronage that is said to sustain such politics elsewhere.

I. Muslims and Ethnic Politics in 21st century Europe: Pre-modern Ties in Modern Times

Large-scale and persistent chain migration of families from Muslim-majority countries with mostly rural origins has been occurring in Europe for more than half a century. It has been accompanied by the replication of clan-based hierarchies, village ties, and home country social norms in European cities. These social structures have been extremely influential in shaping the forays of Muslims into electoral politics. Activating networks of kin and clan, immigrant office-seekers with roots in Turkey, Morocco, Pakistan, and Bangladesh engage in communal electioneering of a style that most political scientists associate with urban ethnic machines of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century United States or with contemporary election campaigns in developing countries. Yet, in highly modernized cities, located in the world's most economically advanced democracies, traditional leaders utilize centuries-old bonds of clan and kinship to drum up bloc votes and frequently rely on village allegiances and complex patterns of reciprocity to engineer turnout for favored candidates. Similar strategies are employed to register voters and gain membership in political parties and thereby influence the nomination of candidates.

Though fascinating ethnographic and journalistic work has detailed these behaviors for some time, a glance at election outcomes can also give clues about the salience of such ties. For example, in Belgian local elections where voters can use preference votes to reward specific candidates, candidates of Moroccan or Turkish descent running in immigrant enclaves manage to amass substantial preference ballots that allow them to move up party lists and beat out more highly-ranked Belgian-origin co-partisans. In English local elections, held according to plurality rule in multimember districts, Pakistani neighborhoods often elect politicians of different parties but of shared kinship, implying that many voters split their tickets on the basis of clan and ethnicity, but not party.¹

Why do we observe these behaviors in advanced democracies with developed economies and mature welfare states? This question harkens back to experiences in developing countries that witnessed the persistence and even intensification of tribal politics when their economies began to modernize and elections became more democratic and competitive (Bates, 1974). One reason why these pre-modern bonds failed to wane was because they turned out to be useful in election contests. Coordinating on ethnicity allowed politicians to build coalitions and voters to extract patronage in return for joining such coalitions (Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2005).

But 21st century European states are not patronage democracies. To be sure, politicians in European cities can engage in some degree of ethnic favoritism, by, for instance, attempting to influence waiting lists for public housing or by helping newly-arrived migrants to navigate state bureaucracies (Dancygier, 2010). But extensive, de-personalized bureaucracies constrain these actions and, moreover, generous welfare states make reliance on such favoritism less essential, at least when compared to the developing-country context.

Nonetheless, we cannot reduce the persistence of ethnic politics to primordial instincts or hangovers from the ‘old country’. Rather, among many immigrants living in enclaves, their position in the tribal or ethnic network and relationships with community leaders remain critical because these factors continue to structure opportunities in the new environment.²

¹Dancygier (2017) provides extensive details. See also Akhtar (2013), Eade (1989), or Teney et al. (2010).

²See also Adida (2014) on this point in the African context.

The activation of these ties is sometimes the result of the immigrant origins of communities. For more recent migrants who face language barriers, having contacts to a coethnic patron who can translate and interpret official documents can be vital. Access to such help can in turn be made conditional on electoral support for the patron himself or for a politician to whom the patron is indebted (Shaw, 2010; Sobolewska et al., 2015).

This kind of exchange does bear some resemblance to dynamics found in patronage democracies. But even when migrants and their descendants no longer depend on this type of assistance, other incentives help sustain ethnic and clan ties and can spill over into the electoral arena. For instance, the successful electoral performance of a kin group and the occupation of political office can raise the group's social status in relation to other migrant groups.³ Here, more research by social scientists is needed as to when and why this relative status gain and the position within one's ethnic or kin group remains consequential after years of settlement in the new country. Another reason why kinship and ethnicity remain salient in elections is because voting for a coethnic candidate makes sense if the candidate's family runs a restaurant or taxi business that can employ a son. Marriage markets also matter. If marriage within the kin group remains a priority, visible support for the group and for candidates whose families are potential in-laws is important.

Benefiting from the efficient delivery of bloc votes that some immigrant communities can deliver, [left and right] parties have frequently remained silent or even encouraged the ethnically-based mobilization of the Muslim vote.

These examples suggest that the socioeconomic assimilation and advancement of migrants will decrease the importance of ethnicity in elections. This claim has been made in the context of immigrant political inclusion in the U.S. (Dahl, 1961). It is worth keeping in mind, however, that in the UK, where many immigrants arrived as British citizens and were able to vote early on, these dynamics have persisted for nearly 50 years and show few signs of abating. One reason for their persistence most likely relates to the continued connection

to, and communication with, the home country. Developments relating to the social, religious, and economic life of the European enclave are frequently and nearly instantly shared with relatives and friends in home villages. These links help to preserve social norms by enabling a kind of "transnational social control" (Timmerman, 2006, 128). Rather than pulling migrants away from these forces, political inclusion can further intensify them.

Finally, even if motivations relating to intra-group economic and social opportunities and constraints aren't universally shared within the enclave, community and family loyalty can nevertheless encourage ethnic and kin-based voting. Especially in communities with strong hierarchical and patriarchal structures, male heads of household can pressure family members to vote in the desired way (Akhtar, 2013; Sobolewska et al., 2015). As a Kurdish-origin candidate running for local office in The Hague explained: "Once we have the word of the head of the household, the rest of the family also votes for us. In our culture we do not go against the will of the *pater familias*" (Zeegers, 2014).

While the tenacity of traditional social structures and norms among immigrant communities has been noted in other contexts (mainly with respect to inter-group relations), what is noteworthy is that they can operate in modern institutional contexts that are thought to be immune to pre-modern influences. For example, the secret ballot should render concerns about community and patriarchal pressures less relevant. Yet, in practice the presence of coethnic acquaintances at polling stations and, more troublingly, the filling-out of postal ballots by fathers and husbands at home, by canvassers at the doorstep, or by third parties in mosques, means that the vote is often quite public. Failure to support co-ethnics can therefore be very costly, within and across families.

This brief discussion opens up a series of research questions that go beyond the immediate topic at hand but for which the European case provides an excellent testing ground. Examples include: How and when can clientelism persist in the absence of state patronage? How can pre-existing social structures be adapted to electoral institutions for electoral gain? And what is the role of political institutions (whose development is

³The connection between political office and group social status was also evident among immigrant communities in the U.S. (Wolfin-ger, 1965).

exogenous to the immigrant presence) in buttressing or breaking down a group's social structures? Further, what is the relationship between minority social and economic advancement and electoral inclusion? Can the electoral process harm majority-minority relations by rewarding minority group members who are most distinct from the majority population?

II. The Consequences of Muslim Electoral Inclusion

Another question that arises from the previous discussion relates to the consequences of minority political inclusion beyond the enclave and for the party system at large. In recent years, the study of the political consequences of immigration in advanced democracies has flourished. Much of this literature deals with the attitudes and vote choices of natives reacting to immigration (Dancygier, 2010, 2013; Golder, 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Kriesi et al., 2008). Likewise, an analogous literature on the U.S. case demonstrates that diversity can alter party systems by causing white voters to abandon diversifying coalitions. The Democratic Party's support for civil rights and African American political inclusion and Republican resistance on these matters generated a lasting partisan realignment. Similar arguments have been made about immigration in the U.S. context, and are increasingly applied to the European case as well. Immigration (and other facets of globalization) pulls voters away from class-based voting, generates a two-dimensional political space, and allows populist parties to rise (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Hooghe and Marks, Forthcoming; Inglehart and Norris, 2017).

This general account is apt, but incomplete in its characterization of transformative change. Research on immigration's political consequences tends to ignore the immigrant side of the equation. A more complete understanding must take into account how immigrants are incorporated into politics. The previous section has highlighted that incorporation tends to elevate bonds of ethnicity and kinship and, by implication, push aside class-based issues and alliances.

Mainstream parties on the Left and the Right bear responsibility for this development.⁴ Benefiting from the efficient delivery of bloc votes that some immigrant communities can deliver, these parties have frequently

remained silent or even encouraged the ethnically-based mobilization of the Muslim vote. Yet, the continued activation of ethnic and kinship networks for electoral purposes has also prevented the cultivation of programmatic linkages between immigrants and parties, at least in enclaves where size and concentration can turn immigrants into pivotal voters and bloc votes are consequently prized (Dancygier, 2017).

Even though districts of immigrant concentration are frequently marked by material deprivation and poverty, election campaigns in these areas often do not revolve around economic concerns. As a result, areas that used to be dominated by left parties are now up for grabs, ushering in realignments of their own.

The relative absence of cross-ethnic, class-based alliances is therefore not only the result of natives' resistance to joining such coalitions. It also stems from parties' unwillingness to engage in the hard work of building encompassing alliances in the face of a much easier alternative. Having relied on ethnic ties and the social structures that uphold them, mainstream parties have played their part in raising the salience of immigrant ethnicity — and, with it, the prominence of inter-group differences — at the expense of other issue dimensions, such as redistribution and social spending. Even though districts of immigrant concentration are frequently marked by material deprivation and poverty, election campaigns in these areas often do not revolve around economic concerns. As a result, areas that used to be dominated by left parties are now up for grabs, ushering in realignments of their own.

This development is not uniform across cases. At this point, the transformation is most visible in elections at the local and regional level, but we can also observe it during national elections in small electoral districts where immigrant-origin minorities can form a large part of the electorate. Looking across countries, these dynamics tend to be most pronounced where citizenship laws and electoral rules make it possible for immigrant enclaves to become pivotal electoral players, and they are therefore most evident in areas of Muslim

⁴Left parties have been more proactive in incorporating immigrant voters, but parties on the right have also exploited ethnic and kin-based ties when recruiting Muslim electorates.

concentration in the UK, Belgium, and the Netherlands. But given the growing size of immigrant communities and the long duration of their settlement, similar developments are unfolding even in settings where citizenship laws and electoral institutions are less permissive, such as Austria or Germany.

These dynamics also prompt a series of questions that future work can tackle. For example, under what conditions does the political behavior of ethnic minorities and immigrants trigger electoral realignments? How do parties decide when to elevate bonds of ethnicity vs. class in their search for votes? How do broader features of the political economy such as the prevalence of (intra-ethnic) self-employment or service work as opposed to (cross-ethnic) factory-based manufacturing jobs influence these recruitment and coalition-building strategies? And how does the decline of organizational structures that traditionally mobilized native majority voters (such as unions and churches) affect parties' interest in the political inclusion of minority voters?

As this short essay suggests, the study of immigrant political inclusion in Western Europe — and in advanced democracies more generally — raises a number of intriguing and wide-ranging questions. Though the topic is important in its own right, future work should also consider using it as a laboratory for addressing questions that are of concern to social scientists spanning subfields and disciplinary boundaries.

References

- Abrajano, Marisa and Zoltan L. Hajnal. 2015. *White Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Adida, Claire L. 2014. *Immigrant Exclusion and Insecurity in Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Akhtar, Parveen. 2013. *British Muslim Politics: Examining Pakistani Biraderi Networks*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bates, Robert H. 1974. "Ethnic competition and modernization in contemporary Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 6(4):457–484.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1961. *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dancygier, Rafaela M. 2010. *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Dancygier, Rafaela M. 2013. "The left and minority representation: The Labour Party, Muslim candidates, and inclusion tradeoffs." *Comparative Politics* 46(1):1–21.
- Dancygier, Rafaela M. 2017. *Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Eade, John. 1989. *The Politics of Community*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Golder, Matt. 2016. "Far right parties in Europe." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19:477–497.
- Hainmueller, Jens and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2014. "Public attitudes toward immigration." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17:225–249.
- Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. Forthcoming. "Cleavage theory meets Europe's crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the transnational cleavage." *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(1):109–135.
- Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. 2017. "Trump and the populist authoritarian parties: The silent revolution in reverse." *Perspectives on Politics* 15(2):443–454.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier and Timotheos Frey. 2008. *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Posner, Daniel N. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Shaw, Alison. 2010. *Kinship and Continuity: Pakistani Families in Britain*. New York: Routledge.
- Sobolewska, Maria, Stuart Wilks-Heeg, Eleanor Hill and Magda Borkowska. 2015. "Understanding electoral fraud vulnerability in Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin communities in England: A view of local political activists." Report prepared for the United Kingdom Electoral Commission.
- Teney, Celine, Dirk Jacobs, Andrea Rea and Pascal Delwit. 2010. "Ethnic voting in Brussels: Voting patterns among ethnic minorities in Brussels (Belgium) during the 2006 local elections." *Acta Politica* 45(3):273–297.
- Timmerman, Christiane. 2006. "Gender dynamics in the context of Turkish marriage migration: The case of Belgium." *Turkish Studies* 7(1):125–143.
- Wolfinger, Raymond E. 1965. "The development and persistence of ethnic voting." *American Political Science Review* 59(4):896–908.
- Zeegers, Marten. 2014. "Moslimstemmen gelden." *de Volkskrant*, March 15.

Misfit Politics: Identity Construction and Vote Choice

by Adam Harris

University of Gothenburg

While racial and ethnic groups tend to vote together, many individuals do not vote with their group. Why is that? I argue here, and in my book manuscript, *Misfit Politics: Identity and Vote Choice in Divided Societies*, that the answer to this question can be found in the extent to which individuals are apparently consistent with the prototypical member of their racial or ethnic group. Or, put more simply, group ‘misfits’, those who are not obvious or typical members of the group, are less likely to vote with the rest of their group.

Research from diverse regions of the world has shown that racial and ethnolinguistic groups tend to vote as cohesive blocks (Dawson, 1994; Telles, 2004; Posner, 2005; Hochschild and Weaver, 2007; Southall and Daniel, 2009; Ferree, 2011; Chauchard, 2016; Horowitz, *Forthcoming*). However, the correlation between social identity group membership and political preferences is far from perfect (Hutchings and Valentino, 2004; Ichino and Nathan, 2013; Horowitz, *Forthcoming*). For example, public opinion data from South Africa and the U.S., two countries in which race is highly politicized, find that as few as 52% and as many as 81% of a racial group’s members vote together in a given election.¹ What explains this individual-level variation in willingness to conform with the group given the expectations and empirical findings that group members typically vote together?

Studies of race and ethnicity have focused on ideological, partisan, prejudicial, strategic, or class differences within racial or ethnic groups to explain within-group variation in political preferences (Dawson, 1994; Hutchings and Valentino, 2004; Griffin and Keane, 2006; Grootes, 2013; Ichino and Nathan, 2013; Baker, Jones and Tate, 2014; Krupnikov and Piston, 2015). However, these studies have overlooked the diversity of ways in which individuals identify with their group beyond the amorphous concept of identity salience, which is largely a result of the focus on shared identities and in- versus out-group dynamics. Because studies focus on groups, the individual-level variation in how identi-

ties are constructed and their influence on vote choice are not fully considered.

Of the various branches of identity studies in political science, studies of race have arguably made the most progress in terms of considering within-group variation in identity and its effects on political outcomes. This is largely because these studies disaggregate race into its constituent parts and focus on how skin tone affects racial experiences (Sen and Wasow, 2016). These studies argue that lighter-skinned African Americans should have divergent stances on political and policy issues from the rest of the African American community because they do not suffer from the same degree of discrimination. However, the empirical support for this theory is mixed at best with the balance suggesting a null relationship (Seltzer and Smith, 1991; Bowman, Muhammad and Ifatunji, 2004; Hochschild and Weaver, 2007; Hutchings et al., 2016). This is puzzling because studies have found that skin tone affects a wide variety of individuals’ daily lives and life prospects (Erasmus, 2001; Maddox and Gray, 2002; Telles, 2004; Wade, Romano and Blue, 2004; Hunter, 2005; Adhikari, 2009). While making important progress in our understanding of race, the literature that looks beyond group membership to skin tone suffers from a key limitation: by focusing only on the lightness or darkness of skin tone rather than the extent to which skin tone is prototypical of the group, past studies do not fully consider the consequences of skin tone for identity-construction and its effects on political preferences. In short, studies have only looked at one type of misfit: those who are fair in complexion without considering the possibility that those who are *relatively* dark in complexion could also be misfit.

To address this shortcoming, I develop the concept of *racial distance*, which allows me to relatively exogenously measure the effects of skin tone and racial identity construction on willingness to vote with one’s group.² Importantly, this approach allows me to take seriously the notion that race is constructed but also establish a causal relationship between socially constructed race and vote choice. In a new theoretical approach, I propose considering the consequences of skin tone for identity construction through the presence of differential treatment not only in terms of the amount of

¹This is based on data from Afrobarometer Round 5 for South Africa and the 2012 American National Election Study for the U.S.

²I also systematically address threats to the exogeneity of this measure such as enumerator assessment bias, racial heritage, and political socialization. This analysis is available upon request.

discrimination (Hutchings et al., 2016) but in terms of receiving treatment that reinforces or questions one's membership in a racial group. Individuals with skin tones that are less typical of their group are likely to be treated as different from the rest of the group whether they are among the darkest or lightest in their group (Adhikari, 2009). If an individual is identified as a 'misfit' of her group (singled out as different from the rest of the group) by those from in- and out-groups, then her group identity is likely weakened. Importantly, the degree to which individuals receive treatment that differentiates them from the rest of the group increases with how divergent their skin tone is from the group because skin tone is a heuristic for racial identity and unfortunately conditions social treatment (Maddox and Gray, 2002; Adhikari, 2009).

Research from diverse regions of the world has shown that racial and ethnolinguistic groups tend to vote as cohesive blocks. However, the correlation between social identity group membership and political preferences is far from perfect.

This weaker racial identity should then reduce the influence of race when casting a ballot. A weaker identity makes these individuals political 'free agents' who are less bound to vote with the group. It is important to note that this relationship is not deterministic: skin tone does not determine one's vote from birth. Rather, skin tone influences whether or not an individual is identified as a misfit and the type of social treatment one is likely to receive, which in turn influences the type of racial identity she constructs and its political consequences.

A few examples of group 'misfits' may help clarify this relationship. Consider three Coloured³ informal interviewees from South Africa. Sharon explained that because her children were darker in complexion, they received negative treatment from not only the other Coloured children at school but also from their own cousins who were much more prototypical in complexion. These experiences led her to actively distance herself from the Coloured community. Mary, a woman

who is relatively fair in complexion, said that she was often accused of not being 'Coloured enough' and said that her Coloured neighbors would call out "There goes that white woman!" when she walked by. Mary still *felt* very 'Coloured' but expressed frustration with other Coloureds and her marginal place in the community. Neither Sharon nor Mary supported the party that other Coloureds support. Contrastingly, Johan, a more racially prototypically Coloured respondent, did not mention any differential treatment. In fact, Johan said "I look like all the other Coloureds, so why should I be treated any differently?" He saw no reason to question his relationship or place in the Coloured community and also supported the Coloured party.

To test the relationship between racial distance and vote choice, this study turns to South Africa, the U.S., and Brazil, all cases in which race is socially and politically salient but to varying degrees (Marx, 1999). I draw on four data sources: (i) original panel survey data that brackets the 2014 South African National Elections, (ii) original exit poll survey data from South Africa's 2016 local elections, (iii) the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES), and (iv) the 2010-2014 Americas Barometer survey data from Brazil. These datasets facilitate a test of the empirical relationship between racial distance and vote choice among the three largest race groups in each country. The empirical analysis finds that racial proximity does predict willingness to vote along group lines for racial majorities and some, but not all, racial minorities in each country.

I. Defining Racial Distance

The racial distance concept developed here seeks to consider the importance of racial groups while at the same time taking seriously the fact that group boundaries contain within them individuals that vary greatly in racial terms. I draw from Chandra's (2012) work on ethnic and racial identities, which defines these identities as rooted in descent-based attributes, attributes that are given at birth. I define racial distance as the degree of skin tone (racial descent-based attribute) similarity between an individual and the prototypical member of a group (either her own or an out-group). I define the prototypical members of a racial group as the individu-

³'Coloured' refers to the largely mixed-race community in South Africa.

⁴I focus on skin tone as a proxy for the set of modal racial attributes of a group. While many racial attributes exist, skin tone is often the most socially/politically consequential. I use the prototypical member of each group as the target for comparison when determining racial distance because people tend to define groups in society based on group prototypes (Fryer and Jackson, 2008; Shayo, 2009). Shayo (2009) uses the mean as the prototype for mathematical convenience and simplicity to measure within-group distance. Empirically, the results

als who have the modal skin tone of their racial group.⁴ Therefore, an individual's racial distance from a group, including her own, increases as her skin tone decreases in similarity to that of the modal skin tone of the group.

Approaching within-group variation in race using this concept of racial distance provides two key advantages. First, rather than focus on race as a zero-one indicator of group membership, it focuses on relational attributes that better capture variation in how individuals relate to and construct their racial identity (Sen and Wasow, 2016). By considering each individual's placement in the racial attribute continuum and her placement relative to the modal members of her group, we move beyond group membership, while still taking it into account. In short, this measure more accurately captures the complexity of race by considering individual variation within race groups.

How individuals relate to and construct their identities is important for understanding the role of race in politics, and this cannot be accurately investigated if scholars focus on group membership and overlook within-group variation in identity. The racial distance approach provides a greater understanding of the dynamics of race and does so in a way that still facilitates a causal interpretation of the results.

Second, racial distance also provides a way to measure race in an exogenous manner because it is rooted in attributes given at birth, which are difficult to change (Chandra, 2012; Telles and Paschel, 2014). It is likely that one's skin tone is more exogenous than reported group membership or identity salience in a survey, which is the norm for assessing identities and their salience (Nobles, 2000; Eifert, Miguel and Posner, 2010).⁵ By focusing on the relational nature of skin tone we can measure race in a way that is exogenous to political processes and thus more clearly identify the causal effect of race on political behavior.⁶ While this

definition of race rests on the idea that descent/biology determines one's racial group membership, it does not however assume or predict that race is immutable from birth. Importantly, the interpretation of racial attributes such as skin tone and the social treatment that results from this interpretation are what make race relevant for social and political outcomes. As Chandra (2012, 149-150) states, "biology determines the shade of skin we have. But how we 'see' that objectively given shade is a product of socially constructed interpretations ... saying that constructivism matters is saying at the same time that 'biology *does* matter.' The question is *how*."

II. Measuring Racial Distance

To measure racial distance, I use each survey's measure of respondent skin tone, which is obtained by asking the enumerator to place each respondent on a skin tone scale at the beginning of each survey (in Brazil, the assessment is made at the end of the survey). I then took the absolute value of the difference between each individual and the observed modal skin color in the sample. Therefore, the resulting variable, *Racial Distance*, increases as an individual becomes less modal in her skin tone and is agnostic regarding whether the person's skin color is darker or lighter than the mode.

In my original survey data, I also measure racial heritage because it provides a way to control for one's connection to different racial communities, and allows me to more fully isolate the social treatment consequences of the racial distance measure in the models below. Identities beyond race could also influence perceptions of racial distance. Therefore, wherever possible, I control for the individual's distance from her group's modal linguistic, religious, and region attributes.

III. Empirics: Racial Distance and Vote Choice

I now turn to an empirical test of the proposed relationship that those who are more racially distant are less likely to vote with their group. For this essay, I only include analysis using the 2016 South Africa exit poll data. Analysis of the other datasets is available upon request. The logit models I estimate predict voting for the group's party using racial distance as the key inde-

below are unchanged when using the mean as the prototype.

⁵ Identity salience has been one way of measuring identity variation within various social identity groups (McLaughlin, 2007; Eifert, Miguel and Posner, 2010; Shayo, 2009), but endogeneity issues limit its empirical usefulness.

⁶ It is possible for individuals to change their racial attributes (e.g., skin bleaching), but such changes are slow and difficult to make, especially in the short time span of a single election.

pendent variable and control for rural/city origin, age, gender, education, economic conditions, policy preferences, strategic voting, the above-mentioned identity controls, and a control for enumerator effects on skin tone assessment. I present here the results from South Africa, but I do briefly summarize the patterns across all three cases. If the proposed relationship holds, we should expect those who are more distant from their group to be less likely to vote for their group's political party. In South Africa, Black voters prefer the African National Congress (ANC) and Coloured and White voters prefer the Democratic Alliance (DA).

Given that this sample contains respondents from multiple race groups, for clarity and ease of interpretation, I interact race group identity with the racial distance indicator, and I interact racial distance with only one race group dummy in each model. This provides a way to estimate the effect of skin tone within a group and compare behavior across groups, conditional on within-group distance. The effects of group membership conditional on racial distance from each model for the South Africa sample are presented in Figure 1. Each plot in Figure 1 presents the change in the predicted probability of voting for one's group's party at each level of racial distance. Given that these plots are based on interaction models, they present the marginal effect of racial distance for the specified group *relative* to the other groups in the sample that prefer a different party. Importantly, these plots indicate the level of distance from the group's modal skin tone at which in-group members become indistinguishable from out-group members in their vote choice. In the plots presented in Figure 1, when the 95% confidence intervals cross zero there is no significant difference in the probability of voting for a certain party between the specified group and groups in society that prefer a different party. If there is no significant difference between the relatively more distant members of a group and other groups in society regarding the probability of voting for the group's party *but* there is a significant difference in vote choice between the most proximate members and out-group individuals, then we can conclude that racial distance does in fact influence vote choice in the expected manner. The figures also indicate the degree to which group membership influences the probability of voting with the group at each level of racial distance. If group membership has a stronger positive effect for the most proximate relative to the most distant, then we

once again have support for the hypothesized relationship.

First consider the results regarding the Black community (the majority group) in Figure 1(a). Racial identity among the most proximate group members significantly increases the probability of voting for the group's party as evidenced by the positive and significant effect associated with a racial distance between 0 and 0.4. In line with the proposed relationship, the positive effect of group membership decreases in magnitude as racial distance increases (moving to the right on the horizontal axis). Further, the positive marginal effect of group membership on voting with the group is non-existent for those who are more than .45 away from the mode in South Africa. Substantively, these results suggest that 23% of black respondents in South Africa (the most racially distant) are *not* significantly more likely to vote for their group's party compared to other groups who tend to prefer a different party.


Now turning to the Coloured community or 'middle' group in Figure 1(b).⁷ Once again, we see that as racial distance increases, the probability of voting for the group's party decreases. Importantly, the model finds that group membership significantly differentiates vote choice only for the relatively proximate members of the Coloured community: those who fall on the most distant 10% of the racial distance scale (1% of Coloured respondents) are not more or less likely to vote for the group's party compared to out-group voters who prefer another party.

From the final plot in Figure 1(c), we find no clear support for the theory among the White minority in South Africa. The effect of group membership does decrease with racial distance, but this effect is not significant at conventional levels. The expected decreasing effect of group membership on voting with the group as racial distance increases is, however, observed, as well as the expected lack of difference between out-group individuals and the relatively more distant in-group members.

This pattern of results is also observed in the U.S. context — the theory finds empirical support among the White majority and the Latino 'middle' minority but not among African Americans. However, in Brazil we find that the theory only applies to the white major-

⁷I define 'middle' minority groups as those that are sandwiched between black and white on the skin tone spectrum.

Figure 1: The Effect of Group Membership on Voting for the Group's Party conditional on Relative Skin Tone



Note: Figure 1 presents plots for South Africa showing how group membership affects the probability of voting for the group's party conditional on an individual's racial proximity in terms of skin tone with respect to the modal group member. Panel (a) is for the majority group (Blacks), panel (b) is for the 'middle group' (Coloureds), and panel (c) is for the minority group (Whites). ANC refers to the African National Congress and DA refers to the Democratic Alliance. When the 95% confidence intervals cross zero, then there is no statistically significant difference in vote choice between group members and out-group individuals from groups that prefer a different party.

ity. Taken together, these results show that the theory applies to majority populations in all three countries and to 'middle' minority groups in countries with relatively strict racial boundaries (South Africa and the U.S.): misfits in these groups are less likely to vote with the rest of the group. However, the theory does not apply to the 'middle' category in Brazil or minority groups in any of the countries.

IV. Conclusion

My essay has sought to explain the role racial identities play in determining preference variation within groups. To do this, I introduced and measured racial distance as a way to understand the degree to which an individual is a misfit in her group. The analysis shows strong support for the argument that those who are more distant from their own racial group are significantly less likely to vote for their group's party. In racially charged elections, these individuals are the most racially distant members of a group, the misfits. These results illustrate that racial distance conditions the role that race plays at the ballot box.

Further, the main results from this study show the importance of measuring race in a way that allows for a serious consideration of the constructed nature of race. Clearly, how individuals relate to and construct their identities is important for understanding the role of race in politics, and this cannot be accurately investigated if scholars focus on group membership and overlook within-group variation in identity. The racial distance approach provides a greater understanding of the dynamics of race and does so in a way that still facilitates a causal interpretation of the results.

References

- Adhikari, Mohamed. 2009. *Burdened by Race: Coloured Identities in Southern Africa*. Cape Town: UCT Press.
- Baker, Lucius J., Mack H. Jones and Katherine Tate. 2014. *African Americans and the American Political System*. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 5 edition.
- Bowman, Phillip J., Ray Muhammad and Mosi Ifatunji. 2004. "Skin tone, class, and racial attitudes among African Americans". In *Skin Deep: How Race and Complexion Matter in the "Color Blind" Era*, ed. Cedric Herring, Verna Keith and Hayward D. Horton. Chicago: University of Illinois Press pp. 128–158.
- Chandra, Kanchan, ed. 2012. *Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chauchard, Simon. 2016. "Unpacking ethnic preferences: Theory and micro-level evidence from north India." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(2):253–284.
- Dawson, Michael C. 1994. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Eifert, Benn, Edward Miguel and Daniel N. Posner. 2010. "Political competition and ethnic identification in Africa." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2):494–510.
- Erasmus, Zimitri. 2001. "Introduction: Re-imagining coloured identities in post-Apartheid South Africa". In *Coloured by History, Shaped by Place: New Perspectives on Coloured Identities in Cape Town*, ed. Zimitri Erasmus. Cape Town: Kwela Books.
- Ferree, Karen E. 2011. *Framing the Race in South Africa: The Political Origins of Racial Census Elections*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Fryer, Roland and Matthew O. Jackson. 2008. "A categorical model of cognition and biased decision making." *The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics* 8(1):1–42.
- Griffin, John D. and Michael Keane. 2006. "Descriptive representation and the composition of African American turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4):998–1012.
- Grootes, Stephen. 2013. *S.A. Politics: Unspun*. Johannesburg: Two Dogs.
- Hochschild, Jennifer L. and Vesla Weaver. 2007. "The skin color paradox and the American racial order." *Social Forces* 86(2):643–670.
- Horowitz, J. Forthcoming. "Ethnicity and campaign effects in Africa's multiethnic democracies." *British Journal of Political Science*.
- Hunter, Margaret L. 2005. *Race, Gender, and the Politics of Skin Tone*. New York: Routledge.
- Hutchings, Vincent L., Hakeem Jefferson, Neil Lewis and Nicole Yadon. 2016. "The color of our skin and the content of our politics: Exploring the effects of skin tone on policy preferences among African Americans." Working paper, University of Michigan.
- Hutchings, Vincent L. and Nicholas A. Valentino. 2004. "The centrality of race in American politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7:383–408.
- Ichino, Nahomi and Noah L. Nathan. 2013. "Crossing the line: Local ethnic geography and voting in Ghana." *American Political Science Review* 107(2):344–361.
- Krupnikov, Yanna and Spencer Piston. 2015. "Racial prejudice, partisanship, and white turnout in elections with Black candidates." *Political Behavior* 37(2):397–418.
- Maddox, Keith B. and Stephanie A. Gray. 2002. "Cognitive representations of Black Americans: Reexploring the role of skin tone." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 28(2):250–259.
- Marx, Anthony W. 1999. *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil*. Cam-

bridge: Cambridge University Press.

- McLaughlin, Eric S. 2007. "Beyond the racial census: The political salience of ethnolinguistic cleavages in South Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 40(4):435–456.
- Nobles, Melissa. 2000. *Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern Politics*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Posner, Daniel N. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Seltzer, Richard and Robert C. Smith. 1991. "Color differences in the Afro-American community and the differences they make." *Journal of Black Studies* 21(3):279–286.
- Sen, Maya and Omar Wasow. 2016. "Race as a bundle of sticks: Designs that estimate effects of seemingly immutable characteristics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19:499–522.
- Shayo, Moses. 2009. "A model of social identity with an application to political economy: Nation, class, and redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 103(2):147–174.
- Southall, Roger and John Daniel. 2009. "The South African election of 2009." *Africa Spectrum* 42(2):111–124.
- Telles, Edward E. 2004. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Telles, Edward and Tianna Paschel. 2014. "Who is Black, White, or mixed race? How skin color, status, and nation shape racial classification in Latin America." *American Journal of Sociology* 120(3):864–907.
- Wade, T Joel, Melanie J. Romano and Leslie Blue. 2004. "The effect of African American skin color on hiring preferences." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 34(12):2550–2558.

Bringing Together Studies of Ethnic Prejudice and Ethnic Conflict in China¹

by Yue Hou

University of Pennsylvania

Patterns of bias against Muslim individuals are frequently observed in China. Uyghur Muslims are more likely to receive unfavorable treatment by the police and other government agencies, they face difficulties in the labor and housing markets, and they seldom appear in top political and corporate positions. However, in the social science literature, there is little work on systematically identifying ethnic bias and discrimination in China. China is the world's most populous country

with 23 million ethnic Muslims. In recent decades, it has experienced a surge in Islamic extremism and violence. From a practical perspective, studying ethnic prejudice in China could produce useful policy implications to help alleviate the current ethnic tensions. From a theoretical perspective, China provides an important, yet understudied, empirical case in the ethnic politics literature.

In this essay, I summarize recent developments in the literatures addressing ethnic conflict and ethnic prejudice in China, focusing in particular on the relations that exist between the Chinese Han and Chinese Muslims.² I also suggest ways for synthesizing the two bodies of scholarship.

I. Ethnic Conflict in China

Ethnic violence in China has increased in frequency and severity since the late 1980s, particularly between the majority Han Chinese and the Uyghurs, a Sunni Muslim ethnic group with a population of 10.1 million (Potter, 2013).³ One of the most serious outbursts occurred in July 2009 in Urumqi, the capital of the Northwestern Xinjiang Autonomous Region, where the majority of Uyghurs reside. A protest quickly turned into a harrowing ethnic riot, resulting in almost 200 deaths, more than 1,700 injuries, and an additional two days of violence due to Han retaliation (Han, 2013). Ethnic violence such as this is difficult to study in China because of data and access constraints: reporters and scholars have limited access to Xinjiang, and many details of incidents go unreported (Hong and Yang, Forthcoming).

Despite these difficulties, there is a rich historical, anthropological, and ethnographic literature on ethnic conflict and Xinjiang (Bovingdon, 2013; Cliff, 2016; Han, 2011; Jacobs, 2016; Millward, 2007; Rudelson, 1997; Finley, 2013). Two recent studies represent a new trend in studying ethnic conflict in China in that they employ rigorous empirical tools and large datasets to make causal inferences.

The first study, by Hong and Yang (Forthcoming), examines the effect of natural resources on the onset of violent incidents in Xinjiang. Hong and Yang (Forth-

¹ I thank Xun Cao, Avery Goldstein, Enze Han, Chad Hazlett, Ji Yeon Hong, and Peichun Wang for helpful comments.

² I do not wish to argue here that Islam has a distinctive effect on ethnic prejudice and ethnic violence in China. I focus on the Han-Uyghur relations simply because the literature on these particular ethnic groups is more developed.

³ Population data come from the 2010 Population Census of China published by the National Bureau of Statistics.

coming) compiled all of the available violence data from 1949 to 2014 in Xinjiang, building on important data sources such as [Bovingdon \(2013\)](#). They find no evidence to support the ‘resource curse’ hypothesis in China — they find that areas with more natural resource production or endowments have a *lower* rate of conflict.

The second study, by [Cao et al. \(2016\)](#), examines the effect of religious institutions on ethnic conflict in Xinjiang. It finds that religious institutions have a ‘conflict-dampening effect’ because they provide local public goods, because they enable information to flow between the local population and the government, and because they facilitate collective bargaining.⁴ [Cao et al. \(2016\)](#) focus on ethnic violence in Xinjiang between 1990 and 2005 to create a comprehensive database, the Ethnic Violence in China (EVC) database, identifying 213 violent events, including bombings, assassinations, riots, arson, and armed attacks. Using this data source, they find that between-group inequalities motivate oppressed groups to revolt, but that the effect is dampened by the strength of religious institutions.

These two studies represent some of the first attempts to systematically analyze conflict in China using quantitative methods. The willingness of the authors to share their conflict datasets will likely generate interest among both China scholars and conflict scholars.⁵ One area that requires more scrutiny has to do with the causes of conflict in China. Informed by earlier theories on grievances, collective action, and conflict, [Cao et al. \(2016\)](#) propose a causal chain in which between-group inequality, proxied by education attainment and occupation categories, produces grievances, which then fuel ethnic conflict. This is plausible, but more fine-grained empirical evidence is needed to support each part of the causal chain. Does economic inequality always lead to political grievances ([Sambanis, 2001](#))? How do minority leaders use grievances to mobilize discontent into actions in a strong state? Are ethnic minorities more likely to use violence to channel grievances? Similarly, [Hong and Yang \(Forthcoming\)](#) admit that they do not have enough evidence to analyze the causes of the fluctuations in violence in Xinjiang. Their proposed story for their empirical results is that areas with more natural

resource extraction experience more abundant employment opportunities and that this benefits both Han and Muslim residents, with the result that violence is reduced.

Many questions remain regarding the causes of ethnic conflict in this new line of research. Does the lack of sustained communication across groups always instigate intergroup violence ([Han, 2010](#))? Do economic development and employment always suppress intergroup grievances? Are there systematic biases against ethnic minorities in the public sphere ([Grossman et al., 2015](#))? How does discontent translate into group violence? From the perspective of the political elite, how exactly do they mobilize ethnic groups and achieve mass compliance? What are the psychological and small-group mechanisms that achieve compliance ([Green and Seher, 2003](#))?

[Green and Seher \(2003\)](#) call for a synthesis of the study of ethnic violence and ethnic bias, as the incorporation of the latter would provide more systematic evaluation of causal hypotheses in the study of ethnic conflict. Similarly, [Sambanis \(2002\)](#) suggests that the civil violence literature should continue to develop a closer fit between macro-level and micro-level theory. Such a synthesis is also very much needed in the study of ethnic politics in China.

