

## LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT ARCHIVED DATA SETS: SO WHAT?

**I**n our individual research efforts we all find ourselves constructing data sets inefficiently, or unwilling to construct a useful data set because the time costs would be too high for the small point that would be useful to make. For example, in my own work now, I would like to know where Estonia stands in comparison to other countries in regard to permanent residents who do not speak the official language of the state. It would be great if I could phone up ICPSR, and generate a table along with documentation. To construct such tables might consume our efforts for half our research careers, and it might be individually irrational to develop the data bases for these variables. If all comparativists could make use of these data, then it would be worth collecting, validating, and archiving; these data would be collective goods. Moreover, as Steven Rosenstone (University of Michigan), Principle Investigator of the American National Election Study (NES), pointed out, such data have "multiplier effects": expanding the funding for the development of these data would "support far more scholars and diverse scholarship than could be supported by like amounts of money devoted instead to individual research grants."

On December 3-5, 1993 the Comparative Politics Section's Committee on Archived Data Sets met in Ann Arbor. Chaired by W. Phillips Shively (University of Minnesota), and supported financially by the Social Science Research Council, this meeting had vast implications for us all. Crucial to the discussions were Richard Rockwell, Executive Director of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), who taught us what an archive is, and Rosenstone, who explained to us how the better funded part of our discipline lives. Shively's report of that meeting is published on page 10 of this issue, so I need not summarize our discussions and plan of action. However, I believe that this initiative is of enormous importance for the comparative politics discipline, and I want to use this space to make a few points

explaining what an archived data set is, and why I believe it merits our support.

### What Is an Archived Data Set?

An archived data set is a process rather than a tangible object. The process demands that a committee representing the community of scholars meet to agree on the core concepts that drive the principal theories in the discipline, to specify and standardize the constituent variables, and to organize the data sets so that they can be linked to other data sets (census, social indicators, geographic) without great difficulty. The committee must then seek grants to collect and archive those data. Finally, it must institutionalize a process so that the core concepts and principal variables are put under regular review by the entire scholarly community. In this man-

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# COMMENTARY, NEWS, AND NOTES

## DIRECTIONS FOR COMPARATIVE POLITICS

### *QUOT HOMINES TOT SENTENTIAE*

The following three comments regard the discussion begun in last issue's (*APSA-CP*, 4: 2, Summer, 1993) columns, "Letter from the Outgoing President," and "Letter from the Incoming President." These remarks from Ronald Rogowski (University of California, Los Angeles) and David Laitin (University of Chicago) addressed the future of the comparativists' discipline, and the debate on the relative merits of area expertise and comparative theory. The first piece, by Steven Reed (Chuo University) takes issue with several points made by Laitin and Rogowski. The second comment, from Sidney Tarrow (Cornell University), is an excerpt from *Rebirth or Stagnation? European Studies After 1989* (Washington, D.C.: Social Science Research Council, 1993). You may order copies, free of charge, from the Western Europe Program of the SSRC at 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 (see *APSA-CP*, 4: 2, Summer, 1993, for a notice). The final set of observations (beginning on page 4) comes from Kenneth Shepsle (Harvard University) and Barry Weingast (Stanford University), and provides an Americanist's point of view. The editors welcome further responses and comments, and hope that this publication will continue as a vehicle for the extension of this debate. You may do so by writing to Adam Levine at the address on the back cover, or by e-mailing your contribution to [levine@polisci.sscnet.ucla.edu](mailto:levine@polisci.sscnet.ucla.edu).

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As a comparativist who specializes in Japan, I have been deeply involved in the area studies versus comparative politics debate since graduate school. Also, having recently joined the Faculty of Policy Studies at Chuo University, a faculty dedicated to interdisciplinary studies, I now regularly talk to people in other disciplines and have even begun to read a great deal outside of political science. This being said, allow me to add my two cents to the discussion.

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Area studies is sometimes caricatured as the atheoretical, configurational study of particular areas of the world, cut off from global perspectives, and from theory and methodology. Yet throughout the interviews carried out in this study [the study involved, among other things, a poll of European specialists and academic administrators concerning the direction and needs of European studies], respondents stressed the need to carry out complementary comparative and

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**Sidney Tarrow** is the Maxwell M. Upson Professor of Government at Cornell University.

**Kenneth A. Shepsle** is Professor of Government at Harvard University.

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## THE FUTURE OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS THEORY AND AREA STUDIES

In his "Letter from the Incoming President," David Laitin broods about the future of comparative politics. In his words, "a specter is haunting comparative politics; it is the specter of pure theory." Using recent developments in linguistics and economics as models of possible futures for comparative politics, Laitin suggests that the future may not only include sophisticated theory and abstract reasoning, but also a mistaken diminution of detailed knowledge of particular areas and regions. This is precisely what has happened in economics where, for example, it is no longer considered necessary for major departments to maintain specialists in particular areas of the world. Economists instead teach a more general, theoretically based approach requiring little knowledge of or concern for particular cultural features or political institutions.

We share Laitin's concerns, and his hopes. As theory rises in prominence in the study of comparative politics, an over-reaction that rejects traditional methods will surely result in a comparative politics more impoverished than one in which theoretical approaches and traditional methodologies are more evenly integrated.

Our purpose here is to suggest that, for several reasons, there are historical experiences other than that of economics or linguistics (Laitin's comparisons), or even physics (offered by Rogowski in his "Letter from the Outgoing President"), from which to conjecture about the future of comparative politics. Economics, especially, has had a far different history than political science, with theory having been valued now for more than two centuries. Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* did not focus on a particular nation, but rather on broad principles that were then applied to a series of particular nations. Neoclassical economists, especially after World War II, rejected the role of institutions and culture (as economic historian and recent Nobel laureate Douglass North is fond of telling us) in precisely the manner implied in Laitin's remarks. Because it is a plausible scenario, and one to be discouraged, we label it the 'dismal scenario.' There is an alternative, however.

We argue that American politics, particularly the study of Congress, constitutes a superior exemplar for comparative politics. Many of the same doubts that now concern comparativists arose in that setting—for example, is abstract reasoning compatible with maintaining an adequate knowledge of what actually goes on in

Congress, or does it produce an emphasis on abstract legislatures and a concomitant loss of knowledge unique to Congress?

Four observations about the Congress field are relevant. The first is that theorists have not driven out the close observers of Congress. Instead, cooperation between theorist and empiricist has arisen. Moreover, contrary to Rogowski's concerns, the theory-description link is a two-way road. Legislative theorists may not read *CQ Weekly Report* with quite the religious fervor of the Congress jock, but the theorist does read it. Indeed, we would wager that theorists are more familiar with the substance of congressional politics than students of the latter are with the latest theorem on committee power. The reason is simple; good theory requires a foundation of robust empirical regularities.

Second, theorists' tools are simply inadequate to make detailed, *ex ante* predictions about the types of behavior that should be observed in any particular legislative context. That knowledge can be derived only from direct observation and detailed empirical analysis. Theorists cannot say, for example, what types of norms are likely to emerge in a body like Congress. For this job, a different kind of training is required.

The other side of the coin is our third point. Those scholars who provide the thick description of congressional behavior do not provide complete explanations for their observations. Again, consider congressional norms. Behavioral scholars may be able to uncover and describe congressional norms, but their tools of

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## JAPANESE POLITICS IN TRANSITION

### IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

The recent political reform and the unprecedented defeat of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan have raised new issues both for those studying Japanese politics as well as comparativists in general. The following side-by-side delves into some of the issues that have arisen in the wake of these historical changes. Margaret A. McKean (Duke University), in her contribution, seeks tentative explanations for the political *hara-kari* committed by Japanese MPs. Francis Rosenbluth (University of California, Los Angeles) looks into the new avenues of research which have been opened up by these dramatic changes.

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#### POLITICAL SUICIDE (AFTER MANY INSINCERE ATTEMPTS) IN JAPAN

When sitting legislators vote approval for radical changes in the electoral system used to select them, we need to wonder why. It is easy to see how a majority of legislators might vote in favor of a change that will protect their own seats, and threaten only the seats of opposition members. Such a change, however, probably cannot be very radical if those voting for it can truly feel confident that they will be safe with the new arrangement. Moreover it is easy to see how a minority of legislators would feel free to vote in favor of a radical change (and earn points with attentive constituents for being adventurous) as long as that change will not receive enough votes to pass, and actually threaten any sitting legislator in fact. This is essentially a chicken game in which legislators look for signals from their colleagues as to which equilibrium position will emerge; can I trust you to vote against this dangerous measure (swerve) so that I do not have

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#### JAPANESE POLITICS: FROM COMPARATIVELY STATIC TO COMPARATIVE STATICS

Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) stayed in power for so long that Japanologists have, thus far, escaped the discipline of comparative statics. It has become customary to assume, for example, that bureaucrats, not politicians, govern Japan. But how would we know? The bureaucrats have served only one party for the entire post-Occupation period. The 'strong-state' proponents have assumed that the bureaucrats would continue with their own policies regardless of the party in power. Unlike scholarship on alternating governments in the U. S. or Europe, this bureaucratic-dominance proposition has not been tested in the Japanese case.

Similarly, some scholars have claimed that Japanese culture is responsible for the personalistic nature of Japanese election campaigns as well as for factionalism within the LDP. Again, how would we know that? Culture changes only gradually and Japan has had the same electoral institutions since 1947. Even cross-national comparisons have eluded us because Japanese

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## BURROWING THROUGH THE INTERNET: REST STOPS ON THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY

### EAST AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN STUDIES DIRECTORY AND CERRO

The end of communist rule in Eastern and Central Europe has opened up new research frontiers to be explored by social scientists. The paucity of data in communist societies had formerly led scholars to employ methodologies which often did not dovetail with those employed in the study of other areas. No longer, however, must area specialists rely on the disparate methodologies which characterized their work in the communist period; the study of these post-communist societies has been drawn, at least methodologically, into the mainstream.

One of the great advances in this respect is the renaissance of survey work. Mark Franklin (Universities of Houston and Strathclyde), Susan Scarrow (Harvard University and University of Houston), and Mark Shephard (University of Houston) have compiled a directory of some of the new survey work done in Eastern and Central Europe. The 28 surveys listed in the directory cover a wide range of subjects, from decommunization and democratization to political culture. Each entry in the directory contains its title, principle and associate investigators, countries covered, year(s), unit(s) of analysis, level of analysis, number of question units, survey language, when the survey will be available in the public domain, and the archive name. The directory is available, free of charge to anyone with access to the internet, through the Central European Regional Research Organization (CERRO). The following is a brief description of the work of CERRO, and the manner in which you can download this, or any other publication from the CERRO archive.

CERRO is a joint initiative of the University of Economics and Business Administration, Vienna, Austria, the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, CSFR, and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. It is the intention of CERRO to stimulate and support regional research in and about the newly re-emerging region of "Central Europe," and to enhance contacts and discussion between researchers and scholars interested in these areas. CERRO includes a broad range of related disciplines: regional science, economic geography regional and urban planning, environmental economics, regional sociology, policy analysis, regional political economy and institutions, etc.

The unique situation and the many problems generated by the fall of the Iron Curtain stimulate opportunities for interdisciplinary and international discussion, particularly new development options for Central Europe. It is the intention of CERRO to provide a forum for this cooperation and discussion, and to remain open to the possibility of additional activities as member interests dictate.

As its first activity CERRO is currently in the process of establishing an electronic archive and discussion forum. These instruments will provide free, worldwide access to information collected by CERRO; it also offers a forum for colleagues from all over the world to share their knowledge and views with other participants in the electronic network.

If you have access to electronic mail you can participate in the CERRO discussion forum. It provides cost-free opportunities for worldwide discussion of topics related to regional development in Central Europe. Any mail sent to the discussion list is distributed to all registered participants. CERRO provides this service for free, and in the future will use its discussion list also for announcement of conferences or publications.

To become a member of the discussion forum, send an e-mail message containing just the string 'SUBSCRIBE CERRO-L <your\_full\_name>' to [LISTSERV@AEARN](mailto:LISTSERV@AEARN) (on bitnet) or [LISTSERV@AEARN.EDVZ.UNIVIE.AC.AT](mailto:LISTSERV@AEARN.EDVZ.UNIVIE.AC.AT) (on internet). Your electronic mail address will then be added to the list of CERRO forum members. All discussion on the CERRO discussion list will be delivered automatically to your electronic mailbox.

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To discuss points of interest with other CERRO members, to ask questions, to raise new topics, to express your views, to announce important events, etc. simply send electronic mail to *cerro-1@AEARN* (on bitnet) or *cerro-1@AEARN.EDVZ.UNIVIE.AC.AT* (on internet). Your mail will automatically be distributed to all the registered recipients.

Non-subscribers may also access the CERRO archive through Gopher. To access your own university's Gopher server which will provide you with links to all the Gophers in the world, contact your computer center. Gopher is a system of nested menus leading to text files which you can download. Either point your Gopher client to *iir.wu-wien.ac.at* and select 'CERRO...', or look for the directory of European Gophers (the easiest way to do this is to go through the University of Minnesota Gopher—the mother of all Gopher servers), select 'Austria,' then 'University of Economics, Vienna,' then 'Netzdienste...', and then 'CERRO:.'. You will be presented with a menu of files which you can download to your own computer, including the East and Central European Studies Directory. If you are having trouble locating the CERRO Gopher, your own Gopher server should have a search procedure (usually labeled 'Jughead,' or 'Veronica'); simply search on the term 'CERRO'. The CERRO Gopher offers all material that is in the archive plus links to other related Gophers and internet services.

The information in the CERRO electronic archive can also be accessed from any computer in the world with access to the internet via anonymous ftp ('file transfer protocol'—if you

are not familiar with ftp, ask your computer center). Open connection to *ftp.wu-wien.ac.at* and login as user 'anonymous.' Use any identification as password. Change to directory */pub/cerro* where you will find detailed descriptions and further subdirectories. Read the descriptions, and download any information you want.

The easiest way of contributing to the archive is by sending your paper, project description, research findings, etc. via electronic mail to *cerro@nestroy.wu-wien.ac.at*. Please send plain ASCII files; the CERRO archive stores only text. CERRO will store your contribution in the archive and thus makes it available worldwide. Alternatively you can mail us a diskette (MS-DOS or Macintosh), and we will upload your information.

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**CERRO** (continued from page 6)

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**I**an Lustick (University of Pennsylvania) has graciously accepted the role of Program Chair for the 1995 American Political Science Convention in Chicago. All scholars interested in participating in the Section's activities at the Convention should contact him at:

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**The 1995 Convention of the American Political Science Association**

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### **SMALL EUROPEAN STATES AND INSTITUTION-BUILDING** **THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA'S OCTOBER SYMPOSIUM**

**P**articipants: Jan Andersson (Finland), Ellen Comisso (University of California, San Diego), Zoltan Csefalvy (Hungary), John Freeman (University of Minnesota), Robert Holzmann (Austria), Randall W. Kindley (University of Minnesota), Helmut Konrad (Austria), Mare Kukk (Estonia), Paulette Kurzer (Babson College), Arpad Lazar (Tufts University), Csaba Mako (Hungary), Ron Rogowski (University of California, Los Angeles), Pekka Sutela (Finland), Niels Thygesen (Denmark), Gunther Tichy (Austria), Franz Traxler (Austria), Juhana Vartianien (Finland), Michael Wallerstein (University of California, Los Angeles), Eric Weitz (St. Olaf), Georg Winckler (University of Vienna).

The popularity of the neo-corporatist paradigm of the late 1970s, and Peter Katzenstein's work in the mid-1980s pushed Europe's smaller states into the limelight. Today's breathtaking changes have brought a resurgence in interest in these countries. This past October 29-30, the Center for Austrian Studies, Center for European Studies, and Institute of International Studies at the University of Minnesota cosponsored a symposium entitled, "The End of the Cold War and Small European States: European Re-integration and Institution Building in Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, and Hungary." It marked the beginning of a general small European states project.

Why the renewed interest in small states? (Note, for instance, Peter Katzenstein's recent call for a CES Research Planning Group in *European Studies Newsletter*, Vol. XXII, No. 6). Rapid internationalization and the USSR's collapse have forced us to find new ways of thinking about European affairs. As part of the EU process or not, reintegration is occurring at breakneck speed. Europe is awash in a flow of ideas, goods, people, and capital. However, the potential for conflict has also greatly increased. Abrupt change has backed the EU onto a weak/broad/fast path, implying softer central supranational institutions. The ball, so to speak, is back in the court of domestic and interstate institutional adjustment in a fluid and highly in-

ternationalized environment.

The second obvious fact is that the national units being added to this milieu, and the majority of the existing ones, are small not large. Germany — the European hegemon — is the single example of consolidation. Even excluding Turkey and Russia from Europe, another 23 sovereign states exist besides "the Twelve." All but Poland, Belarus, and the Ukraine are small. Inside an EU dominated politically by large states, seven have populations of less than 15 million. The trend promises to continue as separatist movements gain momentum under an EU umbrella. What is 'new' in the New Europe is inextricably bound to the politics of small state, and state-like units.

Our symposium was meant to gather a mix of European and American scholars to address the reaction of small state political-economic institutions to sweeping change. I came away with two general observations. First, most presenters were loath to articulate an emergent institutional pattern among small European states. Highly specific institutional prescriptions were avoided in the papers and the session discussions, but taken up, sometimes heatedly, in informal talks among participants.

Secondly, and accounting for this reticence, small states' conditions of adjustment have become exceedingly complex. Gone is the post-

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war certainty of steady demand and constant structures. While common imperatives force institutional change, existing conditions, domestic endowments and politics mark the patterns that can form. Unidimensional and unidirectional explanations are likely to be faulty. 'Flexible adjustment' in the present and future will mean not some singular key to success, but the adoption (ideally) of an internally consistent package of adjustment instruments housed under an institutional arrangement that reflects a loss of power of traditional interests, and, in what may be a common characteristic, a relatively more active governmental elite.

One set of symposia dealt with strategies of monetary integration. In today's highly internationalized currency markets, small states are constantly engaged in a tradeoff between flexibility and credibility. The one allows devaluation to maintain competitiveness; the other lowers risk premiums in interest rates. Gunther Tichy' advocated a monetary regime that lies somewhere between fixed and floating rates ("Monetary Integration: Theoretical Expectations, Austrian Experience, and the Prospects for Greater Europe"). In the 'target zone regime' (TZR), governments would credibly maintain the rate of exchange within a pre-defined ceiling and floor. Arbitrageurs would know the increased likelihood of intervention as the limits are reached, and so smoother, more stable, market-friendly adjustment would occur.

Niels Thygesen and Pekka Sutela speaking respectively to the Danish ("Denmark in the European Integration Process") and Finnish ("The Reluctant Enthusiast: Finland and the European Monetary Union") experiences showed just how the tension between credibility and flexibility plays out, and how politics tips the choice. The cases were perfectly contrasting. Finland, which had been traditionally reluctant on EMU participation (i.e., giving over rate sovereignty), eventually acquired a 'joiner' policy, but was pushed aside in the shake-up of 1993. Denmark, which traditionally has been an EMU stalwart, reluctantly opted out (recall the Maastricht vote), but has remained — with reservations — close to the EMU. Both participants stressed the fact that EMU adherence came with a package of potentially beneficial aspects of membership. Economic structure, and domestic political coalitions also figure prominently as explanations for the differences between Finland and Denmark. However, there

was a common theme. The lack of policy consistency really was a reflection of the central concern of small state policy makers: the credibility-flexibility tradeoff, and the touchiness of the sovereignty issue. As other means of adjusting the fundamentals fade, small states are likely to be trapped in this policy eddy. A stronger state, more market-oriented governments, and weaker traditional interests may make the choice easier, but concerns about distribution and democracy quickly emerge. The contrast between the role played by a decisive Parliament in Denmark's 1982 course change, and Finland's inability to adopt a stronger currency policy was an example.

Fundamentals of a monetary policy are essentially those factors of an economy that can account for competitiveness. Neo-corporatist institutions have typically garnered kudos for keeping labor costs, prices, and investment at appropriate levels through bargains struck among producer groups and the state. Our participants were less than sanguine about an unchanged future for these arrangements or their transfer to the newly emerging small states. In an elegant comparison, Franz Traxler demonstrated that only Austria maintains the essential pre-conditions of consensus and organization ("Neo-Corporatism and Institution-Building in Small Countries of Eastern and Western Europe"). They have been lost in Sweden, and simply do not exist in Hungary and Bulgaria. Even in the Austrian case, as he has argued elsewhere, internationalization has forced a transition to supply-side corporatism. Juhana Vartiainen, speaking to change in Nordic corporatism, pursued a similar transition theme ("Can Nordic Social Corporatism Survive? Challenges in the Labour Market"). Change in technology, and work dynamics may indeed lead to more decentralization, yet not to the individualization of work. Collective forms of regulation, at admittedly more disaggregated levels, will be needed all the more since technology makes it more difficult to identify unique contributions to production. Unions will remain. It will just be more difficult for the state to regulate the economy. These presentations suggested that the fading of corporatist control has a two-sided effect on the monetary sovereignty issue. The fundamentals may be more difficult to control, hence exacerbating the credibility-flexibility tradeoff. On the other hand, if an anti-adjust-

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**KINDLEY** (continued from page 8)

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## REPORT ON ANN ARBOR MEETING ON ARCHIVED DATA SETS FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICS, ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN, DECEMBER 3-5, 1993

**P**articipants: Duane Alwin (University of Michigan), Barry Ames (Washington University, Saint Louis), Ronald Inglehart (University of Michigan), Thomas Lancaster (Emory University), David Laitin (University of Chicago), Karl Dieter Opp (University of Leipzig), Richard Rockwell (University of Michigan; Director, Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research), Ronald Rogowski (University of California, Los Angeles), Steven J. Rosenstone (University of Michigan; Director, American National Election Study), Veron Ruttan (University of Minnesota), W. Phillips Shively (University of Minnesota), Kaare Ström (University of California, San Diego), and Ekkart Zimmermann (University of Dresden).