The scholarship on ethnic bias, often accused of lacking external validity and focusing on a narrow set of outcomes, could benefit greatly from more discussion of the consequences of bias, one of which is its influence on ethnic conflict. There is a great need, and much to be gained, from more dialogue between scholars of ethnic bias and ethnic conflict.

In the next section, I review some new works on the measurement of ethnic bias in politics, in the labor market, and in attitudes towards certain public policies in China. They provide answers to some of the questions above and I argue that this line of work could contribute

⁴Interestingly, the study by [Hong and Yang \(Forthcoming\)](#) finds that the stronger presence of religious institutions in Xinjiang *increases* the probability of conflict. The conflicting results with respect to the impact of religious institutions on violence in these two studies could be a result of the different time periods used in their analyses, how they define violence, and how they measure the presence and strength of religious institutions.

⁵For a detailed overview of the Ethnic Violence in China database, see [Cao et al. \(Forthcoming\)](#).

to the micro-foundations of the scholarship on conflict.

II. Ethnic Bias in China

Earlier works on ethnic bias in China, just like the general literature on discrimination and bias, mostly employ individual-level outcome regressions, where ethnic bias is estimated after controlling for other observable factors that might also determine the various outcomes under consideration, such as income or employment (Hannum and Xie, 1998; Wu and Song, 2014; Zang, 2008). The biggest concern associated with this approach is omitted variable bias. In the labor market, for instance, ethnicity could be “correlated with other proxies for productivity that are unobservable to the researcher but observed by the employer” (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017, 7). Also, minority workers could have sorted themselves into industries with limited discrimination, but industry-specific discrimination would not be identified if industry fixed effects are included in the specifications (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017).

Experiments offer a solution to many of the problems associated with traditional regression models when studying ethnic bias. Below I summarize three new studies that use an experimental approach to measure ethnic bias in China.

Do political elites exhibit bias towards their co-ethnics? Using a national audit experiment where they send fictitious information requests to mayors and altering names that indicate different ethnic identities, Distelhorst and Hou (2014) find that Chinese officials are 33% less likely to respond to information requests from citizens with Uyghur names than those with Han names.

Do individuals react to violence differently if the perpetrators are coethnic? Hou and Quek (2017) study how individuals respond to security threats imposed by coethnic and non-coethnic nationals. Using a series of survey experiments on a national sample of Chinese citizens, they find that individuals are more likely to approve of the government's use of lethal force, independent of the identities of the perpetrators, when they first view reports of violence. They also find sugges-

tive evidence that individuals exhibit intergroup biases when exposed to reports of violence.

Do ethnic minorities face discrimination on the job market, even if they appear as qualified as their Han competitors? In a work-in-progress, Liu, Hou and Crabtree (2017) use a correspondence study research design where they create fictitious job applicants who send resumes to employers for jobs. Each job applicant is assigned either a Muslim or a non-Muslim identity. They measure bias (or the lack thereof) by comparing various outcomes, such as call back rates, across similar applicants with and without an ethnic identity marker. Maurer-Fazio (2012) conducted a similar experiment where she compares Han, Mongolian, and Tibetan applicants in China. Liu, Hou and Crabtree (2017) build on this earlier study and include an additional treatment dimension; specifically, they include a variable — the asking salary — to measure the ‘elasticity’ of ethnic bias.

These experiments have their own limitations. The outcome variables are usually a coarse proxy for what they are intended to measure, the experimental scenarios can look unrealistic, and there are ethical concerns regarding the use of deception. Nonetheless, these works provide ‘disciplined evidence’⁶ regarding individual-level ethnic bias or the lack thereof in official behavior, individual attitudes towards certain public policies, and the labor market.⁷

III. Conclusion

A micro-level understanding of ethnic bias can provide important insights to those scholars interested in examining outcomes and mechanisms in the ethnic conflict literature. Can group preferences be constructed or manipulated by politicians? Under what conditions can ethnic bias manifest itself as ethnic violence? How do elites make decisions? Are decisions and attitudes that appear to be based on ethnicity in fact driven by other qualities of that group? Along similar lines, the scholarship on ethnic bias, often accused of lacking external validity and focusing on a narrow set of outcomes, could benefit greatly from more discussion of the consequences of bias, one of which is its influence on ethnic conflict. There is a great need, and much to be

⁶This disciplined approach does not involve “ad hoc (even if intuitive) additions to the utility function (animus toward certain groups) to help rationalize a puzzling behavior” (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017, 3).

⁷If designed well, experimental studies like these can help distinguish between taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017, 3-4).

gained, from more dialogue between scholars of ethnic bias and ethnic conflict.

References

- Bertrand, Marianne and Esther Duflo. 2017. "Field experiments on discrimination." In *The Handbook of Field Experiments*. ed. Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Bovingdon, Gardner. 2013. *The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Cao, Xun, Haiyan Duan, Chuyu Liu, James Piazza and Yingjie Wei. Forthcoming. "Explaining ethnic violence on China's western frontier: The Ethnic Violence in China (EVC) database and an initial test on the effects of inter-ethnic inequality and natural resources in the Xinjiang region." *China Review*.
- Cao, Xun, Haiyan Duan, Chuyu Liu and Yingjie Wei. 2016. "Religious institutions and the impact of inter-ethnic inequality on conflict: The case of Xinjiang, China." Working Paper, Pennsylvania State University.
- Cliff, Tom. 2016. *Oil and Water: Being Han in Xinjiang*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Distelhorst, Greg and Yue Hou. 2014. "Ingroup bias in official behavior: A national field experiment in China." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 9(2):203–230.
- Finley, Joanne S. 2013. *The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur Identities and Uyghur-Han Relations in Contemporary Xinjiang*. Leiden: Brill.
- Green, Donald P. and Rachel L. Seher. 2003. "What role does prejudice play in ethnic conflict?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 6(1):509–531.
- Grossman, Guy, Oren Gazal-Ayal, Samuel D. Pimentel and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2015. "Descriptive representation and judicial outcomes in multiethnic societies." *American Journal of Political Science* 60(1):44–69.
- Han, Enze. 2010. "Boundaries, discrimination, and interethnic conflict in Xinjiang, China." *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 4(2):245–256.
- Han, Enze. 2011. "From domestic to international: The politics of ethnic identity in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia." *Nationalities Papers* 39(6):941–962.
- Han, Enze. 2013. *Contestation and Adaptation: The Politics of National Identity in China*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hannum, Emily and Yu Xie. 1998. "Ethnic stratification in northwest China: Occupational differences between Han Chinese and national minorities in Xinjiang, 1982–1990." *Demography* 35(3):323–333.
- Hong, Ji Yeon and Wenhui Yang. Forthcoming. "Oilfields, mosques and violence: Is there a resource curse in Xinjiang?" *British Journal of Political Science*.
- Hou, Yue and Kai Quek. 2017. "Violence exposure, intergroup bias, and support for state use of force." Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania.
- Jacobs, Justin M. 2016. *Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press.
- Liu, Chuyu, Yue Hou and Charles Crabtree. 2017. "Religious discrimination in China's labor market: A field experiment." Pre-analysis Plan, EGAP.
- Maurer-Fazio, Margaret. 2012. "Ethnic discrimination in China's Internet job board labor market." *IZA Journal of Migration* 1(1):12.
- Millward, James A. 2007. *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Potter, Phillip B. K. 2013. "Terrorism in China: Growing threats with global implications." *Strategic Studies* 7(4):61–83.
- Rudelson, Justin Jon. 1997. *Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China's Silk Road*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sambanis, Nicholas. 2001. "Do ethnic and nonethnic civil wars have the same causes? A theoretical and empirical inquiry (part 1)." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(3):259–282.
- Sambanis, Nicholas. 2002. "A review of recent advances and future directions in the quantitative literature on civil war." *Defence and Peace Economics* 13(3):215–243.
- Wu, Xiaogang and Xi Song. 2014. "Ethnic stratification amid China's economic transition: Evidence from the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region." *Social science research* 44:158–172.
- Zang, Xiaowei. 2008. "Market reforms and Han–Muslim variation in employment in the Chinese state sector in a Chinese city." *World Development* 36(11):2341–2352.

Preserving White America: White Racial Identity and Support for Nationalist Policies

by Ashley Jardina

Duke University

Over the past several decades, both Europe and the United States have become far more racially and ethnically diverse. They have also opened their borders, expanded international trade programs, and largely embraced globalization. But several events in more recent years suggest that among the citizenry of these countries, political winds have changed. The passage of Brexit and support for Donald Trump's more isolationist policies suggests that many citizens are turning inward, railing against globalization. Opposition to mass immigration has become central to political discourse, and far-right parties, white supremacist groups,

and other ethnonationalist organizations appear to have grown more powerful across the western world.

Political scientists have turned to a number of explanations for these phenomena, arguing that populism (Oliver and Rahn, 2016), authoritarianism (Taub, 2016), economic anxiety (Thompson, 2016), xenophobia, and racial prejudice (Enders and Smallpage, 2016) play varying roles in public opinion toward nationalist policies and toward the political candidates who endorse such positions. There is evidence to support the role of each of these factors. In my work, however, I argue that, at least in the United States, changes in the social and economic landscape, brought about by growing racial and ethnic diversity and by globalization, have set in motion a central but somewhat overlooked dynamic — they have led many whites in the United States to feel as if the social, economic, and political power their group possesses has been threatened. As a result, many white Americans are circling the wagons around their racial group, supporting policies that they perceive to protect their group's interests. Most of these policy positions are nationalist in nature, like opposition to immigration, support for a more isolationist approach to foreign policy, and disapproval of outsourcing.

Not all white Americans have reacted in this way. It is those whites who are most invested and attached to their racial group — those who possess a sense of racial identity or solidarity — that are most reactive to growing racial and ethnic diversity. For scholars of race and politics in the U.S., this is a somewhat surprising claim. For decades, the literature has presumed that very few whites possess a racial identification (Sears and Savalei, 2006). Because of the hierarchical arrangement of racial groups in the U.S., whites, who are at the top, have been largely able to take their racial group for granted. Instead, it is racial and ethnic minorities, who via a legacy of racial oppression, developed a strong sense of racial group identity with political consequences. To the extent that racial attitudes influence political preferences among whites, however, scholars have presumed that it is primarily through racial prejudice and hostility.

The demographic changes the U.S. is experiencing, brought about by massive waves of immigration to the U.S. in the late 1990s and early 2000s, signal to many whites a threat to the racial status quo. They have set in motion a profound shift in the nation's racial and ethnic landscape. Whites are now projected to become a mi-

nority of the U.S. population within two decades. They have also ushered in important changes in political and economic power. For instance, Barack Obama's ascent as the nation's first black president was in part due to large voter turnout among the nation's growing population of racial and ethnic minorities.

While group threat can often lead to out-group hostility, white identity is not synonymous with racial animus or prejudice. It is a decidedly in-group attitude, largely distinct from out-group hostility. In other words, many whites who are high on racial identity do not also score high on standard measures of prejudice toward racial and ethnic minorities.

These changes are viewed by some whites as threats to their group and its status. A long line of work demonstrates that threat can clarify the boundaries around group membership and facilitate in-group cooperation (Brown and Ross, 1982; Maass, Ceccarelli and Rudin, 1996; Sherif et al., 1961). Challenges to a group's status or resources in particular can exacerbate in-group bias (Blumer, 1958; Hornsey, 2008). In short, white identity is now a potent force in politics because it is reactive — politically consequential when the group's position atop the racial hierarchy is threatened, but dormant when the group feels more secure. Thus, the changes brought about by immigration and globalization have, I argue, activated a sense of racial identity among many whites in the U.S., causing some whites to turn inward, supporting policies they believe will benefit and protect their group (Jardina, 2014).

The number of non-Hispanic white Americans who possess this identity is noteworthy. Typically, I measure white identity with a survey question that asks whites how important their racial identity is to them on a five-point scale ranging from "not at all important" to "extremely important." Today, across a number of national public opinion surveys, including the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES) and the 2016 ANES Pilot study, we can see that roughly 30-40% of whites report that their racial identity is very, if not extremely, important to them. It is important to note, however, that these whites are not uniformly what we would call racially prejudiced or racially resentful. While group threat can often lead to out-group hostility, white iden-

tity is not synonymous with racial animus or prejudice. It is a decidedly in-group attitude, largely distinct from out-group hostility. In other words, many whites who are high on racial identity do not also score high on standard measures of prejudice toward racial and ethnic minorities.

I. White Identity and Opposition to Immigration

While white identity is not another expression of racial hostility, it is the case that many of these racially identifying whites do, however, share some of the same policy positions as those more hostile toward racial and ethnic minorities. In particular, whites who score high on group identity are more opposed to immigration, are more supportive of policies that reduce the number of immigrants in the U.S., and more likely to believe that immigration results in negative consequences for the country.

Why would we expect white identity to be so highly linked to immigration opinion? Because immigration is unique in the degree to which it may be viewed as representing a challenge to the dominant status of white Americans. Immigrants introduce an influx of foreign cultures and languages that potentially challenge the nation's white, Anglo-protestant heritage. Indeed, many scholars, pundits, and politicians have made this claim, including the late Samuel Huntington, who warned that the influx of Latinos to the U.S. presents "the single most immediate and most serious challenge to America's traditional identity" (Huntington, 2004, 2). By this account, immigration presents a direct threat to the cultural hegemony of white Americans.

White identity is now a potent force in politics because it is reactive — politically consequential when the group's position atop the racial hierarchy is threatened, but dormant when the group feels more secure.

But most work examining the antecedents of white Americans' immigration attitudes has focused on either the perceived economic burdens immigrants place on the nation's citizens (Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Olzak, 1992) or on the extent to which negative


feelings about Hispanics and Asians — the main immigrant groups to the U.S. — drive opposition (Citrin et al., 1997; Valentino, Brader and Jardina, 2013). Thus, this work has largely overlooked the possibility that whites see immigration as a threat to their racial group and the power and privileges that accompany its status.

My analyses show, however, that white identity is strongly, significantly, and consistently linked to immigration opinion in recent years. This relationship holds even after accounting for objective and subjective economic circumstances, affect toward Hispanics, blacks, and Asians, demographic characteristics, and political dispositions like party identification and political ideology. As an example, Figure 1 plots the predicted level of opposition to immigration across levels of white identity using data on white respondents from the 2012 American National Election Study (face to face).¹ The measures of opposition to immigration and white identity are recoded so that they both range from zero to one. The predicted level of opposition to immigration is estimated from a model that controls for affect toward Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians (measured with placement of these groups on a 101-point feeling thermometer), age, gender, level of education, change in the foreign-born population within the respondent's county over a ten year span, employment status, personal and national economic evaluations, party identification, political ideology, egalitarianism, and attitudes toward the size and scope of government.

It is clear from Figure 1 that white identity is a significant predictor of immigration opinion — as levels of white identity rise, so does opposition to immigration. And this relationship holds across a number of studies. For instance, among whites in the 2016 ANES Pilot study, white identity is strongly linked to not only support for decreasing immigration, but also to the belief that immigration is bad for the U.S. Across a number of additional studies, comprised both of convenience samples and national probability samples, I find that white identity is associated with a preference for increased spending on border security, with support for laws that allow authorities to check the immigration status of individuals, and with the belief that immigrants are harmful to American culture and society. Furthermore, I find that on average, white identifiers are far

¹Opposition to immigration is measured with a question about whether levels of immigration to the U.S. should be increased, decreased, or kept the same.

Figure 1: Predicted Opposition to Immigration



Note: Data are for non-Hispanic whites only and come from the 2012 American National Election Study (face-to-face). Measures of opposition to immigration and white identity have been recoded so that they range from zero to one. Predicted levels of opposition to immigration are based on a model where gender is set to male and all of the other control variables are set to their mean values. The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval.

more concerned about the changing ethnic makeup of the U.S. than are low identifiers. In short, levels of white identity are a key component of immigration opinion in the U.S.


II. White Identity and Globalization

White identity is not merely associated with immigration opinion. I also find that levels of white identity are highly indicative of attitudes toward other consequences of globalization, including opinion about limiting foreign imports to protect American jobs and toward government intervention to prevent companies from outsourcing jobs. Both issues have the potential to be especially important to whites with higher levels of racial identity. For one, they both introduce foreign goods and workers into the U.S. economy, potentially serving as an economic and cultural threat similar to immigration. Furthermore, both issues might also be viewed as diluting the power of the U.S. more broadly, and if whites view themselves as prototypical of the nation, they might see threats to the standing of the nation as threats to the status of their own racial group.

The 2012 ANES allows me to explore the relation-


ship between white identity and attitudes toward imports and outsourcing. At first blush, we might expect individual-level economic circumstances to play a key role in opinion formation in these two domains. Yet I find no significant relationship between attitudes toward these issues and employment status, income, or evaluations of one's personal economic circumstances. Instead, education, evaluations of the national economy, and white identity emerge as the factors primarily associated with opinion on these two issues. In Figure 2, I plot the predicted level of support for limiting imports and for government efforts to prevent outsourcing across levels of white identity. Each predicted-value plot is generated via a model that controls for age, gender, education, employment status, income, personal and national economic evaluations, party identity, political ideology, egalitarianism, and support for more limited government. Even after controlling for these factors, it is clear that higher levels of white identity are strongly associated with greater support for these policy positions. Compared to those low on racial identity, whites with higher levels of in-group identity are much more in favor of limiting imports and of U.S. government efforts to prevent companies from outsourcing jobs to other countries.

Figure 2: Predicted Opinion on Limiting Imports & Preventing Companies from Outsourcing



Note: Data are for non-Hispanic whites only and come from the 2012 American National Election Study (face-to-face). Measures of support for limiting imports, support for government efforts to prevent outsourcing, and white identity have been recoded so that they range from zero to one. Control variables are set at their mean values, with gender set to male. The shaded areas represent the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3: Predicted Support for Isolationism



Note: Data are for non-Hispanic whites only and come from the 2012 American National Election Study (face-to-face). Measures of support for isolationism and white identity have been recoded so that they range from zero to one. Control variables are set at their mean values, with gender set to male. The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval.

III. White Identity and Isolationism

In addition to opposing immigration, wanting to restrict imports, and a desire to prevent companies from outsourcing jobs to other countries, we might also expect that white identity is linked with a preference to withdraw from our interactions with other nations in an increasingly globalized world. If many white Americans would like to protect their in-group, they might, after all, be inclined to limit the extent to which the U.S. is involved in the affairs of other nations.

This relationship is, in fact, what I find. The 2012 ANES asked respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statement: “This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world.” Again, even after accounting for a range of factors that likely lead whites to adopt such a position, I find that white identity emerges as a substantively and statistically significant factor. In Figure 3, I plot the predicted level of support for isolationism across each level of white identity, with the same set of controls as before. We can see that white identifiers would indeed prefer that the U.S. stay out of matters of the world.

IV. The Greater Political Implications

Above, I mentioned that whites with high levels of racial identity comprise a sizeable portion of the non-Hispanic white population in the U.S. They do not, however, make up a majority of whites in the U.S. Nevertheless, one might not be surprised also to learn that these racially-identifying whites are an important component of President Donald Trump’s support base. White identity was a strong and significant predictor of support for Trump in the 2016 primaries (Tesler and Sides, 2016), and Trump adopted many of the same policy preferences described here. Indeed, he began his campaign with a focus on curtailing immigration, has sought to limit the U.S.’s involvement in international trade agreements, and has espoused a more isolationist view of America’s role in the world. Thus, while whites high on racial identity certainly do not comprise the majority of whites in the U.S., the views adopted by this group have an exceptionally powerful advocate at this moment in time. As a result, the political power of white identity is likely to become magnified in the years ahead, with potentially broad implications for global politics.

References

- Blumer, Herbert. 1958. “Race prejudice as a sense of group position.” *Pacific Sociological Review* 1(1):3–7.
- Brown, Rupert J. and Gordon F. Ross. 1982. “The battle for acceptance: An investigation into the dynamics of intergroup behaviour”. In *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, ed. Henri Tajfel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp. 155–158.
- Burns, Peter and James G. Gimpel. 2000. “Economic insecurity, prejudicial stereotypes, and public opinion on immigration policy.” *Political Science Quarterly* 115(2):201–225.
- Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste and Cara Wong. 1997. “Public opinion toward immigration reform: The role of economic motivations.” *Journal of Politics* 59(3):858–881.
- Enders, Adam and Steven Smallpage. 2016. “Racial prejudice, not populism or authoritarianism, predicts support for Trump over Clinton.” *The Washington Post* May 26.
- Espenshade, Thomas J. and Katherine Hempstead. 1996. “Contemporary American attitudes toward U.S. immigration.” *International Migration Review* 30(2):535–570.
- Hainmueller, Jens and Michael J. Hiscox. 2010. “Attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled immigration: Evidence from a survey experiment.” *American Political Science Review* 104(1):61–84.
- Hornsey, Matthew J. 2008. “Social identity theory and self-categorization theory: A historical review.” *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 2(1):204–222.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 2004. *Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Jardina, Ashley E. 2014. *Demise of Dominance: Group Threat and the New Relevance of White Identity for American Politics*. PhD thesis University of Michigan.
- Maass, Anne, Roberta Ceccarelli and Samantha Rudin. 1996. “Linguistic intergroup bias: Evidence for in-group-protective motivation.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71(3):512.
- Oliver, J. Eric and Wendy M. Rahn. 2016. “Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 election.” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 667(1):189–206.
- Olzak, Susan. 1992. *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Sears, David O. and Victoria Savalei. 2006. “The political color line in America: Many ‘Peoples of Color’ or Black exceptionalism?” *Political Psychology* 27(6):895–924.
- Sherif, Muzafer et al. 1961. *Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment*. Vol. 10 Norman: University Book Exchange.
- Taub, Amanda. 2016. “The rise of American authoritarianism.” *Vox* March 1.

- Tesler, Michael and John Sides. 2016. "How political science helps explain the rise of Trump: The role of White identity and grievances." *Washington Post* March 3.
- Thompson, Derek. 2016. "Does 'Economic Anxiety' explain Donald Trump?" *The Atlantic* August 18.
- Valentino, Nicholas A., Ted Brader and Ashley E. Jardina. 2013. "Immigration opposition among US Whites: General ethnocentrism or media priming of attitudes about Latinos?" *Political Psychology* 34(2):149–166.

From Racial Democracy to Racialized Democracy in Latin America

by Marcus A. Johnson, Jr.

University of Maryland College Park

Race matters, even when it seems like it does not. Race structures the way we perceive the world and how we are perceived in the world. It levels the playing field for some and raises obstacles and hurdles for others. Race is wedded to institutions and power structures, and resists attempts to be divorced from them. This essay aims to move toward a more nuanced understanding of race in Latin America, where it has often been assumed not to matter for electoral politics. Previous scholarship on the question has made an important observation that race, particularly for afro-descendants, is neither a central dimension of parties' policy bundles in the region nor a consistent lens through which voters view their electoral choices. In this essay, I argue that the absence of explicit black identity mobilization is not evidence that race politics is immaterial to electoral politics, but rather provokes the question of why racial cleavages are politically inactive despite their social salience. In doing so, I challenge scholars to think more critically about race in contexts where it does not appear to matter at first glance.

In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the Third Wave of democratic transitions swept through Latin America. This new democratic environment precipitated major constitutional overhauls that opened up political participation, carved out explicit spaces for indigenous representation, and, importantly, solidified elections and electoral institutions as the only game in town for

demanding legitimate representation. Scholarship on the region followed, focusing on the quality of democratic representation (O'Donnell, 1994; Stokes, 2001), the stability of democratic institutions (Hagopian and Mainwaring, 2005; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995), and the shift of social movements to political parties and electoral constituencies (Madrid, 2008; Van Cott, 2005; Yashar, 1997).

Surprisingly, there is little scholarship that situates Latin America's large, marginal afro-descendant population within these new democratic institutions (Johnson, 2012). Afro-descendants¹ make up a large portion of Latin America's population. There are an estimated 150 million afro-descendants in Latin America, roughly one third of the region's population (Sánchez and Bryan, 2003). The percentage of the population of African descent varies from country to country, but estimates place this number at 75% in the Dominican Republic, 51% in Brazil, and 30% in Panama and Colombia (Andrews, 2004). Afro-descendants are estimated to make up over 40% of Latin America's poor population and to experience high levels of racial discrimination (Sánchez and Bryan, 2003). Yet despite the fact that elections are the only game in town, and that afro-descendants have shared grievances that might serve as the basis for political mobilization, existing studies have not explored afro-descendant electoral mobilization and political behavior more deeply.

What is the electoral significance of race for afro-descendants in Latin America?² This essay advances three main strategies to thoroughly interrogate this question. The first strategy is to explicitly test what scholars have previously assumed — that afro-descendant voters lack sufficient group consciousness for collective electoral mobilization. The second strategy is to bring the state back into demand-based explanations for the absence of racial identity politics. The absence of black identity in electoral politics is an outcome to be explained, rather than sufficient evidence to discount black identity politics. The third strategy builds on the robust finding that skin color, and skin color discrimination in particular, is correlated with socioeconomic status. The essay advocates an empiri-

¹ I will use the terms afro-descendant, Afro-Panamanian, Afro-Latin, and black interchangeably in this essay to refer to the Latin American population that claims African descent. In Spanish, this includes terms such as *negro*, *moreno*, and *mulato*. The capitalization of afro, is based on whether it is modifying a proper noun — e.g., Panamanian — or a common noun — e.g., descendant).

² I use the terms race and ethnicity interchangeably in this essay to refer to the social and political dimensions of phenotype distinctions (Brubaker, 2009). See Brubaker (2009) for a review of constructivist arguments for and against the functional equivalency of race and ethnicity.

cal approach that treats racial discrimination as a central mechanism through which race takes on electoral salience in racially stratified polities. Indeed, the black and brown hue of Latin American poverty imbues racial significance into what we have previously understood through the exclusive lens of class politics.

I. Strategy 1: Reassessing the Group Consciousness-To-Politics Link for Afro-Latinx

Lee (2008, 461) defines the *identity-to-politics link* as “the inference that, for a given racial and ethnic identity category found in everyday usage or research practice, a group based politics will emerge and organize.” He argues that a problem emerges when identity politics scholars take for granted the natural association between a social group and the intentionality, or groupism, of their political activity.³ Within the identity-to-politics link, scholars often use evidence of subjective identification (or the lack thereof) to assume the existence of group consciousness (or the lack thereof). An adequate explanation for black invisibility in electoral politics requires heeding Lee’s warning and undertaking a close examination of the identity-to-politics link for Afro-Latinx, specifically in terms of the impact of unstable group definition and identification on group consciousness.

I argue that the absence of explicit black identity mobilization [in Latin America] is not evidence that race politics is immaterial to electoral politics, but rather provokes the question of why racial cleavages are politically inactive despite their social salience.

Existing approaches to the study of race politics in the region build on the axiom that Latin American racial categories are unstable, and individual identification within these fluid categories should be questioned rather than assumed. Latin Americanist race scholars contend that the history of state race-making projects that imposed formal mixed-race identification, social stigmas associated with black categorization, and fluid

racial boundaries constitute significant barriers to the activation of black identity politics (Hanchard, 1994; Johnson, 1998; Marx, 1998). In his study of the origins of mass partisanship in the Brazilian electorate, Samuels (2006, 17) finds that “[r]ace, despite its critical importance in Brazilian’s lives and despite the prominent role that some Afro-Brazilians have come to play in national politics, also appears wholly unrelated to partisanship for these parties....”⁴ Bueno and Dunning (2017) find that Brazilian respondents that self-identified as pardo and preto (brown and black) are no more likely to support black candidates for elected office than blancos (whites). While Bueno and Dunning are careful not to interpret their evidence to confirm the lack of a race effect on vote choice, Samuels essentially uses his dummy variable of “white or non-white” to reject a relationship between race and partisanship in Brazil.

Yet the empirical record shows that black identity politics does occur, despite these obstacles. Numerous black social movements have contested racial marginalization throughout the region (Hanchard, 1994; Nobles, 2000; Sawyer, 2006; Paschel and Sawyer, 2008; Paschel, 2010). In addition, self-identified Afro-Brazilians are more likely to vote for black candidates under certain conditions. Mitchell (2009) finds that Afro-Brazilians in predominantly white constituencies are more likely to vote for black candidates. Aguilar et al. (2015) find experimental evidence that when black and white voters are presented with ballots with fewer candidates, they are less likely to take race into consideration, but that when they are presented with ballots with many candidates, they are significantly more likely to support coethnic candidates.

Group consciousness is the politicized expression of group identification, based on a recognition of the group’s marginal social standing and that collective political action is the best way to improve the group’s social standing (McClain et al., 2009, 476). Given the fluidity of racial identification and group membership, categorical indicators of racial group membership are insufficient proxies for group consciousness in Latin America. Each of the studies mentioned above rely on categorical measures of race to proxy for politicized, collective group politics for afro-descendants, as opposed to more

³Brubaker (2004, 8) defines groupism as “the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations, and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed.”

⁴In a follow-up study on the effects of Brazilian partisanship on voters’ issue positions, Samuels and Zucco (2014) do not include any measures of race in their empirical design, implicitly assuming that race is not salient for party politics.

⁵See McClain et al. (2009) for a review of the empirical measures used to operationalize group consciousness.

explicit measures like linked fate and system blame.⁵

Thus, an important component of any empirical approach to studying Latin American race politics must properly examine mass levels of afro-descendant group consciousness. Using explicit measures that examine black perceptions of structural racism, linked fate, and belief in collective efficacy to predict political attitudes and behavior may demonstrate that some afro-descendants do demand a distinctive black politics from non-blacks and blacks with weaker group consciousness. The use of categorical measures of racial group membership rather than explicit measures of group consciousness in part may explain the weak evidence for distinctive, black political attitudes despite the pervasiveness of race in other dimensions of social life (Bueno and Dunning, 2017; Samuels, 2006).

II. Strategy 2: Bringing Parties and Elites Back into Black Identity Politics

The ‘top-down’ approach to cleavage formation situates political parties and elites as gatekeepers in issue articulation, but the strategic behavior of these actors in Latin American race politics has been undertheorized. Inactive black electoral identity becomes a novel and significant form of race politics when we consider political elites’ agency to mobilize some group identities but not others. Building on Chandra’s (2011) conceptualization of ethnic parties, I define activated electoral identity as the explicit electoral mobilization of a social identity by a central component of a party’s platform. In contrast, inactive electoral identity is the absence of explicit electoral mobilization of an existing social identity. The above conceptualization makes it possible to disentangle the social salience of black ethnicity in Latin America from its inactive status in electoral politics. Activated electoral identity does not occur automatically when a racial identity is socially salient. Political parties and candidates play a critical role in articulating the interests of select ethnic constituencies.

Previous scholarship has concluded that black ethnicity is irrelevant to electoral politics because Latin American voters subscribe to racial democracy — the myth of homogenous ethnoracial identity and harmonious race relations as a result of race mixing. But the hegemony of racial democracy in the Latin American consciousness is itself a state project (Hanchard, 1994; Nobles, 2000; Marx, 1998). There is, thus, a gap between

theories that place elites at the center of the construction (and contestation) of racial democracy and theories that omit the active role elites play to maintain (and contest) the hegemony of this ideology in electoral politics. Politicians can ignore social cleavages just as they can try to activate them for political gain (Kristín Birnir, 2007; Chhibber and Torcal, 1997; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003; Wilkinson, 2004).

I encourage scholars of Latin American race politics to adopt the ‘top-down’ approach to exploring racial cleavages in the electorate, which argues that elite political actors, such as parties and candidates, play a central role in determining the dimensions of electoral competition by articulating issues along certain cleavages and not along others. The scholarly consensus that elites in Latin American racial states have engaged in projects that have induced and constrained the demand for race politics at the mass level highlights the role that political parties — institutionalized actors in the state, after all — play in activating and deactivating identity cleavages in electoral politics. The key contribution of the top-down approach to electoral cleavages is that it acknowledges the agency political parties exercise in choosing which structural differences to activate, while maintaining mass attitudinal and structural differences as preconditions that bound the universe of cleavages that parties can activate.

This approach situates race politics within the mainstream theoretical framework in the Latin American electoral politics literature, which has drawn heavily on the paradigm of contingent, top-down cleavage formation to explain the shift in the role of class over time. Collier and Collier’s (1991) seminal work on the incorporation of the labor sector in Latin America identifies the critical role of political parties in incorporating (or not incorporating) labor movements, ultimately shaping the dimensions of party systems throughout the region. When the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s threatened the viability of populism, party elites on the left played a key role in shifting economic platforms to the right with different electoral strategies that deemphasized class cleavages (Levitsky and Burgess, 2003; Corrales, 2000; Roberts, 2014; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003). In this literature, parties have been critical actors in activating and deactivating class identities in regional politics.

Yet studies on the electoral politics of race and eth-

nicity in Latin America typically do not employ this same frame. The few studies that do consider the role of elites in shaping the electoral discourse around race find that politicians avoid activating black electoral identity, particularly in national politics, because they anticipate that these messages will not resonate with voters (Johnson, 1998).⁶ However, the preconditions for black group consciousness have been documented to exist, as indicated above. Thus, we need to ask about the agency of parties and candidates in the activation of black electoral identity. The central role of political elites in the construction and maintenance of Latin American racial states necessitates a theory of activated and inactive black electoral identity that brings political elites back into the analysis.

Previous scholarship has concluded that black ethnicity is irrelevant to electoral politics because Latin American voters subscribe to racial democracy — the myth of homogenous ethnoracial identity and harmonious race relations as a result of race mixing. But the hegemony of racial democracy in the Latin American consciousness is itself a state project.

III. Strategy 3: Evaluating the Electoral Consequences of Racial Stratification in Latin America

To fully analyze the political salience of race in Latin America, we need to interrogate the multiple paths that potentially link black ethnicity to politics; group consciousness is just one of those paths (Sen and Wasow, 2016). Skin color is one of the strongest predictors of socioeconomic status in the region, and yet existing studies of the electoral politics of race largely omit this relationship. I propose that the omission of pigmentocracy — the phenotypic basis of social stratification (Sidanius, Peña and Sawyer, 2001) — from previous theoretical and empirical approaches to Latin American race politics is the key reason that we have overlooked the electoral salience of race. In these racially stratified polities, where dark skin strongly overlaps with class, I posit that what we have traditionally understood as

class politics takes on a “racial coloration” (Horowitz, 1985, 30).

Innovative survey techniques that provide interviewers with measures of respondents’ skin color show that the relationship between skin color and wealth is roughly monotonic: the darker a respondent’s skin tone, the poorer she is on average (Telles, 2014). Dark skin color also predicts lower levels of educational attainment, independent of social class background (Telles, Flores and Urrea-Giraldo, 2015). The correlation between skin color and status are perceptible to Latin Americans. Individuals in lighter and darker skin color categories share a conception of darker skinned individuals occupying lower social strata (Lovell and Wood, 1998; Sidanius, Peña and Sawyer, 2001). People with darker skin color report higher instances of perceived discrimination than people with lighter skin color (Canache et al., 2014). Negative stereotypes about dark skinned people abound and encode pigmentocracy into racial schema (Beck, Mijeski and Stark, 2011; Cervone and Rivera, 1999; Telles and Bailey, 2013; Warren and Sue, 2011).

I find additional evidence of people perceiving the relationship between skin color and wealth in my own research. In the fall of 2015, I organized a series of focus groups in Panama City broadly focused on the themes of racial identity and politics. The four groups were stratified by income and by race: two middle class groups — one composed of black participants and one of non-black⁷ participants — and two lower class groups — similarly composed of only black or non-black participants. After participants in the non-black middle class group discussed their own self-identification and ethnic background, the moderator asked them to discuss how they use visible cues to determine people’s social class. In addition to clothing, vehicles, and neighborhood, the participants emphasized the importance of skin color and hair type in this calculus. A similar situation occurred in the non-black focus group with lower class participants when the moderator asked the same question. After a few of the participants discussed clothing and designer labels, two respondents added

Respondent 1: In Panama, the majority characterizes

⁶While the empirical analyses in these studies focus on the attitudes and electoral strategies of political elites, ultimately they still reflect the bottom-up interpretation of cleavage formation because the role of elites in these studies is solely responsive instead of agentic.

⁷I use ‘non-black’ instead of *mestizo* or white because the composition of these focus groups was heterogeneous. The unifying criterion was that the participants in the two non-black focus groups did not self-identify as black during the recruitment period.

white people more [as wealthy]. There are black people with money and you don't notice as much as you do with whites.⁸

Respondent 2: When a person is wealthy and has a white complexion, you notice it from leagues away. Still, there are black people with money and you just do not really notice them.⁹

The consensus across the four focus groups was that Afro-descendants are typically understood to occupy the lower rungs of the social hierarchy. Afro-Panamanians are often depicted and perceived to be gangsters and thieves. The participants in the black middle class focus group discussed their personal experiences with people assuming that they had acquired their wealth through illegal means. The consensus among black and non-black participants alike was that afro-descendants lack influence and visibility in the political and economic spheres.

While standard categorical measures of self-categorization and identification do point toward racial disparities in Latin America and are helpful for understanding mobilization, they cannot tap into the phenotypic component of race at the heart of black marginalization. Ascriptive measures of blackness show that people who have visibly darker skin experience greater levels of marginalization (Bailey, Loveman and Muniz, 2013). Being seen as black, independent of self-identification and group consciousness, has important social consequences. An accurate measurement of these terms matters for quantitative analyses of race and marginalization. Bailey, Loveman and Muniz (2013) find that the wage gap between black and white Brazilians is significantly larger when their racial group membership is ascribed by an interviewer, compared to when individuals categorize themselves.