The members of the conference considered unmet data needs in the comparative study of politics, and whether archived data sets could help meet those needs. We concluded that while the problems addressed in comparative politics vary greatly from one place or period to another in response to changing situations, there is a broad core of macro-level political, politico-economic, and social variables that figure repeatedly in comparative studies. These typically operate as *independent* variables in analysis, in contrast to the more changeable *dependent* variables, which respond more to the flow of political and social problems—economic modernization, democratization, the rise of ethnic conflicts, global environmental change, and so on. Examples of the sort of independent, macro-level variables we refer to here would be: electoral laws, the degree of independence of central banks, the preferences of major parties and interests (coded for comparative analysis), the linguistic structure of societies, and the trade-exposure of states.

Variables such as those mentioned above are used repeatedly by many investigators, yet they are rarely standardized, they are usually difficult to fit to other data sets, and, frankly, they are not always measured well. Since they are not systematically gathered and archived, many wheels have to be reinvented over and over, usually along subtly different lines each time. Further, since these variables are difficult to measure, and since investigators' attention is often focused more on the dependent measures that first drew them to a problem, the core inde-

pendent variables are often measured casually, and not as well as they might be.

Gathering these variables systematically, and making sure that they link up well with other data (such as surveys) is an often prohibitively difficult enterprise for individuals. These data constitute a public good which often fails to be produced under our current system of organization and incentives.

Accordingly, the participants at the meeting agreed to propose an accountable organizational structure to monitor and to help maintain a core set of macro-level data for the comparative study of politics which would be available to all scholars. We would, at least in intent, try to cover the period from 1920 to the present, and would assemble all data on a standardized set of rather finely-divided geographic districts; thus comparative boundaries could be constructed for all variables in the set.

There will be a tripartite organization for the archive, based on the disciplines of political science, economics, and sociology. Accountability would be provided on a structure modeled loosely on the American National Election Study (NES): an independent board, drawn from the international community of scholars, with continually changing personnel that would control the definition and maintenance of the core data set. Archiving and staff support would be provided by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).

This may sound like a dry operation, but actually the mood of the meeting was one of

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# DATA BASES, ARCHIVES, AND WORKS-IN-PROGRESS

## DATA ON THE 1992 CANADIAN REFERENDUM AND 1993 FEDERAL ELECTIONS

The October 1993 Canadian federal election returned the Liberal Party to power with a comfortable margin of victory; they took 177 seats in the 295-seat Parliament. However, the election was a remarkable one on three counts. First, never before has a government political party been so thoroughly rejected by the voting public. The Progressive Conservatives took office with 170 seats following the 1988 federal election; they held just two seats following the 1993 vote. So decisive was their defeat that the Progressive Conservatives, one of the two major parties which dominated the electoral life of the country since the middle of the Nineteenth Century, lost status as an officially recognized party in the House of Commons. (The election was also unkind to the New Democrats, the long-standing party of the left; it too fell below the twelve-seat minimum, and lost official status as a party.)

Second, in Quebec, voters were presented with the opportunity to vote for a federal political party whose central platform is to work for Quebec independence. Quebec voters seized the moment with such enthusiasm that the independent Bloc Quebecois, with 54 seats, now forms the Official Opposition in the House of Commons. Third, voters in Western Canada also supported a new federal political party, and did so in huge numbers. Before the 1993 election, the populist Reform Party held just one seat in Parliament; after the election, they held 52.

Efforts to interpret what the election signifies are well under way though the outstanding questions remain more interesting and numerous than the answers offered so far. Was the election a continuation of the dynamics of the 1992 Constitutional Referendum in which the public rejected the advice coming from elites? Does the outcome reflect the grinding persistence of regional forces, and the fundamental difficulties Canadian federal parties face in trying to reconcile competing visions of the country? Does the election signal a new plateau for the Quebec independence movement?

The 1992 Referendum/1993 Canadian Election Study team (Richard Johnston, University of British Columbia; Andre Blais, University of Montreal; Henry Brady, University of California, Berkeley; Elisabeth Gidengil, MacGill University; and Neil Nevitte, University of Calgary) is using a three-wave survey strategy, similar to the design used in the study of the 1988 Canadian federal election (see Johnston, et. al., *Letting the People Decide: Dynamics of a Canadian Election*, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992) to explore the dynamics of the campaign, and voter reasoning.

Preliminary analysis of the campaign wave of the study indicates that the campaign mattered. The campaign began as a close two-way race between the Progressive Conservatives and the Liberals, but Progressive Conservative support dropped sharply about ten days into the 47-day campaign. By the ten-day mark, all opposition parties had publicized relatively detailed platforms while the Progressive Conservatives remained aloof about their plans to cut the deficit. Most damaging, it seems, was Prime Min-

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## TRENDS IN MASS BEHAVIOR IN EAST EUROPEAN SOCIETIES BETWEEN STATE AND MARKET

The transformation of the political and economic institutions in Central and Eastern Europe can only succeed if it is matched by changes in the behavior and in the minds of the people who live there. Hence the Centre for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP) at the University of Strathclyde, in collaboration with Central and Eastern European research institutes, has developed a special multinational questionnaire to collect fresh empirical data about how people are responding to changes in the basic institutions of their societies.

The CSPP Programme has developed this unique data set of nationwide sample surveys of individual and household economic and political behavior, and attitudes towards changes in macro-structures.

### Country Coverage

To date 35 surveys have been completed or authorized in the following countries: Austria (2), Belarus (2), Bulgaria (4), Croatia (2), Czech Republic (4), Estonia (2), Germany (1), Hungary (5), Latvia (2), Lithuania (3), Poland (4), Romania (3), Russia (3), Slovak Republic (4), Slovenia (3), Ukraine (2). Additional surveys are in the planning stage with special reference to labor markets and social protection.

### Common Core of Questions

The surveys contain a common core of ques-

tions concerning economic behavior, economic predispositions and expectations, political evaluations, and a host of socio-demographic characteristics. In addition, there are measures of phenomena specially relevant to societies in transition from state to market: time spent queuing, production of food for consumption by the household, individual and household involvement in multiple economies, etc.

### Samples

Each sample is a stratified nationwide sample representative of all adults over the age of eighteen, with normally more than a thousand respondents. The fieldwork was carried out by established research institutes within each country. The data bases are such that each national

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## New Data Set

To facilitate analysis of the linkages between individual-level and national-level variables, Ronald Inglehart (University of Michigan) is constructing a data set which will combine the following elements:

(1) approximately 400 variables reflecting the values and attitudes of individuals, as measured in representative national samples interviewed in the 1990-1991 World Values survey; these will be aggregated to the national level;

(2) approximately 400 variables from the World Bank's World Development Indicators data set; and

(3) political and institutional variables coded at the national level, such as coding of civil liberties, or party factionalization.

Professor Inglehart invites members of the Organized Section, and indeed all scholars, to suggest variables in the third (i.e., political and institutional) category which they would like to have added to this data set. For each variable,

please indicate a source where the relevant national-level codings may be obtained. The 1990-1991 World Values survey includes 43 countries, covering seventy percent of the world's population. A similar survey is planned for 1995.

Please direct all inquiries and suggestions to:

Professor Ronald Inglehart  
Institute for Social Research 3067  
University of Michigan  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1248  
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## THE GREENING OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH IN CHINA CHOCOLATES, CHARLATANS, AND A CHINAMAN'S CHANCE

**W**ith the inauguration of China Gallup Ltd. in Beijing in September, 1993, and the publication in October of four popularity polls of the late Chairman Mao, survey research in China has passed an important landmark in its history. It is still the case that no popularity poll on living political leaders can be published, and China Gallup is licensed to conduct only market research. Indeed, its first poll on chocolates reveals the range of popular as well as regime tastes. Nevertheless, the two events also mark the first foreign pollster in the People's Republic, the first published popularity poll of a named political leader, and the revival of survey research in China since the suppression of the Democracy Movement in June, 1989. In the following review, we will summarize Dong Li's study of 329 polls published between 1979-1992, supplemented by James Tong's discussions in his recent conference with Beijing's leading survey researchers in October, 1993.

For its first three decades, it was an inherent part of socialist realism that *vox populi* was *vox Party*, broadcast in the collective loudspeakers. It was only in December 1978 that the first opinion poll was published, taking advantage of the first political thaw in the post-Mao period. Respondents were asked a simple ten-item questionnaire about the Communist rule and civil rights. Even in the Beijing Spring, the early birds were rare, and only 9 other opinion surveys were published from 1978-1982. A blooming and contending period followed, and no less than 249 polls were published from 1983-1989, until the guns of Tiananmen muffled opinion polling. Only 57 opinion surveys were published from the first half of 1989 to 1992. However, we have witnessed a resurgence of opinion polling in recent months.

Most of these polls share the characteristics of the first-generation opinion surveys, similar to American polling in the 1930s and 1940s, when the non-probability straw polls and quota sampling were predominant. Among Li's sample of 329 polls, only around a third define their population explicitly, close to 30% do not provide information on when the polls were conducted, over 80% fail to provide demographic characteristics of the sample, over half do not report their sampling procedures, and close to two-thirds do not report their response rates. Only a fourth use various forms and combinations of probability sampling. The modal poll still employs different types of non-probability sampling.

Both the research design and statistics for most polls are rather primitive. Close to two-thirds are limited to univariate analysis without any independent variable, 9% use bivariate analysis with one independent variable, while less than 20% use multivariate analysis. The choice of statistics often corresponds to the type of research design. Around 87% use only descriptive statistics, mostly frequencies and means, with some also using modes, medians, and cross-tabulations. 7.7% use descriptive statistics as well as some measures of associations (chi-square, gamma, tau-B, Pearson's *r*, etc.), while only 3.6% use parametric statistics (simple and multiple regressions, log-linear, simultaneous equation models, factor analysis). The great majority of the polls does not report confidence intervals of significance test statistics.