This correlation points to important but neglected political consequences of pigmentocracy. The pervasive association between blackness and poverty means that political actors in the electoral arena (e.g., candidates for office, their campaign staff, and clientelist bro-

kers) operate within this color-stratified schema. As we know from previous research, poorer voters are more likely to be victims of vote buying (Calvo and Murillo, 2004), receive lower quality of representation (Luna and Zechmeister, 2005; Cleary, 2010), perceive lower incentives for participation (Holzner, 2010), and have lower rates of descriptive representation (Carnes and Lupu, 2015). At a micro-level, color discrimination may play a significant role in effecting the quality of representation and electoral mobilization for dark-skinned voters. For example, in my own work I find a significant relationship between skin color and vote buying in Latin America, such that dark skinned voters have a greater likelihood of reporting that they were offered goods or services in exchange for their promised vote, even after accounting for their actual socioeconomic status and important political covariates. The systemic barriers to social mobility that afro-descendants face may also explain their limited political influence at a macro-level. Bueno and Dunning (2017) find that the mismatch between the majority Afro-Brazilian electorate and the predominantly white composition of elected office holders can be explained by economic resource differentials between black and brown candidates on the one hand and white candidates on the other. They find that wealthier candidates win office at much higher rates than less wealthy candidates, and white candidates are significantly wealthier on average than black candidates.

The political marginalization of afro-descendants in the region is, in part, the product of political discrimination. Because social class and black ethnicity overlap, afro-descendant voters are more likely to experience electoral politics (both from the vantage point of a voter and as a candidate) in substantively different ways from whites and mestizos. Political discrimination occurs when citizens are given unequal terms of political incorporation in a way that is related to an observable characteristic, such as race, ethnicity, or other salient group memberships.¹⁰ In racially-stratified contexts, electoral institutions can produce racially-discriminatory outcomes, even absent discriminatory intent on behalf of political elites and voters. This outcome-based perspec-

⁸“En Panamá, la mayoría se diferencian más en las personas blancos; hay personas negras que tienen dinero y no se les nota tanto como a los blancos.”

⁹“Cuando la persona es adinerada y es de tez blanca se le nota a leguas; sin embargo hay personas negras de dinero y no se les nota.”

¹⁰I developed this definition of political discrimination by adapting Altonji and Blank's (1999, 3168) definition of labor market discrimination. They define discrimination as “a situation in which persons who provide labor market services and who are equally productive in a physical or material sense are treated unequally in a way that is related to an observable characteristic such as race, ethnicity, or gender. By ‘unequal’ we mean [that] these persons receive different wages or face different demands for their services at a given wage.”

tive on discrimination in politics can help us to understand the political consequences of racial stratification for blacks in Latin America.

IV. Conclusion

My primary objective in this essay has been to challenge the misconception that race does not matter for electoral politics in Latin America. Political scientists who have attempted to situate Latin America's pervasive racial hierarchy within electoral politics conclude that race does not matter because they cannot find evidence of an effect on voters' preferences and parties' appeals. These scholars tend to study race politics through the singular mechanism of identification, so when there does not appear to be an identity effect, they often treat this as evidence that race is not a salient political factor. These studies miss the fact that the preconditions — group consciousness, discrimination, and objective pigmentocracy — necessary for black mobilization exist, alongside inactive black electoral identity. This essay is a call for scholars working on identity politics in Latin America to reexamine the principal assumptions that have generated the consensus that race does not matter to electoral politics — specifically, to bring more precise measures to the operationalization of black group consciousness, to bring the behavior of political parties and elites back to the center of our analysis of race politics, and to consider the synergy between the socioeconomic and political mechanisms for Afro-Latin marginalization.

References

- Aguilar, Rosario, Saul Cunow, Scott Desposato and Leonardo S. Barone. 2015. "Ballot structure, candidate race, and vote choice in Brazil." *Latin American Research Review* 50(3):175–202.
- Altonji, Joseph G. and Rebecca M. Blank. 1999. "Race and gender in the labor market." *The Handbook of Labor Economics* 3:3143–3259.
- Andrews, George R. 2004. *Afro-Latinoamérica, 1800-2000*. Madrid: Iberoamericana Ed. Vervuert.
- Bailey, Stanley R., Mara Loveman and Jeronimo O. Muniz. 2013. "Measures of 'Race' and the analysis of racial inequality in Brazil." *Social Science Research* 42(1):106–119.
- Beck, Scott H., Kenneth J. Mijeski and Meagan M. Stark. 2011. "¿Qué Es Racismo?: Awareness of racism and discrimination in Ecuador." *Latin American Research Review* 46(1):102–125.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 2004. *Ethnicity without Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 2009. "Ethnicity, race, and nationalism." *Annual Review of Sociology* 35:21–42.
- Bueno, Natália S. and Thad Dunning. 2017. "Race, resources, and representation: Evidence from Brazilian politicians." *World Politics* 69(2):327–365.
- Calvo, Ernesto and Maria V. Murillo. 2004. "Who delivers? Partisan clients in the Argentine electoral market." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4):742–757.
- Canache, Damarys, Matthew Hayes, Jeffery J. Mondak and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2014. "Determinants of perceived skin-color discrimination in Latin America." *Journal of Politics* 76(2):506–520.
- Carnes, Nicholas and Noam Lupu. 2015. "Rethinking the comparative perspective on class and representation: Evidence from Latin America." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(1):1–18.
- Cervone, Emma and Fredy Rivera. 1999. "Ecuador racista." *FLACSO, Quito*.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2011. "What is an ethnic party?" *Party Politics* 17(2):151–169.
- Chhibber, Pradeep and Mariano Torcal. 1997. "Elite strategy, social cleavages, and party systems in a new democracy: Spain." *Comparative Political Studies* 30(1):27–54.
- Cleary, Matthew R. 2010. *The Sources of Democratic Responsiveness in Mexico*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Collier, Ruth B. and David Collier. 1991. *Shaping the Political Arena*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Corrales, Javier. 2000. "Presidents, ruling parties, and party rules: A theory on the politics of economic reform in Latin America." *Comparative Politics* 32(2):127–149.
- Hagopian, Frances and Scott P. Mainwaring. 2005. *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hanchard, Michael G. 1994. *Orpheus and Power: The 'Movimento Negro' of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, Brazil 1945-1988*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Holzner, Claudio A. 2010. *Poverty of Democracy: The Institutional Roots of Political Participation in Mexico*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Johnson, Ollie A. 1998. "Racial representation and Brazilian politics: Black members of the National Congress, 1983–1999." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 40(4):97–118.
- Johnson, Ollie A. 2012. Race, politics, and Afro-Latin Americans. In *Routledge Handbook of Latin American Politics*, ed. Peter R. Kingstone and Deborah J. Yashar. New York: Routledge.
- Kristín Birnir, Jóhanna. 2007. "Divergence in diversity? The dissimilar effects of cleavages on electoral politics in

- new democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(3):602–619.
- Lee, Taeku. 2008. "Race, immigration, and the identity-to-politics link." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11:457–478.
- Levitsky, Steven and Katrina Burgess. 2003. "Explaining populist party adaptation in Latin America: Environmental and organizational determinants of party change in Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela." *Comparative Political Studies* 36(8):881–911.
- Lovell, Peggy A. and Charles H. Wood. 1998. "Skin color, racial identity, and life chances in Brazil." *Latin American Perspectives* 25(3):90–109.
- Luna, Juan P. and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2005. "Political representation in Latin America: A study of elite-mass congruence in nine countries." *Comparative Political Studies* 38(4):388–416.
- Madrid, Raúl L. 2008. "The Rise of ethnopopulism in Latin America." *World Politics* 60(3):475–508.
- Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Marx, Anthony W. 1998. *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McClain, Paula D., Jessica D. Johnson Carew, Eugene Walton Jr and Candis S. Watts. 2009. "Group membership, group identity, and group consciousness: Measures of racial identity in American politics?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 12:471–485.
- Mitchell, Gladys. 2009. "Campaign strategies of Afro-Brazilian politicians: A preliminary analysis." *Latin American Politics and Society* 51(3):111–142.
- Mozaffar, Shaheen, James R. Scarritt and Glen Galaich. 2003. "Electoral institutions, ethnopolitical cleavages, and party systems in Africa's emerging democracies." *American Political Science Review* 97(3):379–390.
- Nobles, Melissa. 2000. *Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern Politics*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 1994. "Delegative democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 5(1):55–69.
- Paschel, Tianna S. 2010. "The right to difference: Explaining Colombia's shift from color blindness to the law of Black communities." *American Journal of Sociology* 116(3):729–69.
- Paschel, Tianna S. and Mark Q. Sawyer. 2008. "Contesting politics as usual: Black social movements, globalization, and race policy in Latin America." *Souls* 10(3):197–214.
- Roberts, Kenneth M. 2014. *Changing Course in Latin America: Party Systems in the Neoliberal Era*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Samuels, David. 2006. "Sources of mass partisanship in Brazil." *Latin American Politics and Society* 48(2):1–27.
- Samuels, David and Cesar Zucco. 2014. "The power of partisanship in Brazil: Evidence from survey experiments." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(1):212–225.
- Sánchez, Margarita and Maurice Bryan. 2003. *Afro-Descendants, Discrimination and Economic Exclusion in Latin America*. London: Minority Rights Group International.
- Sawyer, Mark Q. 2006. *Racial Politics in Post-Revolutionary Cuba*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sen, Maya and Omar Wasow. 2016. "Race as a bundle of sticks: Designs that estimate effects of seemingly immutable characteristics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19:499–522.
- Sidanius, Jim, Yesilernis Peña and Mark Sawyer. 2001. "Inclusionary discrimination: Pigmentocracy and patriotism in the Dominican Republic." *Political Psychology* 22(4):827–851.
- Stokes, Susan C. 2001. *Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Telles, Edward. 2014. *Pigmentocracies: Ethnicity, Race, and Color in Latin America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Telles, Edward, René D. Flores and Fernando Urrea-Giraldo. 2015. "Pigmentocracies: Educational inequality, skin color and census ethnoracial identification in eight Latin American countries." *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility* 40:39–58.
- Telles, Edward and Stanley Bailey. 2013. "Understanding Latin American beliefs about racial inequality." *American Journal of Sociology* 118(6):1559–1595.
- Torcal, Mariano and Scott Mainwaring. 2003. "The political recrafting of social bases of party competition: Chile, 1973–95." *British Journal of Political Science* 33(1):55–84.
- Van Cott, Donna L. 2005. *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Warren, Jonathan and Christina A. Sue. 2011. "Comparative racisms: What anti-racists can learn from Latin America." *Ethnicities* 11(1):32–58.
- Wilkinson, Steven I. 2004. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Yashar, Deborah J. 1997. *Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica and Guatemala, 1870s-1950s*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Electoral Institutions and Ethnic Clientelism

by **Kristen Kao**
University of Gothenburg

I. Introduction

The bulk of extant research on ethnic politics in the developing world focuses on clientelism. As far back as the 1970s, a specific identity-based form of clientelism is documented (Lemarchand, 1972; Bates, 1983; Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2005; Lust, 2009; Corstange, 2016). Yet, much of the seminal work on clientelism lacks a social identity component, analyzing politicians' use of party machines instead (Stokes, 2005; Magaloni, 2006; Schaffer, 2007; Stokes et al., 2013). This divide in the literature begs the question: under what conditions does ethnicity underpin clientelistic relationships and where does it not? Focusing on sub-national variation in legislative electoral institutions and an original dataset on particularistic service provision in Jordan, this essay provides insight into the conditions under which relationships between parliamentarians and their constituents are ethnically-based and when they cross ethnic divides.¹

Building on a rich body of literature in political science, I examine the effect of electoral systems — and district magnitude in particular — on ethnic voting behavior and clientelistic linkages. In the 1980s, a burgeoning field of research on comparative electoral systems led to a focus on party versus personal voting, as well as clientelistic linkages between representatives and their constituents. The ranking of electoral systems by their tendency to incentivize the cultivation of a personal vote by Carey and Shugart (1995) is one example, but others abound (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Mainwaring 1991; Mitchell 2000; Shugart 2005). To a large extent, this research ignores social cleavages and the role they play in distributive politics.

Horowitz (1985), Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994), Lijphart (1996), Cox (1997), and Clark and Golder (2006), among others, argue that some electoral institutions diminish the impact of ethnic divisions on elections more than others. Importantly, Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) find that electoral institutions and

ethnic heterogeneity interact to shape the number of groups competing in elections, a result that is backed up by Cox (1997) and Clark and Golder (2006) across a wider array of settings and types of elections. In this essay, I provide additional support for this finding by using novel empirical evidence to investigate the effect of different electoral rules on clientelistic linkages when ethnic cleavage structures are held relatively constant. Furthermore, I outline a mechanism to explain why in a setting of high ethnic salience, institutions play an important role in determining why some clientelistic relationships are ethnically based while others are not.

Variation in the types of linkages that bind clients to patrons is understudied because it is usually assumed that only one form of clientelism (identity-based or not) dominates a single political environment. Switching between political environments can provide insights, but fails to hold many other socioeconomic factors constant, which introduces potential confounders to cross-country findings. Ichino and Nathan (2013) provide a rare exception with their analysis of the role of local ethnic geography in determining cross-ethnic cooperation versus competition in Ghanaian elections. Their argument rests on the premise that when locally targeted club goods such as health clinics, schools, and roads are a key feature of parliamentary service provision, members of ethnic minorities have incentives to join the dominant ethnic group's voting bloc. However, work on voting in clientelistic settings is driven by the transfer of particularistic goods (Stokes 2005), highlighting that the provision of "small-scale collective goods like a community well or a school building are targeted but not personal private goods and as such is not clientelism" (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013, 721).

In this essay, I analyze an original dataset of particularistic service provision logs belonging to parliamentarians in Jordan to shed light on how clientelistic linkages vary across communities within a single country. Jordan represents an excellent case for understanding why ethnicity gains salience in some clientelistic settings but not others. First, clientelism is rampant in Jordanian politics. Being a competitive authoritarian regime in which power is highly centralized, elected representatives are much more limited in their ability to distribute club goods such as those studied in Ichino and Nathan (2013) or other works (Kramon and Posner

¹This essay draws on material from my working paper, "Electoral Institutions and Ethnic Clientelism: Authoritarianism in Jordan" (Kao, 2017).

2013); instead they spend their time competing to offer particularistic state benefits to constituents (Lust, 2009). In other words, it offers an electoral environment that is closer to being purely clientelistic. Second, attachments to ethnic identities, in the form of tribalism, run deep in Jordan and they are not correlated with district type. Third, Jordan used to employ two different types of voting systems, providing leverage in understanding how the primary independent variable that this essay is interested in — electoral rules — shapes the role of ethnicity in clientelistic relationships.

II. The Jordanian Context

From 2003 to 2013, Jordan ran a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system in 60% of its districts alongside a single member district (SMD) plurality system in the remaining 40% of its districts. Being systems based on plurality rules, both SMDs and SNTV districts are expected to encourage clientelism by favoring personalized candidate competition (Cox, 1997; Carey and Shugart, 1995). The major difference between the two systems is simply district magnitude. Under SNTV rules, voters cast a single ballot for a candidate, but multiple candidates win seats within the district. In Jordan, as many as seven candidates will win a seat in a given district, making it difficult for voters to predict likely winners before the election is over. The SNTV system is highly confusing for voters, making strategic voting as well as coordinated political behavior difficult (Cox, 1997; McCubbins and Rosenbluth, 1995; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1998; Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010). On the other hand, SMDs offer a simplified electoral environment in which each voter casts a single vote and a single candidate wins. Under these conditions, voters are able to vote strategically, abandoning candidates with the least popular support and coordinating votes with a larger subset of the community to elect a consensus candidate (Droop, 1869; Duverger, 1959; Cox, 1997). In a setting where tribes dominate the political system and are cognizant of the approximate ethnic head counts within their districts, the SMD system encourages smaller tribes to form alliances to challenge larger tribes, which are in turn encouraged to recruit from outside their own ethnic group.

When voters are confused and unable to coordinate amongst themselves, as in SNTV districts, they turn to the organizational mechanism they relied upon long before the modern political system was put in

place: coethnicity. In places as varied as India (Chandra, 2004), Zambia (Posner, 2005), South Africa (Ferre, 2006), Uganda (Carlson, 2015; Habyarimana et al., 2009), Lebanon and Yemen (Corstange, 2016), and Kenya (Kramon and Posner, 2016), scholars find that ethnic cues help voters to differentiate credible promises of patronage provision from those that are unreliable in low-information settings. If this argument holds, ethnicity should play an important role in determining political behavior in SNTV districts. By contrast, SMDs provide a simpler electoral environment, which will encourage voters from smaller ethnic groups to form a political alliance around a consensus candidate. The outcome of this system should be more inter-tribal cooperation and compromise in politics.

Variation in the types of linkages that bind clients to patrons is understudied because it is usually assumed that only one form of clientelism (identity-based or not) dominates a single political environment.

III. Data

Due to the clientelistic nature of the political system, Jordanian MPs receive a high number of constituent requests every day and they spend a large proportion of their time fulfilling these requests. For example, if a voter has a sick relative in the hospital and cannot afford to pay the bill, she will go to her parliamentarian. The parliamentarian will write a letter asking the regime-appointed Minister of Health to forgive the debt. Two years of fieldwork in Jordan suggest that every MP has either folders of these constituent service letters or, increasingly in recent years, an electronic record of them. The parliamentarian casework log dataset used for this essay comprises about 3,000 requests from six parliamentarians on topics ranging from getting a son a job to connecting electricity to a home to freeing a coethnic tribal member from jail, and so on. The casework logs cover periods ranging from six months to over two years, detailing the types of services sought by constituents, the reasons for the request, and the names of the beneficiaries. Three of these MPs were elected in SMDs and three in SNTV districts. These data provide a rare firsthand glimpse into the clientelistic interactions between parliamentarians and their constituents, overcoming the social desirability bias against reporting

such relationships.

The overwhelming majority of requests in the dataset were for employment and for outright financial aid. Letters for employment sought to help constituents obtain recruitment into the armed services, appointments to jobs in public institutions, transfers from certain departments to others, promotions, and so on, and range from 6% to 67% of all the requests these MPs processed. Financial aid requests could include the forgiveness of a payment for a traffic ticket or a fine for some other violation of the law, financial aid for students, charity for the poor or unfortunate, public sponsorship of a patient who cannot afford to pay his hospital bills, and so on, and range from 21% to 87% of the services processed by these MPs. Educational enrollment requests were made on behalf of students to be admitted (or transferred) into a school, usually at the university level, or to be appointed to university seats under the royal benevolence (*makrama*) system, making up anywhere between 0% and 4% of requests. A final category of services that could be attributed to helping out a group of voters or the nation as a whole (e.g., refurbishing a hospital, amending school curricula), considered to be ‘public services’, represent anywhere from 1% to 6% of an MP’s services. As expected, the focus on particularistic benefits greatly outweighs efforts spent on the provision of public services due to the inability of parliamentarians to affect broad policy changes.

I am not able to verify that these constituent service logs cover *all* of the MPs’ service provision activities. But without official government approval of such benefits to constituents, the MPs would either be paying for these services themselves or relying on their personal connections to provide them. It is therefore in an MP’s best interest to submit a formal request to meet constituent demands. As a result, these data should provide an overview of the typical types of requests MPs are expected to deal with.

To find evidence of whether or not the MPs in Jordan are practicing ethnic favoritism in their provision of state services and benefits to constituents, it is necessary to estimate the size of each MP’s tribe within his district. Last names offer a pretty accurate estimation of tribal origins in Jordan, once one breaks down the tribe into its various branches, clans, and families within a given region. I gathered information on the structures of the largest ethnic groups from the tribal sheikhs within each

MP’s electoral district. In order to create the most accurate family tree for each tribe, I cross-referenced this information with scholarly texts (Al Rawabdeh, 2010; Peake and Field, 1958; Al Azizi, 2001). At least three local sources confirmed that the ethnic identity mapping employed for this measure is correct. From voter registration lists of the year the MP was elected, I estimate the sizes of the tribes and clans within the electoral district by counting how many registered voters are members of the MP’s tribe and figuring out what percentage of the potential electorate they make up, since not all registered voters actually turn out to vote. I also calculate the percentage of all the requests the MP made to the government that were on behalf of members within his tribe and his clan. These figures are then used to check whether a disproportionately high amount of services are requested for the MP’s coethnics in comparison to the number of voters his tribe/clan has registered within the district.

IV. Results

Table 1 provides the information I gleaned from the constituent casework database. The first column of Table 1 contains the MP’s ID number, while the second identifies the type of district he was elected in. The third column displays the percentage of all the requests the MP processed that were for his coethnic tribal members. The fourth column offers an estimate of the size of the MP’s tribe based on their percentage of registered voters in the district. Column five shows the difference between the share of requests the MP processed for his coethnics and the share of registered voters in the district who are from the MP’s tribe. If the number in column five is close to zero, there is no evidence that the coethnic constituents are receiving more than their fair share of services, as the MP would be serving coethnics at a rate that is similar to their proportion of the entire population of constituents in the district. The higher the number in the fifth column, the more evidence there is that ethnic favoritism in service provision exists, because benefits are disproportionately being funneled to the MP’s coethnics. A negative number in column five — as in the case of MP 1 and MP 3 — indicates that patronage is being directed away from the MP’s coethnics, because he is serving them even less than their share of the registered voting population warrants. Figure 1 graphically depicts this relationship.


As the last column in Table 1 indicates, MPs 1, 2,

Table 1: MP Service Provision and Tribal Constituent Favoritism in Jordan

MP	District Type	% Processed Requests for Tribal Members	Tribe Size (% Registered Voters)	% Processed Requests — Tribe Size
1	SMD	29%	31%	-2%
2	SMD	13%	6%	+7%
3	SMD	62%	60%	-2%
4	SNTV	33%	3%	+30%
5	SNTV	55%	36%	+19%
6	SNTV	34%	10%	+24%

Note: The first column indicates the ID code for the MP. The second column indicates district type: SMD = single-member district and SNTV = single non-transferable vote (multi-member) district. The third column indicates the percentage of ‘processed’ requests that came from members of the MP’s tribal group. The fourth column indicates the percentage of registered voters belonging to the MP’s tribal group. The fifth column indicates the percentage of ‘processed’ requests that came from members of the MP’s tribal group minus the percentage of registered voters belonging to the MP’s tribal group. Positive numbers in the fifth column indicate that the MP’s tribal group is favored with respect to service, while negative numbers indicate that they are disfavored.

Figure 1: Ethnic Favoritism in Service Provision in Jordan



Note: Figure 1 plots the difference between the percentage of ‘processed’ requests that came from members of the MP’s tribal group and the percentage of registered voters in the district belonging to the MP’s tribal group for six Jordanian MPs elected in single-member districts (SMD) or single non-transferable vote (SNTV) districts. Higher columns indicate coethnic favoritism, as the MP is funneling a higher proportion of his service provision to his tribal members than would be expected given the size of his tribal group in the district.

and 3, who won their seats in SMDs, tended to provide services to their coethnic constituents at proportions that are less than or almost equal to their tribe's share of the registered voters in the district. In other words, they did not necessarily practice ethnic discrimination. In contrast, MPs 4, 5, and 6, who ran in SNTV districts, grossly favored their tribal coethnics over other constituents in the district when providing personal services. In sum, the data indicate that MPs in SNTV districts practice more tribal favoritism in the provision of services than MPs in single-member districts.

Interestingly, most accounts of life in Jordan describe how tribalism is a more dominant social force in the rural areas, which tend to be SMDs, compared to the urban areas, which tend to be SNTV districts, where tribal ties are drowned out by ethnic diversity and a diminished need for a social safety net based on ascriptive ties. The 2014 *Governance and Local Development* (GLD) survey supports these accounts, finding that 84% of GLD participants registered to vote in SMDs claim to have a tribal identity compared to only 68% of those in SNTV districts (Lust, Kao and Benstead, 2014). 87% of eligible voters registered in SMDs report that one should worry about being cheated by those who are not from their clan or tribe, while this figure is 83% in SNTV districts. Yet, what the findings of this essay suggest is that there is more tribal favoritism in the distribution of government goods and services in the SNTV areas of Jordan than there is in the SMD areas. This contradicts much of the previous research implying that service MPs are limited to rural areas (Lust, 2009, 128).

VI. Concluding Remarks and Implications for Future Research

Since I was limited to gathering data from MPs who were willing to provide information on their service provision, my sample cannot be said to be representative of the whole country. There may exist non-random selection bias between MPs who are willing to share such data and those who are not. It may be that these MPs provide more services to their constituents than others, which is why they were more willing to share their files. All six MPs allowed me free access to the folders in their file cabinets or computer so that openness in record sharing should not be correlated with the outcome of interest for these data: coethnic favoritism in service provision.

The MPs who provided data for analysis here represent constituencies across the northern, central, and southern regions of Jordan. One MP was elected in the capital city of Amman, while another was elected in Jordan's most populous electoral district of Irbid, and yet another was elected in the second smallest district in terms of population. Additionally, one of the MPs hails from Palestinian roots and another is a woman, demonstrating that similar clientelistic behavior among MPs in Jordan crosses ethnonational and gender cleavages. Finally, in other work, I link tribal voting with the ethnic clientelism observed in SNTV districts and I extend the relationship described in this essay between electoral rules and ethnic favoritism in service provision across twelve more districts by demonstrating that having a history of an ethnic connection in the parliament drives voter turnout in SNTV districts, but not SMD ones (Kao, 2015, chapter 4). These findings suggest an important relationship between electoral institutional design and variation in the types of connections that link patrons and clients that is understudied or even argued against in the literature (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).

Scholars tend to take a top-down approach to understanding clientelism, analyzing whether patrons target core or swing voters with clientelistic offers (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Stokes, 2005; Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez and Magaloni, 2016), whether they focus on voters from lower socioeconomic backgrounds (Scott, 1969; Kramon and Posner, 2016; Corstange, Forthcoming; Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez and Magaloni, 2016), or whether they seek to influence vote choice or simply encourage voter turnout (Nichter, 2008; Larreguy, Marshall and Querbin, 2016). Such patron-client relationships are rarely examined from both top-down and bottom-up perspectives at the same time.

Although we should remain cautious about accepting results from a single case study, the data presented in this essay show evidence of ethnically-defined (or non-ethnically defined) patterns of parliamentary service provision. An overall implication of this brief analysis is that there is nothing inherent about ethnicity alone that produces clientelism or hinders democracy, highlighting the importance of understanding how electoral institutions affect citizen access to state benefits in non-democracies and developing democracies.

References

- Al Azizi, Roks Bin Za'id. 2001. "Qamus al-A'ashai'r fi al-Urdun wa al-Filistin." *Dictionary of Tribes in Jordan and Palestine*. Amman, Jordan: Al-Yazuri House for Publishing and Distribution.
- Al Rawabdeh, Rawaf Abdel. 2010. "Qamus al-a'asha'ir fi al-Urdun wa al-Filistin." *Dictionary of Tribes in Jordan and Palestine*. Amman, Jordan: Sharuq House for Publishing and Distribution.
- Bates, Robert H. 1983. "Modernization, ethnic competition, and the rationality of politics in contemporary Africa." *State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas* 152:171.
- Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina. 1987. *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Carey, John M. and Matthew S. Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas." *Electoral Studies* 14(4):417-439.
- Carlson, Elizabeth. 2015. "Ethnic voting and accountability in Africa: A choice experiment in Uganda." *World Politics* 67(2):353-385.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Clark, William Roberts and Matt Golder. 2006. "Rehabilitating Duverger's theory: Testing the mechanical and strategic modifying effects of electoral laws." *Comparative Political Studies* 39(6):679-708.
- Corstange, Daniel. 2016. *The Price of a Vote in the Middle East: Clientelism and Communal Politics in Lebanon and Yemen*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Corstange, Daniel. Forthcoming. "Clientelism in competitive and uncompetitive elections." *Comparative Political Studies*.
- Cox, Gary W. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1986. "Electoral politics as a redistributive game." *Journal of Politics* 48(2):370-389.
- Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto, Federico Estévez and Beatriz Magaloni. 2016. *The Political Logic of Poverty Relief: Electoral Strategies and Social Policy in Mexico*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Droop, Henry R. 1869. *On the Political and Social Effects of Different Methods of Electing Representatives*. London: William Maxwell & Son, Law Booksellers and Publishers.
- Duverger, Maurice. 1959. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. York: Methuen.
- Ferree, Karen E. 2006. "Explaining South Africa's racial census." *Journal of Politics* 68(4):803-815.
- Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. 1996. "Electoral competition and special interest politics." *Review of Economic Studies* 63(2):265-286.
- Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2009. *Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Los Angeles: California University Press.
- Ichino, Nahomi and Noah L. Nathan. 2013. "Crossing the line: Local ethnic geography and voting in Ghana." *American Political Science Review* 107(2):344-361.
- Kao, Kristen. 2015. *Ethnicity, Electoral Institutions, and Clientelism: Authoritarianism in Jordan*. PhD thesis University of California, Los Angeles.
- Kao, Kristen. 2017. "Electoral institutions and ethnic clientelism: Authoritarianism in Jordan." Working paper, University of Gothenburg.
- Kitschelt, Herbert and Steven I. Wilkinson. 2007. *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kramon, Eric and Daniel N. Posner. 2013. "Who benefits from distributive politics? How the outcome one studies affects the answer one gets." *Perspectives on Politics* 11(2):461-474.
- Kramon, Eric and Daniel N. Posner. 2016. "Ethnic favoritism in education in Kenya." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 11(1).
- Larreguy, Horacio, John Marshall and Pablo Querbin. 2016. "Parties, brokers, and voter mobilization: How turnout buying depends upon the party's capacity to monitor brokers." *American Political Science Review* 110(1):160-179.
- Lemarchand, René. 1972. "Political clientelism and ethnicity in tropical Africa: Competing solidarities in nation-building." *American Political Science Review* 66(1):68-90.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1996. "The puzzle of Indian democracy: A consociational interpretation." *American Political Science Review* 90(2):258-268.
- Lindbeck, Assar and Jörgen W. Weibull. 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition." *Public Choice* 52(3):273-297.
- Lust, Ellen. 2009. "Reinforcing informal institutions through authoritarian elections: Insights from Jordan." *Middle East Law and Governance* 1(1):3-37.
- Lust, Ellen, Kristen Kao and Lindsay Benstead. 2014. "Governance and local development Jordan post-election survey." Program on Governance and Local Development, University of Gothenburg.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott. 1991. "Politicians, parties, and electoral systems: Brazil in comparative perspective." *Comparative Politics* 24(1):21-43.

- McCubbins, Mathew D. and Frances Rosenbluth. 1995. Party provision for personal politics: Dividing the vote in Japan. In *Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States*, ed. Henri Tajfel. New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 35–55.
- Mitchell, Paul. 2000. “Voters and their representatives: Electoral institutions and delegation in parliamentary democracies.” *European Journal of Political Research* 37(3):335–351.
- Nichter, Simeon. 2008. “Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot.” *American Political Science Review* 102(1):19–31.
- Ordeshook, Peter C. and Olga V. Shvetsova. 1994. “Ethnic heterogeneity, district magnitude, and the number of parties.” *American Journal of Political Science* 38(1):100–123.
- Peake, Frederick G. and Henry Field. 1958. *History and Tribes of Jordan*. Oxford: University of Miami Press.
- Posner, Daniel. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ramseyer, J. Mark and Frances M. Rosenbluth. 1998. *The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rosenbluth, Frances M. and Michael F. Thies. 2010. *Japan Transformed: Political Change and Economic Restructuring*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Schaffer, Frederic Charles. 2007. *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Scott, James C. 1969. “Corruption, machine politics, and political change.” *American Political Science Review* 63(4):1142–1158.
- Shugart, Matthew S. 2005. Comparative electoral systems research: The maturation of a field and new challenges ahead. In *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, ed. Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stokes, Susan. 2005. “Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina.” *American Political Science Review* 99(3):315–325.
- Stokes, Susan, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Taagepera, Rein and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1989. *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Weghorst, Keith R. and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2013. “What drives the swing voter in Africa?” *American Journal of Political Science* 57(3):717–734.

Studying Minorities in the Middle East: The Kurdish Case

by Ekrem Karakoç
Binghamton University

Although aspiring researchers may sometimes despair at ever finding an original topic to investigate, there are, in fact, many facets of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region before the Arab Uprisings that have yet to receive their due attention. The status of minorities in the MENA region in political science deserves pride of place, both for its importance and historical neglect.

Why, until recently, have ethnic, sectarian, and religious minorities in the MENA region received so little scholarly attention? There are several reasons. The first stems from the geopolitical climate in the post-Cold War era, which has directed a great deal of academic research toward topics like security and conflict. Minority groups, along with many other topics, have received comparatively little attention. The second has to do with the rise of political Islam and its use by authoritarian regimes to enhance their legitimacy in domestic and international arenas, which has diverted scholarly attention to the study of political Islam, American foreign policy in the region, authoritarian durability, political culture, and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Bellin, 2004; Waterbury, 1994; Lust, 2011; Jamal, 2012; Nugent, Masoud and Jamal, Forthcoming; Masoud, 2008). The third reason arises from the difficulties that were inherent to conducting fieldwork and survey research of minorities in the MENA region in previous decades. Things are changing now, though, largely because of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration’s short-lived effort to promote democracy, and the more recent Arab Uprisings, all of which have lowered the barriers to study, and promoted greater interest in, minorities. All of this means that it is only recently that scholars have begun to examine the relationship between states and their religious (e.g., Christian, Jewish, Ezidis, Bahais) and sectarian (e.g., Sunni, Shia) minorities (White, 2011; Skovgaard-Petersen, 1996; McCallum, 2010).

Some ethnic minorities such as the Kurds and Amazigh have received greater scholarly attention than others because of their long-lived struggles against state power, although the Kurds and Amazighs have been marginalized to different degrees (Aslan, 2014). Recent decades have witnessed a relatively large number of studies looking at both minority groups (Kirişçi and

Winrow, 1997; Aissati, 2001; Maddy-Weitzman, 2011; Marcus, 2007). The Arab Uprisings, the Syrian civil war, and subsequent developments have provided an impetus to studies of the Kurds and the Kurdish conflict. The Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) recent referendum on Kurdish independence from Iraq on September 25th, 2017, as well as the resurrected clashes between the KRG and the Iraqi army, has further increased interest in the Kurds in neighboring countries as well as other minorities. With the defeat of ISIS in Syria, this is because these developments have amplified the uncertainty about the future of the political borders and systems within and across neighboring countries.

I. Survey Research on Minorities in the MENA Region

Survey research has great potential to contribute to minority-majority relations in the MENA region. Cross-national surveys such as the Arab Barometer, the World Values Survey, and several others have been valuable resources for scholars. They can tell us to what extent minorities and majorities hold similar or conflicting opinions on domestic and international issues/actors in a country or across several countries.

However, the lack of nuanced and theoretically informed questions on minority-majority relations or minority-related issues in these cross-national surveys remain a major problem. Including more questions or a module on minorities in the MENA surveys would greatly enhance our knowledge of minority-regime and minority-majority relations. Those conducting surveys on minorities need to consider the social and political context more than general surveys do, however. Reliable data collection will require careful questionnaire construction and well-planned fieldwork.

The major problem is that the existing surveys ask limited questions, mostly whether somebody belongs to a particular ethnic, sectarian, or religious group. Scholars then use these questions as minority dummy variables and examine a respondent's attitude toward a domestic issue, actor, or institution. Such surveys neglect issues of inter-ethnic trust, grievances, support for minority rights, and other important issues, depriving us of valuable information. Do ethnic majorities support the right of minorities to get an education and to be served in non-titular languages in public institutions, or do they defend the status quo that denies such rights? A recent trend in survey research in the MENA region

is to conduct survey experiments, but most of the focus has been on testing particular theories of political psychology and social identity, or on secular/religious cleavages, trust, political tolerance, and attitudes toward major actors.

State policies that created a hierarchy in social identities, especially between Turks and Kurds, continue to increase prejudices and hatred across ethnic lines. This is especially so among Turks who feel that they 'own' the state and who view the Kurds as subordinate citizens.

Due to the nature of minority studies, many scholars turn to political psychology to derive hypotheses. In particular, Tajfel's social identity theory (SIT) and other approaches have been used to develop hypotheses that have been tested in the MENA region. These studies focus on the dynamics of in-group and out-group relations and their impact on various social and political issues such as social tolerance, foreign policy attitudes, and support for armed groups. Most studies find that ethnic and religious identities have either a direct or indirect effect on these issues. Let me briefly mention some of these studies. Ciftci (2013) finds that ethnic identity and one's conceptualization of national interest shape foreign policy preferences in Turkey. Özcan, Köse and Karakoç (2015) and Köse, Özcan and Karakoç (2016) examine minority attitudes toward foreign policy in Turkey and major actors in Iraq and Egypt respectively. Belge and Karakoç (2015) look at how ethnic and religious minorities differ in their support for authoritarianism in the MENA region. Corstange and Marinov (2012) investigate how intervention by foreign powers affects people with different sectarian identities in Lebanon. Finally, Ciftci and Tezcür (2016) investigate sectarian identities and their favorability ratings of several MENA-region countries.

II. The Origins of Nation States in the MENA Region

While approaches based on SIT and other theories have great explanatory power, ignoring the political history of states comes with a high cost. Investigating the ethnocratic, sectarian, or religious natures of the states in the MENA region, as well as their origins, would help us to understand why identity matters and how identity

intertwines with social status, economic interest, and security needs in order to shape how people view each other and their political regimes.

MENA-region countries with minorities have been constructed around particular identities that are hierarchical in nature. Certain ethnic, religious, and/or sectarian identities enjoy a privileged status as the new states are created and then consolidated. It is essential to problematize the hierarchies of social identities and political and economic policies in the minds of ruling elites and ethnic groups associated with that identity. And while this may not be surprising for most specialists in the region, what is less well known is the extent to which these policies have shaped attitudes and behaviors toward each other; in particular, popular perceptions toward minority rights across minority and majority groups. To provide a specific example, I now turn to the Kurdish case in Turkey and illustrate my argument with some empirical evidence.

III. The Turkish State and the Kurds

The newly founded Republic of Turkey in 1923 sought to create a new national identity based on Turkishness and it pursued assimilationist policies toward Muslim ethnic groups, including the Kurds. Due to their distinctive language, culture, physical features, population density, and geographic distribution, these policies have been mostly unsuccessful. Discriminatory policies toward the Kurds date back to the Ottoman Empire, long before the Turkish state was established. To make a long history short, soon after the Turkish republic was established, the exclusionary policies of the new Turkish state intensified. The state ideology, secular nationalism, that is to say, Kemalism, long regarded the Kurds as an ethnic group that required civilizing and assimilation through public policies. With this colonialist mindset, it saw people on the periphery, especially the Kurds, as needing to be assimilated into the chosen identity of 'future Turks' (Yeğen, 2007).