As to be expected, data manipulation and validation procedures are rare or non-existent. There is hardly any attempt to construct indices from questionnaire items, or use the more common Thurstone, Likert, and Guttman scales. We have not found much effort devoted to questions of reliability of measurement. Inter-item and item-test correlations like the coefficient of stability, parallel forms, and omnibus internal consistency measures are almost never reported, nor have we seen the use of split half and variance component procedures to determine item reliability. There is equal inattention to questions of validity, as evidenced by the absence of the more common correlation coefficient.

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James Tong is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles.

**Steven J. Rosenstone** is Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan and the Principle Investigator of the American National Election Studies at the University's Institute for Social Research.

## THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

**M**ore than two decades ago, Stein Rokkan argued for coordinated, cross-national research to explore, in ways that are not possible "through secondary analysis of independently conducted surveys, the structural contexts of the individuals' reactions to politics." Although multi-national data collections that enhance the comparative study of public opinion have been carried out, Rokkan's plea for research that would illuminate how electoral institutions constrain and condition the beliefs and behaviors of citizens has gone unheeded.

The American National Election Studies (NES) in collaboration with the International Committee for Research into Elections and Representative Democracy (ICORE) has taken the first steps to heed Rokkan's call by mounting a collaborative program of research among the world's national election studies. The long-term agenda includes an interest in the comparative study of electoral institutions (parliamentarism versus presidentialism, electoral laws, and political parties); a concern with how different electoral systems cope with potentially divisive issues (such as those stemming from racial and ethnic differences, from global environmental change, and from economic displacement); and a concern with the nature of ties between citizens and their representatives.

In collaboration with colleagues in the U.S. and abroad, we have begun to elaborate an agenda, study design, and instrumentation that will permit the coordinated, international, comparative study of electoral systems in 1996 and beyond. Under the auspices of ICORE, two international conferences will be convened to bring together scholars of electoral research from the world's democracies. The first gathering will occur in Berlin in August 1994, prior to the opening of the International Political Science Association meetings. The second conference will

be held in Ann Arbor in January 1995 when a planning committee will begin to specify the details of the study design, the content of the questionnaire, and the macro-level data that need to be gathered in each polity.

Social scientists within each polity will be responsible for securing funding and managing the implementation of their country's national election survey. We envision a portion of each nation's election study conducted in 1996 and beyond will be devoted to instrumentation that will grow out of this collaboration. We anticipate that international teams of social scientists will collaborate to collect macro-data on the attributes of the social, political, and institutional settings in which citizens find themselves.

NES welcomes colleagues who are interested in contributing to this collaboration to contact us. We look forward to involving a broad set of social scientists in the planning process.

For more information about the National Election Studies or about the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, please write:

The American National Election Studies  
Center for Political Studies  
Institute for Social Research, Room 4026  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1248  
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**Li and Tong** (continued from page 13)

clients between the test and criterion scores such as the product-moment, the rank-order family, and biserial measures. There are the usual unconfirmed reports that some unscrupulous investigators pocketed the research fee and cooked up the data in their warehouses, or did the survey in Beijing but claimed that it was a nationwide sample, or cut and paste old look-alike surveys from their inventories and passed these

off as results of new commissioned research.

Several trends portend the increasing importance and sophistication of public opinion research in China. First, Chinese authorities, both party and government, and at different administrative levels, have come to appreciate opinion polls as an important part of statecraft. Aside from the four polls on Mao's popularity referred

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# LITERATURE REVIEWS, BOOK AND ARTICLE NOTICES

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### THE URUGUAY ROUND, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND REGIONALIZATION OF TRADE

Anyone watching the final days of the Uruguay Round negotiations of GATT through the eyes of the British media could be forgiven for thinking that GATT had been reduced to an EU-US bilateral negotiation. What were the other hundred-plus countries doing in Geneva while the real action took place in Brussels — sampling fondue? A neutral observer in Paris could be forgiven for thinking that the perfidious Americans had quite deliberately set out to take a shot at the three things nearest to the hearts of the French — French food, the French language, and that curiously ill-defined animal, the French lifestyle.

What should academic trade theorists be saying to help our confused observer? They could try to explain the effects of regional trade blocs; are they creating islands of xenophobia with non-club members left with “‘Most-Favored Nation’ treatment, which in reality is the least favored,” rather than helping efforts to cement liberalization (David Greenaway and R. C. Hine, “Trade Policy and Protection in the European Community,” *Open Economies Review*, 4, 1993: 433-56)? What are the economic effects of greater trade within regional blocs? On the other hand, could they simply try to explain why the French government denounces Jurassic Park as the malignant effect of Hollywood on cherished cultural values while the French people flock to see the movie?

This review is more modest in scope; quite simply I provide a small sampling of some recent thinking on the regionalization of trade — is it happening, and if so, is it a good or a bad thing for the world economy? In the same vein, I offer a few remarks on the likely effects of intra-EU trade.

If you listen to talk about regional trade blocs for long enough, you can end up pretty bewildered because the subject manages to evoke extreme alarmism (‘a world trade war is around

the corner’), and smug optimism (‘more integration at the regional level means more trade, and more trade means more growth’). The European Union has been at the game of regional integration for longer than the North Americans, and so it is possible to measure the gains from increased (enlarged) trade. IMF studies suggest that for France and Germany greater intra-EU trade has benefited labor and capital productivity, and hence growth (David T. Coe and Reza Moghadam, “Capital and Trade as Engines of Growth in France: An Application of Johansen’s Cointegration Methodology,” *IMF Staff Papers*, 40: 3: September, 1993: 542-66; David T. Coe and Thomas Krueger, “Why Is Unemployment so High at Full Capacity? The Resistance of Unemployment, the Natural Rate, and Potential Output in the Federal Republic of Germany,” *IMF Working Papers* 90/101, 1990; Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, *Innovation and Growth by the Global Economy*, Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1991; Luis Rivera-Batiz and Paul Romer, “Economic Integrating and Endogenous Growth,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 16, 1991: 165-93).

How has this occurred? First, successive expansions of the EU have led to higher intra-EU trade per capita (i.e., as a percentage of EU

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**Bailey** (continued from page 15)

output). Second, the Single Market (or 1992) program is breaking down remaining non-tariff barriers within the EU (technical standards, transport charges, public procurement policies, etc.). For industries characterized by higher levels of imperfect competition within the EU — especially skill-intensive industries such as specialty engineering — there are opportunities for increased specialization within a larger market, and possibly increasing returns to scale in production, and research and development.

However, the studies show that there are very strict limits to the growth effects from increased intra-EU trade. At the current size, and once the 1992 program is completed, the growth effects tail off quite rapidly. The lesson is that the EU needs to grow in size if it is to keep up the benefits of greater intra-area trade. Put another way, the benefits of regionalization, and particularly regional market-opening policies can tail off quite rapidly. Of course, the NAFTA should have longer-lived effects because of the time scale for the growth of the Mexican middle class and supplying them with consumer goods is inevitably longer.

Two conclusions can be drawn from modeling the EU trade-growth relationship. First, if the EU is to sustain a higher trade-growth elasticity, it needs to bring the EFTA countries on board — something that is likely to happen for all except Switzerland next year. The EFTA countries need the EU even more, because as small, open economies they stand to suffer badly from the improved intra-EU competitiveness of EU firms. The second conclusion is slightly

more speculative, but of greater long-term significance. Regional trade blocs need each other precisely because there is a diminishing potential for increased intra-bloc trade (Jan Haaland, "Welfare Effects of '1992: A General Equilibrium Assessment for EC and EFTA Countries," *Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper*, No. 828, July 1993). In other words, the number of extra Mexicans likely to see Jurassic Park II at the newly-built multiplex is limited — ultimately, Hollywood needs the French.

Another way of approaching this question of trade blocs is to ask why, if regionalization means the end of inter-regional trade, the recent GATT Round matters? If the issue is the existence of blocs themselves, then GATT is not the right forum, and the efforts to open inter-regional trade are wasted. The answer is that regional blocs do not necessarily reduce trade vis-à-vis the rest of the world, nor do they pose an inevitable threat to the integration of the world economy (David Henderson, "The EC, the US, and Others in a Changing World Economy," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108:5, September 1993: 537-52; Greenaway and Hine, 1993).

How quickly and how widely dispersed will the costs of adjustment be felt? Will the commission be able to withstand the pressures of industry-groups cum Euro-lobbies? Will 'fair-trade' measures of outsiders (particularly the 301 provision of the US) provoke European interests to pressure for retaliation? Finally, what will be the effects of the Uruguay Round?

**Li and Tong** (continued from page 14)

to earlier, Chinese authorities have also published polls showing widespread support for Deng's reform policies, popular resentment against the British position on Hong Kong, employees' satisfaction with working conditions, and a public evaluation of municipal services at the city of Tianjin. Several multinational consumer product or marketing firms have handed out lucrative contracts to gauge consumer preferences on soft drinks and candy bars in the vast emerging Chinese market. Where academia failed, market forces are introducing product differentiation, sorting out the professionals from the charlatans. Finally, a decade of normalization has built the infrastructure for

scientific and education exchange between China and the outside world. Several international organizations, U. S. federal agencies, private foundations, and major universities have funding programs that support travel, conference, and collaborative projects between China and the U. S. At the same time, the first generation of Chinese graduates are getting Ph.Ds in major U. S. schools, awarded NSF research grants, and landing job offers from several top ten social science departments, bringing with them both rigorous social science training and institutional ties to and from China's research establishment. We welcome a fuller blossoming of survey research in China.



**ROBERT H. BATES, V. Y. MUDIMBE, AND JEAN O'BARR. *AFRICA AND THE DISCIPLINES: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF RESEARCH IN AFRICA TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES*. CHICAGO: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 1993. \$24.95/\$9.95.**

The editors of *Africa and the Disciplines* undertake the laudable task of demonstrating how the study of Africa has shaped the university and its disciplines. With contributions from prominent Africanists representing three social sciences (anthropology, economics, and political science), and four humanities (philosophy, history, art history, and literature), the editors assemble a volume of essays that highlights the past contributions and the future possibilities of African studies.

In their introduction, the editors indicate that there are two audiences for the volume: the administrators who may be in the position of considering whether to expand an African Studies program, and Africanists themselves. For the former, each essay presents arguments that the study of Africa contributed to the advancement of the discipline, and will continue to do so in the future. For the latter, the volume provides an overview of the work of their Africanist colleagues in other disciplines that may parallel or complement their own.

Richard Sklar, representing political science, acknowledges significant innovations by political scientists who are also Africanists. However, he is also intent on playing the role of devil's advocate: "I cannot think of a widely recognized problem or theory, of concern to political scientists generally, that requires African area expertise to either explore scientifically or explain to students."

Sklar suggests that Africanists can contribute to the discipline by addressing Africa's intriguing and potentially agenda-setting political questions through a combination of universalistic and culturally relativistic methodologies. Rather than rationalizing deviations from presumed universal norms, researchers should explain them by incorporating an understanding of African thought and values. Sklar suggests that Africanists enjoy a comparative advantage in the quest to unite these methodologies, claiming that the relativist-universalist dialogue among Africanists in political science is generally constructive, rather than antagonistic.

Although Sklar makes a compelling argument for a potential role of Africanists in the field of political science, he goes too far in dis-

counting the general applicability of African specialization. The work of political scientists such as Bates and Crawford Young demonstrates that Africanists can contribute valuable and universal insights on widely relevant issues such as the political economy of development and ethnicity. Nonetheless, Sklar's most valuable insight is that the combination of relativistic and universalistic methodologies holds much promise for Africanist political scientists.

Paul Collier calls Africa a "gold mine" to economics, given its wealth of similar countries and drastically different economic histories — both in terms of policy and performance. He concedes that contributions from Africanists have lagged behind those from scholars focusing on other regions (primarily due to data limitations), but the current availability of more reliable data will allow African research to realize its potential.

In the sub-field of macroeconomics Collier emphasizes how African research has augmented predominant general theories. In microeconomics, Africa has been central to the development of the new economics of household decisions, and to demonstrating the importance of incorporating gender distinction into analysis. In addition, Collier suggests that investigation of the CFA Franc zone will be a principle research task for the 1990s, especially given European attempts at monetary union. Of particular interest to political scientists, Collier cites the African liberalization literature as being on the leading edge of political economy. Collier demonstrates that Africa provides invaluable data for testing and refining prevailing theories as well as inspiring new ideas in economics.

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**BARRY EICHENGREEN AND CHARLES WYPLOSZ. "THE UNSTABLE EMS,"**  
**BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. 1993: No. 1: PP. 51-143.**

The collapse of the European Monetary System in September 1992 quickly put a damper on the post-Maastricht Euro-phoria. To the pessimists, this crisis reflected the fallibility of Europe's goal of monetary union; to the optimists, it represented only a temporary, albeit serious, setback on the road towards European integration. In "The Unstable EMS," Eichengreen and Wyplosz approach this debate head-on, by empirically testing different economic models in an attempt to explain the cause of the currency crisis. Based on their results, they make bold policy recommendations which they believe will safeguard the future of the EMU. In addition to this article's historical overview and thorough economic analysis, their controversial conclusions and policy recommendations beg the attention of any political economist interested in the future of the European Union.

Whereas most political economists have focused on the role that obstinate German monetary policy played in creating instability for other European currencies, the authors criticize not a single monetary shock, but the incompatible policies contained in the Maastricht Treaty. Specifically, they argue that self-fulfilling speculative attacks triggered the crisis, and that the current outline for the EMU contains policies too inflexible to manage such speculative threats. The combination of full capital mobility, fixed exchange rates, as well as national policy autonomy created an environment for a crisis.

The collapse of the EMS ended the fourteen years of relative exchange rate stability, and consequently created a serious setback for the creation of the EMU. Stable currency is just one of the main criteria for any state's entry into the union. The authors cite the rigidity of all these controls as a part of the prescription for a speculative attack. If a country is forced to devalue and leave the EMS, it can no longer fulfill the requirements to reenter the EMS, and, as a result, no longer has an incentive to follow the other policies.

Eichengreen and Wyplosz begin their analysis by summarizing the history of increasing rigidity in the EMS. Initiated in 1979, the EMS realigned currencies eleven times before 1987. After this year, however, a no-realignment policy was adopted. In addition to relatively frozen exchange rates, capital controls protecting central banks from speculative attacks were eliminated after 1990. Add to this the auto-

my of memberstate policy, the authors argue, and the result is an unviable system.

One of the strengths of this paper is the ease with which the authors shift from empirical evidence to economic theory. The authors consider four economic models to provide plausible explanations for the exchange rate collapse in the fall of 1992: 1) overt competitiveness problems in high-inflation countries, 2) hidden competitiveness problems caused by German reunification, 3) anticipated competitiveness problems resulting from predicted backlash to the Maastricht Treaty, and 4) self-fulfilling speculative crisis. Though they believe that all four explanations find support in some countries, only the fourth explanation captures the events triggering the crisis on a European level.

The authors argue that the crisis was provoked by speculative attacks which, regardless of expected or future outlooks, can be self-fulfilling. Market participants anticipate that if they attack the market, policy will become more expansionary. Hence the attack becomes self-fulfilling and actually creates a new equilibrium.

To tease out more empirical evidence supporting the link between the theory and praxis, the authors include a section which presents the results of their survey of foreign exchange traders. This section buffers the logic of their argument and complements the presentation of the economic models. The most intriguing aspect of this article, and also the most criticized in the "Comments and Discussion" portion of this

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Sally Falk Moore, in her chapter on anthropology, points out that Africa has always played a "central role" in the field, both as a source of data, and as the material from which anthropologists defined their methodological agendas. She divides the history of the discipline into three periods, each bearing the marks of Africanists. Moore concludes that "anthropology may be poised for yet another phase of theoretical and methodological revision," which, she argues, Africanists will play an integral role in defining. Non-anthropologists should appreciate Moore's essay, which is supplemented by a seventeen page bibliography, for its overview of the themes and development of anthropology during the past century.

While the chapters that will be of most interest to comparativist political scientists are those pertaining to the social sciences, those pertaining to the humanities address pertinent themes as well. In particular, V. Y. Mudimbe and Kwame Anthony Appiah, in their discussion of the relationship between African and Western philosophy, address the impact of African philosophy on the philosophy of science — especially social science. Steven Feierman, in his essay on the study of African history and its relationship to world history, discusses the process of integrating "newer" work on Africa with the traditional, mainstream core of the discipline.

As one might expect of an edited volume in which the contributors were confronted with a broad and challenging question, there is a lack of continuity from chapter to chapter. The var-

ious authors interpret their task differently. Some, such as Moore, complement their discussion with a historical catalogue of the major contributions by Africanists to their field. Others, such as Sklar, press a single theme rather than provide an authoritative bibliography of Africanist work in their discipline.

The articles, however, when taken together, point to another advantage for African studies according to which Africanists can be an asset to the academic community: their potential for interdisciplinary scholarship. Except for a few paragraphs in the introduction on the influence of anthropology in particular on the other disciplines, the book's contributors and editors do not explicitly develop this theme. Yet, as is evident from the discussions by the anthropologist Moore and the philosophers Mudimbe and Appiah which invoke the same authors, from the economist Collier's discussion of African governments, and from the political scientist Sklar's insistence that "the relevant anthropological works should be mastered by political scientists," Africanists can benefit from their colleagues in other disciplines. Furthermore, especially given the tendency of Africanists to be affiliated with multi-disciplinary African Studies programs, Africanists should be well situated to realize such benefits. This volume should lead Africanists to appreciate the possibilities for interdisciplinary scholarship, just as it should lead provosts, deans, and department chairs to recognize the value of Africanists to the disciplines.

**Billera and Simon** (continued from page 17)

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paper, is their critique of full capital mobility, and subsequent policy recommendation for a tax on the purchase or sale of foreign currency. Despite an argument to the contrary offered in the Discussion, the authors understand and make evident the need for credible, stable exchange rates on the European continent.

After considering five proposals — 1) no policy reform, 2) status quo but with more realignments, 3) a Deutschmark-Franc union, 4) a two-speed EMU, 5) and flexible exchange rates — Eichengreen and Wyplosz argue that none offers a viable policy promising credible exchange rates that can survive market shocks. With the Tobin tax, the authors prescribe a meth-

od of "throwing sand in the wheels of speculation." An implicit tax on foreign exchange transactions would discourage short-term capital movements; essentially, this plan offers a small buffer between the domestic and foreign markets, enough to provide time for realignments in the wake of market shocks.

If speculative shocks are the biggest threat to stable currencies, then a curb on capital mobility as they prescribe seems the best policy. However, the disadvantages of such a policy may be felt most in countries hungry for capital, specifically the so-called "Southern tier." However, they claim that by applying the tax to all countries simultaneously, such a backlash can

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**Dylla** (continued from page 18)

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**TED ROBERT GURR WITH MONTY G. MARSHALL, BARBARA HARFF, AND JAMES R. SCARRITT. *MINORITIES AT RISK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICT*. WASHINGTON, D. C: UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, 1993. \$32.95/\$19.95.**

The enormous scope of Ted Gurr's latest undertaking, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict*, constitutes both its greatest strength and its greatest weakness. Gurr, along with contributors Monty G. Marshall, Barbara Harff, and James R. Scarritt, seeks to classify, explain, and propose solutions for communal conflicts in all regions of the world. The book offers generalizable propositions about communal strife based principally upon a statistical analysis of 233 ethnopolitical conflicts since World War II in 93 countries.

The first few chapters attempt to create order out of such a complex undertaking by laying out the basic theory, methodology, and level of analysis. They provide a framework for organizing these diverse 233 conflicts based on the nature of their communal history, principal demands, and primary source of group identification. Gurr identifies *national peoples*, among whom he distinguishes between what he calls ethnonationalists and indigenous people, and *minority peoples*, who are subdivided as ethno-classes, militant sects, and communal contenders. These subgroup classifications, as well as regional classifications form the primary level of analysis for the book.

The theoretical heart of the book lies in the explanation of when and why minorities rebel. Acknowledging the limitations of his own relative deprivation theory for conflict analysis, Gurr combines it with its traditional theoretical adversary — group mobilization theory. He incorporates two other competing theories, primordialism and instrumentalism, in order to explain ethnic identity. His theory states that ethnic demands arise when long-term grievances about status combine with specific political and economic interests that have been articulated by the group leaders. Further, ethnicity is only one of multiple identities for the individual, as the instrumentalists argue, but it cannot be picked up and discarded at will, as that theory suggests.

The result of this four-theory combination is a convincing explanation of ethnic conflict that addresses the sources of ethnic identification as well as the reasons for group mobilization. Accounts of ethnopolitical movements have tended to focus on why a group has an

interest in mobilization, and to assume that this interest translates into action. Gurr, however, demonstrates that group identity alone does not create ethnic demands. Rather, the interests and motivations of political leaders play the critical role in determining if the group mobilizes at all, and if so, what form it takes. In this sense, he borrows from collective action literature while remaining sensitive to the peculiarities of sub-national identity. Furthermore, it sensibly acknowledges that each theory's emphasis on a single explanatory variable captures only part of the complex picture of ethnicity.

A chapter by each of the contributors as well as by Gurr on specific regional findings adds some critical depth to an effort otherwise notable for its breadth. He discusses the status, demands, and prospects of minorities in the Western democracies and Japan. Although ethnic groups in this region face the least discrimination, their experiences vary according to their group-type.