The ruling elite of the new republic created an ethnocentric regime in which Turkishness has been the dominant ethnic identity (Saatci, 2002; Yeğen, 2004). Numerous failed rebellions by the Kurds increased the state's security-oriented policies toward the Kurds. While armed struggle against the state stopped between the late 1930s and the late 1970s, neither the Kurds' fight for more voice in the system through leftist parties and

other political movements nor the state's repressive policies have slowed down. The armed struggle against the state started anew in the first half of the 1980s and intensified in the 1990s. In the 2000s, the state attempted to introduce some minor reforms aimed at increasing the linguistic and cultural rights of the Kurds. However, these reforms did not lead to any major changes in public policy because the bureaucratic apparatus, whether the security forces, the judiciary, or state ministries, either hindered the implementation of the reforms or simply did not implement the reforms at their discretion. The Turkish General Staff was not hesitant to call Kurdish protestors 'pseudo-citizens' as recently as 2005 (Gambetti, 2007). The Turkish state's security-oriented policies eventually resulted in the Kurds' underrepresentation in both political and economic spheres, increasing the wealth gap between Turks and Kurds and distrust in national institutions among Kurds. (Tezcür and Gürses, 2017; Karakoç, 2013).

The state attempted unsuccessfully to use Islam to pacify Kurdish political demands and reduce support for Kurdish parties (Gürses, 2015; Sarigil and Fazlıoğlu, 2013; Sarigil and Karakoç, 2016). Furthermore, secular and religious Turks that otherwise differ in all aspects of politics and society are united only against Kurdish demands, further intensifying ethnic polarization. Anti-Kurdish attitudes and stereotypes in Turkey are ubiquitous (Dixon and Ergin, 2010). Ordinary people link Kurdish identity to negative moral characteristics of this unwelcome identity (Ergin, 2014). People increasingly need to hide their prejudices against Kurds as the dominant discourse among Turks portrays Kurds as non-modern, separatist hate-mongers and terrorists (Saraçoğlu, 2010). Furthermore, and not surprisingly, the increasing visibility of Kurds, due to their temporary or permanent migration to the western part of the country and their superficial interaction with Turks, has occasionally resulted in conflict and increased tensions between the two ethnicities (Gambetti, 2007; Çelik, Bilali and Iqbal, 2017).

In sum, state policies that created a hierarchy in social identities, especially between Turks and Kurds, continue to increase prejudices and hatred across ethnic lines. This is especially so among Turks who feel that they 'own' the state and who view the Kurds as subordinate citizens. The next section will show in detail the extent to which Turks support or oppose minority rights, such as Kurdish cultural, political, and economic

Table 1: Attitudes towards Minority Rights in Turkey, 2015

	Turk Yes (%)	Kurd Yes (%)
Is there State Discrimination against the Kurds?	11	57
Is there Equality in Civil Rights and Liberties?	82	35
Education in Mother Tongue	14	83
Offering Optional Courses in Kurdish	35	91
Kurdish Names for Villages, Towns	18	87
Kurdish Language in Municipalities, Hospitals, and Courts	24	64
Kurdish as Second Official Language	6	74
Regional Parliament	6	64
Kurdish Independence	11	38
N	5383	1340

Note: Table 1 indicates support for minority rights across Turks (column 1) and Kurds (column 2) based on a survey conducted in April 2015.

demands.

IV. The Survey

The data come from a nationwide public opinion poll of around 7,000 individuals conducted in Turkey in April 2015.¹ This was shortly before the political opening to the Kurds was officially over and the fighting between the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) and Turkish security forces had recommenced. Kurds who live in Southeast Anatolia and the rest of the country are included in the survey. Please note that earlier surveys that asked the same questions display a significant difference on the same issues (Sarigil and Karakoç, 2016).

The first task is to understand whether Kurds and Turks share a similar opinion on the nature and origins of Kurdish problems in Turkey. The survey asks whether there is state discrimination against Kurds and whether Kurds and Turks are equal in their civil rights and liberties. The first two rows of Table 1 indicate that there is a

great divide in how Kurds and Turks think about these issues. Putting aside ‘I do not know’ or ‘No response’ for the sake of simplicity,² we find that among Turks, eleven percent agree that there is state discrimination against the Kurds and 82 percent believe that the Kurds enjoy equal civil rights and liberties. Kurds clearly hold a different perception on these issues — around 56 percent of Kurds reported discrimination by the state and only 35 percent said that they enjoyed equal civil rights and liberties with Turks.

The next five rows in Table 1 focus on the cultural rights of Kurds. We see that most Turks oppose the Kurdish language in education and as an official language. Only fourteen percent of Turks, but 83 percent of Kurds, want education in Kurdish in public schools, while only 24 percent of Turks and 64 percent of Kurds want the Kurdish language in municipalities, hospitals, and courts. Support for optional courses in Kurdish is higher for both ethnic groups, with 35 percent of Turks and 91 percent of Kurds indicating that they support

¹The survey was conducted by TEPAV, the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey.

²Including these categories does not change the substantive interpretation of the results.

these types of courses. Turks show little support for Kurdish as a second official language — only six percent of Turks support this possibility compared to 74 percent of Kurds. These figures suggest that most Turks feel ‘ownership’ of the state, and are hesitant to share ‘state identity’ with the Kurds.

As the last two rows in Table 1 indicate, the divide between the two ethnic groups is also visible in the debate over regional parliaments and independence for Kurdish majority regions. Only six percent of Turks, but 64 percent of Kurds, support a Kurdish regional parliament. Support for Kurdish independence is at eleven percent among Turks, but also relatively low among Kurds at 38 percent.

The results suggest that the dominant ethnic group does not want to share the identity of the state with another ethnic group, preferring to keep the hierarchical status quo that benefits them. Opposing education in another language or recognizing Kurdish as a second official language show that Turks want to keep their dominant position, but they are willing to grant second order rights such as the use of the Kurdish language in public institutions like hospitals, courts, and municipalities while receiving service. Turkish ethnocracy has changed over time in the way it operates, but it persists in most Turks’ minds and to a lesser extent in Kurds’ minds in the sense that many Kurds accept their subordinate position in the Turkish political structure. The reasons for this internalized subordination should form the basis for a future study.

The formation of nation states in the MENA countries with ethnic or religious heterogeneity entails inequality between groups, whether these groups vary in terms of ethnicity, religion, or sectarian identities.³ The Kurdish case in Turkey that I discuss here illustrates this. The extent to which public policies imposing inequality affect intergroup relations, minority-regime relations, and consequently social, economic, and political behavior in Turkey and elsewhere remains an understudied and potentially rich subject.

References

- Aissati, Abderrahman El. 2001. “Ethnic identity, language shift, and the Amazigh Voice in Morocco and Algeria.” *Race, Gender & Class* 8(3):57–69.
- Aslan, Senem. 2014. *Nation Building in Turkey and Morocco*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Belge, Ceren and Ekrem Karakoç. 2015. “Minorities in the Middle East: Ethnicity, religion, and support for authoritarianism.” *Political Research Quarterly* 68(2):280–292.
- Bellin, Eva. 2004. “The robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in comparative perspective.” *Comparative Politics* 36(2):139–157.
- Çelik, Ayşe Betül, Rezarta Bilali and Yeshim Iqbal. 2017. “Patterns of ‘Othering’ in Turkey: A study of ethnic, ideological, and sectarian polarisation.” *South European Society and Politics* 22(2):217–238.
- Ciftci, Sabri. 2013. “Social identity and attitudes toward foreign policy: Evidence from a youth survey in Turkey.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 45(1):25–43.
- Ciftci, Sabri and Güneş Murat Tezcür. 2016. “Soft power, religion, and anti-Americanism in the Middle East.” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12(3):374–394.
- Corstange, Daniel and Nikolay Marinov. 2012. “Taking sides in other people’s elections: The polarizing effect of foreign intervention.” *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3):655–670.
- Dixon, Jeffrey C. and Murat Ergin. 2010. “Explaining anti-Kurdish beliefs in Turkey: Group competition, identity, and globalization.” *Social Science Quarterly* 91(5):1329–1348.
- Ergin, Murat. 2014. “The racialization of Kurdish identity in Turkey.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37(2):322–341.
- Gambetti, Zeynep. 2007. “Linç Girişimleri, Neo-Liberalizm ve Güvenlik Devleti.” *Toplum ve Bilim* 109:7–34.
- Gürses, Mehmet. 2015. “Is Islam a cure for ethnic conflict? Evidence from Turkey.” *Politics and Religion* 8(1):135–154.
- Jamal, Amaney A. 2012. *Of Empires and Citizens: Pro-American Democracy or No Democracy at All?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Karakoç, Ekrem. 2013. “Ethnicity and trust in national and international institutions: Kurdish attitudes toward political institutions in Turkey.” *Turkish Studies* 14(1):92–114.
- Kirişçi, Kemal and Gareth M. Winrow. 1997. *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict*. London: Frank Cass.
- Köse, Talha, Mesut Özcan and Ekrem Karakoç. 2016. “A comparative analysis of soft power in the MENA region: The impact of ethnic, sectarian, and religious identity on soft power in Iraq and Egypt.” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12(3):354–373.
- Lust, Ellen. 2011. “Missing the third wave: Islam, institutions, and democracy in the Middle East.” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 46(2):163–190.
- Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce. 2011. *The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African States*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

³See Mahmood (2015) for a similar argument about group hierarchy in secular states.

- Mahmood, Saba. 2015. *Religious Differences in a Secular Age: A Minority Report*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Marcus, Aliza. 2007. *Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence*. New York: New York University Press.
- Masoud, Tarek. 2008. "Are they Democrats? Does it matter?" *Journal of Democracy* 19(3):19–24.
- McCallum, Fiona. 2010. "Christians in the Middle East: A new subfield?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 42(3):486–488.
- Nugent, Elizabeth, Tarek Masoud and Amaney A. Jamal. Forthcoming. "Arab responses to Western hegemony: Experimental evidence from Egypt." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
- Özcan, Mesut, Talha Köse and Ekrem Karakoç. 2015. "Assessments of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East during the Arab uprisings." *Turkish Studies* 16(2):195–218.
- Saatci, Mustafa. 2002. "Nation-states and ethnic boundaries: Modern Turkish identity and Turkish-Kurdish conflict." *Nations and Nationalism* 8(4):549–564.
- Saraçoğlu, Cenk. 2010. *Kurds of Modern Turkey: Migration, Neoliberalism and Exclusion in Turkish Society*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Sarigil, Zeki and Ekrem Karakoç. 2016. "Who supports secession? The determinants of secessionist attitudes among Turkey's Kurds." *Nations and Nationalism* 22(2):325–346.
- Sarigil, Zeki and Omer Fazlioglu. 2013. "Religion and Ethno-nationalism: Turkey's Kurdish issue." *Nations and Nationalism* 19(3):551–571.
- Skovgaard-Petersen, Jakob. 1996. "Religious heads or civil servants? Druze and Sunni religious leadership in post-war Lebanon." *Mediterranean Politics* 1(3):337–352.
- Tezcür, Güneş Murat and Mehmet Gürses. 2017. "Ethnic exclusion and mobilization: The Kurdish conflict in Turkey." *Comparative Politics* 49(3):213–230.
- Waterbury, John. 1994. Democracy without democrats? The potential for political liberalization in the Middle East. In *Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*, ed. Ghassan Salame. London: I.B. Tauris.
- White, Benjamin T. 2011. *The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Yeğen, Mesut. 2004. "Citizenship and ethnicity in Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies* 40(6):51–66.
- Yeğen, Mesut. 2007. "Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish question." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30(1):119–151.

China's Local Ethnic Exclusion: Cross-regional and Within-region Patterns in Tibet and Xinjiang

by Chuyu Liu

Pennsylvania State University

I. Introduction

In this essay, I use novel subnational data to highlight several puzzling patterns with regard to the politics of nation-building in China. Scholars from the disciplines of anthropology, geography, and sociology have made substantial progress in understanding the causes of ethnic violence in contemporary China (Yeh, 2013; Brox and Bellér-Hann, 2014; Fischer, 2014; Hillman and Tuttle, 2016). This body of literature tends to focus on socioeconomic disparities and endangered minority cultures, but ignores the role of *local ethnic exclusion* — the extent to which ethnic minorities can access local governments. While the comparative politics literature has examined this crucial issue, the body of existing studies remains sparse and relies heavily on anecdotal evidence (Bovingdon, 2010; Côté, 2015).

The study of local ethnic exclusion involves two lines of inquiry that are central to current ethnic conflict studies. One revolves around ethnic exclusion, a concept that captures whether ethnic groups are excluded from state power and is closely associated with ethnonationalist grievances that usually result in violence (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). A second line of inquiry involves a recent shift in methodology that prioritizes the role of local conditions in explaining intrastate conflicts. In this essay, I use recently available data to present the first systematic examination of local ethnopolitical configurations in China's two most restive borderlands, Tibet and Xinjiang.

I focus on the role of local ethnic exclusion for two theoretical reasons. First, previous studies on ethnic exclusion have typically obscured important intra-regional variations at the local level. The use of country-level/group-level measures of political exclusion dominates the recent empirical research (Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009; Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). For example, the widely used Ethnic Power Relations (EPR — EEH) dataset covers whether politically

¹ EPR-EEH also includes information on whether those groups excluded from central power-sharing arrangements enjoy regional autonomy. "By 'regional' we refer to a substate unit below the level of the state as a whole" (Cederman et al., 2015, 360). The authors do not discuss the local variation in power-sharing arrangements *within* the substate units under scrutiny.

relevant ethnic groups are included in the executive organs of central governments.¹ While such an aggregated approach is justified in many cases, it can obscure considerable local variation in ethnic exclusion. This is problematic because ethnic conflicts are often highly geographically concentrated within a country (Varshney, 2003; Varshney, Tadjoeeddin and Panggabean, 2008). In other words, a more nuanced approach should pay more attention to ethnic exclusion at the local level, especially with regard to ethnic groups' access to local governments. In fact, a lack of attention paid towards local governments is not something that is specific to the field of Chinese ethnic politics. As a recent article claims, "governments are conspicuously absent from the empirical literature on civil conflict" (Lacina, 2014). In this essay and my other research, I argue that it is necessary to examine *local ethnic exclusion* for a more comprehensive view of ethnic violence.

Second, a focus on local ethnic exclusion helps us to have a better understanding of how ethnofederalism affects ethnic mobilization. Ethnofederalism means "a federal political system in which component territorial governance units are intentionally associated with specific ethnic categories" (Hale, 2004, p.165). According to some scholars, ethnofederalism is regarded as a cause of separatist conflicts in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Bunce, 1999; Cornell, 2002; Hale, 2008). Specifically, this group of scholars argues that an ethnofederal state breeds inter-ethnic conflict through two mechanisms. According to the *ethnic identity enhancement mechanism*, ethnofederalism strengthens and even politicizes ethnic identity. In effect, ethnofederalism makes it easier for political entrepreneurs to mobilize the masses along clear-cut ethnic lines (Brubaker, 1994). According to the *elite empowerment mechanism*, ethnofederalism offers ethnic elites a number of designated institutional resources such as predefined national legislatures, indigenized administrative bureaucrats, and cultural symbols (Roeder, 1991). Once the state is organized as a set of essentially quasi-nation states, minority elites can easily convert these enshrined organizational resources into contentious political actions.

The case of China is particularly interesting here since it offers us an opportunity to unpack the two mechanisms underlying the proposed relationship between ethnofederalism and ethnic conflict. Under the influence of the Soviet Union's ethnofederalism (Ma, 2007), China adopted a set of institutions to "divide the

population of the state into an exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of national groups" (Brubaker, 1994, 53). However, only a relatively low level of power was actually transferred to China's minority elites (Sautman, 2012). Thus, the ethnic identity enforcement mechanism linking ethnofederalism and ethnic mobilization should be strong in China but the elite empowerment mechanism should be weak.

Previous studies on ethnic exclusion have typically obscured important intra-regional variations at the local level ... This is problematic because ethnic conflicts are often highly geographically concentrated within a country.

My preliminary analysis reveals three findings. First, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has adopted distinct power-sharing policies in response to domestic rebellions by minority groups in Tibet and Xinjiang. In particular, I find that the state has conceded more decision-making power to Tibetan elites than to Uyghur elites. Second, the party-state has employed a particular strategy to control its peripheral regions. Specifically, the party-state has allowed a significant number of minority elites to be incorporated into local bureaucratic apparatuses while refusing to offer them substantive decision-making power. Third, I find that there is considerable intra-regional variation regarding the access that minority elites have to local governments. Together, these findings raise a number of interesting questions that are particularly ripe for future research.

II. Sources of Data

One of the biggest challenges to studying ethnic politics in China is the scarcity of reliable subnational data. One reason for this is that the ethnicity issue is politically sensitive. In this essay, I turn to a number of government documents, scholarly publications, and other secondary sources to gather three types of information related to: (i) ethnic conflict in Tibet and Xinjiang, (ii) the ethnic profile of county-level CCP party secretaries in Tibet and Xinjiang, and (iii) the ethnic background of local bureaucrats in Xinjiang.

Ethnic Conflict in Tibet and Xinjiang. The data on ethnic conflict in Tibet are taken from the 2016 annual

report on Tibet by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Following Barnett (2016), I use the number of Tibetan political detentions as a proxy for the intensity of local pro-independence protests. The report covers the period from 1986 to 2016. As a comparison, the annual number of ethnic conflict incidents in Xinjiang from 1990 to 2005 are drawn from Cao et al. (Forthcoming). For the purposes of the present study, I extended the temporal coverage of Cao et al. (Forthcoming) to 1986. Despite certain data limitations that arise because of reporting biases,² these two sources of data provide a good description of ethnic conflict in Tibet and Xinjiang.

Ethnic Profile of CCP Party Secretary. The ethnic profile data of CCP party secretaries were collected from two sources. For Xinjiang, I turned to provincial year-books for the lists of the names of party secretaries at the county level between 1980 and 2005. I then checked the ethnic background of each official by using county gazettes and the internet. For Tibet, I included the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), Qinghai, Garzê Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Ngawa Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, and Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. The data for Tibet are drawn from Landry, Lü and Duan (Forthcoming), who identify the ethnic profiles of the party secretaries in these regions between 1996 and 2007.

Ethnic Composition of Local Bureaucrats in Xinjiang. To get the ethnic background of Xinjiang's local bureaucrats, I used county-level Organizational History Statistics (*zuzhishi ziliao*), a type of internally published government document that breaks down the number of cadres by ethnicity between 1980 and 1987. The drawback of this source is that it has not been systematically updated since 1987. To supplement the missing values from 1988 to 1995, I collected data from Xinjiang's more than 80 county gazettes. To my knowledge, this is the first systematic analysis of this valuable source of information with regard to China's ethnic politics.

III. Three Findings

Below, I outline three findings from my preliminary analysis of the ethnic conflict data from Tibet and Xinjiang.

Finding I: Different Responses to Ethnic Violence by the Chinese State. Given the key role played by ethnonationalist exclusion in explaining inter-group conflict, recent civil conflict studies have begun to explore the origins of ethnic exclusion. Wucherpennig, Hunziker and Cederman (2016) attribute the cause of different ethnopolitical configurations to the impact of colonial legacies. Roessler (2011) argues that personalist regimes have strong incentives to exclude out-groups as a strategy of coup-proofing. However, it remains unclear why the state often takes distinct accommodating strategies toward different domestic minority groups after experiencing a wave of ethnic violence.


In Figure 1, I plot the number of ethnic conflict events by year in Tibet and Xinjiang between 1986 and 2005. As we can see, the number of inter-group conflicts was particularly high from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s in both regions. Although China witnessed an explosive growth in social unrest from 1986 to 2005, most of this social unrest involved relatively peaceful protests. The party-state has adopted a wide array of tactics to routinize these forms of popular collective actions (Chen, 2011). In Tibet and Xinjiang, though, social unrest and inter-group conflict was driven by secessionist motivations and posed much bigger security threats to the regime.

Despite facing parallel increasing threats in Tibet and Xinjiang at the end of the 1990s, the party-state responded in radically different ways in the two regions. In Figure 2, I plot the percentage of minority party secretaries at the county level in Tibet and Xinjiang. A striking pattern emerges. Although Uyghur political elites were almost completely excluded from accessing local executive power, this was not the case for their counterparts in Tibet. The question is, why did the party-state adopt such different power-sharing policies towards seemingly similar levels of threats in these two regions?

Finding II: Rent-Sharing without Power-Sharing. Figure 3, which focuses on Xinjiang, captures a crucial theoretical distinction between two types of ethnic inclusion that are often obscured in the existing civil conflict literature: power-sharing and rent-sharing. Power-sharing has to do with the level of ethnic representation in the government's decision-making process. Do minority elites have access to key positions and, hence, the


²See the related discussion in Cao et al. (Forthcoming).

Figure 1: Number of Ethnic Conflict Events in Tibet and Xinjiang, 1986 - 2005




Note: Figure 1 shows the number of ethnic conflict events in Tibet (purple) and Xinjiang (red) from 1986 to 2005. The vertical axis on the left indicates the number of political detentions in Tibet, while the vertical axis on the right indicates the number of incidents of ethnic conflict in Xinjiang.

Figure 2: Percentage of Minority Party Secretaries in Tibet and Xinjiang, 1996 - 2005




Note: Figure 2 shows the percentage of minority party secretaries at the county level in Tibet (purple) and Xinjiang (red) from 1996 to 2005.

Figure 3: The Trend of Political Exclusion in Xinjiang, 1980–1995



Note: Figure 3 shows the percentage of minority party secretaries (red) and the percentage of minority cadres (blue) at the county level in Xinjiang between 1980 and 1995.

Figure 4: Degree of Political Exclusion in Xinjiang, 1980–1995 (County-Level)



Note: In Figure 4, I plot the difference between the proportion of minority cadres and the proportion of the minority population in a county in Xinjiang between 1980 and 1995. Observations to the right of the dashed red vertical line indicate that minority cadres are overrepresented, while observations to the left indicate that minority cadres are underrepresented.

ability to influence the policy-making process? Power-sharing in Xinjiang would mean allowing minority elites to be local CCP party secretaries. Previous studies in China have shown that county party secretaries are key political actors who essentially control local executive power (Guo, 2009). Rent-sharing as a form of ethnic inclusion has more to do with using systems of patronage to materially buy off minority elites (Lust-Okar, 2005; Blaydes, 2010). Many politically marginalized ethnic minorities are eager to compete for government jobs even if these positions do not provide an opportunity to influence substantive policies (Côté, 2015). To capture the degree of rent-sharing in Xinjiang, I measure the percent of minority county-level bureaucrats — the local cadres that are subordinate to the county's party secretary. These minority cadres have access to material rents but have little control over important policy decisions.

In Figure 3, I plot the share of county-level minority party secretaries (power-sharing) and minority cadres (rent-seeking) in Xinjiang between 1980 and 1995. As the figure indicates, the Chinese state has historically adopted more of a rent-seeking strategy towards ethnic minorities than a power-sharing strategy. Significantly, the level of power-sharing with ethnic minorities has consistently declined over time. Two questions naturally arise. First, threatened by ethnic unrest in Xinjiang, why did the Chinese state dramatically reduce the level of inter-ethnic power-sharing over time while keeping the degree of cross-ethnic rent-sharing almost constant? Second, how did this specific strategy of ethnic inclusion on the part of the state affect the characteristics of local secessionist violence?

Finding III: Variation of Local Cross-Ethnic Rent-Sharing. Figure 4 shows considerable cross-county variation in Xinjiang in the discrepancy between the percentage of minority bureaucrats and the share of the minority population. Although minority political elites are overrepresented in local government in some counties, a majority of counties reveal evidence of substantial ethnic exclusion in local governments. In this latter set of counties, minority elites are prevented from securing lucrative government jobs. In other words, there appears to be considerable cross-county variation in the use of rent-seeking as a strategy of ethnic inclusion within Xinjiang.

This finding is particularly puzzling in light of pre-

vious scholarship. If privileged access to political rents by minority elites is associated with a lower risk of rebellion (De Juan and Bank, 2015; Bunte and Vinson, 2016), why did the ethnic group in power not offer more patronage to out-group elites? On the other hand, if the state is mainly motivated by an in-group bias (Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009), how would we account for those cases in which minority bureaucrats are over-represented? In sum, we still lack a general theoretical framework that is able to explain variation in the distribution of local patronage across ethnic lines.

IV. Summary

Ethnic unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang has attracted increasing academic and public interest in the last decade. Specialists on these two regions have pointed out the impact of ethnic exclusion on the onset of local inter-ethnic violence. However, there is still little systematic scrutiny of the spatial and temporal variation in ethnic exclusion in Tibet and Xinjiang. In this essay, I present a first cut at the data and discuss three preliminary findings. The findings raise a number of interesting questions about ethnic politics in China and we still know little about the answers — we have only begun to scratch the surface on the important topic of nation-building in China.

References

- Barnett, Robert. 2016. "Imagining the borderlands: Managing (to prolong) conflict in Tibet." *Nations and Nationalism* 22(4):706–724.
- Blaydes, Lisa. 2010. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bovingdon, Gardner. 2010. *The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Brox, Trine and Ildikó Bellér-Hann. 2014. *On the Fringes of the Harmonious Society: Tibetans and Uyghurs in Socialist China*. Copenhagen: Nias Press.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1994. "Nationhood and the national question in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Eurasia: An institutional account." *Theory and Society* 23(1):47–78.
- Bunce, Valerie. 1999. *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bunte, Jonas B. and Laura T. Vinson. 2016. "Local power-sharing institutions and interreligious violence in Nigeria." *Journal of Peace Research* 53(1):49–65.
- Cao, Xun, Haiyan Duan, Chuyu Liu, James Piazza and Yingjie Wei. Forthcoming. "Explaining ethnic violence on China's western frontier: The Ethnic Violence in China (EVC)

- database and an initial test on the effects of inter-ethnic inequality and natural resources in the Xinjiang region." *China Review*.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer and Brian Min. 2010. "Why do ethnic groups rebel? New data and analysis." *World Politics* 62(01):87–119.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian S. Gleditsch and Halvard Buhaug. 2013. *Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, Simon Hug, Andreas Schädel and Julian Wucherpfennig. 2015. "Territorial autonomy in the shadow of conflict: Too little, too late?" *American Political Science Review* 109(2):354–370.
- Chen, Xi. 2011. *Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cornell, Svante E. 2002. "Autonomy as a source of conflict: Caucasian conflicts in theoretical perspective." *World politics* 54(2):245–276.
- Côté, Isabelle. 2015. "Horizontal inequalities and sons of the soil conflict in China." *Civil Wars* 17(3):357–378.
- De Juan, Alexander and André Bank. 2015. "The ba'athist blackout? Selective goods provision and political violence in the Syrian civil war." *Journal of Peace Research* 52(1):91–104.
- Fischer, Andrew M. 2014. *The Disempowered Development of Tibet in China: A Study in the Economics of Marginalization*. Plymouth: Lexington Books.
- Guo, Gang. 2009. "China's local political budget cycles." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(3):621–632.
- Hale, Henry E. 2004. "Divided we stand: Institutional sources of ethnofederal state survival and collapse." *World Politics* 56(02):165–193.
- Hale, Henry E. 2008. *The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hillman, Ben and Gray Tuttle, eds. 2016. *Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China's West*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lacina, Bethany. 2014. "How governments shape the risk of civil violence: India's federal reorganization, 1950–56." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(3):720–738.
- Landry, Pierre F., Xiaobo Lü and Haiyan Duan. Forthcoming. "Does performance matter? Evaluating political selection along the Chinese administrative ladder." *Comparative Political Studies*.
- Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2005. *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ma, Rong. 2007. "A new perspective in guiding ethnic relations in the twenty-first century: 'De-politicization' of ethnicity in China." *Asian Ethnicity* 8(3):199–217.
- Roeder, Philip G. 1991. "Soviet federalism and ethnic mobilization." *World Politics* 43(2):196–232.
- Roessler, Philip. 2011. "The enemy within: Personal rule, coups, and civil war in Africa." *World Politics* 63(2):300–346.
- Sautman, Barry. 2012. "Paved with good intentions: Proposals to curb minority rights and their consequences for China." *Modern China* 38(1):10–39.
- Varshney, Ashutosh. 2003. *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Varshney, Ashutosh, Mohammad Z. Tadjoeeddin and Rizal Panggabean. 2008. "Creating datasets in information-poor environments: Patterns of collective violence in Indonesia, 1990–2003." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 8(3):361–394.
- Wimmer, Andreas, Lars-Erik Cederman and Brian Min. 2009. "Ethnic politics and armed conflict: a configurational analysis of a new global dataset." *American Sociological Review* 74(2):316–337.
- Wucherpfennig, Julian, Philipp Hunziker and Lars-Erik Cederman. 2016. "Who inherits the state? Colonial rule and postcolonial conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 60(4):882–898.
- Yeh, Emily T. 2013. *Taming Tibet: Landscape Transformation and the Gift of Chinese Development*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Ethnicity, Parties, and Electoral Violence in Developing Democracies

by Aditi Malik

College of the Holy Cross

This essay describes how differences in the degree of party stability generate varying incentives for elites to instrumentalize election-time violence. Although I focus on two 'ethnic' forms of electoral conflict — Hindu-Muslim riots in India (Varshney, 2002; Wilkinson, 2004) and 'ethnic clashes' in Kenya (Klopp, 2001) — the core insights from the essay can be applied to cases of partisan violence as well. In short, my aim here is to underline that one of the key factors that makes certain places prone to electoral violence — ethnic or non-ethnic — is the instability of political parties. Whether or not such violence manifests itself in an ethnic form depends on the salience of ethnic (as opposed to non-ethnic) differences (Posner, 2005) and on the degree to which these differences are institutionalized by the state (Lieberman and Singh, 2012a,b).

I. Recent Advances in the Study of Ethnicity

Since the publication of Donald Horowitz's *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (1985), the study of ethnicity has be-

come a dedicated area of inquiry in comparative politics. Based on a constructivist approach, much of this research has focused on detailing the “effects of ‘ethnicity’ ” (Chandra, 2009).¹ At the same time, and especially over the last decade, scholars of ethnic politics have made considerable progress in (i) defining what an ethnic identity is and (ii) identifying the properties — namely, constrained change and visibility — that are intrinsic to it (Chandra, 2006, 2009). In doing so, this research has shown that “the properties commonly associated with ethnic identities” — such as common ancestry, common language, and common culture — are not defining features of such identities (Chandra, 2006, 399). Rather ethnic identities are “an arbitrary subset of categories in which descent-based attributes are necessary for membership” (Chandra and Wilkinson, 2008, 520). There is also a consensus among researchers as to the kinds of identities — namely, religion, sect, language, dialect, tribe, clan, race, physical differences, nationality, region, and caste — that qualify as ethnic categories. However, membership in these categories must be based on descent and not on voluntary acquisition over the course of a person’s lifetime (Chandra, 2006; Chandra and Wilkinson, 2008).

In places where elites do not expect their parties to endure from one election to the next, the future costs of electoral violence — such as voter sanctioning — are likely to be discounted.

Both prior to and since the articulation of these vital conceptual clarifications, ethnicity as an independent variable has been tied to a number of economic and political outcomes. These outcomes include violence (Posen, 1993; Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Petersen, 2002; Lieberman and Singh, 2012b), democratic stability (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Horowitz, 1985; Chandra, 2005), and voting behavior and political patronage (Bates, 1974; Fearon, 1999; Caselli and Coleman, 2013; Chandra, 2004; Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008; Habyarimana et al., 2009; Ferree, Gibson and Long, 2014). In developing democracies, ethnicity has also featured in studies of party formation and reproduction (Chandra, 2011; LeBas, 2011; Elischer, 2013) as well as coalition politics (Posner, 2005; Arriola, 2013). Finally, research on election-time violence has generated valuable insights into the various ways in which ethnic identities

can be mobilized to drive such conflict (Gagnon, 1994; Brass, 1997, 2003; Chua, 2003; Snyder, 2000; Varshney, 2002; Wilkinson, 2004; Berenschot, 2011). Recent work has highlighted that in places where long-standing ethnic rivalries exist and are available for appropriation, elections can provide crucial focal points during which elites can activate ethnic cleavages and instrumentalize violence (Shah, 2012; Travagianti, 2014; Malik, 2015). Survey-based research, furthermore, has demonstrated that ethnic identification tends to become stronger during periods of political competition (Eifert, Miguel and Posner, 2010). In short, research on ethnic politics and electoral violence has considerably advanced our understanding about the reasons due to which elections in multiethnic democracies can descend into violent conflict.

II. Ethnicity and Electoral Violence in Developing Democracies

Despite these vital insights, a number of questions — about the link between electoral competition on the one hand and ethnic strife and violence on the other — remain unanswered. For instance, in places marked by a history of election-related conflict — expressed along ethnic lines — how can we explain changes in the patterns of such violence over time? More concretely, why does election-time ethnic conflict persist, or even escalate, in some places while it declines in others? And what accounts for how, when, and why different ethnic identities come to be electorally salient?

In the first wave of studies on election violence, research on Hindu-Muslim riots in India (Brass, 1997, 2003; Varshney, 2002; Wilkinson, 2004) and ethnic and nationalist conflict in Eastern Europe (Gagnon, 1994; Snyder, 2000) generated several important insights about the ways in which ethnic divisions can be appropriated to instrumentalize election violence. Much of this work, particularly in the Indian context, leveraged spatial variation to account for election-related conflict. With regard to changes in ethnic salience, influential accounts held that voters’ efforts to become members of ‘minimum winning coalitions’ serve to explain these shifts (Lieberman and Singh, 2012b; Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2005).

Election-related conflict has been found to take on ethnic manifestations in places where ethnic divisions

¹ The constructivist approach stands in opposition to an earlier primordial understanding of ethnicity and ethnic behavior.

not only exist on the ground but where these divisions are also electorally salient. For example, in India, the Hindu-Muslim cleavage is salient in many different parts of the country. As Varshney (2002, 2004) has documented, northern and western states have seen the highest levels of conflict between the two communities. Furthermore, and as Lieberman and Singh (2012a) have shown, the Indian state continues to institutionalize this cleavage through several different mechanisms. Similarly, in Kenya, where divisions between many different tribal communities — owing largely to historical reasons — are salient, ethnicity has been enumerated in the census since 1948. These two countries have typically witnessed *inter-ethnic* forms of election-time conflict. However, electoral violence has also manifested itself *within ethnic groups*, as in Sri Lanka (Shah, 2012) and Burundi (Travagianti, 2014). In these places, rather than being used as a way to depress turnout — as seen in cases of inter-ethnic electoral conflict — election-time violence has largely been used to coerce the support of coethnic voters (Travagianti, 2014).

III. Political Parties and Electoral Violence in Developing Democracies

Manipulable ethnic cleavages and the institutionalization of these divisions are key *enabling* conditions for electoral violence. However, there are several more proximate *triggering* conditions, such as unexpected results, electoral fraud, close elections (Wilkinson, 2004), and biased police, that drive election-related conflict (Höglund, 2009, 423). Political elites, for their part, often play a crucial role in converting these precipitants into active violence. Whether they do so directly by deploying narratives of autochthony (Klopp, 2001; Côté and Mitchell, 2016) or intimidating challengers (Kriger, 2005) or indirectly by relying on ‘violence specialists’ (Cleven, 2013; Brass, 2003), existing studies have consistently shown that election-related conflict stems from elite instrumentalization.

In much of the literature on this topic, scholars have either implicitly held or explicitly demonstrated that elites amass electoral benefits by orchestrating election-time violence (Klopp, 2001; Jaffrelet, 2003; Dhattiwala

and Biggs, 2012; Ticku, 2015). Indeed, it is only recently that researchers have begun to specify the costs of such conflict, which range from voter sanctioning — that is, supporting rival parties and candidates (Gutierrez-Romero and LeBas, 2015; Rosenzweig, 2017) — to international criminal trials (Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski, 2014). This more recent research suggests that if politicians believe that instrumentalizing violence could backfire on them, then they will steer clear of organizing such conflict.

One way that we might think about elite calculations regarding the utility of electoral violence is by paying attention to levels of party stability. At their core, we can define stable parties as those parties that endure from election to election. For its part, by noting that electoral violence often occurs in places with ‘weak’ parties, existing work on election-related conflict has already shed some light on the role of party structures. In the Kenyan case, for instance, scholars have highlighted that non-programmaticity (Mueller, 2008) and a lack of internal rules and procedures (Wanyama, 2010) mark most of the country’s political parties. In election periods, when ethnic rivalries have often been available for appropriation, parties and elites have drawn on these antagonisms to drive violence (Klopp, 2001). However, from a broader perspective and barring a few exceptions (Siddiqui, 2017), we know relatively little about the relationship between parties and party systems on the one hand and electoral violence on the other.

My research holds that the level of party stability impacts elites’ calculations about the utility of electoral violence by elongating or shortening their time horizons. In places where elites do not expect their parties to endure from one election to the next, the future costs of electoral violence — such as voter sanctioning — are likely to be discounted.² Under these conditions, violence will manifest itself ethnically if ethnic identities and divisions are electorally salient and manipulable. However, in places where political parties are generally stable and well established, and where elites expect their parties to survive over the long-term, they will weigh the costs and benefits of violence much more carefully. In short, we should expect that as a country’s parties and

²By saying that punishment from voters is a potential future cost, I simply mean that if elites organize violence at time t , voters get a chance to react and sanction them at time $t+1$. There is an important theoretical reason to expect this to be the case: voters have to learn who was behind the violence at time t . During episodes of electoral violence, voters may lack good information about who organized the conflict. But after violence has occurred, this information often becomes accessible through investigatory commissions, the press, and community leaders.

³This does not mean that politicians will always correctly deduce the costs and benefits of violence, and recent research has shown that

its party system stabilize, the frequency of electoral violence will decline.³

IV. Kenya and India

I apply these insights to account for variations in the incidence of electoral violence in Kenya and India. My work draws on recent advancements in the study of party volatility. Specifically, I use what Eleanor Powell and Joshua Tucker (2014) have termed Type A volatility, which measures the extent of party entry and exit, to proxy elite expectations of their parties' lifespans.⁴ Kenya and India are appropriate cases for a cross-national comparative analysis of this topic for two reasons. First, both nations have extensive histories of deadly violence (ethnic clashes in Kenya and Hindu-Muslim riots in India) around elections. In fact, although recent scholarship on the subject of election-related conflict has highlighted that such violence is on the rise across much of the developing world, within their respective regions, Kenya's and India's experiences with election-time violence long predate these trends (Straus, 2012; Staniland, 2014). Second, the *trajectories* of electoral conflict in the two countries have diverged considerably. While the incidence of such violence has declined in India since the mid-1990s, Kenya continues to be at risk of experiencing electoral conflict.⁵

Variations in the level of party stability across the two countries and within each country over time serve to explain these patterns. In Kenya, the fact that new parties frequently emerge and existing parties routinely disintegrate between elections is well recognized (Ajulu, 2002; Elischer, 2010; Wanyama, 2010).⁶ Venerable research on the country's political parties has also emphasized that these entities typically form and prolifer-

ate along ethnic lines (Branch and Cheeseman, 2010; LeBas, 2011). As a result of instability at the party level, electoral coalitions in Kenya, too, are notoriously volatile. For instance, in the last election for which I have complete data — 2013 — the birth of new parties and the death of existing parties contributed to a change in seat share in the National Assembly (the lower house of Kenya's parliament) to the tune of 48%.⁷

For its part, Kenya's 2010 constitution put in place a number of reforms, some of which — including the new requirement that 50%+1 votes and at least 25% percent of the votes in at least 24 counties must be won to secure the presidency — sought to reduce high rates of party entry and exit. In addition, and so as to prevent last-minute defections, as per the 2012 Political Parties Act, pre-election coalitions now have to register themselves with the Registrar of Political Parties three months before an election is conducted. At the same time, however, other reforms — particularly devolution, have actually heightened competition for positions at the county level. All in all, the evidence from 2013 was mixed. While the presidential election was generally deemed peaceful, violence associated with county-level elections broke out in several parts of the country (Burbidge, 2015; Malik, 2017). Although it is too early to draw conclusions about whether the new constitution will keep party birth and death under check in the long-term, at least in 2013, political elites in many different parts of the country — uncertain of their future and the future of their parties — drew on 'negative ethnicity' to mobilize voters and drive violence.⁸

On the other hand, party instability in India — at both the national and sub-national levels — rose precipitously in the mid- to late-1970s, after which party

elites can make important errors in this regard (McGlinchey, 2011; Varshney, 2013; Rosenzweig, 2017). Accounting for the conditions under which such miscalculations occur, however, is beyond the scope of this work.

⁴At the time of writing this article, the incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta had been declared victorious in the controversial re-run of Kenya's 2017 presidential election. However, complete results — of the presidential, parliamentary, and county levels — were not publicly available. Thus, my data for Kenya spans the 1992 to 2013 elections.

⁵This is not to say that India has entirely stopped experiencing electorally-motivated Hindu-Muslim riots. In 2013, for instance, violent clashes in Uttar Pradesh's Muzaffarnagar and Shamli districts claimed the lives of over sixty individuals. This violence appeared to be linked to the upcoming 2014 general elections. Nonetheless, the incidence of such conflict in India has dropped over the last two decades. In Kenya, on the other hand, the risk of election-time violence persists. In the run-up to the 2017 elections, for example, the country's National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) identified 33 of Kenya's 47 counties as being at risk of experiencing electoral conflict. Furthermore, it is estimated that at least sixty-five individuals had been killed in election-related police shootings by October 31, 2017 (Ngêthe, 2017).

⁶Interview with an ODM party official, Nairobi, September 18, 2013; interview with a policy expert, Nairobi, October 17, 2013; interview with a civil servant, Nairobi, November 25, 2013.

⁷Interestingly, total electoral volatility (as measured by the Pedersen Index) was 65%. This means that more than half of the overall volatility was attributable to party entry and exit as opposed to vote-switching among existing parties.

⁸Interview with a CCM politician, Nakuru, October 23, 2013.

entry and exit levels declined. Furthermore, and with regard to the rate of party birth and death over the last two decades, India's party system has fluctuated between being quite stable and being moderately stable (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001). As a result of these important changes, Indian elites — in ethnic, multi-ethnic, and non-ethnic parties — have come to orient themselves towards the future. To put it in the clearest terms, because most politicians in India today expect that their parties will survive from one election to the next — and because Indian elites fear a potential backlash from voters — they have powerful reasons to steer clear of orchestrating electoral conflict.⁹

V. Concluding Comments

Foundational research on the study of ethnic politics sheds considerable light on the causes of ethnic violence. More recent work has shown that ethnicity often also matters in the context, and for the mobilization, of election-time violence. Why does election-related conflict persist in some places but not others? Comparative insights from Kenya and India suggest that differences in the level of party stability impact the incentives of elites to engage in electoral conflict.

Manipulable ethnic cleavages, institutionalized by the state, are available to politicians in both countries. Furthermore, many elites in both Kenya and India compete for political office via ethnic parties. But while politicians in India generally expect their parties to endure from one election to the next, elites in Kenya are far more uncertain about the long-term survival of their political parties. This difference in projected party lifespan, as proxied by party entry and exit, affects the calculations of politicians about the electoral utility of conflict. Compared to their counterparts with long time horizons (as in India), elites with short time horizons (as in Kenya) can more readily choose violence as a strategy.

The electoral salience of certain ethnic groups and the continued institutionalization of these divisions in Kenya and India has meant that electoral violence in these countries has manifested itself along ethnic lines. But the idea that election-time violence is more likely to occur, and recur, in places with high rates of party birth and death can also be extended to other forms of electoral conflict such as partisan violence. In order to make sense of the threat and likely form of election-

related violence more generally, then, scholars will need to pay closer attention to the relationships between elite incentives, prevailing social cleavages (both ethnic and non-ethnic), and formal institutions (including political parties). To this end, existing insights on how ethnicity has been mobilized to mount electoral violence in many different contexts can help us better explore the drivers of non-ethnic forms of election-related conflict as well.

References

- Ajulu, Rok. 2002. "Politicised ethnicity, competitive politics and conflict in Kenya: A historical perspective." *African Studies* 61(2):251–268.
- Arriola, Leonardo R. 2013. *Multi-Ethnic Coalitions in Africa: Business Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bates, Robert H. 1974. "Ethnic competition and modernization in contemporary Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 6(4):457–484.
- Berenschot, Ward. 2011. *Riot Politics: Hindu-Muslim Violence and the Indian State*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Branch, Daniel and Nic Cheeseman. 2010. "Introduction: Our turn to eat". In *Our Turn to Eat: Politics in Kenya since 1950*, ed. Daniel Branch, Nic Cheeseman and Leigh Gardner. Münster: Lit Verlag, pp. 1–22.
- Brass, Paul R. 1997. *Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Brass, Paul R. 2003. *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Bratton, Michael and Mwangi S. Kimenyi. 2008. "Voting in Kenya: Putting ethnicity in perspective." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 2(2):272–289.
- Burbidge, Dominic. 2015. "Democracy vs. diversity: Ethnic representation in a devolved Kenya." Working Paper, Princeton University.
- Caselli, Francesco and Wilbur J. Coleman. 2013. "On the theory of ethnic conflict." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 11(S1):161–192.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2005. "Ethnic parties and democratic stability." *Perspectives on Politics* 3(2):235–252.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. "What is ethnic identity and does it matter?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 9:397–424.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2009. Making causal claims about the effect of 'Ethnicity'. In *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Cul-*

⁹Interview with a religious leader, Hyderabad, July 28, 2013; interview with an academic, Hyderabad, August 1, 2013.

- ture, and Structure, ed. Mark I. Lichbach and Alan Z. Zuckerman. New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 376–411.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2011. “What is an ethnic party?” *Party Politics* 17(2):151–169.
- Chandra, Kanchan and Steven Wilkinson. 2008. “Measuring the effect of ‘Ethnicity.’” *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4-5):515–563.
- Chua, Amy. 2003. *World on Fire*. New York: Doubleday.
- Cleven, Erik T. 2013. *Elites, Youth and Informal Networks: Explaining Ethnic Violence in Kenya and Kosovo*. PhD thesis Purdue University.
- Côté, Isabelle and Matthew I. Mitchell. 2016. “Elections and ‘sons of the soil’ conflict dynamics in Africa and Asia.” *Democratization* 23(4):657–677.
- Dhattiwala, Raheel and Michael Biggs. 2012. “The political logic of ethnic violence: The anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat, 2002.” *Politics & Society* 40(4):483–516.
- Eifert, Benn, Edward Miguel and Daniel N. Posner. 2010. “Political competition and ethnic identification in Africa.” *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2):494–510.
- Elischer, Sebastian. 2010. Political parties, elections and ethnicity in Kenya. In *Our Turn to Eat: Politics in Kenya since 1950*, ed. Daniel Branch, Nic Cheeseman and Leigh Gardner. Münster: Lit Verlag, pp. 199–220.
- Elischer, Sebastian. 2013. *Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Formation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Fearon, James D. 1999. “Why ethnic politics and ‘Pork’ tend to go together.” Paper presented at the Social Science Research Council–MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Ethnic Politics and Democratic Stability, University of Chicago, March.
- Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 1996. “Explaining interethnic cooperation.” *American Political Science Review* 90(4):715–735.
- Ferree, Karen E., Clark C. Gibson and James D. Long. 2014. “Voting behavior and electoral irregularities in Kenya’s 2013 election.” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8(1):153–172.
- Gagnon, Valere P. 1994. “Ethnic nationalism and international conflict: The case of Serbia.” *International Security* 19(3):130–166.
- Gutierrez-Romero, Roxana and Adrienne LeBas. 2015. “When do voters endorse violent politicians? A vignette experiment in Kenya.” Working Paper, American University.
- Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2009. *Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Susan D. Hyde and Ryan S. Jablonski. 2014. “When do governments resort to election violence?” *British Journal of Political Science* 44(1):149–179.
- Höglund, Kristine. 2009. “Electoral violence in conflict-ridden societies: Concepts, causes, and consequences.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21(3):412–427.
- Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2003. “Communal riots in Gujarat: The state at risk?” Working Paper Number 17 (South Asia Institute/Department of Political Science), University of Heidelberg.
- Klopp, Jacqueline M. 2001. “‘Ethnic Clashes’ and winning elections: The case of Kenya’s electoral despotism.” *Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 35(3):473–517.
- Kruger, Norma. 2005. “ZANU (PF) strategies in general elections, 1980–2000: Discourse and coercion.” *African Affairs* 104(414):1–34.
- Kuenzi, Michelle and Gina Lambright. 2001. “Party system institutionalization in 30 African countries.” *Party Politics* 7(4):437–468.
- LeBas, Adrienne. 2011. *From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lieberman, Evan S. and Prerna Singh. 2012a. “Conceptualizing and measuring ethnic politics: An institutional complement to demographic, behavioral, and cognitive approaches.” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 47(3):255–286.
- Lieberman, Evan S. and Prerna Singh. 2012b. “The institutional origins of ethnic violence.” *Comparative Politics* 45(1):1–24.
- Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Malik, Aditi. 2015. *Playing the Communal Card: Elites, Parties, and Inter-ethnic Electoral Violence in Kenya and India*. PhD thesis Northwestern University.
- Malik, Aditi. 2017. “Devolution and altered patterns of electoral violence: Theory and evidence from India.” Working Paper, College of the Holy Cross.
- McGlinchey, Eric. 2011. “Exploring regime instability and ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan.” *Asia Policy* 12(1):79–98.
- Mueller, Susanne D. 2008. “The political economy of Kenya’s crisis.” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 2(2):185–210.
- Ng’ethe, Vincent. 2017. “Police killed 214 people as of October, database shows.” *The Daily Nation*. November 4.
- Petersen, Roger D. 2002. *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Posen, Barry R. 1993. “The security dilemma and ethnic conflict.” *Survival* 35(1):27–47.
- Posner, Daniel N. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Powell, Eleanor N. and Joshua A. Tucker. 2014. “Revisit-

ing electoral volatility in post-communist countries: New data, new results and new approaches." *British Journal of Political Science* 44(1):123–147.

Rabushka, Alvin and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1972. *Politics in Plural Societies*. Columbus: Charles E. Merrill.

Rosenzweig, Steven C. 2017. "Dangerous disconnect: How politicians' misperceptions about voters lead to violence in Kenya." Working Paper, Yale University.

Shah, Seema K. 2012. *Intra-ethnic Electoral Violence in War-torn, Divided Societies: The Case of Sri Lanka*. PhD thesis University of California, Los Angeles.

Siddiqui, Niloufer. 2017. *Under the Gun: Political Parties and Violence in Pakistan*. PhD thesis Yale University.

Snyder, Jack. 2000. *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Staniland, Paul. 2014. "Violence and democracy." *Comparative Politics* 47(1):99–118.

Straus, Scott. 2012. "Wars do end! Changing patterns of political violence in sub-Saharan Africa." *African Affairs* 111(443):179–201.

Ticku, Rohit. 2015. "Riot rewards? Study of BJP's electoral performance and Hindu Muslim riots." Working Paper Number 19/2015. Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

Travaglianti, Manuela. 2014. *Threatening Your Own: Electoral Violence Within Ethnic Groups in Burundi and Beyond*. PhD thesis New York University.

Varshney, Ashutosh. 2002. *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Varshney, Ashutosh. 2004. States or cities? Studying Hindu-Muslim riots. In *Regional Reflections: Comparing Politics Across India's States*, ed. Rob Jenkins. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 177–218.

Varshney, Ashutosh. 2013. "A strange fire." *The Indian Express*. September 20.

Wanyama, Frederick. 2010. "Voting without institutionalized political parties: Primaries, manifestos, and the 2007 general elections in Kenya". In *Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transitions: The Kenya 2007 General Elections*, ed. Karuti Kanyinga and Duncan Okello. Nairobi: Society for International Development (SID) and the Institute for Development Studies (IDS), University of Nairobi, pp. 61–100.

Wilkinson, Steven I. 2004. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Europe's Urban-Rural Divide on Immigration

by [Rahsaan Maxwell](#)

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Europe is geographically divided on the question of how to deal with immigration. The big cities are home to 'Cosmopolitan Europe', where immigrants are considered valuable contributors to society and multiculturalism is a virtue. In comparison, the countryside is home to 'Nationalist Europe', where immigrants are considered unwelcome outsiders and multiculturalism is an insidious ideology that threatens to destabilize society.

This geographic divide on immigration has become politically prominent in recent years because it has been at the center of several recent elections. During the 2016 'Brexit' referendum in the United Kingdom, opinions were divided between Greater London and a few other metropolitan areas that voted to Remain and the rest of the country that voted to Leave. In large part, these divergent preferences reflected different views on how Britain should respond to the challenges of managing immigration in an era of globalization ([Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley, 2017](#)). One year later during the UK general election there was a similar geographic divide over support for Labour and the Conservatives ([Jennings and Stoker, 2017](#)).

The new political geography on issues like immigration threatens to upend the axes of partisan conflict that were established during the 20th century.¹ Party cleavages in the 20th century formed around socioeconomic issues and the broad distinction between workers (left wing) and capitalists (right wing) ([Lipset and Rokkan, 1967](#)). However, Cosmopolitan and Nationalist perspectives each draw support from across the left-right divide. This makes it difficult for established center-left and center-right parties to take coherent stances on immigration, or to make significant policy progress once elected. In addition, it opens space for insurgent and populist parties to gain influence. In the 2017 French Presidential election, neither the center-left nor the center-right candidates made it to the second round. Emmanuel Macron received the majority of his support from large urban areas and campaigned on an explicitly cosmopolitan and pro-immigration policy agenda, while Marine Le Pen received the majority of her sup-

¹Urban-rural political conflict is not a new concept. In many respects, the urban-rural divide was at the center of European politics in the 19th century, but it lay dormant for much of the 20th century.

port from rural France and campaigned on an explicitly nationalist, anti-immigration platform. This urban-rural axis of political conflict may lead to a period of extended instability as parties realign and adjust to geographic divides on issues like immigration (Hooghe and Marks, *Forthcoming*).

I. Why Are Immigration Attitudes More Positive in the Big Cities?

While much is being written to document the new political geography and explore its implications for party politics, we know surprisingly little about why people in large cities are more likely to have favorable opinions about immigrants and immigration. The general literature on geographic differences suggests two possible explanations: (i) contextual effects and (ii) compositional effects.

The logic of contextual effects is that people are influenced by certain aspects of their environment that shape their attitudes. In particular, big cities tend to have higher levels of population density. Some research suggests that sharing space may force urban residents to be more accepting and tolerant of cultural differences in general (Wessendorf, 2014). One way this tolerance may manifest is through more positive attitudes about immigration. In addition, big cities tend to have higher percentages of immigrant residents. This means that residents of urban areas should be more likely than rural residents to be exposed to immigrants on a regular basis. There is a long debate about whether intergroup contact leads to more positive or negative attitudes, in part because much depends on the nature of the contact (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). However, under the right circumstances, having more exposure to immigrants may cause big city residents to become more familiar and more comfortable with immigrants, and therefore have more positive attitudes about immigration.

The logic of compositional effects is that people cluster in different geographic locations for specific reasons, and that those selection processes are the reason for geographic variation in immigration attitudes. For example, large European cities attract young educated professionals and people with foreign origins. This is largely because of connections to the global economy through financial services and information technology industries. These industries recruit highly-educated workers from around the world and are especially re-

liant on continued access to new and young talent. As a result, residents of large European cities are increasingly likely to be young, have post-secondary degrees, work in professional occupations, and have foreign origins (Favell, 2008). In comparison, rural areas and small towns suffer from declining agricultural and manufacturing sectors, which means the more mobile people from those areas (e.g., the young and the well-educated) move to large urban cities in search of opportunities. These demographic differences may account for the geographic variation in immigration attitudes because a wide range of research suggests that being younger, better educated, having a professional occupational status, or having foreign origins are all associated with more favorable attitudes towards immigrants (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014).

Adjudicating between contextual and compositional effects as explanations for the urban-rural divide on immigration is important because the two perspectives have very different implications for European society. If the urban-rural divide on immigration is about contextual effects, it means that local environments are the primary determinant of attitudes. Therefore, we should expect greater geographic divergence as the urban environments make people increasingly positive about immigration and rural environments make people increasingly negative about immigration. On the other hand, if the urban-rural divide on immigration is about compositional effects, then the demographic factors that are driving attitudes will be the key to future divides on immigration. Europeans may continue to cluster in different geographic areas according to demographics, which suggests that an urban-rural divide may persist. However, the demographic divides between young, educated professionals and older, less-educated manual laborers may also exist within big cities (and within rural areas) and as such would be the real axis of conflict in European society.

I evaluate these perspectives in a new working paper entitled “Cosmopolitan immigration attitudes in large European cities: Contextual or compositional effects?” (Maxwell, 2017). My results find much more support for selection than adaptation. I start with data from the European Social Survey and find that across a wide range of European countries there are indeed more positive immigration attitudes in large cities as opposed to the countryside. However, the largest gaps in attitudes are across demographic categories (in particular

highly-educated and professional versus low education and manual laborer). Moreover, the demographic gaps in immigration attitudes exist within large cities and the countryside. Highly-educated professionals are always more positive about immigrants and less-educated manual laborers are always more negative, regardless of where they live.

If the urban-rural divide on immigration is about contextual effects, it means local environments are the primary determinant of attitudes. [...] On the other hand, if the urban-rural divide on immigration is about compositional effects, then the demographic factors that are driving attitudes will be the key to future divides on immigration.

I then turn to data from the Swiss Household Panel to explore whether attitudes towards immigrants change after people move to big cities. If so, this would be strong evidence to support for contextual effects. Yet, there is no evidence in the Swiss Household Panel that people change immigration attitudes (in any direction) after moving to big cities.

I also analyze neighborhood-level data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, where I do find evidence that people become more positive about immigrants after moving to specific big city neighborhoods where the general attitudinal climate is favorable to immigrants. To some extent this could be considered evidence of contextual effects. However, while neighborhoods are spatial units, they are also clusters of similar demographic groups. Therefore, attitude change at the neighborhood level could also be interpreted as evidence that the real divide on immigration is between different demographic types of people. Indeed, my results suggest that the positive shift in immigration attitudes after moving to pro-immigrant neighborhoods in big cities is more pronounced among the Cosmopolitan demographics (younger, better educated, professionals, and people with foreign origins) who are already more likely to be favorable about immigrants.

My analysis suggests that the underlying divide on immigration in Europe is between people with different demographic profiles. Therefore, the future political geography of immigration conflicts in Europe will most likely be a function of how economic trends interact with different demographic profiles to shape residential patterns.²

II. How Does the Immigration Issue Relate to Broader Values Divides?

Conflicts over immigration have been prominent in recent European political campaigns, but in some respects immigration is just one indicator of a larger values divide. The same big city Cosmopolitans who are positive about immigration also tend to support various forms of cultural diversity, expansive conceptions of civil rights, open labor markets, European unification, left-wing political parties, and they generally embrace globalization. The same rural Nationalists who are threatened by immigration also tend to hold negative views on cultural diversity, value tradition over the empowerment of new social groups, support protectionist labor market policies, are skeptical of (or outright hostile towards) the European Union, vote for right-wing or far-right populist political parties, and want more national sovereignty as opposed to more global interconnectedness. These are two completely different worldviews, and as such, some people fear that they could split European countries into different sub-states. This is especially the case since the Cosmopolitan perspective is anchored in big cities and the Nationalist perspective is anchored in the countryside.

This raises the question of whether geographic divides on attitudes about a wider range of issues beyond immigration are also fundamentally about demographic selection issues. Or, whether urban and rural environments are more important for shaping some attitudes as opposed to others?

My initial analyses suggest that attitudes towards gay rights and the European Union are divided by geography in Europe. Residents of big cities are more likely than residents of the countryside to support gay rights and the European Union. However, just as with immigration attitudes, attitudes towards gay rights and the European Union are more divided by demographic

²There is very limited evidence of people sorting geographically based on political preferences. Instead, economic trends and socioeconomic characteristics are the main determinants of who lives in different geographic contexts (Gallego et al., 2016).

categories than by geographic location. In addition, attitudes towards gay rights and the European Union are fairly consistent among people with the same demographic profile, regardless of where they live.

In contrast, there is a strong geographic component of partisanship, especially for the Nationalist demographic. People who are older, less educated, and manual laborers are more likely to support left-wing parties when they live in big cities but more likely to support right-wing and far right parties when they live in the countryside. The intersection of these demographic and geographic divides is therefore a particular challenge for left-wing parties, who have been losing votes from their traditional manual laborer support base. However, while the Left retains strong support from some urban manual laborers in the Nationalist demographic, this may not last forever. The urban voters who have lower levels of education, are manual laborers, and support left-wing parties often do not share the same policy preferences as the urban well-educated professionals who support left-wing parties. The former group is likely to oppose immigration, gay rights, and European unification, while the latter group is likely to support all three issues. Some have described this dynamic as a fundamental crisis for left-wing parties in Europe, and to the extent that voters leave the Left for anti-system populist parties it could be a crisis for European democracy in general (Berman, 2016).

III. Whether the Urban-Rural Divide in Europe?

Europe's urban-rural divide on immigration appears to primarily be a function of how different demographic groups are sorted geographically. This demographic divide may also be a more general phenomenon that can account for urban-rural differences on other issues. The clash between Cosmopolitan and Nationalist ideologies may be more about who people are (demographically) than where they live.

Nonetheless, the geographic divide is real and may have political consequences, in part because some Nationalist demographics are split politically based on where they live. In addition, electoral politics is based on vote aggregations within districts. To the extent that

Cosmopolitans and Nationalists are clustered in different types of geographic locations, Cosmopolitans may be better able to elect representatives in urban areas while Nationalists can better elect representatives in rural areas. This would further polarize politics ideologically and geographically, while leading Cosmopolitans in rural areas and Nationalists in urban areas to feel frozen out of political representation.³

Finally, there is work to be done on unpacking the demographic divide on issues like immigration. Why is it that people who are young, well-educated, and professionals tend to have more positive views on immigration? There is a mountain of research documenting these correlations but much less work establishing the causal relationships or exploring the mechanisms.⁴ Moreover, it is possible that there are more subtle geographic differences among people in the same Cosmopolitan or Nationalist demographic, which do not show up in standard surveys. Do well-educated professionals in big cities, suburbs, small towns, and rural villages really all have the same perspective on immigration? Are they thinking about the same types of immigrants? Do they have the same concerns about what more or less immigration would mean for society? All of these questions are ripe for future research as the urban-rural divide will remain salient — in one way or another — for European politics.

References

- Berman, Sheri. 2016. "The specter haunting Europe: The lost left." *Journal of Democracy* 27(4):69–76.
- Cavaillé, Charlotte and John Marshall. 2017. "Education and anti-immigration attitudes: Evidence from compulsory schooling reforms across Western Europe." Working Paper, Georgetown University.
- Clarke, Harold D., Matthew Goodwin and Paul Whiteley. 2017. *Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Favell, Adrian. 2008. *Eurostars and Eurocities: Free Movement and Mobility in an Integrating Europe*. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
- Gallego, Aina, Franz Buscha, Patrick Sturgis and Daniel Oberski. 2016. "Places and preferences: A longitudinal analysis of self-selection and contextual effects." *British Journal of Political Science* 46(3):529–550.

³There are similar debates about the extent to which geographic sorting is contributing to political polarization in the United States (Sussell and Thomson, 2015).

⁴A rare exception is recent work by Cavaillé and Marshall (2017), which explores the causal relationship between education and immigration attitudes.

- Hainmueller, Jens and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2014. "Public attitudes toward immigration." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17:225–249.
- Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. Forthcoming. "Cleavage theory meets Europe's crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the transnational cleavage." *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(1):109–135.
- Jennings, Will and Gerry Stoker. 2017. "Tilting towards the cosmopolitan axis? Political change in England and the 2017 general election." *The Political Quarterly* 88(3):359–369.
- Lipset, Seymour and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: An introduction. In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, ed. Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan. Toronto: The Free Press pp. 1–64.
- Maxwell, Rahsaan. 2017. "Cosmopolitan immigration attitudes in large European cities: Contextual or compositional effects?" Working Paper, University of North Carolina.
- Pettigrew, Thomas F. and Linda R. Tropp. 2006. "A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 90(5):751–783.
- Sussell, Jesse and James A. Thomson. 2015. *Are Changing Constituencies Driving Rising Polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives?* Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.
- Wessendorf, Susanne. 2014. *Commonplace Diversity: Social Relations in a Super-Diverse Context*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

South Asian Americans in the post-9/11 United States: Panethnicity and Religion

by Sangay Mishra

Drew University

This short essay analyzes the role of religious identity in the racial targeting of South Asians in the United States as well as in their countermobilization to contest such targeting in the post-9/11 period. The evidence suggests that, despite the lumping of all South Asians on the basis of their appearance as outsiders and threatening in this period, there was a differentiated response to the racialization of Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs, and religious identity played a significant role in shaping the reactions of different South Asian groups to the racial targeting, leading to further sharpening of the internal boundaries within the community. Religious distinctions played out in a way that constrained a unified panethnic South Asian response to the post-9/11 racial

hostility, challenging existing theories of panethnic solidarity and foregrounding the importance of religious identities.

I. South Asian Diversity and Panethnicity

South Asians in the United States are an incredibly diverse group in terms of religion, nation of origin, class, caste, sect, region, gender, sexuality, and language. Religious diversity among South Asians is reflected in the presence of a wide range of religious identities such as Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, Parsis, and Jains, among others. Even though a large number of South Asians in the United States are Hindus, a significant part of the community is constituted by Sikhs, Muslims, Christians, and other religious communities. In fact, South Asian Muslims in the United States are the second largest group of Muslims after African American Muslims (Leonard, 2005). Religious plurality is accompanied by diversity on the basis of nation of origin, and there is often a slippage between the two. For instance, India is associated exclusively with Hindus, and Pakistan and Bangladesh with Muslims. However, there is a significant population of Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians in India, and the Indian immigrant community in the United States also has a sizable segment from these communities. Similarly, Pakistan and Bangladesh have Hindu, Sikh, and Christian populations.

The category of 'South Asian' in the United States is a nascent one, and it is still evolving as compared to other panethnic formations such as 'Asian American' and 'Latino'. Panethnic categories are a product of several processes including cultural similarity, racial lumping, bureaucratic classification, and, most importantly, strategic adoption of broader identities by racial minorities for contesting racialization, enhancing political influence, and other such benefits (Espiritu, 1993; Lien, Conway and Wong, 2004). Scholars have noted that the emergence of a nascent South Asian identity can be traced, in part, to the student population of South Asian descent, primarily those who were either born or brought up in the United States, and their search for a collective identity on college campuses in the 1980s (Prashad, 1998). Students of Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Sri Lankan descent who were born and/or grew up in the United States found the category of South Asian a useful one since it captured their racial positioning as brown Asians with shared cultural backgrounds, who were racialized and faced discrimi-

nation but who could not easily become a part of the campus Asian American organizations.

The evolution of this identity was further shaped by a number of subsequent developments. For instance, South Asian students and academics collectively questioned the marginalization of their voices in Asian American studies courses, conferences, and publications, and worked toward creating a space for a South Asian identity. A fear of complete invisibility resulting from inclusion under the broader Asian American category also pushed the South Asian identity to the fore. Work undertaken by nonprofit organizations among low income South Asians as well the creation of panethnic organizations among journalists, lawyers, and other professionals have also played an important role in strengthening this identity.

II. Racialization and Panethnicity

The post-9/11 racial hostility against South Asians brought the issue of religious identity to the fore, and religion formed an important element of the racialization process, alongside physical appearance, nation of origin, and culture. The literature on race often traces the concept of racialization to the racial formation framework that is defined “as the socio-historical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed” (Omi and Winant, 1994, 55). This perspective emphasizes the dynamic nature of the process through which racial groups are not only formally classified — such as through census categories — but also the ways in which certain meanings and values are attributed to racial groups at the societal level.

Racialization is thus the attribution of meanings and values to different groups, based on physical appearance, skin color, and other factors, both by formal institutional as well as ‘commonsense’ social processes, that does the work of defining them as racial groups. It is important to bear in mind that the racial formation framework does not refer to religion as an important element of race creation and racialization (Rana, 2011). The emphasis is on the dynamic interplay among physical features, culture, national identity, and ethnicity. The curious absence of religion has important implications for analyzing groups such as South Asians because religion has historically been an important element through which the group has been racialized. For instance, the immigrants from South Asia in the early

twentieth century were racialized as “Hindoos”, making religion a key element in the racialization process (Takaki, 1998).

An important dynamic that often accompanies racialization is the lumping together of groups into homogenous racial categories on the basis of apparent physical similarity, while internal distinctions are completely suppressed in the eyes of outsiders. Different Asian groups being seen and treated as the same is a classic illustration of this phenomenon. We find a similar homogenizing dynamic at work among other groups such as Latinos and Indigenous Americans. In fact, South Asians of different nationalities, language, and religion were similarly lumped together in the post-9/11 period on the basis of their physical appearance, and they all became potential targets of racial hostility.

[T]he racial formation framework does not refer to religion as an important element of race creation and racialization. [...] The curious absence of religion has important implications for analyzing groups such as South Asians because religion has historically been an important element through which the group has been racialized.

Scholars of race and ethnicity have suggested that the racialization process working through lumping is directly linked to the possibilities of forming broader panethnic solidarities. The literature on panethnicity suggests that one of the important preconditions for the emergence of a broader panethnic identity is racialized lumping together of a group as homogeneous by outsiders (Espiritu, 1993). Moreover, external threats lead to the intensification of group cohesion as members react in defensive solidarities and develop common interests where none may have existed before. The literature on the creation of panethnic identities such as Indigenous American, Latino, and Asian American identifies the situational and political dimension of the process as opposed to an exclusive primordial cultural explanation (Espiritu, 1993). The history of Asian immigrants being lumped together as ‘Asiatic’, ‘Oriental’, and ‘Mongolian’ at different points in history is well documented, and this process of racial lumping provided an important precondition for political activists to adopt the panethnic identity of Asian American as a

tool to resist racialization and gain access to resources (Espiritu, 1993; Lien, Conway and Wong, 2004).

Expanding on the dynamics of racial lumping, one of the important arguments in the panethnicity literature is that violence and hostility on the basis of a lumped racial identity leads to increased panethnic identification and mobilization. Among Asian Americans, all group members suffer reprisals for the activities and hostility targeted against those who resemble them. Espiritu (1993) argued that violence against Asians on the basis of lumping led to intensified panethnic mobilization and contributed to enhanced panethnic organizing among Asian American communities. Analyzing the significance of the killing of Vincent Chin in 1982, Espiritu argued that Asian Americans across the nation were drawn together by the 'mistaken identity' murder of Chinese American Vincent Chin. Espiritu predicted that if racial hostilities against Asians escalated, panethnic organizations and mobilization would also increase. The import of the panethnicity literature for South Asians in the post-9/11 period is the following: given the lumping together and racial targeting of different South Asian communities, the likelihood of a panethnic South Asian consciousness and mobilization should be strong, and yet, as my research suggests, such mobilization has not occurred on a large scale.

III. Post- 9/11 Racialization: Racial Lumping and Religious Identity

The racial hostility toward South Asians and Arabs of all religious and national backgrounds started immediately after the 9/11 attacks, and the process of lumping a broader segment of South Asians started with descriptors such as 'Muslim', 'terrorist', 'Middle Easterner', 'Arab', and so on. According to a study conducted by SAALT (South Asian Americans Leading Together), there were 645 incidents of racial bias reported by the media in the first week after the September 11 attacks. These incidents ranged from verbal attacks to serious hate crimes involving arson, physical assault, and shootings. A wide range of ethnicities were at the receiving end of these attacks, including South Asians of different religious affiliations as well as immigrants of other nationalities (Singh, 2002). The first death resulting from the racial hate crimes following the 9/11 attacks was of Balbir Singh Sodhi, an Indian American Sikh who was shot in Mesa, Arizona. Human Rights Watch reported that Mr. Sodhi's killer was heard saying in a bar that

he would kill the "ragheads" responsible for September 11. On the heels of Balbir Singh Sodhi's killing, on October 4, 2001, a Hindu immigrant from India, Vasudev Patel, was shot dead at his convenience store in Mesquite, Texas. His killer, Mark Stroman, also shot Rais Bhuyian, a Muslim immigrant from Bangladesh, at a gas station in Dallas, Texas. Mr. Bhuyian survived the deadly attack, but lost the vision in one of his eyes. The third victim of Stroman's revenge spree was Waqar Hassan, a Pakistani Muslim immigrant, who was shot dead in a grocery store in Dallas. Stroman later said that the anger over September 11 led him to target any storeowner who appeared to be Muslim (Singh, 2002). He called himself an "Arab slayer" and believed that he should be commended for his "patriotic" work of taking revenge by killing those who looked Arab or Muslim. The racial hate crimes against Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus, and others in the initial days after the 9/11 attacks are evidence of the hostility faced by all South Asians irrespective of their religion, nation of origin, class, and other distinctions. Such crimes are evidence of a process whereby people of South Asian origin are racialized through lumping, and the identity of 'Muslim' or 'Arab' is used as a broader descriptive category for all members of the group.

The racial lumping of South Asians also points toward the fungibility of the racial construction of those 'appearing to be Muslims' in the post-9/11 period. Volpp (2002) argues that the category of those who appear 'Middle Eastern', 'Arab', or 'Muslim' is socially constructed and heterogeneous. Persons of many different races and religions, including Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims, and Christians have been included in this category, and 'Middle Eastern' or 'Muslim' has become a racial signifier. Similarly, Ahmad (2004) argues that the construct of 'Muslim looking' in the post-9/11 period is neither exclusively religion nor conduct based. This profile has a substantial racial content because it operates through a focus on phenotype rather than religion or action. A significant number of hate crime attacks on South Asians and Arabs of different religious affiliations in the post-9/11 period is a testimony to this racial fungibility. Ahmad points to two assumptions underlying this fungibility: (i) all Muslims are associated with terrorism, and (ii) all 'Muslim-looking' people are Muslims. These assumptions lead to the presumption that all 'Muslim-looking' people are potentially allies of terrorism. This twin fungibility is, of course, devoid of any rationality or logic and derives primarily from a combination of

fear, ignorance, and preexisting racism (Ahmad, 2004, 1278-1279).

IV. Patterns of Mobilization against Racial Targeting

Historically, those who have been racialized through a process of lumping have often demonstrated their agency by claiming certain identities and disavowing others. As discussed earlier, the panethnic category of Asian American as a racial and political organizing resource emerged in the 1960s, when groups fighting against the treatment of different Asian groups as outsiders used this for mobilization against racism and nativism (Omi and Winant, 1994; Espiritu, 1993; Prashad, 1998). Organizations representing different Asian communities were able to turn racial lumping into a political tool that was used as a mobilizing identity to contest racism. The example of Asian Americans thus points to the agency of racialized groups in rearticulating new racial meanings and alliances. This framework is of critical importance while analyzing the responses of South Asian groups to racialization in the post-9/11 period. South Asians were not only victimized and attributed with particular racial meanings but they also contested racialization by foregrounding certain identities and avoiding others. I argue that the response on the part of different South Asian groups pointed to a racial project that was very different from the 1960s Asian American response to racialization or the consolidation of Asian American identity in the wake of the Vincent Chin killing in 1982. In particular, racial hostility and attacks against South Asians in the post-9/11 period did not elicit panethnic solidarity, as the theories of panethnic identity development predicted they would.

Interviews with community members and activists suggest that the responses of different South Asian groups to racial targeting after 9/11 broke down primarily along the lines of religious identity, with a certain amount of slippage between religious and national identity. Asked about the possibility of a united campaign against racial targeting after September 11, a New York-based sixty-five-year-old Hindu Indian community leader said:

Hindus must be supporting Sikhs on that sort of campaign but I don't see any way that Pakistanis, Indians, and Bangladeshi

can meet. Religion is a big divide — it really is. It is not only a feeling, but it is there in practical life also even in India, I think, Hindus don't trust Muslims, whether they (Muslims) would go for India or for Pakistan. This is really a problem, though it should not be, but it is and that can be reflected here also. Religion is a big factor.¹

This statement points to the fault lines within the South Asian community and to the possible hurdles to a unified response to racial targeting. There is a clear slippage here between nation of origin and religious identity, with the underlying erroneous presumption that being Indian is equivalent to being Hindu.