Marshall addresses ethnopolitics in Eastern Europe, arguing that the status of minorities is determined by the nature of the state; therefore, given the rapid changes in the state structures in this region, we must study their emerging state systems. The pre-Cold War policy choices between Leninist national self-determination and Stalinist cultural autonomy still will have a considerable effect on the development of policy options now, according to Marshall.

Harff examines North Africa and the Middle East, where these conflicts seem most intractable. Through an analysis of six specific groups, she finds general, but not complete, support for Gurr's theory that discrimination in-

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creases grievances, and thereby adds to the potential for mobilization.

Scarritt discusses Sub-Saharan Africa, primarily through case studies of Kenya, Zambia, and Ethiopia. He finds that, unlike the other regions, communal contenders form the majority of ethnic groups. They use unstable multi-ethnic political coalitions as the principle forum in which to compete over political power and economic benefits. Because they are less primordial than other groups globally, African minorities' grievances can most easily be met with appropriate policy measures such as reforms in the party system and center-periphery power distribution.

These four regional chapters illustrate of the importance of distinguishing among types of ethnic groups; the variety of grievances, demands, and levels of mobilization underscores that policy solutions successful in one region, may have little effect elsewhere. Furthermore, some policy options may prove disastrous when applied to specific types of ethnic groups. However, although independently interesting and potentially very useful, the integration of these chapters with the theoretical portions of the rest of the book is poor. The chapters neither seem to rigorously test Gurr's theories through the case studies, nor to clearly relate their individual findings to the book's broader conclusions.

*Minorities At Risk* deserves praise for its venture into policy recommendations. Gurr devotes an entire chapter to the strategies avail-

able to governments in coping with their communal conflicts. He paints a less grim picture of the difficulties of conflict resolution than popularly imagined, and provides insights into the strengths and weaknesses of an array of approaches, devoting particular attention to the varying utility of each strategy in different regions.

Gurr does correctly predict the objections of quantitative researchers and area specialists; the nature of the subject poses formidable methodological problems and the enormous scope of the book precludes great detail. Particularly troubling is the problem of inaccurate data — as Gurr concedes, many national governments do not produce data on the politically touchy subject of ethnic divisions within their state, and estimates from regional experts are often no more than educated guesses. Given this problem of accuracy, evaluating the importance of small distinctions among the data becomes highly problematic. Furthermore, the coding often appears overly simplistic.

Nonetheless, Gurr has attempted, and largely succeeded, in creating a framework for analyzing all communal conflicts. It is an insightful and useful handbook for anyone interested in ethnic conflict in the global context. The book boldly sets out to sketch the "big picture" while providing empirical support for its generalizations. Although flawed, the work is impressive and deserves recognition as the staging point for future endeavors of this scale.

**Fuller (continued  
from page 20)**

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be avoided.

While their argument concerning the cause of the EMS collapse seems well-supported by the evidence presented, the authors avoid critiquing directly the prevailing alternative argument seen in the Comments/Discussion section. The conventional wisdom supports the notion that German refusal to lower their interest rates provoked the attack on European currencies. Indeed, two sections of their paper seem to support conventional wisdom. Though they aim to use these sections to show how the inability of the rigid system to deal with market pressures, they fail to refute the argument that high Ger-

man interest rates played the main role in causing capital flight from other currencies.

In addition to the infeasibility of these economic policies, one should also keep in mind the contribution of the lack of political commitment to the ultimate goal EMU by memberstates such as Germany and Britain. Indeed, the authors point out that the French franc and Danish krone escaped devaluation because of the selective Bundesbank which chose to support these two currencies. In addition to the incompatibility of economic policies discussed, any EMS will remain unstable without the *esprit communautaire*.

**Dylla (continued  
from page 19)**

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**SUSAN SHIRK. *THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA.* BERKELEY, CA: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS, 1993. \$48.00/\$15.00.**

In the last decade or so, an avalanche of work has been published on the Chinese economy, examining the soundness of the party's reform policies and, more often than not, prescribing additional painful measures. The overwhelming majority of this research, however, has relied on an economically-deterministic framework of analysis, assuming that the overhaul begun by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 was an inevitable consequence of an ill-fated experiment in central planning. *The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China* enters this debate from a new and provocative angle. Shirk asserts that there was nothing inevitable about Chinese reform; rather, the choices of Deng were dictated by political concerns.

Shirk's starting point is the divergence of reform outcomes in the Soviet Union and China, which can be explained by Deng and Gorbachev's respective policies. In the former case, she argues that the strategy of political reform before economic reform produced "political chaos and disintegration and a decline in living standards and growth rates." By contrast, the Chinese path of economic reform without political reform created general economic prosperity, albeit limited by continued repression. The Chinese success is all the more remarkable, considering it was achieved largely through the former central planning bureaucracy. These surprisingly flexible institutions allowed Deng to pluralize the state economic structure, and thus mobilize new interest groups supportive of reform. It is this idea, that institutions are as important (or even more important) than individuals in shaping policy in communist systems, which separates this work from the personalistic analyses of the past.

The author provides the reader with a good thematic and chronological survey of the pre-1978 economic system and Deng's subsequent reforms. While most of this section covers old ground, there are many original insights, including the notion that Deng's vaunted agricultural responsibility system was not designed by the paramount leader, but was in fact a *fait accompli* delivered from the 'liberated' countryside. Also, in an excellent structural comparison of the Soviet and Chinese systems, Shirk asserts that the key explanatory variable was the more decentralized nature of the Chinese economy, and the disruptive chaos of the Cultural Revolu-

tion.

The middle chapters explore five "contour" variables of Chinese political institutions. First, "authority relations" during the decade of reform were marked by a delegation of "discretion to the government [as opposed to Party] in economic policy-making." This decentralization provoked loud dissension within the membership of the Party, creating a "law of anticipated reactions" whereby "policies emerging from the government bureaucracy reflect[ed] the preferences of party leaders." Second, the author indicates that the "leadership incentives" of the "selectorate" (i.e., Central Committee, elders, PLA leaders, and the preeminent leader) operate under a mechanism of "reciprocal accountability," by which each must satisfy the other to remain in office. In terms of reform, the "competition among CCP leaders for the support of the selectorate biased the process toward particularistic policies and against universal ones."

Third, during periods of leadership division and competition, Shirk proposes that the Central Committee became a "bargaining arena," defined by the Allisonian notion that "where you stand is where you sit." Following the path-breaking work of Lieberthal and Oksenberg, she shows that formal administrative rank within the bureaucratic hierarchy of the State Council largely determines the terms of bargaining and authority, and guarantees self-interested conflict and contentious behavior between competing units. Fourth, the author asserts that the outcomes of these disputes is often determined by

*Please turn to page 23*

"who is enfranchised to participate in bureaucratic decision-making and what decision rules they use." The recent era has seen the Chinese bureaucracy enfranchise some sectors and groups, such as heavy industry, at expense of labor, women, and agriculture, allowing powerful provincial officials and heavy industry to wield a disproportionate influence on the path of Chinese economic reforms. In the end, decisions are made under a system of "delegation by consensus," which encourages lower levels to compromise with higher authorities. As the author demonstrates, however, "delegation by consensus" did not work well in the 1980s, remanding many conflicts to the level of the State Council for final decision.

The most provocative section of the book begins in Part 3 with a discussion of Deng's fiscal strategy of "playing to the provinces." Although the author has explored this subject in previous journal articles, the argument is for the first time placed in its appropriate historical and analytical context. Briefly, Shirk asserts that the political cornerstone of China's economic reform was fiscal decentralization to the local level, because it allowed the provincial majority in the Central Committee to become a political counterweight to the conservative center. Unfortunately, the local officials who benefited from partial reform quickly became impediments to a more thorough overhaul. As a result, crucial reform proposals designed to improve the efficiency and self-regulation of the economy were thwarted or weakened. Even when uncontrolled local investment produced

politically volatile periods of overheating and inflation, conservative leaders were unable to reign in the powerful provincial and municipal interests.

Over the next four chapters, the author follows this center-local struggle through key periods of the reform era. Shirk does an excellent job of disentangling the many conflicting interests, especially those of the "particularistic" sectors chosen to gain the most from fund-sharing bargains struck with the center. This section also succeeds in charting the seemingly contradictory strategies pursued by both reform advocates and their conservative opponents.

The potential problem with this work, like those of its methodological forerunners (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Hough and Lampton, et al.), is the 'black box' dilemma endemic to all studies of bureaucratic behavior. While the author has conducted a remarkably thorough set of interviews with officials at all levels of the hierarchy, she will never have full access to the personal aspects of decision-making that she so easily attributes to Deng and the other key players. In her defense, Shirk seems cognizant of this methodological limitation, and does not stretch any of her assertions beyond what her well-documented data would suggest.

In conclusion, *Political Logic of Economic Reform in China* is an excellent addition to China studies and comparative politics in general. I would heartily recommend it to students of Chinese politics and anyone else interested in the political and economic development of post-communist states.

**Mulvenon** (continued from page 22)

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survey may be analyzed on its own, in a time-series fashion, or cross-sectionally across several countries.

#### **Trend Data**

The New Democracies Barometer of the Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna is completing its third annual survey, covering eleven countries in Eastern and Central Europe. The use of comparable questions across time provides unique data for trend analysis of economic, social, and political behavior and attitudes. The New Russian Barometer uses a January, 1992 survey as its baseline; the third trend survey, focusing on privatization, is planned for Spring, 1994.

#### **Monitoring Progress and Catching Up**

For decades Eastern European countries have published a variety of standard social statistics relevant to public policy (e.g., labor force participation by demographic group, health, education, etc.). These are potentially of great value for monitoring long-term trends not only within Eastern Europe but also by comparison with OECD countries. 'Catching up' is a function of the speed of change as well as the distance between countries. The position of East European countries also varies from social indicator to social indicator. The results have been published by the European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research, Vienna (a United

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**Rose** (continued from page 12)

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## TURNING SWEDEN AROUND?

With almost fifteen percent unemployment and a spiraling budget deficit, the economic crisis has not only affected the credibility of Swedish politicians, but also social scientists. In hindsight it is clear that Sweden was not an exceptional case. The image of Sweden, not the least in the eyes of foreign Swedophiles, was largely a myth.

Social scientists have now begun the hard work to create a new understanding of how a developed welfare state works, and how it can be changed. Unfortunately, much of this work is only available in Swedish. Some of it has been translated into English, and I would like to take this opportunity to mention a few of my own contributions.

In the late 1980s the *Swedish Study of Power and Democracy*, a five-year government-sponsored research program, described how Swedish society evolved into a political culture whose characteristics were commonly captured by the notion of "The Swedish Model." The output from this large research program consists of about twenty books, a hundred reports, and a concluding analysis published in the series of Swedish official investigations. The main results are summarized in English (Olof Petersson, "Democracy and Power in Sweden," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 14: 173-191).