A thirty-year-old activist of Hindu Indian descent working with a grassroots South Asian organization in New York City talked about the Indian Hindu community's reaction to racial targeting, arrests, and deportation in the months following the 9/11 attack. She said:

I think they [Indian Hindus], on one hand, felt a little saved; we got by this time. But on the other hand, it was oh, good, it is them [Muslims]. And it created even sharper divisions. There is already all of our stuff we [Indians] bring from home about Pakistanis and Bangladeshis and all of that. I think it created more of that us and them divide. I am talking mostly about Hindu Indians here. Of course, there were exceptions and folks that expressed a lot of solidarity. Most of us who are here [in this organization] are Indian ... But the Indian community, yeah, I think there was a real conservative response, very little visible showing of support or solidarity with other South Asians who were being targeted. There was a desire to distance.

There was a clear attempt to foreground an Indian Hindu identity and create some distance from identities that included others, particularly Muslims, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis. Analyzing the responses of different South Asian groups amidst the atmosphere of fear and intimidation in the days and months following 9/11, Prashad (2005, 585-586) wrote, "Rumors flew about

¹ These interviews were conducted by the author between 2006-10 in Los Angeles and New York City.

that the Indian embassy in Washington asked its nationals to wear a bindi, to help distinguish 'Indians' from Arabs and Afghans... Talk of the bindi went about as a way for some to suggest it as an adequate sign of being a Hindu, or at least not a Muslim." India's Consul General in New York, Shashi Tripathi, was reported in multiple media outlets after the 9/11 attacks recommending precautions Indian Americans should be taking to avoid hate violence. He said, "We are also considering asking Indian women to wear a bindi as a distinguishing mark. Right now, everybody should be careful" (Nanda, 2001). The reference to a distinguishing mark was in all likelihood about differentiating Hindus from Muslims and Arabs. Rajiv Malhotra, president of the Infinity Foundation and a well-known Indian American personality, was quoted by journalist Sarah Wildman on this issue: "A lot of Hindus suddenly have started realizing they better stand up and differentiate themselves from Muslims or Arabs" (Wildman quoted in Kurien, 2003, 274). The relative silence of the Indian American Hindu community and most of the Indian American community organizations in the post-9/11 period, with direct and indirect attempts to foreground their Hindu identity, suggested a very particular racial project embedded in the idea of a narrow and exclusive Hindu identity. Prema Kurien (2003), in her important work on Indian Americans, also identified a Hindu-centric Indian identity as one of the major axes of response to racialization in the post-9/11 period.

There is no doubt that mobilization on the basis of religious identity is deeply linked to the racialization process, which deployed religion centrally alongside physical characteristics to attribute meanings such as 'un-American', 'untrustworthy', 'terrorist', 'outsider', and 'stranger' to Muslims, Sikhs, and other South Asians and Arab Americans.

It is important to note that the assertion of a distinct religious identity and distancing from Muslims was happening not only among Hindu South Asians. This process could also be seen as playing out, albeit a little differently, among Sikh Americans. As noted earlier, Sikhs were faced with much more intense targeting in public spaces because of their religiously mandated turban and beard, and their responses were in relation to

the exigencies of this situation. A fifty-two-year-old Indian Muslim immigrant from the New York Metropolitan Area pointed to the ways in which Sikhs reacted to the post-9/11 environment:

I have seen Sikhs with posters saying 'we are not Muslims.' It was shocking actually, but I guess I could understand, they were the ones targeted most. So that way everybody tried to distance themselves from Muslims, within the community. I had heard conversations in the Edison area where they were saying they would go out of their way to show that they are different (Hindu).

The Sikh organizations that formed after September 11, 2001 to build an effective resistance against racial attacks were careful not to follow the line of reasoning articulated in the 'we are not Muslims' refrain. However, mobilization against racial targeting in the post-9/11 period among both Sikhs and Muslims developed primarily on religious lines, and there was only limited organizing across religious boundaries.

The Sikh mobilization focused mostly on the attacks on Sikhs, and there was an emphasis on educating the law enforcement agencies as well as the general public about Sikh religious identity. The Muslim response was also mostly based on foregrounding their religious identity. Groups such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), and the Council of Pakistani American Affairs (COPAA), which were some of the leading organizations working in that period to mobilize against the racial targeting of Muslims, focused primarily on Muslim religious identity. In fact, the Sikh and Muslim groups mobilized their communities against racial and religious targeting successfully by deploying religious identity and used religious institutions — Gurdwaras and mosques — to increase community participation on this issue. There is no doubt that mobilization on the basis of religious identity is deeply linked to the racialization process, which deployed religion centrally alongside physical characteristics to attribute meanings such as 'un-American', 'untrustworthy', 'terrorist', 'outsider', and 'stranger' to Muslims, Sikhs, and other South Asians and Arab Americans. In fact, the racializing dynamics that foregrounded religious identity also highlighted the tension between a possible South Asian

panethnic identity and distinct religious identities. The earlier literature on South Asian Americans framed the tensions within panethnic identity more along the lines of nation of origin, whereas post-9/11 developments foreground the religious axis as an important factor.

The South Asian experience in the post-9/11 period suggests a complex dynamic of panethnic solidarity that is expected to emerge due to racial lumping in the context of threats faced by groups. The analysis suggests that religion is not only an important axis around which South Asians were racialized but it also became an identity that shaped the responses to racialization in a manner that constrained panethnic solidarity.

References

- Ahmad, Muneer I. 2004. "A rage shared by law: Post-September 11 racial violence as crimes of passion." *California Law Review* 92(5):1259–1330.
- Espiritu, Yen Le. 1993. *Asian American Panethnicity: Bridging Institutions and Identities*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Kurien, Prema A. 2003. "To be or not to be South Asian: Contemporary Indian American politics." *Journal of Asian American Studies* 6(3):261–288.
- Leonard, Karen. 2005. "American Muslims and authority: Competing discourses in a non-Muslim state." *Journal of American Ethnic History* 25(1):5–30.
- Lien, Pei-te, M. Margaret Conway and Janelle Wong. 2004. *The Politics of Asian Americans: Diversity and Community*. New York: Routledge.
- Nanda, Tanmaya K. 2001. "Sikhs become targets of ire in New York." *rediff.com* U.S. ed., September 12.
- Omi, Michael and Howard Winant. 1994. *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*. New York: Routledge.
- Prashad, Vijay. 1998. Crafting solidarities. In *A Part, Yet Apart: South Asians in Asian America*, ed. Lavina D. Shankar and Rajini Srikanth. Philadelphia: Temple University Press pp. 105–126.
- Prashad, Vijay. 2005. "How the Hindus became Jews: American racism after 9/11." *South Asian Quarterly* 104(3):583–606.
- Rana, Junaid. 2011. *Terrifying Muslims: Race and Labor in the South Asian Diaspora*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Singh, Amardeep. 2002. 'We Are Not the Enemy': Hate Crimes Against Arabs, Muslims, and Those Perceived to be Arab Or Muslim After September 11. Vol. 14 Human Rights Watch.
- Takaki, Ronald. 1998. *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Volpp, Letti. 2002. "Citizen and terrorists." *UCLA Law Review* 49:1575–1600.

Race, Ethnicity, and the Participation Gap: Comparing Australia with Canada and the United States

by Juliet Pietsch
Australian National University

In my new book, *Race, Ethnicity and the Participation Gap: Understanding Australia's Political Complexion* (Pietsch, Forthcoming), I begin with the normative argument that political institutions in settler and culturally diverse societies such as Australia, Canada and the United States ought to mirror their culturally diverse populations. However, compared to Canada and the United States, Australia has very low rates of immigrant and ethnic minority political representation in the Commonwealth Parliament, particularly in the House of Representatives, which is essentially an 'all-White' assembly. One has to ask the question whether an 'all-White' assembly can seriously claim to be truly representative when those it represents are so much more ethnically diverse than the assembly representing them (Phillips, 1995, 6). The overall existence of racial hierarchies within formal political institutions represents an inconsistency with the democratic ideals of representation and accountability in pluralist societies.

The research in my book draws on findings from Canada and the United States on the political representation of immigrants and ethnic minorities and adds, for the first time, a detailed empirical study of Australia, which to date is under-researched in comparative scholarship on the political participation and representation of immigrants and ethnic minorities. Historically-speaking, as a member of the Commonwealth with similar multicultural policies to Canada, Australia should be on par with Canada, particularly in terms of the proportion of immigrants and ethnic minorities regularly elected to parliament, relative to their numbers in the general population. However, this is not the case. Indeed, Australia lags behind other settler countries, not only in terms of the actual numbers of immigrant and ethnic minority representatives in national-level politics but also in terms of opportunities for political representation. In fact, my research shows that the political representation gaps in Australia are significant

when compared to Canada and the United States, altogether revealing a democratic deficit. As a country with a similar immigrant history to other settler countries — particularly in terms of Asian migration, which is the fastest growing panethnic group in all three-settler countries — the book examines when and why Australia took a different path to other settler countries. In addressing these questions, the book also examines the impact of this alternative path on the political representation of immigrants and ethnic minorities.

My research is grounded in the theoretical framework of descriptive and substantive representation. Pivotal to normative studies of representation is the distinction between descriptive and substantive representation in national parliaments (Phillips, 1995; Pitkin, 1967; Mansbridge, 1999, 2011; Williams, 1998). The normative argument for descriptive representation comes from the idea that political institutions should reflect the social composition of the populations they serve. In other words, legislatures in Western democracies should aim as close as possible to mirror the social characteristics of their electorates. Substantive representation, however, demands that the policy preferences of the electorate be translated into legislative behavior.

[W]hile there are a number of historical, electoral and party-political barriers, the strongest determinant of the political under-representation of immigrants and ethnic minorities is an underlying low level of pervasive discrimination which blocks the entry of non-white immigrants and ethnic minorities into national-level politics.

The two concepts of descriptive and substantive representation are often intertwined. For example, Phillips (1995) has argued for the importance of a ‘politics of presence’ where the parliamentary presence of minority groups such as ‘non-white’ immigrants and ethnic minorities enhances the quality of democracy. The ‘politics of presence’ argument suggests that there is a link between descriptive and substantive representation. This is because elected minorities are best equipped to deal with the issues affecting minority groups.

Other researchers internationally have similarly demonstrated the importance of minority group presence in national parliaments for democracy. For example, a significant amount of research has shown how the election of members from traditionally under-represented groups has a positive impact on policy making and overall feelings of trust in the political system (Crisp et al., Forthcoming; Bratton, 2006; Juenke and Preuhs, 2012; Minta, 2009; King and Marian, 2012; Pande, 2003; Saalfeld and Bischof, 2012; Saalfeld, Wüst and Bird, 2011; Banducci, Donovan and Karp, 2004). By contrast, the lack of representation can increase feelings of alienation among minority groups (Pantoja and Segura, 2003; Jones-Correa, 1998).

In recent decades, scholarly debate has paid increasing attention to the political representation of ‘visible minority’ and/or ‘non-white’ immigrant and ethnic minority groups in politics (Bird, 2016; Saalfeld, Wüst and Bird, 2011; Bilodeau, 2016; Black, 2016; Van Heelsun, Michon and Tillie, 2016; Morales, 2009; Morales and Pilati, 2011; Jones-Correa, 2016; Saggat, 2016; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001). Much of the literature stems from the observation that ‘non-white’ immigrants are under-represented in formal political institutions despite having a long presence in the country. In ethnically diverse settler societies such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, integration is unlikely to succeed without the adequate representation of ‘non-white’ immigrants and ethnic minorities and their diverse interests. As Jones-Correa (1998, 35) observes, the political marginalization of immigrants undermines the process of democratic representation and accountability and perpetuates the view of immigrants and their descendants as outsiders. Their feelings of exclusion may have an impact on their successful social and economic integration. This is because their lack of presence in the political system may result in the policy process not addressing their needs. Therefore, achieving political representation has important implications for the overall quality of democracy, and indeed is an expected outcome of pluralist models of democracy.

My book uses a multilevel exploratory approach, which recognizes the importance of historical and institutional context, individual and group characteristics, as well as behavioral and attitudinal factors in explaining political participation and representation. Using evidence from historical records, census data, cross-national surveys, and interviews with political elites, the

research builds a narrative to explore why Australia's national parliament mainly consists of those from British and Southern European origins, even though more than seventeen percent of Australia's population come from non-British and/or European origins.

A major task of the book is to find out about the party-political barriers that limit opportunities for immigrant and ethnic minorities to enter mainstream politics. This was achieved through qualitative interviews, which were conducted with members of parliament (MPs). The aim of the qualitative interviews was to find out from MPs what they felt were some of the main party-political barriers to the political representation of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Australia. To complement the qualitative interviews, survey research was used to investigate the political attitudes and behaviors of the Australian population more broadly and sub-groups of immigrants and ethnic minorities. The questions analyzed were modelled on similar questions used in the Canadian Election Study, the American National Election Study, and the National Survey of Asian Americans (NAAS) to draw meaningful cross-national comparisons.

The findings in the book showed that while there are a number of historical, electoral and party-political barriers, the strongest determinant of the political underrepresentation of immigrants and ethnic minorities is an underlying low level of pervasive discrimination which blocks the entry of non-white immigrants and ethnic minorities into national-level politics. This type of discrimination rarely surfaces in the form of race riots or community violence. However, it is well understood in public debates and media commentary and is enough to raise doubts in the minds of party representatives involved in candidate selection and recruitment.

Overall, the existence of structural and social inequalities related to widespread discrimination facilitates the maintenance of racial and ethnic hierarchies, as well as various forms of social and political closure. The findings raise many questions for reflection in terms of the overall representativeness, responsiveness, and accountability of democratic institutions in immigrant societies such as Australia, and more broadly Canada and the United States. The participation gap in each country, especially in Australia, undermines the future of representative democracy at a time when confidence in national institutions in established democracies is

declining. As such, the issue of immigrant and ethnic minority representation requires significant attention in the field of comparative politics, as well as future legislation and policy-making.

References

- Banducci, Susan A., Todd Donovan and Jeffrey A. Karp. 2004. "Minority representation, empowerment, and participation." *Journal of Politics* 66(2):534–556.
- Bilodeau, Antoine. 2016. *Just Ordinary Citizens? Towards a Comparative Portrait of the Political Immigrant*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Bird, Karen. 2016. "What accounts for the local diversity gap? Supply and demand of visible minority candidates in Ontario municipal politics". In *Just Ordinary Citizens? Towards a Comparative Portrait of the Political Immigrant*, ed. Antoine Bilodeau. Toronto: University of Toronto Press pp. 180–201.
- Black, Jerome. 2016. "Who represents minorities? Question period, minority MPs, and constituency influence in the Canadian Parliament". In *Just Ordinary Citizens? Towards a Comparative Portrait of the Political Immigrant*, ed. Antoine Bilodeau. Toronto: University of Toronto Press pp. 201–224.
- Bratton, Kathleen A. 2006. "The behavior and success of Latino legislators: Evidence from the states." *Social Science Quarterly* 87(1):1136–1157.
- Crisp, Brian F., Betul Demirkaya, Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer and Courtney Millian. Forthcoming. "The role of rules in representation: Group membership and electoral incentives." *British Journal of Political Science*.
- Jones-Correa, Michael. 1998. *Between Two Nations: The Political Predicament of Latinos in New York City*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Jones-Correa, Michael. 2016. "Does prior socialization define patterns of integration? Mexican immigrants and their political participation in the United States". In *Just Ordinary Citizens? Towards a Comparative Portrait of the Political Immigrant*, ed. Antoine Bilodeau. Toronto: University of Toronto Press pp. 83–98.
- Juenke, Eric G. and Robert R. Preuhs. 2012. "Irreplaceable legislators? Rethinking minority representatives in the new century." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3):705–715.
- King, Ronald F. and Cosmin G. Marian. 2012. "Minority representation and reserved legislative seats in Romania." *East European Politics and Societies* 26(3):561–588.
- Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. "Should Blacks represent Blacks and women represent women? A contingent 'Yes.'" *Journal of Politics* 61(3):628–657.
- Mansbridge, Jane. 2011. "Clarifying the concept of representation." *American Political Science Review* 105(3):621–630.
- Minta, Michael D. 2009. "Legislative oversight and the sub-

- stantive representation of Black and Latino interests in Congress.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 34(2):193–218.
- Morales, Laura. 2009. *Joining Political Organisations: Institutions, Mobilisation and Participation in Western Democracies*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Morales, Laura and Katia Pilati. 2011. “The role of social capital in migrants’ engagement in local politics in European cities”. In *Social Capital, Political Participation and Migration in Europe: Making Multicultural Democracy Work?*, ed. Laura Morales and Marco Giugni. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan pp. 87–115.
- Pande, Rohini. 2003. “Can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities? Theory and evidence from India.” *American Economic Review* 93(4):1132–1151.
- Pantoja, Adrian D. and Gary M. Segura. 2003. “Does ethnicity matter? Descriptive representation in the state-house and political alienation among Latinos.” *Social Science Quarterly* 84:441–460.
- Phillips, Anne. 1995. *The Politics of Presence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pietsch, Juliet. Forthcoming. *Race, Ethnicity, and the Participation Gap: Understanding Australia’s Political Complexion*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Pitkin, Hanna F. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick and Thomas J. Espenshade. 2001. “Immigrant incorporation and political participation in the United States.” *International Migration Review* 35(3):870–909.
- Saalfeld, Thomas, Andreas M. Wüst and Karen Bird. 2011. Epilogue: Towards a strategic model of minority participation and representation. In *The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: Voters, Parties and Parliaments in Liberal Democracies*, ed. Karen Bird, Thomas Saalfeld and Andreas M. Wüst. New York: Routledge.
- Saalfeld, Thomas and Daniel Bischof. 2012. “Minority-ethnic MPs and the substantive representation of minority interests in the House of Commons, 2005–2011.” *Parliamentary Affairs* 66(2):305–328.
- Saggar, Shomit. 2016. British citizens like any others? Ethnic minorities and elections in the United Kingdom. In *Just Ordinary Citizens? Towards a Comparative Portrait of the Political Immigrant*, ed. Antoine Bilodeau. Toronto: University of Toronto Press pp. 63–83.
- Van Heelsum, Anja, Laure Michon and Jean Tillie. 2016. New voters, different votes? A look at the political participation of immigrants in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In *Just Ordinary Citizens? Towards a Comparative Portrait of the Political Immigrant*, ed. Antoine Bilodeau. Toronto: University of Toronto Press pp. 29–46.

Williams, Melissa. 1998. *Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ethnic Visibility

by Amanda L. Robinson
The Ohio State University

Ethnic groups — social identity groups in which membership is defined by descent-based attributes (Chandra, 2012) — are central to many theories of political behavior. Past research shows that shared ethnicity shapes interpersonal trust (Robinson, 2016), cooperation and social sanctioning (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Habyarimana et al., 2009; Jeon, Johnson and Robinson, Forthcoming), vote choice (Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2005; Ferree, 2006), the provision of public goods (Franck and Rainer, 2012; Burgess et al., 2015; Ejdemyr, Kramon and Robinson, Forthcoming), and government responsiveness (McClendon, 2016).

Many of the theoretical explanations for these empirical findings rely on the assumption that ethnicity is ‘visible.’¹ That is, many theories assume the individuals can readily discern the ethnic identity of other individuals and can then use that information to condition their behavior (Hale, 2004). Habyarimana et al. (2009) define ethnic identifiability as the likelihood that someone else would classify an individual as a member of the same ethnic group with which that individual would associate herself, and Harris and Findley (2014) refer to the expectation that ethnicity is readily visible as the “identifiability assumption.”

In some cases, ethnic visibility is not only assumed, it is posited as the key characteristic — along with ‘stickiness’ — that makes ethnicity politically and socially useful (Chandra, 2004; Hale, 2004; Chandra, 2012). For example, theories of ethnic patronage posit that ethnicity provides a useful cue for the coordination and enforcement of patronage networks in low information and weakly institutionalized political systems (Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2005). In this framework, ethnicity’s stability and visibility help to coordinate whom a citizen should support politically and which constituents

¹ In using the term visibility, I do not mean to imply that ethnic markers must be physical, and in fact they may not be in many cases (e.g., language, accent, or name). I simply mean to capture the degree to which someone’s ethnic identity is discernible, perceptible, legible, or identifiable.

a politician should favor materially (Fearon, 1999; Posner, 2005; Chandra, 2004, 2012).

But is ethnicity as visible as many theories assume? The empirical research on this question has produced two key findings. First, lab-based studies have shown that ethnicity is much less visible than we might expect. American undergraduates across several universities were able to identify Jewish students only 55% of the time (Allport and Kramer, 1946), and rates of correct ethnic attribution did not differ among Jews and non-Jews (Lindzey and Rogolsky, 1950). Habyarimana et al. (2009) report that Ugandans living in Kampala correctly classified their coethnics only about two thirds of the time, and incorrectly classified non-coethnics as members of their own group at a non-negligible rate (11%). Similarly, Harris and Findley (2014) report that South Africans correctly identified coethnics only 45% of the time, and non-coethnics significantly less often.

[W]hen ethnicity is highly salient in politics, ethnically visible citizens may participate at higher rates than their less visible coethnics because they have the most to gain and the most to lose in the outcome of an ethnically-charged election.

Second, past studies have identified characteristics associated with an improved ability to discern the ethnicity of others. In particular, a series of studies demonstrated that individuals with more prejudicial views of ethnic minorities were better able to identify members of that ethnic minority, which was typically attributed to their increased sensitivity to ethnic cues (Allport and Kramer, 1946; Lindzey and Rogolsky, 1950; Dorfman, Keeve and Saslow, 1971). Similarly, Harris and Findley (2014) find that the ability of South Africans to correctly classify the ethnicity of others increased with the strength of attachment to their own ethnic group. These studies thus demonstrate that individuals differ in their ability to ethnically identify others, with those most invested in ethnic distinctions performing the best.

But these studies raise a crucial question: how does variation in an individual's own ethnic visibility shape

his or her political attitudes and behaviors?² Building on Habyarimana et al.'s (2009) conceptualization of ethnic identifiability at the individual-level, I address this question preliminarily within the context of four larger research projects. In so doing, I also highlight individual-level characteristics that are associated with increased ethnic visibility.

I. The Political and Social Implications of Ethnic Visibility

I draw on several of my past and ongoing research projects to provide preliminary evidence on the relationship between ethnic visibility and four politically relevant outcomes: (i) interethnic trust, (ii) political participation, (iii) ethnic party support, and (iv) politically relevant identification. This empirical exercise draws on four distinct research projects, including two in Malawi, one in Kenya, and one among African immigrants in the U.S. The degree to which ethnic visibility was central to the studies' designs varies quite a bit, and thus some of the measures of ethnic visibility that I employ below are better than others. In most cases, I can only report correlations between ethnic visibility and the outcomes of interest, despite positing a causal relationship. I discuss potential sources of endogeneity in the conclusion, and suggest avenues for future research to better understand the causal effect of ethnic visibility.

Interethnic Trust. How does ethnic visibility relate to interethnic trust? In past research, I have documented a coethnic trust premium (Robinson, 2016, *Forthcoming*), meaning that individuals tend to trust coethnics more than non-coethnics. However, we might expect that this coethnic trust premium would be limited to, or stronger for, ethnically visible members of an ethnic group. This is because such visibility is required in order for others to be able to condition their trusting behavior on shared ethnicity.

To address this question, I rely on data collected in 2011 in a region of Malawi near the international border with Zambia. As part of a larger project on nationalism and interethnic trust, I surveyed 508 respondents from two different ethnic communities, the Chewa and the Tumbuka. The face-to-face survey collected information about respondent demographic characteristics, strength of ethnic and national identification, interper-

²One exception is recent work by Harris (2017) on racial typicality in South Africa. He finds that individuals who are less phenotypically typical for their group have weaker social identification with that group because they are less likely to be treated as a member of that group.

sonal trust, and social networks. Following the completion of the survey, respondents were invited to take part in a later study session in which they played trust games with both Malawians and Zambians from both ethnic communities. I used these data to demonstrate that national identification can foster interethnic trust (Robinson, 2016).

Within the survey, respondents were asked which of the following statements they agreed with more: “I see myself as quite similar to most Chewas (Tumbukas)” or “I see myself as quite different from most Chewas (Tumbukas).” While this question was not designed to capture ethnic visibility, it is likely that individuals who see themselves as more typical of their ethnic group also anticipate that their ethnicity is more visible to others. By this measure, 75% of respondents reported being ethnically visible. While there were no differences by gender, members of the Tumbuka ethnic group reported much higher rates of ethnic visibility (82%) than members of the Chewa ethnic group (69%, $z = 3.05, p < 0.01$). This ethnic difference is consistent with my own (admittedly anecdotal) experience working in Malawi since 2009: members of the Tumbuka ethnic group are perceived to be more visible than other groups, due to the widespread use of the Chitumbuka language — and the resulting ‘Tumbuka accent’ when speaking English or Chichewa (the national language) — and the relative uniqueness of Tumbuka surnames. I also find that ethnic visibility is higher among the 350 respondents who reported that all four of their grandparents were members of the same ethnic group (80%), than it is among the 158 respondents with mixed ethnic heritage (65%, $z = 3.81, p < 0.001$).

To assess the effect of ethnic visibility on interethnic trust, I evaluate its relationship to reported expectations of being cheated by different kinds of strangers. In particular, respondents were asked about how much they would worry in four different hypothetical situations, with each hypothetical situation asked for each of four different types of individuals (Malawian Chewa, Malawian Tumbuka, Zambian Chewa, and Zambian Tumbuka):

1. If you were traveling, would you worry about accepting food and accommodation from a [Malawian Chewa] whom you did not know?
2. Would you worry about getting cheated if you

were to change currency with a [Malawian Chewa] whom you did not know?

3. If a [Malawian Chewa] traveler whom you did not know came near your home, would you be scared to invite him or her into your home?
4. Would you worry about getting cheated if you were buying goods at the market from a [Malawian Chewa] whom you did not know?

I then aggregated negative (more trusting) responses to these four questions by the stranger’s identity to produce an overall measure of trust in each type of stranger for each respondent.

In the types of face-to-face interactions to which these questions refer, we would expect that differences in ethnic visibility should matter, as strangers can condition their behavior towards the respondent on co-ethnicity more if the respondent’s ethnicity is visible. Coethnics are indeed trusted in more of these hypothetical contexts than non-coethnics (72% vs. 50%, $t = 11.92, p < 0.001$), but this trust in coethnics is slightly stronger among those who are ethnically visible (73% vs. 68%, $t = 1.43, p < 0.10$, one-sided). There is no comparable difference in trust in non-coethnics by ethnic visibility, suggesting that ethnic visibility facilitates *intraethnic* trust more than it inhibits *interethnic* trust.

There is no effect of ethnic visibility on relative trust in coethnics vs. non-coethnics under conditions of anonymous interaction (an anonymous trust game). This suggests that ethnic visibility is not shaping perceptions of coethnic trustworthiness, in general, through, for example, stronger in-group identification (Harris, 2017). Instead, these results are more consistent with the interpretation that ethnic visibility shapes trust in coethnics only in contexts where an individual knows that his coethnics could potentially discern that he is indeed a member of their group.

In contexts where trust is quite low (Robinson, Forthcoming; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011), shared ethnicity may facilitate interpersonal trust. However, this section suggests that this benefit of ethnic commonality is stronger for those individuals whose ethnicity is visible to others. This is because they anticipate that other members of the group will be able to tell that they

are also members of the same group, and therefore condition their trustworthy behavior on their shared ethnicity.


Political Participation. How does ethnic visibility affect political participation? In contexts where ethnicity is highly correlated with electoral politics, we might expect that ethnically identifiable citizens will be more likely to be actively engaged in politics for two reasons. The first is that the most ethnically visible could be more likely to benefit from the patronage rewards if one's own ethnic party is elected. The second reason that ethnic visibility might induce political participation is through the prospect of collective accountability. In particular, if a party is closely associated with a particular ethnic community, then the individuals who are identifiable as members of that ethnic community can be held collectively responsible for the party's political actions. Under such conditions, the most ethnically visible members of an ethnic community have strong incentives to actively support their ethnic party, even if that support is not genuine (de Figueiredo Jr and Weingast, 1997; Padró i Miquel, 2007). This is because the most ethnically visible are at the highest risk of being victimized in ethnically-targeted violence, like the kind that followed the disputed 2007 Kenyan elections. For both these reasons, when ethnicity is highly salient in politics, ethnically visible citizens may participate at higher rates than their less visible coethnics because they have the most to gain and the most to lose in the outcome of

an ethnically-charged election.

To evaluate this expectation, I rely on data collected in Nairobi, Kenya in 2016, in collaboration with Rachel Beatty Riedl. The goal of the project was to understand the myriad ways in which Nairobians are connected to rural areas in Kenya, and the political implications of these different forms of urban-rural linkage (Riedl and Robinson, 2016). With the help of a team of enumerators, we recruited and interviewed 472 respondents face-to-face within sixteen different neighborhoods and locations throughout Nairobi. The resulting sample was ethnically diverse — 29% Kikuyu, 20% Luo, 14% Luhya, 14% Kamba, 4% Somali, and 19% other, including Kalenjin, Kisii, Meru/Embu, Masai/Samburu, Mijikenda, and Taita. The sample also varied in terms of urban generation, with 76% born outside Nairobi and the remainder being second (15%), third (5%), and even fourth generation Nairobians (3%).

To measure ethnic visibility, respondents were asked, “Can strangers within Nairobi tell your ethnicity?” Based on this measure, 44% of our sample were ethnically visible. However, this rate was significantly higher for men (48%) than women (38%, $z = 2.12$, $p < 0.05$), and also varied widely across ethnic communities (Figure 1), with Somali residents in Nairobi being the most ethnically visible. However, visibility did not differ significantly by urban generation or the strength

Figure 1: Variation in Ethnic Visibility by Ethnic Group among Residents of Nairobi, Kenya.



Note: Figure 1 shows the proportion of individuals from different ethnic groups who responded positively to the question, “Can strangers within Nairobi tell your ethnicity?” The survey data come from 472 residents of Nairobi, Kenya in 2011 (Riedl and Robinson, 2016).

or nature of urban-rural linkages. Respondents who reported that their ethnic identity was visible to strangers were also asked *how* others could identify them. Respondents attributed their visibility to language or accent (76%), name (46%), physical appearance (45%), and religion (6%).

Demonstrating variability in ethnic visibility does not mean that existing theories that assume ethnic visibility should be discarded. Instead, a consideration of ethnic visibility should, at a minimum, provide scope conditions to the applicability of such theories to the individuals, groups, and ethnic boundaries for which ethnicity is indeed observable.

To evaluate the effect of ethnic visibility on political participation, I use an indicator of having voted in the last national election, which was adapted from the standard Afrobarometer question.³ While 68% of our respondents overall reported having voted, participation differed by ethnic visibility. In particular, ethnically visible Nairobi residents were significantly more likely to report having voted (73% vs. 65%, $z = 1.86$, $p < 0.10$). While visibility is correlated with both gender and ethnicity, the effect of visibility on political participation is not driven by either factor, as the effect of ethnic visibility is even larger once we control for ethnic group and gender (nine percentage points, $p < 0.05$).

These empirical patterns lend support to the expectation that ethnic visibility will be associated with increased political participation in contexts where ethnicity is politically salient. While it remains to be determined whether these patterns generalize beyond urbanites, we might expect that ethnic visibility is less consequential for political participation in rural areas where ethnoregional segregation makes political targeting — of goods or violence — less reliant on individual signals of ethnic group membership (Robinson, Forthcoming; Ejdemyr, Kramon and Robinson, Forthcoming).

Ethnic Party Support. The same logic that induces

ethnically visible citizens to participate in politics at a higher rate when ethnic differences are politically salient may also make ethnic appeals by political elites more effective. To assess whether ethnic appeals are indeed more effective among the ethnically visible, I draw on survey data from Malawi that is part of a larger project on the political logic of cultural revival (Robinson, 2017). The Lhomwe ethnic group — a historically stigmatized and politically marginalized group — has been mobilized on the basis of their ethnicity by political elites only very recently. This mobilization has been spearheaded by a new ethnic association, Mulhako wa Alhomwe, established in 2008, and a new political party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), founded in 2005. Because the mobilization of the Lhomwe population is quite recent and ongoing, it offers a unique opportunity to address fundamental open questions about the process of ethnic mobilization as it evolves, and to collect the attitudes, motivations, and behaviors of those targeted.

I fielded an original survey targeted at members of the Lhomwe ethnic group across three districts in Malawi in October and November 2016. 1,254 individuals were interviewed face-to-face in their homes, of which 892 self-identified as Lhomwe. The survey collected standard demographic characteristics, measures of ethnic practice and identification, and political attitudes and behaviors. It included four different measures of ethnic identifiability. First, respondents were asked whether they are often mistaken for a member of a different ethnic group. This question was reverse coded so that it indicated ethnic visibility, in the form of rarely being misidentified. By this measure, 86% report being identifiably Lhomwe, with the remaining saying they were often mistaken for members of the Chewa, Mang'angja, or Yao ethnic groups, the other three main groups in the region. Second, respondents were asked the same question used in the project on interethnic trust discussed above: whether respondents see themselves as similar or different to most other Lhomwes. Here, only 56% are ethnically visible via typicality. Third, respondents were asked, "If a stranger heard your first or given name, could he know that you are Lhomwe just based on that name?" and just over a third of respondents (34%) said they could. Fourth,

³"Understanding that some people were unable to vote in the most recent national election in 2013, which of the following statements is true for you? You voted in the elections, You were not registered to vote, You were too young to vote, You decided not to vote, You could not find the polling station, You were prevented from voting, You did not have time to vote, You did not vote because you could not find your name in the voter registry, You did not vote for some other reason."

we asked the same question about surnames, with 47% possessing Lhomwe surnames. While these four indicators all capture some facet of ethnic visibility, they seem to be tapping into different components of visibility, as seen in the correlation matrix in Table 1. Across all four indicators, ethnic visibility is higher for respondents with four Lhomwe grandparents than for those with more mixed ethnic heritage (by ten to thirteen percentage points).

To assess the effect of Lhomwe visibility on support for the political party associated with the Lhomwe cultural revival (DPP), I utilize two questions on party support borrowed from the Afrobarometer. Respondents were first asked “Do you feel close to any particular political party?” and then, if so, which party. Overall, 62% of Lhomwe respondents felt close to the DPP party (compared to 55% of non-Lhomwe respondents in the same communities), with the vast majority of the remainder not feeling close to any party (i.e., very few Lhomwe reported feeling close to political parties other than the DPP). Across all four measures, ethnic visibility is positively associated with support for the DPP political party. Figure 2 plots the increase in the predicted probability of DPP support for each indicator of Lhomwe visibility. Effect sizes range from an increase of seven percentage points for having a Lhomwe surname to an increase of ten percentage points among those who see themselves as ‘typically Lhomwe.’

These results suggest that ethnic visibility is indeed associated with greater support for a political party engaging in ethnic appeals. In the larger research project, I argue that the ongoing Lhomwe cultural revival, symbolically led by the DPP, is strategically aimed at increasing the visibility of ethnic origins among Lhomwe citizens in order to bind this population to the party in future elections. While past research has noted that cultural change often results from political mobilization, as elites emphasize some cultural features over others (Brass, 1979; Chandra, 2012), this change is typically treated as an epiphenomenal byproduct of mobilization rather than its strategic aim. Instead, I argue that the reification of cultural differences between Lhomwe and neighboring groups, and the resulting increase in visibility of Lhomwe ethnicity, is the express aim of the elite-led Lhomwe cultural revival in Malawi.

Strategic Self-Identification and Boundary Maintenance. Ethnic invisibility may also shape political and social incentives. In particular, when individuals

are easily mistaken for members of another group — especially a group with lower social standing — we might expect to see stronger in-group identification and greater investment in the maintenance of boundary markers.

To evaluate this expectation, I draw on ongoing research with Claire Adida on African immigrant assimilation in the United States (Adida and Robinson, 2017b,a). Sociologists and political scientists have long documented black immigrant resistance to assimilation in the U.S., typically attributed to the fact that the segment of the host population into which they would most likely assimilate — black Americans — is itself a marginalized minority. The primary form of resistance, as documented by Waters (1999), is an insistence on an ethnic or national identity that differentiates black immigrants from black Americans. In particular, Waters found that “by evoking their foreign status” black immigrants aim to “‘exit’ from the stigmatized black category” (p. 151). Subsequent work on black immigrants has tended to echo this finding, showing that black immigrants strategically reject black racial identity in an effort to distance themselves from black Americans and avoid exposure to race-based discrimination (Foner, 1998; Chacko, 2003; Portes, 2004; Rogers, 2006; Greer, 2013; Treitler, 2013; Imoagene, 2017). Immigrants who are successful in doing so are granted a form of “elevated minority status” (Greer, 2013), in which they are still subject to race-based discrimination, but of a less extreme form: they are viewed as “different, special, and good” blacks (Rogers, 2006).

Maintenance of a non-racial national or ethnic identity is thus a strategic response to racial discrimination in the U.S., and the risk that such discrimination poses to black immigrants who are perceived to be black American. Yet black immigrants in the United States are a diverse group, and not all are equally ‘mistaken’ for black Americans. While the recent foreign heritage of some black immigrants is highly visible, the differences between other black immigrants and black Americans are ‘invisible.’ In our ongoing research, Adida and I argue that resistance to assimilation among black immigrants will vary with immigrants’ visibility *as immigrants*, with more disincentives to assimilate among those less visible as ‘foreign.’ We evaluate this expectation in the context of African immigrants, and propose that those who could plausibly ‘pass’ as black American


Table 1: Correlation Matrix of Lhomwe Visibility Indicators

	Rarely Mistaken	Similar to Others	Lhomwe First Name	Lhomwe Surname
Rarely Mistaken as Non-Lhomwe	1.00			
Similar to Other Lhomwes	0.01	1.00		
Given Name Signals Lhomwe Identity	0.07*	0.07	1.00	
Surname Signals Lhomwe Identity	-0.01	0.10**	0.48***	1.00

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Survey data are from 892 Lhomwe Malawians in 2016 across three districts in Malawi (Robinson, 2017).