In December 1992 the Swedish government appointed a group of social scientists to analyze the economic crisis in Sweden and to suggest ways to solve it. It was headed by Assar Lindbeck (University of Stockholm), and worked independently of government. The commission's final report was presented in March 1993 ("Nya Villkor for Ekonomi och Politik," *Series of Official Investigations*, 16, 1993). An English version of the final report will be published this year (Assar Lindbeck, Per Molander, Torsten Persson, Olof Petersson, Agnar Sandmo, Birgitta Swedenborg & Niels Thygesen, *Turning Sweden Around*, M.I.T. Press, forthcoming 1994).

The commission formulated a comprehensive program for the restoration of the Swedish economy. It included proposals for short-term and long-term stabilization measures, and institutional change deemed necessary to improve economic efficiency, increase economic growth,

and carry out the stabilization program.

The main idea in the commission's report is that many of Sweden's problems stem from an unclear division of responsibilities. The state has assumed responsibility for so many different tasks that it is unable to fulfill its core obligations. Interest groups have gained control of decision-making bodies, with the result that these bodies have pursued special interests at the expense of the public interest. In keeping with this observation, institutional change is necessary in order to cope with problems. By increasing the long-term credibility of fiscal and monetary policy, the government could in fact create more options for successful action in the short-run.

The commission proposed a number of changes in political institutions. One goal was to create a more clear delineation of power within the parliamentary system, drawing more distinct lines between the executive and the legislature. Moreover, the commission made suggestions aimed at insulating parliament from special interests. Also, reforms of the budget process were offered.

Some changes in political institutions are underway. The election period may be extended to four years and parliament's budget process may be tightened up. However, there has not been any major restructuring of the public sector or any significant reduction of government expenditures. These difficult decisions are yet to be taken.

If you have any questions or comments, please feel free to contact me at:

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great excitement. We think the proposed Comparative Political, Economic, and Social Data Base offers the best chance in a long time to *improve* (rather than just continue) the comparative study of politics. Its benefits extend well beyond the creation of a superior data resource. What is attractive to us in the NES model is that it is *consultative*, and, over time, *evolutionary*. That is, the core data set would evolve over time in response to developing understanding, and changing needs; the manner in which it would change would be through broad-based consultation among the disciplines involved.

Maintaining the core data base will stimulate theoretical development, because the choice and definition of the variables requires theory; the evolutionary nature of the data base will put emphasis on the *development* of theory. Further, the process of consultation will require the establishment and strengthening of networks of scholars. By the nature of the endeavor, these networks will necessarily be international and inter-disciplinary. Moreover, because a large proportion of scholars with whom we often would be coordinating to gather data are gradu-

ate students, the network would tend to draw scholars at a key point in their careers.

We see this first of all as an effort which will fill a basic infrastructure need for comparative politics. As a secondary benefit, it will also help to build a theoretical community in a field which is often not very theoretical, and which often is fragmented along the geographical boundaries of the objects of our study.

We have committed ourselves to pursue funding to establish the Comparative Data Base. I have agreed to chair the effort, and to serve as the initial Principle Investigator if we are successful.

Please direct all comments, suggestions, and queries to:

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**SHIVELY** (continued from page 10)

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ister Cambell's speech indicating that social programs were "too important to discuss during an election campaign."

The Canadian Election Study team will release the data for public use in early 1995. Note that this is a five-wave study combining the 1992 Referendum and the 1993 federal election. Inquiries should be directed to:

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1Z1  
Phone: (604) 228-5456  
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**Nevitte** (continued from page 11)

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Nations regional center), in its report to the 5th Conference of European Social Welfare Ministers, Bratislava; a book is in progress.

#### Reports

Detailed reports and analyses normally appear first in the Centre's monograph series, *Studies in Public Policy*. This flexible format permits very fast publication, and the inclusion of a large amount of detailed and original tables. Papers subsequently appear in a variety of professional journals, some specializing in Eastern Europe (e.g., *Soviet Studies*, or *Post-Soviet Geography*), and others with a broad readership (e.g., *British Journal of Political Science*). The

Oxford University Press has agreed to publish a series of books from the program.

For information on these, or any other activities of the Centre, or for a listing of Centre publications, please contact Professor Richard Rose at:

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**Rose** (continued from page 23)

ment domestic coalition is weakened, monetary policy may meet less opposition.

If government monetary and fiscal intervention are more difficult (as is especially the case in the IMF constrained east), and producer group regulation unlikely, what other forms might economic governance take? Csaba Mako gave us a unique glimpse into a Hungarian alternative ("Small Business and Local Economic Regeneration in Hungary"). He suggested that local cooperatives and fluid networks of small scale producers can flourish. In fact, his sociological study of several village networks demonstrates that this form is being rapidly institutionalized by acquiring hierarchy and organizational structure.

Another recurrent theme was the increasing insecurity of the EU arrangement. Two alternative regimes were presented: open markets, and regional association building. Lead papers sketched the theoretical bases for these. Robert Holzmann, from an econometrician's perspective, eliminated all but an open trade approach toward the east ("Economic Implications of Eastern European Reforms on Western European Economies"). Export-led growth, he concluded, would be less costly than to the alternatives (migration, external financing of import-led growth). The problem, of course, as acknowledged in the paper and discussions, was who would pay the costs of stimulating demand, absorbing imports, and losing jobs in the developed 'crescent' states? Also, the capital to pursue export-led growth must come from somewhere. Zoltan Csefalvy took an empirical look at whence foreign direct investment has come from in Hungary ("From Forced Integration to Organic Integration: Competition and Resource Transfer in East Central Europe"). An interesting bifurcation has occurred. In the arena of large investment projects, money comes from the major capital exporters — the United States and Japan. However, much of the larger number of small-scale capital transfers originate close to home in Austria, Germany, and nearby states. The implication is that (often small) crescent states are becoming closely linked to transition markets, but that, perhaps more importantly, sectoral development interests are diverging between major and minor capital exporters.

Jan Andersson, in an intuitive reaction to the market-based approach, presented a morphology of alternative European institutional futures, and concluded that EU cooperation would be-

come more diluted ("Finland's Role in an Uncertain Europe"). Even more interesting, from his Finnish perspective, was the desirability of a Nordic-Baltic regional economic institution. Clearly, thought is being given to regional associations that may cover the uncertainty in EU developments. No better verification can be given of this than Mare Kukk's analysis of institution-building in the case of the emerging Council of Baltic Sea States ("Regionalization, Development and Integration: The Council of Baltic States"). In this context, Kukk sees the Council as a means to further the transition process in the Baltics, and, as well, to mitigate security concerns in the area. What is apparent here is that regional associations might increasingly be seen as overlapping patches in the otherwise incomplete institutional fabric across Europe. The issue is whether these will become the real institutional context.

These responses may not wholly satisfy those trying to make sense of change. On the other hand, the issues new institutions must address were plainly presented. A tremendous challenge, but genuine opportunity exists for the exploration of alternative European institutional forms. We will chart these in an edited volume developed from the conference papers. The governance of Europe's small economies is only one of several issues being addressed in our Small European States program here. Parallel to the conference, a course on the Political Economy of Small European States was developed and taught. Other working groups are forming on identity issues and issues of small state security.

For additional information and welcomed comments, suggestions, discussion, and questions you may contact me at the following:

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to, and so that I am the one who ends up looking brave?

This being said, it is not clear why a majority of legislators in any time and place would be willing to vote for a change in the electoral system that could unseat them all by drastically changing both district lines and vote-counting rules. That, however, is what 270 members of the normally cautious Lower House of the Japanese Diet did on November 18, 1993. If the package of four electoral reform bills passed by the Lower House also goes through the Upper House, as is likely, then all members of the Lower House seeking reelection in the next general election will face new districts and new vote-counting rules. Many individual incumbents are certain to need new jobs after the next general election.

The current electoral system in Japan (single, non-transferable votes cast in multi-member districts) is notorious. It is the enemy of parties, candidates, and voters who want to plan well. Large parties must calibrate the number of candidates for each district very carefully, and then try to equalize the vote among their multiple candidates in each district. In a time when party allegiance of voters is weak and rapidly changing, this is enormously difficult to do (ask the Japan Socialist Party — it knows!). Candidates from large parties who want electoral security do not really want to share votes with others, even those from their own party, so they resist vote-equalizing strategies. They are better off accumulating as many votes as possible even if this deprives a colleague in the same party of a seat, to demonstrate to party donors, and personal support groups of voters that they are safe, reliable repositories of campaign funds and effort. Voters who support large parties must contend with the fact that a vote for the candidate of their choice may harm the party of their choice. Voters who support small parties must contend with the fact that a vote for the party of their choice may hurt the camp (conservative or progressive) of their choice.

It is not hard to imagine why this system is hated by those who must live with it; it is easy to see why particular alternative schemes would be favored by the various parties as collective entities. The Liberal Democrats as a party have always favored a wholesale shift to single-member districts, and have brought this up periodically to terrify the left. The progressive parties, which together have often won more popular

votes than the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) plus conservative independents (the LDP including its conservative independent allies has received less than 50% of the popular vote in every Lower House election since 1967), have always favored a wholesale shift to national proportional representation in order to turn this support into Diet seats. Yet there is a serious problem of divergence between a party's collective interest and the individual interests of the Diet members in that party. It is not easy for legislators who have invested for years in personal support groups in their district (their method for overcoming the uncertainties in this system) to vote readily for a radically different system that would invalidate their political investments.

How radical is the new proposal? Japan will shift to a side-by-side system containing 274 single member seats and 226 proportional representation seats. If the Lower House proposal remains intact, then there will actually be three tiers in this system: 1) the 226 PR seats will be selected from a nationwide district, 2) 47 of the single-member seats will represent each of Japan's existing 47 prefectures, and 3) the remaining 227 single member seats will come from tiny single-member districts carved out of Japan's existing 130 multi-member districts. These new boundaries do not exist yet; the reform bills simply create a commission to perform the dirty work. Obviously, the job of carving new boundaries, of slicing ones enemies' support 'bases' (*jiban*) to ribbons, will be the Diet's most exciting task in 1994.

Not having interviewed the 270 Diet members (257 from parties of the new ruling Hosokawa coalition and 13 from the LDP who ignored party superiors' advice) who voted for the reform package, I can only speculate on their individual motives. The Hosokawa coalition as a collective entity is enthusiastic about change because the PR segment of the new Diet guarantees it an increase in seats. As long as the coalition remains united enough to nominate joint candidates for the single-member seats, the coalition is expected to perform respectably there as well. If the coalition as a whole receives more votes in the next election than it did in 1993 (and Hosokawa and the coalition have risen remarkably in the polls since the 1993 election), the coalition as a whole could do very well indeed with the new system.