Figure 2: Effect of Ethnic Visibility on Ethnic Party Support



Note: Coefficients were estimated in four separate linear probability models that included enumerator fixed effects. Confidence intervals are shown for 90% and 95% confidence levels. Survey data are from 892 Lhomwe Malawians in 2016 across three districts in Malawi (Robinson, 2017).

are more likely to resist identifying as black and more likely to insist on an identification that differentiates them from black Americans. In contrast, African immigrants who are already more visible as immigrants — because they wear Muslim garb, or are perceived as physically distinct from African Americans — face less incentives to resist assimilation. In sum, we expect immigrant visibility to facilitate black identity formation.

In May 2016, we conducted in-depth interviews with 33 first and second generation African immigrants (self or parent born in Africa), as well as twenty black Americans (all four grandparents born in the U.S.), all of whom were university students. To gauge identifiability, we asked all African immigrant respondents how often they were mistaken for black Americans by strangers in the U.S. on a five point scale from “never” (high visibility) to “always” (low visibility). I will refer to the reverse coded version of this variable as “subjective identifiability.” However, we also wanted a more objective measure of immigrant visibility. So, after the interviews, we took photos, videos, and names of willing respondents (83% of the interviewee sample), and showed them to 165 undergraduate students in the lab. Lab participants were asked to guess whether each of the 25 randomly assigned photos, videos, or names they viewed was an African immigrant or black American, and correct classification was monetarily incentivized. When these judgements are aggregated by immigrant interviewee, this gives us a measure of identifiability that ranges from 0 (always miscategorized as black American) to 1 (always categorized correctly as an immigrant), which I will refer to as “objective identifiability.”

We observed significant variation in subjective identifiability, as shown in Figure 3. Those who have high visibility told us things like “people say I’m black, but not ‘Black’ ” (2nd generation Ethiopian-American) and “people say ‘you look foreign’ ” (2nd generation Somali-American). In contrast, immigrants with low visibility said things like “when you first see me, you see black, you don’t see that I’m African” (2nd generation Ivorian-American) and “people looking at me on the outside without looking at my name are going to be like ‘oh she’s black American’ ” (2nd generation Nigerian-American). We observed similar variation in objective identifiability: overall, immigrants were correctly identified 70% of the time, but this ranged from 28% to 94%

among the immigrants we interviewed. Subjective and objective identifiability were closely related: while interviewees who said they were never mistaken for black Americans were correctly identified 81% of the time that their photo was shown, this figure was only 51% for those who said they were always or usually mistaken for black Americans.


The two strongest correlates of immigrant visibility were geographic origins and religion. First, interviewees from the Horn of Africa region — Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia — were much more identifiable, both subjectively (4 vs. 2.5 on a five-point scale, $t = 2.70, p < 0.05$) and objectively (75% vs. 51%, $t = 2.77, p < 0.01$). This is because immigrants from the Horn of Africa are comprised primarily of Afroasiatic peoples who are, on average, phenotypically distinct from the Bantu and Nilotic groups that comprise the majority of the rest of the continent and from which most black Americans descend (Tishkoff et al., 2009). Second, Muslims reported being less often mistaken for Black American (1.56 vs. 3.50, $t = 3.91, p < 0.01$), but this difference was confirmed by objective identifiability only for women (79% vs. 60%, $t = 2.05, p < 0.10$).⁴ This is consistent with our focus on visible markers of recent immigrant heritage, as women are more likely to be visibly marked as Muslim by wearing a *hijab* or other head covering.

We indeed find that immigrant visibility is related to patterns of group identification. Respondents were asked the identity to which they felt the strongest in an open-ended question. Controlling for generation (1st vs. 2nd), we find that objective immigrant visibility increases the likelihood of identifying primarily as “black” ($p = 0.13$): a one standard deviation increase in visibility more than doubles the likelihood of black identification from 10% to 21%. This increased racial identification comes at the expense of identifying primarily in terms of an African or national (e.g., Nigerian or Eritrean) identity ($p = 0.01$): a one standard deviation increase in identifiability translates into a reduction in the likelihood of African or national identification from 65% to 43%.

These patterns of group identification are important because racial group identification and the development of racial group consciousness are important in shap-

⁴Horn of Africa origins and Islam are not capturing the same thing, as we had Christians from Ethiopia and Eritrea and Muslims from Guinea, Liberia, and Sudan.

Figure 3: Variation in the “Subjective Identifiability” of African Immigrants in the United States



Note: Results are based on interviews in 2016 with 33 first and second generation African immigrants to the United States (Adida and Robinson, 2017b).

ing race-related political attitudes and behaviors among black Americans (McClain et al., 2009; Smith, 2014). In the larger project, we link the effect of immigrant visibility on racial identification to political attitudes and behaviors, including racial resentment, support for racially-progressive policies, and political engagement in the U.S. (Adida and Robinson, 2017b,a).

II. Conclusion

Consistent with past research (Habyarimana et al., 2009; Harris and Findley, 2014), the results presented here demonstrate that ethnic visibility cannot be universally assumed. However, these results suggest more than just low or variable rates of identifiability — they demonstrate that variation in ethnic visibility is potentially consequential for politically relevant attitudes and behaviors.

However, while I have posited a causal relationship between ethnic visibility and four politically relevant outcomes, most of the reported results are correlational. The study that comes the closest to causal identification is the one focused on African immigrants to the U.S., because we have the lab-based measure of immigrant

identifiability. However, even in that case, it is possible that interviewees were able to signal their immigrant heritage in photos and videos, based on their degree of identification (although this endogeneity would probably work against our hypothesis, with those who identify as black being less and not more likely to signal foreign heritage). In the other three cases that rely on self-reports of ethnic typicality and identifiability, there is even more reason for concern. It may be that intergroup contact, political engagement, and exposure to ethnic appeals *shape* rather than result from perceived identifiability. Thus, an important avenue for future research is to better measure identifiability and to evaluate the factors that shape its variation across individuals, groups, and ethnic cleavages.

Demonstrating variability in ethnic visibility does not mean that existing theories that assume ethnic visibility should be discarded. Instead, a consideration of ethnic visibility should, at a minimum, provide scope conditions to the applicability of such theories to the individuals, groups, and ethnic boundaries for which ethnicity is indeed observable. My hope, however, is that an increased focus on ethnic visibility might do more. Recognizing ethnic visibility as a political resource, and

one that can be influenced by political and social action, should motivate us to develop a better theoretical understanding of the political processes that manipulate, constrain, or leverage ethnic identifiability.

References

- Adida, Claire L. and Amanda L. Robinson. 2017a. "Becoming Black? Immigrant visibility, racial identity formation, and political integration among Somalis in the US." Working Paper, Ohio State University.
- Adida, Claire L. and Amanda L. Robinson. 2017b. "Black, but not 'Black': Immigrant visibility racial assimilation among African immigrants in the US." Working Paper, Ohio State University.
- Allport, Gordon W. and Bernard M. Kramer. 1946. "Some roots of prejudice." *Journal of Psychology* 22(1):9–39.
- Brass, Paul. 1979. "Elite groups, symbol manipulation and ethnic identity among the Muslims of South Asia". In *Political Identity in South Asia*, ed. David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp. London: Curzon Press pp. 35–43.
- Burgess, Robin, Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, Ameet Morjaria and Gerard Padro i Miquel. 2015. "The value of democracy: Evidence from road building in Kenya." *American Economic Review* 105(6):1817–1851.
- Chacko, Elizabeth. 2003. "Identity and assimilation among young Ethiopian immigrants in metropolitan Washington." *Geographical Review* 93(4):491–506.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Chandra, Kanchan, ed. 2012. *Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- de Figueiredo Jr, Rui J. P. and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. "Rationality of fear: Political opportunism and ethnic conflict". In *Military Intervention in Civil Wars*, ed. Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder. New York: Columbia University Press pp. 261–302.
- Dorfman, Donald D., Susan Kieve and Carl Saslow. 1971. "Ethnic identification: A signal detection analysis." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 18(3):373.
- Ejdemyr, Simon, Eric Kramon and Amanda L. Robinson. Forthcoming. "Segregation, ethnic favoritism, and the strategic targeting of local public goods." *Comparative Political Studies*.
- Fearon, James D. 1999. "Why ethnic politics and 'Pork' tend to go together." Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University.
- Ferree, Karen E. 2006. "Explaining South Africa's racial census." *Journal of Politics* 68(4):803–815.
- Foner, Nancy. 1998. "West Indian identity in the diaspora: Comparative and historical perspectives." *Latin American Perspectives* 25(3):173–188.
- Franck, Raphael and Ilia Rainer. 2012. "Does the leader's ethnicity matter? Ethnic favoritism, education, and health in sub-saharan Africa." *American Political Science Review* 106(2):294–325.
- Greer, Christina M. 2013. *Black Ethnics: Race, Immigration, and the Pursuit of the American Dream*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2009. *Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Hale, Henry E. 2004. "Explaining ethnicity." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(4):458–485.
- Harris, Adam. 2017. "Distant swing voters: The limits to group-based voting." Working Paper, University of Gothenburg.
- Harris, Adam S. and Michael G. Findley. 2014. "Is ethnicity identifiable? Lessons from an experiment in South Africa." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58(1):4–33.
- Imoagene, Onoso. 2017. *Beyond Expectations: Second-Generation Nigerians in the United States and Britain*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Jeon, Sangick, Tim Johnson and Amanda L. Robinson. Forthcoming. "Nationalism and social sanctioning across ethnic lines: Experimental evidence from the Kenya–Tanzania border." *Journal of Experimental Political Science*.
- Lindzey, Gardner and Saul Rogolsky. 1950. "Prejudice and identification of minority group membership." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 45(1):37.
- McClain, Paula D., Jessica D. Johnson Carew, Eugene Walton Jr and Candis S. Watts. 2009. "Group membership, group identity, and group consciousness: Measures of racial identity in American politics?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 12:471–485.
- McClendon, Gwyneth H. 2016. "Race and responsiveness: An experiment with South African politicians." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 3(1):60–74.
- Miguel, Edward and Mary K. Gugerty. 2005. "Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public goods in Kenya." *Journal of Public Economics* 89(11):2325–2368.
- Nunn, Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. "The slave trade and the origins of mistrust in Africa." *American Economic Review* 101(7):3221–3252.
- Padró i Miquel, Gerard. 2007. "The control of politicians in divided societies: The politics of fear." *Review of Economic Studies* 74(4):1259–1274.
- Portes, Alejandro. 2004. For the second generation, one step at a time. In *Reinventing the Melting Pot: The New Immigrants and What it Means to be American*, ed. Tamar Jacoby. New York: Basic Books pp. 155–166.
- Posner, Daniel N. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Riedl, Rachel B. and Amanda L. Robinson. 2016. "Who is an urban citizen? The nature of urban-rural linkages among urban Kenyans." Working Paper, Ohio State University.
- Robinson, Amanda L. 2016. "Nationalism and ethnic-based trust: Evidence from an African border region." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(14):1819–1854.
- Robinson, Amanda L. 2017. "The political logic of cultural revival: Mobilization of Lomwe ethnic identity in Malawi." Working Paper, Ohio State University.
- Robinson, Amanda L. Forthcoming. "Ethnic diversity, segregation, and ethnocentric trust in Africa." *British Journal of Political Science*.
- Rogers, Reuel R. 2006. *Afro-Caribbean Immigrants and the Politics of Incorporation: Ethnicity, Exception, or Exit*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Candis W. 2014. *Black Mosaic: The Politics of Black Pan-Ethnic Diversity*. New York and London: New York University Press.
- Tishkoff, Sarah A., Floyd A. Reed, Françoise R. Friedlaender, Christopher Ehret, Alessia Ranciaro, Alain Froment, Jibril B. Hirbo, Agnes A. Awomoyi, Jean-Marie Bodo, Ogobara Doumbo et al. 2009. "The genetic structure and history of Africans and African Americans." *Science* 324(5930):1035–1044.
- Treitler, Vilna Bashi. 2013. *The Ethnic Project: Transforming Racial Fiction into Ethnic Factions*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Waters, Mary C. 1999. *Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Revisiting the Relationship between Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Provision

by Prerna Singh

Brown University

and Matthias vom Hau

Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals

Ethnic diversity is frequently treated as a problem for development. Whether it is popular literature, public policy circles, or social science scholarship, there appears to be convergence around the idea that both economic growth and social welfare are more difficult to achieve in ethnically heterogeneous settings. At first glance, there would appear to be good reasons for such an understanding. A large and influential body of scholarship argues that ethnic diversity impedes the provision of a wide range of public goods across countries, regions, cities, and communities from sub-Saharan Africa

and South Asia to North America. These findings have led scholars working in this research tradition to increasingly focus on the micro-logics of this connection (Baldwin and Huber, 2010; Lieberman and McClendon, 2013; Habyarimana et al., 2009, 5).

In contrast, we make a case for pausing to reexamine the foundations of this scholarship and suggest that this might provoke a step back from the conventional wisdom. Specifically, we contend that the case for the so-called 'diversity-development deficit thesis' is overstated. For one thing, a rapidly expanding body of work questions whether the supposedly negative impact of diversity on public goods provision is really as straightforward and robust as the political economy scholarship suggests. There is empirical evidence that ethnic diversity might not dampen state provision of public goods in U.S. cities (Hopkins, 2011; Lee, Lee and Borcharding, 2016; Rugh and Trounstone, 2011), Indian provinces (Singh, 2011, 2015), Russian regions (Foa, 2014), countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Majerovitz, 2015), Tanzania (Miguel, 2004), Zambia (Gibson and Hoffman, 2013), and subnational units across the world (Gerring et al., 2015) and in Africa (Gisselquist, Leiderer and Niño-Zarazúa, 2014). Scholars also find contradictory results for the impact of ethnic diversity on different kinds of public services (Gisselquist, 2014), and for the effects of different kinds of heterogeneity on public goods provision (Chaves and Gorski, 2001). Furthermore, as we hope to delineate in this essay, the theoretical edifice of the political economy scholarship rests on a shaky theoretical foundation, in particular, a neglect of time and temporality.

Drawing on our own work, in combination with substantive contributions to a double special issue of *Comparative Political Studies* we have edited on this topic (Singh and vom Hau, 2016),¹ we argue that a close attention to history and politics is necessary and can provoke a reexamination of the conventional wisdom about the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods provision.

Specifically, we suggest that the lion's share of evidence for the diversity-development deficit thesis comes from studies that use a measure of ethnic diversity constructed with data from the 1960s (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 1997; La Porta et al.,

¹See also Cramsey and Wittenberg (2016), Darden and Mylonas (2016), Gao (2016), McDonnell (2016), Soifer (2016), and Wimmer (2016).

1999) or from the 1990s (Alesina et al., 2003). This temporally limited focus bears the danger of overlooking the distinct causal contexts of different time periods (Grzymala-Busse, 2011; Pierson, 2004). More fundamentally, it leads to the treatment of ethnic heterogeneity as exogenous, similar to variables such as climate or topography.

The potential endogeneity of ethnic diversity has been relatively unaddressed and remains, even by the admission of some of the prominent contributors to the scholarship, an important shortcoming (Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan, 2005).² In response, the political economy scholarship has recently begun to wrestle with these questions. The study by Michalopoulos (2012) is, to our knowledge, the first systematic attempt to endogenize ethnicity within this scholarship, linking ethnic diversity to geographic variation in land quality. Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan (2008, 3138) attempt to think through factors “that can affect heterogeneity (such as urbanization, being in a border area, being near a major road or waterway, being next to a region where there was a war and therefore a large exodus) [and] can also directly influence ...the demand for and the supply of public goods.” Yet all of these remain, at the end of the day, fundamentally apolitical and ahistorical understandings. Probably the most promising lead forward so far has been Majerovitz’s (2015) study, which shows that when issues of endogeneity are taken seriously in regressions of fractionalization on growth, GDP per capita, and public goods provision, the effects of ethnic diversity are minimal or statistically insignificant. Majerovitz then proceeds to speculate that long-term patterns of state development appear to be crucial for explaining both contemporary levels of ethnic diversity and development.

Building on, but also pushing beyond these observations, our essay details our own approach to endogenize diversity and address the potentially spurious relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and public goods provision. We also unpack the role of timing and

different temporal contexts. Building on these discussions, this essay concludes by outlining a new research agenda on ethnicity and public goods provision that is historically-informed and takes politics seriously.

I. Endogenizing Diversity and Public Goods Provision

Most of the political economy scholarship that suggests a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and public services is primarily concerned with provision via the collective action of local communities (Algan, Hémet and Laitin, 2011; Bardhan, 2000; Khwaja, 2009; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). While collective action by communities is clearly important, an excessively narrow focus on communities stands at odds with the global historical reality of ethnic identity formation and public goods provision. As shown by a vast literature, the modern state — and more specifically, the institutional configurations and political actors constitutive of the state — plays a unique role for both public goods provision (Huber and Stephens, 2001, 2012; Skocpol, 1992) and collective identities (Laitin, 1986; Marx, 1998; Lieberman and Singh, 2012; Wimmer, 2002). Across most parts of the world, the provision of public services has been and remains primarily the responsibility of the state, while states also have, to a much greater degree than local communities, the power to create or modify patterns of ethnicity over time.

Different historical patterns of nation-building and state development, and the strategies and capabilities to provide public goods associated with them, likely shaped subsequent levels of diversity and public goods provision, leading to a spurious association between contemporary heterogeneity and the extent of public services.

Our theoretical approach to unpack the relationship between ethnic diversity and the provision of pub-

²Some of the most important articles in this literature suggest possible but ultimately dissatisfying ways to address problems of endogeneity. Most prominently, Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly’s (1999, 1267-1269) use of community fixed effects remains fundamentally ahistorical and incidentally leads the effect of heterogeneity to become insignificant or even positive. And even the use of historical data on ethnic composition to instrument for contemporary heterogeneity, a strategy pursued by Miguel and Gugerty (2005, 2326), does not address the potential spuriousness of the relationship between diversity and public goods provision.

³We are aware, and will develop in greater detail below, that an assessment of the full impact of history and politics on the causal relationship between ethnicity and public goods provision probably requires close attention to a variety of macro-historical processes, including but not limited to capitalist development and market expansion, civil society formation, and the legacies of violent conflict and conflict settlement.

lic goods from a historical perspective therefore focuses on the state, and, in particular, on patterns of nation-building and state institutional development.³ Such an analytical perspective is necessarily historical because the goals of state officials and the form of state institutions are not given a priori, but need to be understood as embedded in and shaped by world-time (Skocpol, 1979). We argue that past state intentions and capabilities to provide public goods shape both contemporary patterns of ethnic diversity and state provision of public services. More specifically, we focus on the initial mode of nation-building pursued by states and the public goods provision strategies associated with it, as well as distinct long-term patterns of state development and the varying capabilities for public goods provision linked to them — and their role in influencing both contemporary ethnic heterogeneity and public service provision.

Drawing on important new work in the study of nation-state formation, we can think of assimilation, accommodation, and exclusion as three distinct historical modes of nation-building (Aktürk, 2012; Mylonas, 2013). These three historical modes were associated with different state strategies to provide public goods, both in terms of scope — who should receive public goods from the state (e.g., all citizens or only members of certain ethnic groups), and nature — what kind of public goods should be provided (e.g., those that ignore or recognize ethnic differences). States that seek to nation-build through assimilation are likely to provide public goods such as schooling or health care on a universal basis to all citizens without regard to ethnicity, yet often with the implicit aim of establishing congruence between the ethnic markers (e.g., language, religion) of the dominant group and the national political community. States that pursue accommodation as their main nation-building strategy are also inclined to provide public goods on a universal basis, but are open to the provision of distinct kinds of public goods to different ethnic groups, in line with their preferences. Finally, states that seek to forge a national political community through exclusion usually limit national membership, either in terms of formal citizenship and/or the actual exercise of citizenship rights to one dominant ethnic group and target public goods towards this group.

While states might aspire to assimilate, accommodate, or exclude minority groups, they might not be able to fully implement their preferred mode of nation-

building, and the distinct public goods provision strategies associated with it. In fact, there are and have been dramatic variations in the extent to which states are capable of providing public services. Our theoretical framework therefore emphasizes the centrality of a second, equally relevant aspect of nation-state formation — historical state capacity to provide public goods. The long-term consequences of assimilation, accommodation, and exclusion for ethnic diversity and public goods provision at subsequent periods thus might vary, depending on whether states had the capacity to implement a particular nation-building strategy throughout their realm.

In sum, bringing in politics and history casts doubts on the notion of ethnic demography as destiny. The theory developed so far highlights that contemporary diversity and public service provision are better approached as historically constituted. Different historical patterns of nation-building and state development, and the strategies and capabilities to provide public goods associated with them, likely shaped subsequent levels of diversity and public goods provision, leading to a spurious association between contemporary heterogeneity and the extent of public services.

II. The Contextual Effects of Timing

Another critical aspect of inserting history and politics into the relationship between ethnicity and public goods provision is the placement of ethnic heterogeneity and the provision of public services in different temporal contexts (Falleti and Lynch, 2009; Grzymala-Busse, 2011). Most analyses, including some of the most-cited articles, examine very circumscribed periods in time — they tend to measure ethnic diversity primarily in the 1960s, or in some cases in the 1990s — and focus their analysis on (some combination of years from) the 1960s to the 1990s (e.g., Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Alesina et al., 2003; Easterly and Levine, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999).

Yet, levels of diversity in the 1960s might have been endogenous to circumscribed temporal effects, including period-specific patterns of public goods provision, which raises the issue of reverse causality. In much of the developing world, the 1960s were characterized by anticolonial struggles, decolonization, and the rise of newly independent states (Young, 1994; Slater, 2010). Departing colonial administrations often removed the

organizational structure and human capital necessary for even the most basic state services, leading to distributional conflicts and the massive politicization of ethnicity, especially during the first decade after independence (Wimmer, 2012). And once violent conflicts along ethnic lines broke out, they often entailed the destruction of physical infrastructure and further undermined the effective provision of public goods. In other words, during the 1960s the decline of the British and French colonial empires and the resulting wave of nation-state formation greatly contributed to the rise of ethnic diversity through the decline of public goods provision by the state.

Further we suggest that the predominant focus on the 1990s renders these studies vulnerable to temporally specific state transformations that might have increased both ethnic diversity and dampened state provision of public goods, prompting the question of whether the negative relationship posited between them might in fact be spurious. After the end of the Cold War, states underwent dramatic transformations. Class lost much of its purchasing power, whether as a source of mobilization or as a basis for structuring state-society relations, while ethnicity gained in political significance (Castells, 1997; Yashar, 2005) but also economic importance (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2009). Simultaneously, changes in global models of statehood — cognitive and normative orientations that define and legitimate state action (Meyer et al., 1997) — led states to recognize multicultural rights, providing ethnic groups with new legal resources to engage in collective action and make their demands heard.

[T]he framing of ethnic diversity as inherently problematic for development is too blunt and simplistic, and therefore needs to be treated with utmost caution.

Moreover, the rise of neoliberalism as a new, market-oriented ideological platform, combined with the policy prescriptions of the ‘Washington Consensus’, led to a significant decline in the provision of public goods, whether by concentrating public infrastructure investments on areas attractive to international capital (Brenner, 2004; Sassen, 2001), privatizing social services (Mesa-Lago, 1997; Portes and Hoffman, 2003), or by changing collective expectations about what public services should be expected from states (Blyth, 2002).

State capacities to provide public goods were similarly impacted by the end of Cold War superpower competition, and the disengagement of both the United States and Russia from the material support that they had provided to many of their former client states (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010). Thus, when measured during the 1990s, the supposedly negative relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods provision might be a product of the dramatic state transformations unfolding during this decade.

This discussion of possible timing effects thus reaffirms our insistence on taking history and politics seriously when revisiting the diversity-development deficit thesis. A focus on timing allows us to adjudicate among path-dependent effects of historical patterns of nation-state formation, and more recent period-specific patterns of state (trans)formation when investigating the relationship between contemporary diversity and levels of public goods provision.

III. Towards a New Research Agenda

Our approach to endogenize contemporary diversity and public goods provision has focused on macro-historical processes of nation-building and state development, and the state strategies and capabilities to provide public goods associated with them. In what remains we briefly sketch out, arguably in broad brush strokes, a new research agenda that builds on the historical perspective advocated by this essay.

Three interrelated areas of inquiry appear to be crucial for this agenda. First, we invite future research to further explore when and to what extent ethnic diversity dampens public goods provision through research designs that address issues of endogeneity head on by incorporating a focus on history and politics. Patterns of nation-state formation are not the only possible macro-historical process that might account for the potentially spurious relationship between ethnicity and public goods provision. More work is needed on the role of capitalism and market formation. Trade liberalization might incentivize ethnic identifications while also reducing state capabilities to provide public goods (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2009). Moreover, the ways in which business elites understand ethnic divisions affect their inclinations for cross-class alliances and elite-state coalitions (Arriola, 2013), with potentially major implications for public goods provision outcomes (Eaton,

2007; Lieberman, 2003). Future research could also build on insights from the literature on violent conflict (Kalyvas, 2006; Tilly, 1990) to examine the possible causal connections between historical episodes of war, ethnic identity formation, and public goods provision. Another possible approach would be to focus on the historical development of civil society networks and their impact on contemporary diversity and public goods provision (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Wimmer, 2014).⁴

Second, bringing in politics and history and putting the state at the center of theoretical attention also allows us to open up the debate around the causal relationship between ethnicity and public goods provision. Our argument that the dampening effects of contemporary ethnic diversity on public service provision are overstated because both might be endogenous to historical patterns of nation-building and state development does not mean that the provision of public goods is necessarily unrelated to contemporary levels of diversity. But this is where we need to start revisiting another established wisdom in the political economy literature, namely that ethnic lobbying constitutes the key causal mechanism by which ethnic heterogeneity influences the state provision of public goods. Going back to Max Weber and Alexis de Tocqueville, our approach instead suggests a theoretically more sophisticated and historically more nuanced understanding of states as institutional structures in which state elites may act on their own interests, world views, and identities. More precisely, we suggest an alternative perspective that is more closely attuned to the ethnic threat perceptions and self-identifications of state actors, but also their normative concerns about ethnic differences in order to understand how ethnic diversity might shape the provision of public goods.

Third and finally, a historical perspective could also complement existing work on the mediating role of institutions. Scholars have shown that formal political institutions such as federalism or electoral rules, but also economic institutions such as property rights and land tenure systems (Brancati, 2006; Weldon, 2006), crucially shape how ethnic divisions impact the provision of public goods. What has received comparatively less attention are the power relations that underpin the often contrasting effects of the same institution in different

contexts (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Khan, 2010). A focus on history and politics helps to do precisely that, to gain further insights into the macro-historical processes that shape how particular institutions mediate the relationship between ethnicity and public goods provision.

Taken together, then, this essay and the larger research initiative it builds on, develop a new research agenda that moves beyond the prevailing presentist approach in the political economy scholarship. By treating contemporary diversity and public goods provision as endogenous to macro-historical processes of nation-state formation we have opened up the path towards an alternative approach that puts history and politics squarely at the center of the study of the relationship between ethnicity and public goods provision. And seen in this light, the framing of ethnic diversity as inherently problematic for development is too blunt and simplistic, and therefore needs to be treated with utmost caution.

References

- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2012. *The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty: Why Nations Fail*. New York: Crown Business.
- Aktürk, Şener. 2012. *Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. "Fractionalization." *Journal of Economic Growth* 8(2):155–194.
- Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir and William Easterly. 1999. "Public goods and ethnic divisions." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114(4):1243–1284.
- Algan, Yann, Camille Hémet and David Laitin. 2011. "Diversity and public goods: A natural experiment with exogenous residential allocation." IZA Discussion Paper No. 6053.
- Arriola, Leonardo R. 2013. "Capital and opposition in Africa: Coalition building in multiethnic societies." *World Politics* 65(2):233–272.
- Baldwin, Kate and John D. Huber. 2010. "Economic versus cultural differences: Forms of ethnic diversity and public goods provision." *American Political Science Review* 104(4):644–662.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, Lakshmi Iyer and Rohini Somanathan. 2005. "History, social divisions, and public goods in ru-

⁴In the context of sub-Saharan Africa, scholars have also shown a negative relationship between the pervasiveness of the slave trade in a given area and contemporary levels of ethnic diversity and development (Nunn, 2008).

- ral India." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 3:639–647.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, Lakshmi Iyer and Rohini Somanathan. 2008. Public action for public goods. In *The Handbook of Development Economics*, ed. Paul Schultz and John Strauss. Oxford: Elsevier pp. 3117–3154.
- Bardhan, Pranab. 2000. "Irrigation and cooperation: An empirical analysis of 48 irrigation communities in South India." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 48(4):847–865.
- Blyth, Mark. 2002. *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brancati, Dawn. 2006. "Decentralization: Fueling the fire or dampening the flames of ethnic conflict and secessionism?" *International Organization* 60(3):651–685.
- Brenner, Neil. 2004. *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Castells, Manuel. 1997. *The Power of Identity*. Malden: Blackwell.
- Chaves, Mark and Philip S. Gorski. 2001. "Religious pluralism and religious participation." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27(1):261–281.
- Comaroff, John L. and Jean Comaroff. 2009. *Ethnicity, Inc.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cramsey, Sarah A. and Jason Wittenberg. 2016. "Timing is everything: Changing norms of minority rights and the making of a Polish nation-state." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(11):1480–1512.
- Darden, Keith and Harris Mylonas. 2016. "Threats to territorial integrity, national mass schooling, and linguistic commonality." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(11):1446–1479.
- Easterly, William and Ross Levine. 1997. "Africa's growth tragedy: Policies and ethnic divisions." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(4):1203–1250.
- Eaton, Kent. 2007. "Backlash in Bolivia: Regional autonomy as a reaction against indigenous mobilization." *Politics & Society* 35(1):71–102.
- Falleti, Tulia G. and Julia F. Lynch. 2009. "Context and causal mechanisms in political analysis." *Comparative Political Studies* 42(9):1143–1166.
- Foa, Roberto. 2014. "State history and state capacity in post-Soviet Russia." Working Paper, Harvard University.
- Gao, Eleanor. 2016. "Tribal mobilization, fragmented groups, and public goods provision in Jordan." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(10):1372–1403.
- Gerring, John, Strom C. Thacker, Yuan Lu and Wei Huang. 2015. "Does diversity impair human development? A multi-level test of the diversity debit hypothesis." *World Development* 66:166–188.
- Gibson, Clark C. and Barak D. Hoffman. 2013. "Coalitions not conflicts: Ethnicity, political institutions, and expenditure in Africa." *Comparative Politics* 45(3):273–290.
- Gisselquist, Rachel M. 2014. "Ethnic divisions and public goods provision, revisited." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37(9):1605–1627.
- Gisselquist, Rachel M., Stefan Leiderer and Miguel Niño-Zarazúa. 2014. "Ethnic heterogeneity and public goods provision in Zambia: Further evidence of a sub-national 'Diversity Dividend.'" WIDER Working Paper WP/2014/162.
- Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2011. "Time will tell? Temporality and the analysis of causal mechanisms and processes." *Comparative Political Studies* 44(9):1267–1297.
- Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2009. *Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Hopkins, Daniel J. 2011. "The limited local impacts of ethnic and racial diversity." *American Politics Research* 39(2):344–379.
- Huber, Evelyne and John D. Stephens. 2001. *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets*. Chicago: University of Chicago press.
- Huber, Evelyne and John D. Stephens. 2012. *Democracy and the Left: Social Policy and Inequality in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. and Laia Balcells. 2010. "International system and technologies of rebellion: How the end of the Cold War shaped internal conflict." *American Political Science Review* 104(3):415–429.
- Khan, Mushtaq. 2010. "Political settlements and the governance of growth-enhancing institutions." Working Paper, University of London, SOAS.
- Khwaja, Asim I. 2009. "Can good projects succeed in bad communities?" *Journal of Public Economics* 93(7):899–916.
- La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. 1999. "The quality of government." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 15(1):222–279.
- Laitin, David D. 1986. *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Change among the Yoruba*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lee, Soomi, Dongwon Lee and Thomas E. Borchert. 2016. "Ethnic diversity and public goods provision: Evidence from US municipalities and school districts." *Urban Affairs Review* 52(5):685–713.
- Lieberman, Evan S. 2003. *Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Brazil and South Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lieberman, Evan S. and Gwyneth H. McClendon. 2013. "The ethnicity-policy preference link in sub-Saharan Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 46(5):574–602.

- Lieberman, Evan S. and Prerna Singh. 2012. "Conceptualizing and measuring ethnic politics: An institutional complement to demographic, behavioral, and cognitive approaches." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 47(3):255–286.
- Majerovitz, Jeremy. 2015. "Does ethnic fractionalization matter for development?" Stanford, CA: Stanford University, Department of Economics. Honors Thesis.
- Marx, Anthony W. 1998. *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McDonnell, Erin Metz. 2016. "Conciliatory states: Elite Ethno-demographics and the puzzle of public goods within diverse African states." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(11):1513–1549.
- Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. 1997. "Social welfare reform in the context of economic-political liberalization: Latin American cases." *World Development* 25(4):497–517.
- Meyer, John W., John Boli, George M. Thomas and Francisco O. Ramirez. 1997. "World society and the nation-state." *American Journal of Sociology* 103(1):144–181.
- Michalopoulos, Stelios. 2012. "The origins of ethnolinguistic diversity." *American Economic Review* 102(4):1508–1539.
- Miguel, Edward. 2004. "Tribe or nation? Nation building and public goods in Kenya versus Tanzania." *World Politics* 56(3):328–362.
- Miguel, Edward and Mary K. Gugerty. 2005. "Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public goods in Kenya." *Journal of Public Economics* 89(11):2325–2368.
- Mylonas, Harris. 2013. *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Nunn, Nathan. 2008. "The long-term effects of Africa's slave trades." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(1):139–176.
- Pierson, Paul. 2004. *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Portes, Alejandro and Kelly Hoffman. 2003. "Latin American class structures: Their composition and change during the neoliberal Era." *Latin American Research Review* 38(1):41–82.
- Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rugh, Jacob S. and Jessica Trounstein. 2011. "The provision of local public goods in diverse communities: Analyzing municipal bond elections." *Journal of Politics* 73(4):1038–1050.
- Sassen, Saskia. 2001. *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Singh, Prerna. 2011. "We-ness and welfare: A longitudinal analysis of social development in Kerala, India." *World Development* 39(2):282–293.
- Singh, Prerna. 2015. *How Solidarity Works for Welfare: Subnationalism and Social Development in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Singh, Prerna and Matthias vom Hau. 2016. "Ethnicity in time: Politics, history, and the relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods provision." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(10):1303–1340.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1992. *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Slater, Dan. 2010. *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Soifer, Hillel D. 2016. "Regionalism, ethnic diversity, and variation in public good provision by national states." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(10):1341–1371.
- Tilly, Charles. 1990. *Capital, Coercion and European states*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell.
- Weldon, Steven A. 2006. "The institutional context of tolerance for ethnic minorities: A comparative, multilevel analysis of Western Europe." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2):331–349.
- Wimmer, Andreas. 2002. *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wimmer, Andreas. 2012. *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wimmer, Andreas. 2014. "Nation building. A long-term perspective and global analysis." *European Sociological Review* 31(1):30–47.
- Wimmer, Andreas. 2016. "Is diversity detrimental? Ethnic fractionalization, public goods provision, and the historical legacies of stateness." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(11):1407–1445.
- Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Young, Crawford. 1994. *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Identity and Political Attitudes: What Insights Can an Alternative Measurement Strategy Provide?

by [Amber D. Spry](#)
Columbia University

I. Race and Identity in American Democracy

Current United States politics are as ripe with examples of policy appeals by identity groups as they have ever been. The Black Lives Matter and Brown Lives Matter movements are not only conduits for social activism among black and Hispanic/Latino Americans, they have harnessed the ability of new media to provide timely and relevant information about policies important to their respective causes, and opportunities for allies to hold representatives accountable to those policies. The town of Charlottesville, Virginia made global headlines as a Unite the Right rally gathered self-proclaimed alt-right and white supremacist demonstrators to protest the removal of a Confederate memorial while counter-demonstrations drew even larger crowds of people from diverse racial, religious, and class backgrounds. From January to September 2017 there have been as many as thirteen organized marches on Washington, D.C., including the Native People's March on Washington (led by primarily indigenous people demonstrating opposition to the Dakota Access Pipeline and the U.S. Government's relationship with native nations), airport rallies and a march in protest of the Trump administration's Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements executive order, the May Day Action March (supporting immigrants and workers), and the Women's March on Washington (to address women's rights and the related issues of immigration reform, LGBT rights, racial equality, labor issues, and the environment). The magnitude of social demonstration from groups mobilized under banners of identity and interest signal the vitality of identity politics in the United States.

But on what basis should observers form empirical inferences about group members and their identity-related appeals? Are the appeals of those who strongly identify with a particular racial group indicative of the preferences of group members as a whole? People who are merely ascriptively categorized in a racial or ethnic group may not share the same ideas, or express the same intensity of preference, as people who have an identity attachment to the group. This may be especially true for people who believe themselves to be part of many

group categories, and who understand the relationships between self and group to be fluid and malleable.

I argue that a full appreciation for the political relevance of racial identity requires us to also understand how racial identities intersect other politically salient identities. When we further interrogate how attitudes and behavior respond to self-categorization, we may develop a more refined picture of identity and intersectional politics. In other words, empirical strategies that account for the complexity and subjectivity of identity will improve social scientific inferences about the relationship between groups and political attitudes in the context of an increasingly pluralistic society like the United States, where the dividing lines of politics are increasingly drawn along lines of identity.

II. Understanding the Relationship between Identity and Political Attitudes

Before discussing what the empirical literature has told us about group political attitudes in the United States, we should first clarify the terms used throughout the social science literature to discuss individuals and their relationships to groups. While *group membership* refers to a person's ascriptive categorization in a particular group, *group identity* refers to a person's awareness of belonging to that group coupled with a sense of psychological attachment due to a sense of shared beliefs, interests, feelings, or ideas with fellow group members ([McClain et al., 2009](#)). Distinct from group identity, *group consciousness* is in-group identification politicized by a set of ideological beliefs about the status of the group within the broader society, as well as a view that collective action is the best way for the group to improve its status and realize its shared interests ([Dawson, 1994, 2003](#); [McClain et al., 2009](#)). The empirical goal of my work is to understand whether the policy attitudes we observe for individuals are different when we are looking from the perspective of group membership (observing relationships in data based on ascriptive categorization alone) versus group identity (observing relationships in data by asking a person which group identities matter to her).

Discussions of social identities in the United States tend to center around race, class, gender, and religion. Early observations in the social science literature by Tocqueville and others point out that race is not only a significant part of American politics but also that

race will continue to drive social and political cleavages in the U.S. (Tocqueville, 1945; Brown, 1931). Since Brown's work, *The Nature of Race Consciousness* (1931), scholars have sought to understand not only how identities become politicized, but also what effect group consciousness has on political outcomes for individuals and groups. Scholars who focus on race have highlighted the effects of racial identity and racial group consciousness on voting and political participation and behavior (McClain and Stewart Jr., 1995; Cho and Cain, 2001; Harris-Lacewell and Junn, 2007; Lien, 2010; Sanchez, 2006; Segura, 2012; Lien, 1994; Kim and Lee, 2001), candidate choice (Cho and Cain, 2001; Segura, 2012; Stokes, 2003; Chong and Rogers, 2005; Wong, 2008; Schildkraut, 2012), and preference for policies that purportedly benefit minorities (Griffin, 2014; Lee, 2008; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010). Many observational studies treat race as a fixed categorical variable in which survey respondents indicate the racial or ethnic group to which they belong by checking a box, and are subsequently asked a battery of outcome measures whose relationships to racial identity are determined using regression analysis. To the extent that such studies contrast the political differences between groups, the majority of studies focus on differences between white and black Americans, although scholars have increasingly studied the effects of group consciousness among Hispanics and Latinos (Stokes, 2003; Sanchez, 2006; Manzano and Sanchez, 2010; Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010; Schildkraut, 2012; Gay, Hochschild and White, 2016), women and individuals who identify as LGBT (Simien, 2005; Moore, 2010), and religious communities (Harris, 1994; Harris-Lacewell and Junn, 2007; Granqvist and Kirkpatrick, 2008; Gay, Hochschild and White, 2016). Studies focusing on class and socioeconomic difference in the U.S. face the challenge of creating an empirical distinction between the influence of class and race, which are not only highly correlated but also often empirically endogenous. Still, scholars such as Gay (2004, 2006) have argued for the direct effects of class-consciousness on policy preferences and attitudes toward other groups. Again, such studies argue for the effect of class consciousness on political outcomes using self-reported observational data. Across literatures, to a large extent, studies related to group identity study categories of identity in isolation from one another.

III. Adapting Measurement Strategies

We might think measurement strategies matter not

only because of the responsibility social scientists have to accurately reflect populations through research, but also because political scientists and policy analysts use social science research to describe important relationships between social groups and their relationships to power, policy, and preferences that have meaningful consequences in the political world. And if we take identity to be fluid and malleable, providing for identity with more than one racial category is an important first step.

In several instances the United States Census has adapted the racial and ethnic categories used to describe the population to reflect both changes in the demographic composition of the country, and the names that groups of people prefer to call themselves. Most recently, the Census has adapted the way individuals are allowed to report their race.

[A]ttitudes across policy areas differ according to the primary identity offered by respondents, and differ for some groups from what we might observe using the conventional 'checked box' measure of group identity.

In the United States Census 2000 and Census 2010, respondents were given the opportunity to check more than one racial category for the first time. In 2010, 9.0 million people reported multiple races, a 2.4 percent point increase from the 6.8 million people who reported multiple races in 2000 (Jones and Bullock, 2013). The growth of the population reporting more than one race on the census is probably attributed to a combination of factors. One explanation is outright population growth, the other is a shift in the thinking of people who were already multiracial but are now more inclined to report themselves as being so on censuses and other surveys. While the percentage of individuals who report belonging to two or more races may seem small, the two or more races population is often reported in a single-race category, especially in subnational surveys. If these individuals were removed from the single-race category and placed in the two or more races category, "the numbers might begin to affect policy decisions and resource allocation" (Renn, 2009). In education policy, for example, racial data are used to determine funding for programs designed to promote equal opportunity,

planning for schools serving Native American communities, and monitoring of school segregation and possible racial discrimination in the areas of ability grouping, discipline, financial aid, and programs designed to serve special populations (Renn, 2009).

Work by Taeku Lee (2009) measures identity by giving respondents a fixed number of identity points to allocate at their discretion across a set of racial and ethnic categories. Analogous to Lani Guinier's 'cumulative voting' design (1994), which allows citizens to vote for multiple candidates and weight their votes according to preference intensity within the set of candidates, Lee's identity point allocation system allows survey respondents to identify with multiple group identities and to weight the strength of their association across groups, indicated by the number of points a respondent allocates to each group.

IV. A Multidimensional Approach

My dissertation research uses original survey data that extends the identity point allocation design to include class, religion, and gender alongside race as categories to which respondents allocate points in a single task (Spry, 2017). Conducted in 2015, the Identity Measurement Study (IMS) was distributed to a national online sample as part of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Political Experiments Research Lab 2015 Omnibus Survey and compares the identities individuals report using the point allocation task to the identities individuals report using a conventional 'checked box' measure of identity.

Comparison between different measurement designs allows us to understand how different approaches to measurement may reveal different outcomes on important identity-related questions while also allowing us to compare policy attitudes among people who are given the opportunity to select a primary identity from a comprehensive list of socially relevant categories. We are also able to explore whether the attitudes observed when individuals select a primary identity are different from the attitudes we observe when using conventional correlations between attitudinal outcomes and ascriptive measures of group membership where respondents 'check' a box for each category to which they belong. Allowing respondents to tell us what identities matter to them may provide a more robust scope of information about the subjects of social science research and the

policy preferences of their subjective groups.

The IMS first collected respondents' demographic information, asking subjects to self-report their race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, gender, and religion, among other questions in a multiple choice format. Next, respondents were given a point allocation task where they could allocate points indicating their magnitude of identity with gender (male or female), religion (Protestant, Roman Catholic, Mormon, Eastern or Greek Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Atheist, Agnostic, or None), class (lower class, working class, middle class, or upper class), and racial categories (White / Caucasian, Black / African American, Hispanic, Asian, American Indian / Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian / Pacific Islander). The choices in each category were populated with each respondent's previous responses, and only appeared if selected by respondents during the demographic portion of the survey. Primary identity is defined as the group given the most points for each respondent. I compare primary identities to ascriptive categories, or the 'checked boxes' selected in the demographic portion of the survey.

Respondents were also asked a number of questions related to their attitudes on undocumented immigrants, foreigners with work visas, government jobs, welfare, aid to the poor, education, defense, and climate change. Because policy attitudes are widely regarded as political expressions of group identities, the relationships between group identities and policy attitudes are analyzed along two dimensions: (i) the difference in mean attitudes between groups themselves, and (ii) the difference in mean attitudes observed under ascriptive categorization versus primary group membership.

The findings of the IMS complement the findings of theoretical and qualitative work showing that individual perceptions of identity are more subjective than researchers have assumed using conventional strategies for the measurement of identity (Spry, 2017). Specifically, I find that attitudes across policy areas differ according to the primary identity offered by respondents, and differ for some groups from what we might observe using the conventional 'checked box' measure of group identity. Individuals who primarily identify as white, male, or Protestant consistently stuck out as having distinctive views from the population average, but also as having stronger views than what we would observe under conventional correlation between ascriptive catego-

rization and attitudinal outcomes, especially on welfare and immigration issues. Protestants, males, and white Americans are not the only categories where primary identification with the group relates to distinctive policy attitudes. Concerning immigration, respondents who offered the Hispanic group as their primary identity reported warmer feelings toward undocumented immigrants than those who were merely ascriptively categorized as Hispanic. To summarize, IMS data suggest that attitudes around policies that politicize a person's primary identity tend to be especially strong. Taken together, these findings underscore the idea that ascriptive group membership reveals a one-dimensional link between identity and political attitudes. Subjective identification with a group, even given the opportunity to identify with other socially relevant categories, reveals how identity across multiple dimensions relates to political attitudes.

V. Advancing Empirical Appreciation for the Complexities of Identity

In an increasingly pluralistic society, social scientists stand to gain important information about the degree of variation displayed in self-identification. In a time when the dividing lines of politics are increasingly drawn along the lines of identity, understanding how identity relates to political choice has clear and immediate implications for both public policy and electoral politics, not only in the United States but also across many regional contexts. Future comparative research should leverage empirical strategies that account for the complexities of identity to better understand the relationships between individuals, their subjective identities, and the empirical correlates of identity such as inequality, intergroup conflict and violence, coalitional politics, and descriptive representation. As research and measurement strategies are further refined, we should see a more detailed portrait of identity and its ties to the policy preferences and political behaviors of groups.

References

Brown, William O. 1931. "The nature of race consciousness." *Social Forces* 10(1):90-97.

Cho, Wendy K. T. and Bruce E. Cain. 2001. "Asian Americans as the median voters: An exploration of attitudes and voting patterns on ballot initiatives." In *Asian Americans and Politics: Perspectives, Experiences, Prospects*, ed. Gordon H. Chang. Stanford: Stanford University Press pp. 133-152.

Chong, Dennis and Reuel Rogers. 2005. "Racial solidarity and political participation." *Political Behavior* 27(4):347-374.

Dawson, Michael C. 1994. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Dawson, Michael C. 2003. *Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gay, Claudine. 2004. "Putting race in context: Identifying the environmental determinants of Black racial attitudes." *American Political Science Review* 98(4):547-562.

Gay, Claudine. 2006. "Seeing difference: The effect of economic disparity on Black attitudes toward Latinos." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4):982-997.

Gay, Claudine, Jennifer Hochschild and Ariel White. 2016. "Americans' belief in linked fate: Does the measure capture the concept?" *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* 1(1):117-144.

Granqvist, Pehr and Lee A. Kirkpatrick. 2008. "Attachment and religious representations and behavior". In *Handbook of Attachment: Theory, Research, and Clinical Applications*, ed. Phillip R. Shaver and Jude Cassidy. New York: The Guilford Press pp. 906-934.

Griffin, John D. 2014. "When and why minority legislators matter." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17:327-336.

Guinier, Loni. 1994. "[E]racing democracy: The voting rights cases." *Harvard Law Review* 108:109.

Harris, Fredrick C. 1994. "Something within: Religion as a mobilizer of African-American political activism." *Journal of Politics* 56(1):42-68.

Harris-Lacewell, Melissa and Jane Junn. 2007. "Old friends and new alliances: How the 2004 Illinois Senate race complicates the study of race and religion." *Journal of Black Studies* 38(1):30-50.

Jones, Jungmiwha and Nicholas A. Bullock. 2013. The two or more races population: 2010 census brief. Technical report United States Census Bureau.

Kim, Claire J. and Taeku Lee. 2001. "Interracial politics: Asian Americans and other communities of color." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 34(3):631-637.

Lee, Taeku. 2008. "Race, immigration, and the identity-to-politics link." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11:457-478.

Lee, Taeku. 2009. Between social theory and social science practice: Toward a new approach to the survey measurement of 'Race'. In *Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists*, ed. Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair I. Johnston and Rose McDermott. New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 113-144.

Lien, Pei-te. 1994. "Ethnicity and political participation: A comparison between Asian and Mexican Americans." *Political Behavior* 16(2):237-264.

Lien, Pei-te. 2010. *Making of Asian America: Through Politics*

cal Participation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Manzano, Sylvia and Gabriel R. Sanchez. 2010. "Take one for the team? Limits of shared ethnicity and candidate preferences." *Political Research Quarterly* 63(3):568–580.

McClain, Paula D., Jessica D. Johnson Carew, Eugene Walton Jr and Candis S. Watts. 2009. "Group membership, group identity, and group consciousness: Measures of racial identity in American politics?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 12:471–485.

McClain, Paula D. and Joseph Stewart Jr. 1995. "Can we all get along? Racial and ethnic minorities in American politics." *Dilemmas in American Politics Series* ERIC.

Moore, Mignon R. 2010. "Articulating a politics of (multiple) identities." *Du Bois Review* 7(2):1–20.

Renn, Kristen A. 2009. "Educational policy, politics, and mixed heritage students in the United States." *Journal of Social Issues* 65(1):165–183.

Sanchez, Gabriel R. 2006. "The role of group consciousness in Latino public opinion." *Political Research Quarterly* 59(3):435–446.

Sanchez, Gabriel R. and Natalie Masuoka. 2010. "Brown-utility heuristic? The presence and contributing factors of Latino linked fate." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 32(4):519–531.

Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2012. "Which birds of a feather flock together? Assessing attitudes about descriptive representation among Latinos and Asian Americans." *American Politics Research* 41(4):699–729.

Segura, Gary M. 2012. "Latino public opinion and realigning the American electorate." *Daedalus* 141(4):98–113.

Simien, Evelyn M. 2005. "Race, gender, and linked fate." *Journal of Black Studies* 35(5):529–550.

Spry, Amber. 2017. *Identity in American Politics: A Multidimensional Approach to Study and Measurement*. PhD thesis Columbia University.

Stokes, Atiya K. 2003. "Latino group consciousness and political participation." *American Politics Research* 31(4):361–378.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1945. *Democracy in America*. New York: Vintage.

Wong, Janelle. 2008. *Democracy's Promise: Immigrants and American Civic Institutions*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Dataset

Democratic Electoral Systems around the World, 1946-2016

by Nils-Christian Bormann

University of Witten-Herdecke

and Adina Pintilie

University of Exeter

and Jack N. Smith

University of Exeter

Elections are a defining feature of contemporary democracies. The precise rules governing elections can have an important impact on a diverse set of outcomes related to things like identity formation, political representation and accountability, economic policy, public goods provision, coalition formation, levels of corruption, party systems, various forms of voter behavior, and so on. In this essay, we describe the latest update to Bormann and Golder's (2013) widely used [Democratic Electoral Systems \(DES\) dataset](#), which provides detailed information on the electoral rules used in all democratic elections around the world as well as the size of party systems.


Version 3.0 of the DES dataset covers democratic elections from 1946 (or independence) through 2016, and provides information on 1,341 legislative elections and 498 presidential elections.¹ Accompanying the release of this new version of the DES dataset is a web-based interactive [Shiny application](#) that graphically illustrates the geographic and statistical distributions of electoral rules by decade.² Since we classify regimes as democratic or dictatorial based on the coding rules found in [Przeworski et al. \(2000\)](#), the new version of the DES dataset can also be used as an updated version of Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland's (2010, 69) popular [Democracy and Dictatorship \(DD\) data](#), which, until now, only ran from 1946 to 2008. Scholars using the new version of the DES dataset should continue to use the following citation:

- Bormann, Nils-Christian & Matt Golder. 2013. "Democratic Electoral Systems around the World, 1946-2011." *Electoral Studies* 32: 360-369.

¹This version of the dataset adds five more years of temporal coverage to the previous version, amounting to an additional 144 legislative elections and 65 presidential elections.


²In the future, we plan to add more details of the electoral rules used in various countries to the Shiny application. We welcome feedback on what would be helpful information when using the app for teaching purposes.

Figure 1: Legislative Electoral System Families



Note: These are all of the electoral systems used in national-level lower-house legislative elections around the world. TRS refers to ‘two-round systems’.

Figure 2: Number of Elections using Different Electoral Formulas by Electoral System Family, 2011 to 2016



Note: Figure 2 shows the number of legislative elections using different types of electoral formulas across majoritarian (top row), proportional (middle row), and mixed (bottom row) electoral systems. Majoritarian systems, from left to right, are single-member district plurality (SMDP), block vote (BV), two-round system (TRS) majority-plurality, single non-transferable vote (SNTV), modified Borda count (mBC), two-round system (TRS) majority-majority, and alternative vote (AV). For proportional systems, Hag-Bisch. is the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota, Mod. S.-L. is modified St. Laguë, and STV is the single transferable vote.

The DES dataset classifies legislative electoral systems into three main families based on their electoral formula: majoritarian, proportional, and mixed. Just over half of contemporary legislative elections employ a proportional electoral system, one third employ a majoritarian system, and the remainder employ a mixed system. As Figure 1 indicates, there are many different types of electoral formula that exist within each of the three overarching electoral system families. For an introductory overview of these different electoral formulas, see [Bormann and Golder \(2013, 361-363\)](#).

In Figure 2, we plot the number of contemporary legislative elections that employ the various types of majoritarian, proportional, and mixed electoral systems.³ The single-member district plurality (SMDP) system is by far the most common type of majoritarian electoral system in use around the world. Proportional electoral systems are dominated by list-PR systems, with roughly 55% using some kind of divisor system to allocate legislative seats and 45% using some kind of quota system. The d'Hondt divisor system is by far the most common type of divisor system and the Hare quota (typically with largest remainders) is the most popular type of quota system. Only two democracies, Malta and Ireland, employ the single transferable vote. In terms of elections that employ mixed electoral systems, 62% used a mixed-independent system and 38% used a mixed-dependent system.⁴ Supposition and correction systems are easily the most common types of independent and dependent mixed systems, respectively.

Version 3.0 of the DES dataset covers democratic elections from 1946 (or independence) through 2016, and provides information on 1,341 legislative elections and 498 presidential elections.

In addition to classifying electoral systems based on their electoral formula, the DES dataset also includes variables such as the election date (for each round), the number of electoral tiers, the number of districts in each electoral tier, the average district magnitude in each electoral tier, and assembly size. While we have focused here on legislative elections, the DES dataset also codes

the electoral systems used in presidential elections.

Finally, the DES dataset also provides information on party system size. Specifically, it includes the effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties (and presidential candidates). In Figure 3, we plot party system size by decade across established (left column) and non-established (right column) democracies, and across majoritarian (top row) and proportional (bottom row) electoral systems. The effective numbers of electoral parties (ENEP) are shown with solid black circles, while the effective numbers of parliamentary parties (ENPP) are shown with solid black triangles.


The information conveyed in Figure 3 with respect to established democracies is consistent with Duverger's (1963) theory of party system size ([Clark and Golder, 2006](#)). For example, party systems in established democracies employing proportional electoral rules are consistently larger than those employing majoritarian rules. In line with Duverger's Law, the effective number of parliamentary parties in majoritarian democracies has remained below three, and typically below two and a half. Duverger's mechanical effect of electoral systems is also clearly visible with respect to established democracies — the divergence between the effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties is consistently smaller in proportional systems, indicating that votes are more accurately translated into seats in these systems.

The panels for established democracies in Figure 3 also indicate that party system size in proportional democracies has increased significantly in recent decades. While the effective number of electoral parties in proportional democracies was 3.8 on average in the 1950s, it was up to six in the 2010s. Majoritarian democracies seemed to be following a similar trend with larger party systems in the 1990s and 2000s relative to previous decades. However, the evidence for this trend in the 2010s is less strong. Although the effective number of electoral parties in majoritarian democracies remains fairly high and close to four in the 2010s, the average effective number of parties that win seats is once again below 2.5. This last result reminds us how the mechanical effect of majoritarian electoral rules consistently restricts the number of parliamentary parties ([Clark](#)

³For multi-tier majoritarian and proportional systems, the data refer to the electoral formula in the lowest electoral tier.

⁴Mixed-independent systems are sometimes referred to as mixed parallel systems, and mixed-dependent systems are sometimes referred to as mixed member proportional systems.

Figure 3: Party System Size by Decade across Established and Non-Established Democracies, and across Majoritarian and Proportional Electoral Systems



Note: Figure 3 provides information on the effective number of electoral (circles) and parliamentary (triangles) parties by decade across established democracies (left column) and non-established democracies (right column), and across majoritarian (top row) and proportional (bottom row) electoral systems.

and Golder, 2006).

As Duverger (1963, 228) himself predicted, his theory receives slightly less support among non-established democracies (right column of Figure 3). That said, there is still evidence that party systems in proportional countries are consistently larger and more variable than those in majoritarian countries.

In this brief essay, we have introduced the latest update to Bormann and Golder's (2013, 361-363) Democratic Electoral Systems dataset. We hope that the DES dataset will continue to act as an invaluable source of information for social scientists interested in the origins and consequences of electoral rules.

References

- Bormann, Nils-Christian and Matt Golder. 2013. "Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2011." *Electoral Studies* 32(2):360-369.
- Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi and James R. Vreeland. 2010. "Democracy and dictatorship revisited." *Public Choice* 143(1-2):67-101.
- Clark, William Roberts and Matt Golder. 2006. "Rehabilitating Duverger's theory: Testing the mechanical and strategic modifying effects of electoral laws." *Comparative Political Studies* 39(6):679-708.
- Duverger, Maurice. 1963. *Political Parties*. London: Methuen.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Other

Call for Bids: New Editorial Team for the Comparative Politics Newsletter

Bids are now welcomed for the editorship of the *Comparative Politics Newsletter*, the official newsletter of the Comparative Politics Section of the American Political Science Association. The newsletter is the major public face of the Section and includes symposia, special topics, debates, review articles, and news of the subfield. Section members, supported by their Universities, are encouraged to submit a bid.

Here are the guidelines for submitting a bid for the running of the newsletter and for the responsibilities of the bidding institution. They have been adapted from those used in 2013 and the current practices of the newsletter editors:

General:

1. The editorship of the newsletter will be for a four-year term and may be renewed for a second four-year term.
2. The next term will begin in the fall of 2018, with responsibility for the spring issue of 2019.
3. The deadline for submitting an application for the editorship is January 31, 2018.
4. A four-person committee, to be appointed by the president of the Section, will decide on the winning application. The committee will include the current co-editors of the newsletter.
5. The committee will assess applications on the basis of how well the editorial team meets editor and host institutions' responsibilities (see next two sections) and on the basis of the quality of proposed journal content (see section on "Proposals should include:").
6. The selection committee's decision will be announced by April 1, 2018.

Editors' Responsibilities:

1. Responsibilities of the editorial team include identifying and developing themes, contacting potential contributors, selecting and editing submissions, and overall oversight of the production and distribution process.
2. The editor or co-editors must be able to commit an estimated working time of 2-3 weeks per issue, spread out over a longer period of time. Past practice suggests the editor(s) plan to produce two issues per year (typically a spring and fall issue).
3. An assistant editor is expected to be appointed to handle layouts, convert email submissions, and otherwise assist in production and distribution as well as manage a website. Estimated time spent by the assistant editor is four weeks per issue. Compensation for this position comes from the bidding institution.

The Bidding Institution:

1. Should have a comparative politics faculty sufficiently large to support an editor or co-editors and an assistant editor, and have possible replacements.
2. Should be prepared to provide appropriate administrative support.
3. Release time for faculty will be taken into account but is not a requirement.

Financial Arrangements:

1. Section dues will contribute up to \$2,000 per year towards the production of the newsletter (e.g., new software).
2. Other expenses should be covered by the proposing institution, including compensation for any assistant editor or student assistance.

3. The newsletter will continue to be distributed electronically via the APSA Connect Section distribution list.

Proposals Should Include:

1. Names and CVs of proposed editor or editors.
2. A prospective budget.
3. A statement of administrative support from the proposing institution.
4. Possible themes, directions, special topics, and other ideas of the bidding editors for the newsletter may be proposed and will be taken into account by the selection committee.

The Selection Committee Consists of:

- Matt Golder, Pennsylvania State University (mgolder@psu.edu).
- Sona N. Golder, Pennsylvania State University (sgolder@psu.edu).
- Karen Jusko, Chair, Stanford University (k1jusko@stanford.edu).
- Kimuli Kasara, Columbia University (k2432@columbia.edu).

All correspondence should be sent to the Committee Chair, Karen Jusko.

Cathie Jo Martin
President (cjmartin@bu.edu)

Editors and Contributors

Matt Golder



Matt Golder is a Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies in the [Department of Political Science](#) at [The Pennsylvania State University](#). He received his Ph.D. in 2004 from [New York University](#). His research looks at how political institutions affect democratic representation. In addition to articles in journals such as the *American Journal of Political Science*, the *Annual Review of Political Science*, the *British Journal of Political Science*, the *Journal of Politics*, and *Political Analysis*, he has also published a textbook on comparative politics, *Principles of Comparative Politics*, now in its third edition. He is currently working on three research projects. The first looks at negative campaigning in a multiparty context, the second involves a book project on interaction models, and the third examines various aspects of women's representation. In addition to serving as chair of APSA's section on [Representation and Electoral Systems](#) (2011-2013), he is also a member of the executive board for the [Making Electoral Democracy Work](#) project led by André Blais at the University of Montreal and the advisory board for the [Electoral Integrity Project](#) led by Pippa Norris at Harvard University. More information can be found at his [website](#) and on his [Google scholar profile](#).

Sona N. Golder



Sona Golder is a Professor in the [Department of Political Science](#) at [The Pennsylvania State University](#). She is also an editor at the *British Journal of Political Science* and an associate editor at *Research & Politics*. She received her Ph.D. in 2004 from [New York University](#). She studies political institutions, with a particular interest in coalition formation. As well as publishing three books, *Multi-level Electoral Politics: Beyond the Second Order Model* (Oxford University Press), *The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation* (Ohio State University Press), and *Principles of Comparative Politics* (Sage/CQ Press), she has also published in numerous journals such as the *American Journal of Political Science*, the *British Journal of Political Science*, the *Journal of Politics*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Political Analysis*, and *Politics & Gender*. In addition to serving on the editorial boards of the *American Political Science Review*, *Comparative Political Studies*, and *Political Science Research and Methods*, she has also been involved in the women in methods group — she was the organizer and host for the [4th Annual Visions in Methodology \(VIM\) Conference](#), she has served as a VIM mentor for female graduate students and junior faculty, and she was a member of the diversity committee for APSA's Political Methodology Section. More information can be found at her [website](#) and on her [Google scholar profile](#).

Claire Adida



Claire Adida is an Associate Professor in the [Department of Political Science](#) at the [University of California, San Diego](#). Her research focuses on ethnic politics and immigrant exclusion, with a regional emphasis on Africa. In addition to publishing articles in journals such as *Comparative Political Studies*, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, the *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, the *Annals of Economics and Statistics*, the *Journal of Experimental Political Science*, *Economics and Politics*, the *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, *Economic Inquiry*, and the *Economics Bulletin*, she has also published two books. Her first book, *Immigrant Exclusion and Insecurity in Africa: Coethnic Strangers*, was published with Cambridge University Press. Her second book, *Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies*, was published with Harvard University Press. Her research has been funded by the [National Science Foundation](#), the [Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation](#), and the [Hellman Foundation](#). More information can be found at her [website](#) and on her [Google Scholar profile](#).

Nils-Christian Bormann



Nils-Christian Bormann is currently a Visiting Professor of International Political Studies in the Department of Economics at the [University of Witten-Herdecke](#), Germany and Lecturer in the [Department of Politics](#) at the [University of Exeter](#), United Kingdom. His research focuses on ethnic coalitions and power-sharing, civil wars, democratization, and spatial methods. He has published articles in journals such as *International Studies Quarterly*, the *European Journal of Political Research*, *Electoral Studies*, the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, and the *Journal of Peace Research*. More information can be found on his [Google Scholar profile](#).

Volha Charnysh



Volha Charnysh is a Post-Doctoral Fellow in the [Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance](#) at [Princeton University](#). She will start as an Assistant Professor in the [Department of Political Science](#) at the [Massachusetts Institute of Technology](#) in Fall 2018. Her research focuses on historical political economy, nation- and state-building, and ethnic politics. She is currently working on her book, *Migration, Diversity, and Economic Development*. She has published articles in journals such as the *American Political Science Review*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Nationalities Papers*, and the *European Journal of International Relations*. More information can be found at her [website](#).

Rafaela Dancygier



Rafaela Dancygier is an Associate Professor in the [Department of Politics](#) and [Woodrow Wilson School](#) at [Princeton University](#). Her research focuses on ethnic diversity in advanced democracies. In addition to publishing articles in journals such as the *American Journal of Political Science*, the *American Political Science Review*, the *Annual Review of Political Science*, the *Journal of Politics*, *Comparative Politics*, and *World Politics*, she has also published two books. Her first book, *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*, was published with Cambridge University Press. Her second book, *Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics*, was published with Princeton University Press. Her research has been funded by the [National Science Foundation](#) and the [Swedish Research Council](#). More information can be found at her [website](#).

Adam Harris



Adam Harris is a Post-Doctoral Fellow with the [Program on Governance and Local Development](#) (GLD) at the [University of Gothenburg](#), Sweden. In January 2018, he will join the [Department of Political Science](#) at [University College London](#) as a Lecturer in Development Politics. His research focuses on political participation, and race and ethnic politics, with a regional emphasis on Africa. He has published articles in journals such as the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *International Organization*, and *Political Research Quarterly*. His research has been supported by the National Science Foundation and the Swedish Research Council. More information can be found at his [website](#) and on his [Google Scholar profile](#).

Matthias vom Hau



Matthias vom Hau is an Associate Professor of Comparative Politics at the [Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals](#) (IBEI). His research focuses on the relationship between identity politics, institutions, and development, with a regional emphasis on Latin America. He has published articles in journals such as the *American Journal of Sociology*, *Sociological Methods and Research*, the *Journal of Development Studies*, the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *Nations and Nationalism*, and the *Latin American Research Review*. More information can be found at his [website](#) and on his [Google Scholar profile](#).

Yue Hou



Yue Hou is an Assistant Professor in the [Department of Political Science](#) at the [University of Pennsylvania](#). Her research focuses on authoritarian institutions, ethnic politics, business-state relations, and the political economy of development, with a regional emphasis on China. She is currently working on her book, *Participatory Autocracy: Private Entrepreneurs, Legislatures, and Property Protection in China*. She has published articles in journals such as the *Journal of Politics*, the *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, and *Social Science Quarterly*. More information can be found at her [website](#) and on her [Google Scholar profile](#).

Ashley Jardina



Ashley Jardina is an Assistant Professor in the [Department of Political Science](#) at [Duke University](#). Her research focuses on racial attitudes, the development of group identities, and the way in which these factors influence political preferences and behavior, with a regional emphasis on the United States. She has published articles in journals such as *Political Psychology*, the *Annual Review of Political Science*, and the *Journal of International Migration and Integration*. More information can be found at her [website](#) and on her [Google Scholar profile](#).

Marcus Johnson, Jr.



Marcus Johnson is a [President's Postdoctoral Fellow](#) at the [University of Maryland](#). He will be starting as an Assistant Professor in the [Department of Political Science](#) at [CUNY Baruch College](#) in Fall 2018. His research focuses on race and ethnic politics, as well as electoral behavior and institutions, with a regional emphasis on Latin America. More information can be found at his [website](#).

Kristen Kao



Kristen Kao is a Post-Doctoral Fellow with the [Program on Governance and Local Development](#) (GLD) at the [University of Gothenburg](#), Sweden. Her research focuses on electoral authoritarianism, clientelism, and ethnic politics, with a regional emphasis on the Middle East and North Africa. She has published her research in *Survey Practice* and in the *Washington Post/Monkey Cage*. More information can be found at her [website](#).

Ekrem Karakoç



Ekrem Karakoç is an Associate Professor in the [Department of Political Science](#) at the [University of Binghamton, SUNY](#). His research focuses on comparative political economy, inequality, immigration, and democratization. His recent research examines religion and ethnicity in the Middle East. He has published articles in journals such as *World Politics*, *Comparative Politics*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Political Research Quarterly*, *Party Politics*, *Electoral Studies*, and the *European Political Science Review*. More information can be found at his [website](#) and on his [Google Scholar profile](#).

Chuyu Liu



Chuyu Liu is a Ph.D. candidate (expected 2019) in the [Department of Political Science](#) at [Pennsylvania State University](#). His research interests include civil violence, ethnic politics, and terrorism, with a regional emphasis on China and East Asia. His research has been published in *Energy Policy* and *The China Review*. More information can be found at his [website](#).

Aditi Malik



Aditi Malik is an Assistant Professor in the [Department of Political Science](#) at the [College of the Holy Cross](#). Her research focuses on political violence, ethnic politics, and political parties. Aditi studies these topics in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. She is currently working on her book, *Playing the Communal Card: Party Volatility and Electoral Violence in Developing Democracies*. Her articles have appeared, or are forthcoming, in journals such as *Human Rights Quarterly*, *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review*, *Transitional Justice Review*, *Human Rights Review*, and *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*. More information can be found at her [website](#).

Rahsaan Maxwell



Rahsaan Maxwell is an Associate Professor in the [Department of Political Science](#) at the [University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill](#). His research focuses on racial, ethnic, religious, and immigrant-origin minorities, with a regional emphasis on Western Europe. In addition to publishing articles in journals such as *World Politics*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Social Forces*, *Political Behavior*, *European Political Science*, *West European Politics*, the *European Sociological Review*, the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, and the *Du Bois Review*, he has also published two books. His first book, *Immigrant Politics: Race and Representation in Western Europe*, was published with Lynne Rienner. His second book, *Ethnic Minority Migrants in Britain and France: Integration Trade-Offs*, was published with Cambridge University Press. More information can be found at his [website](#) and on his [Google Scholar profile](#).

Gwyneth McClendon



Gwyneth McClendon is an Assistant Professor in the [Department of Politics](#) at [New York University](#). Her research focuses on comparative political behavior, religious and ethnic politics, and political participation, with a regional emphasis on Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States. She has published articles in journals such as the *American Journal of Political Science*, the *Journal of Politics*, *Comparative Political Studies*, the *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, the *Journal of Experimental Political Science*, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, and *African Affairs*. Her book, *Envy in Politics*, is forthcoming at Princeton University Press. More information can be found at her [website](#) and on her [Google Scholar profile](#).

Sangay Mishra



Sangay Mishra is a Visiting Assistant Professor in the [Department of Political Science](#) at [Drew University](#). His research focuses on immigrant political incorporation, global immigration, and racial and ethnic politics, with a regional focus on the United States. In addition to publishing articles in journals such as *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* and *AAPI Nexus: Asian American and Pacific Islanders Policy, Practice, and Community*, he has also published a book, *Desis Divided: The Political Lives of South Asian Americans*, with the University of Minnesota Press. More information can be found at his [website](#).

Juliet Pietsch



Juliet Pietsch is an Associate Professor in the [College of Arts and Social Sciences](#) at [Australian National University](#). Her research focuses on racial and ethnic politics, with a regional emphasis on Australia and Southeast Asia. She has published articles in journals such as the *Journal of Sociology*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *Environmental Politics*, *Social Inclusion*, *Current Sociology*, the *Journal of Elections*, *Public Opinion and Parties*, and the *Australian Journal of Political Science*. Her book, *Race, Ethnicity and the Participation Gap: Understanding Australia's Political Complexion*, is forthcoming with the University of Toronto Press. More information can be found at her [website](#).

Adina Pintilie



Adina Pintilie is a 3rd-year undergraduate politics and international relations student with a specialization in data analysis ([Q-STEP](#)) at the [University of Exeter](#), United Kingdom. She has served as a research assistant for the latest update to the [Democratic Electoral Systems](#) dataset.

Amanda Robinson



Amanda Robinson is an Assistant Professor in the [Department of Political Science](#) at [Ohio State University](#). She is also the interim director of [Decision Sciences Collaborative](#). Her research focuses on race, culture, and identity formation, with a regional emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa. She has published articles in journals such as *Comparative Political Studies*, *World Politics*, *World Development*, and the *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*. More information can be found at her [website](#) and on her [Google Scholar profile](#).

Prerna Singh



Prerna Singh is the Mahatma Gandhi Assistant Professor of [Political Science](#) and [International Studies](#) at [Brown University](#). In addition to publishing articles in journals such as *Comparative Politics*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *World Development*, and *World Politics*, she has also published a book, *How Solidarity Works for Welfare: Subnationalism and Social Development in India*, with Cambridge University Press. More information can be found at her [website](#) and on her [Google Scholar profile](#).

Jack N. Smith



Jack N. Smith is a 3rd-year undergraduate politics and international relations student with a specialization in data analysis ([Q-STEP](#)) at the [University of Exeter](#), United Kingdom. He has served as a research assistant for the latest update to the [Democratic Electoral Systems](#) dataset.

Amber Spry



Amber Spry is a Ph.D. candidate (expected 2018) in the [Department of Political Science](#) at [Columbia University](#). Her research focuses on the relationship between group identity and political attitudes and behavior, with a regional emphasis on the United States. She has published her research in the *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*. Amber's research has been supported by the National Science Foundation and a visiting fellowship at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. More information can be found at her [website](#).

About the Section

The [Organized Section in Comparative Politics](#) is the largest organized section in the American Political Science Association (APSA) with over 1,300 members. The purpose of the Section is to promote the comparative, especially cross-national, study of politics and to integrate the work of comparativists, area studies specialists, and those interested in American politics. The Section organizes panels for APSA's annual meetings; awards annual prizes for best paper, best article, best book, and best data set; and oversees and helps finance the publication of the Newsletter. For more information, please visit the Section's website.

About the Newsletter

The goal of the Comparative Politics Newsletter is to engender a sense of community among comparative politics scholars around the world. To this end, the Newsletter publishes symposia on various substantive and methodological issues, highlights new data sets of broad appeal, prints short comments from readers in response to materials in the previous issue, and generally informs the community about field-specific developments. Recent symposia have looked at women/gender in comparative politics, data access and research transparency, populism, the politics of space, and sensitive data. It is published twice a year, once during the Spring and once during the Fall. The Newsletter is currently edited by [Matt Golder](#) and [Sona N. Golder](#) at The Pennsylvania State University.

How to Subscribe

Subscription to the APSA-CP Newsletter is a benefit to members of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association. To join the section, check the appropriate box when joining APSA or renewing your Association membership. You may join the APSA online at <https://www.apsanet.org/MEMBERSHIP/Membership-Membership-Form>.

Copyright 2017 [American Political Science Association](#).
Address: 1527 New Hampshire Ave, NW Washington, DC 20036-1206
Phone: (202) 483-2512 | Fax: (202) 483-2657 | Email: apsa@apsanet.org