This does not, however, explain individual

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**McKean** (continued from page 5)

**Tarrow (continued from page 3)**

theoretically-driven problem-oriented research, and to train students in theory and methodology as well as substance.

These are tall orders, but Europe has some unique advantages as a focus of research and training. Stimulated by the recent changes in Europe, by the availability in Europe of a large number of European studies centers oriented towards cooperation with American scholars, and by the activities of supra-national and transnational research organizations such as the European Science Foundation and the OECD, there is an historic opportunity to make Europe a laboratory for social scientific research unmatched since the expansion of area studies in the Third World in the 1950s and 1960s.

However, effective social science research is more than the transmission and diffusion of method and theory; it also relies on the accumulation of empirical information, its transformation into comparable analytic form, and the contextualization of findings into usable country and area-specific form. As a result, area studies, methodological training, and theoretical perspectives must be combined in a more integrated way that has been true in the past.

Consider the example of comparative survey research on electoral behavior in Eastern Europe as it has developed since 1989. The methods and theories for such research which were developed in Western Europe and North America in the 1950s and 1960s are, by now, widely understood and employed in Eastern Europe. The implementation of this research requires a combination of national data-gathering efforts, and coordinated data analysis by scholars familiar with different countries. The usefulness of the findings depends on both the effective comparative analysis, and on understanding the meaning of the data in the distinct conditions of countries undergoing rapid transition from noncompetitive to competitive elections.

This combination of diffusion of methods

and theories, accumulation of country-specific data, comparison and integration of findings, and contextualization in different national contexts requires the combined resources of social science theory and methodology—which are best provided in social science departments and institutes—and area studies knowledge, language, and insights—best nurtured and developed by scholars with a commitment to area studies. This combination also depends on a high level of cooperation and interaction between American and European scholars and students working in these areas—a function best carried out through cooperation between disciplinary and area studies units. The problem is not to choose between disciplinary research and area studies but to provide for both side of the equation.

Respondents at almost all of the universities surveyed argued vigorously that—with the recent changes in Europe—the intersection between area studies and disciplinary research has grown more important as new bodies of substantive knowledge become available, social science methods are diffused to new areas and problems, and students are trained both in social science and in the cultures and languages of different countries. This is true both for Western Europe, where the expansion of the European Community has vastly increased both the flow of information and the number of relevant levels of analysis, and in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where a wealth of archival material has recently become available, and social science methods can now be more readily employed. Many respondents agreed that these expanded new bodies can best be absorbed and mobilized—and the dangers of parochialism avoided—by theoretically guided, problem-oriented research related to work being carried on in other countries through both comparative methods and improved communication, diffusion, and replication of new findings.

**Rosenbluth (continued from page 5)**

culture is 'unique' they say and only Taiwan — just now democratizing — has similar enough electoral rules to be an appropriate comparison.

Comparativists should take cheer from the political reform underway in Japan, if only be-

cause of the quasi-experimental conditions it sets up for hypothesis-testing. Now that the LDP is out of power, does the bureaucracy in fact behave as if nothing has changed? It is too early for either side of the debate to claim victory. However, at least the rhetoric of the Hosokawa

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First, Chalmers Johnson and other Japan specialists argue convincingly that economics has paid a serious price for ignoring the comparative study of economic systems. At the very minimum, economics departments want to find people who can teach a course on the Japanese economy, but cannot find them because no self-respecting graduate school would produce one. Neither would a Japan specialist ever be granted tenure in a reputable economics department. At the maximum, economists have so long ignored data, and satisfied themselves with internally consistent models that their models have lost empirical validity. We should carefully review the 'accomplishments' of economics before taking it as a model. My impression is that, while impressive in many respects (elegant mathematics, and the aura of certainty that comes with deductive logic), economics explains very little about how economies actually operate.

The physics model is also potentially misleading. One of our main problems in the empirical study of politics is our inability to perform relevant experiments. We must deal with the real world and data provided by actual events. The 'hard' sciences do not do very well in predicting the weather or the next earthquake because they cannot control for all the factors involved. The great accomplishments of the hard sciences were achieved in laboratories under highly artificial environments. They were then able to build machines which replicate artificial environments well enough to work reliably. The certainty of physics comes from elaborately controlled laboratory experimentation which the social sciences cannot hope to duplicate.

The second thing to emphasize is that physicists never assume things that can be shown to

be false. In fact, experimentalists work their hardest testing assumptions of new theories. Rational choice in the social sciences clearly fails this test. No psychologist takes the idea of rationality, in the sense implied by rational choice models, seriously.

I know only a little about the Chomsky revolution in linguistics, but what I do know suggests that Chomsky demonstrated that there is a large set of characteristics held in common by all languages. I would argue that comparativists often delight so much in contrasting what is different that we forget to point out the universals (within a specific frame of reference). By reveling in variety, we often fail to take proper credit for things we do know. More importantly, in linguistics, after all the universals have been established, there will still be a lot of variance to be explained. In linguistics the residual variance may amount to trivia, things that are best left unexplained, and simply memorized if one must actually speak the language. I find it hard to imagine that the same will prove true of politics. Even after explaining how all political systems work in general, we will still need to understand the workings of particular political systems, and the history of what actually happened in particular countries at particular times.

Physicists may find it trivial to trace the route of a particular hurricane as it proceeds northward. They may note that there was a 75% probability that Hurricane A would turn into the Gulf of Mexico, but, in this particular case, the lower probability was realized, and it turned up the Atlantic coastline. Political scientists and historians are likely to find an analogous exercise, explaining the development of democracy in Spain, much more interesting even if we were to have equally impressive general theories at our fingertips.

**Reed** (continued from page 3)

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government is different in favoring freer trade and domestic deregulation. That the government seems slow to act appears more the fault of the Socialist Party, than of a foot-dragging bureaucracy.

If the new government gets its electoral reform bill through the Diet, we will have other hypotheses to test. If personalistic electoral campaigning followed from the intra-party competition that multi-member districts generate, cam-

paigns under the new rules should focus more on issues, and less on private favors that LDP members dole out to their personal support networks. LDP factions, robbed of their function of helping LDP members compete against their fellow LDPers in multi-member districts, should begin to wither away. Political reform in Japan will keep us all more honest — not just the notoriously corrupt LDP politicians, but the scholars who study them as well. It's about time.

**Rosenbluth** (continued from page 28)

**Shepsle and Weingast (continued from page 4)**

discovery are less well-suited for understanding why one set of norms operates rather than another.

Our final observation from congressional scholarship is that, by and large, theoretical and empirical exercises are seen by their respective practitioners as complementary. Recent attempts to understand how the Congress has evolved in response to the reforms of the 1970s is a good example. Explaining why the changes have taken place is dependent upon a carefully crafted understanding of what actually occurred; the explanation, in turn, enriches the description, often identifying new descriptive regularities that might otherwise have gone unnoticed. In this way the skills and comparative advantages of each group are necessary to generate and accumulate knowledge in the field.

Laitin recognizes the desirability of exactly this type of harmony in his letter: "We should engage more directly with [theoretical work], continually tantalizing theorists with uncomfortable data. To use our area knowledge to discover interesting anomalies, to provide plausible deductive accounts of our statistically validated patterns, or to identify theoretically appropriate data sets...to integrate theory and empirical data... this is our disciplinary challenge."

How might such an integration proceed in comparative politics? First, as both Laitin and Rogowski note, a number of such scholars have emerged already besides themselves, including Alt, Bates, Cox, Gettes, Miriam, Huber, Lange, Laver, Popkin, Przeworski, Shirk, Shugart, Taagapera, Tsebelis, Wallerstein, and others. These scholars demonstrate how deep understanding of particular areas can be combined with deep theoretical reasoning.

Our comparative advantage in answering the question about integration of approaches, and the point on which we conclude this essay, is to sketch how theorists might proficiently make use of area-studies scholarship. This is especially important because traditional area studies and rational choice theory are often seen as antithetical.

First, positive theorists have increasingly become interested in culture over the past decade. One of the deep and all-encompassing problems of rational choice models is the multiplicity of equilibria (i.e., the Folk Theorem). This implies that theorists cannot predict cultural patterns in advance. In order to do this,

particular knowledge of a given society is absolutely essential. (As an aside, the theoretical indeterminacy of the Folk Theorem provides a firm theoretical rationale for the multiplicity of cultural patterns and practices that are actually observed.)

Thus, the area specialist's knowledge is necessary not only for thickly descriptive but also for theoretical accounts of politics, in large part because her knowledge provides important hints about the nature of equilibrium processes. These hints concern information about the preferences, beliefs, and expectations of indigenous actors.

Consider just one example. In their study of the cultural roots of democracy, *The Civic Culture*, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba emphasized that one of the constraints on political elites was the "law of anticipated reactions," the idea that members of a society would react sufficiently negatively against certain elite moves to discourage elites from making them in the first place. It is precisely such logic that positive theorists need in order to model the politics of a particular society and for offering comparisons that range across societies.

Second, the methodological divide between positive theorists and many empirical scholars in comparative politics is more than just a contest between abstract logic and in-depth knowledge. It also typically entails the divisions that separate positivism from interpretation. More often than not these are seen as irreconcilable approaches. Recent work, however, suggests that this is false. Ferejohn's work on elections in 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century England, Calvert's on social norms, Greif's on medieval trading norms, and Kreps' on corporate culture all demonstrate the compatibility of thickly descriptive accounts and intentionalist accounts. Moreover, theory is not simply the translation of existing knowledge into a technical vocabulary. Positive theory provides more than jargon. It provides the conditions that limit the types of accounts that can be given of a particular phenomenon.

We commend to our colleagues in comparative politics the 'catholic' congressional perspective, a perspective that emphasizes gains from intellectual exchange, complementarities, and scholarship that is simultaneously theory-rich and substance-rich. We expect this tribe will multiply and be fruitful. This, at least, is our rosy scenario.

ner, new theoretical work would continue to impact on the definition of the core.

We must be clear on what an archived data set is not. An archived data set is not a theory. Rather, it must be useful to scholars on both sides of theoretical debate, and useful to scholars with a variety of theoretical interests. Nor would an archived data set be sufficient to complete most serious work in comparative politics. Good scholarship in comparative politics will continue (in my judgment) to require field work, language skills, and data sets peculiar to the research interest of the scholar. The archived data set, in having standard core variables available to researchers, will allow scholars to 'get on' with their original research without having to spend too much time in treating the standard explanations for the phenomenon that is under investigation.

#### **NES Is a Compelling Organizational Model.**

The American National Election Studies is an organization with three components. First, there are the Principle Investigators and professional staff who are legally responsible for administering the grants that NES receives. Second, there is a Board of Overseers which is made up of leading scholars in election studies who review and revise the data collection activities of NES, and are the responsible body for the ultimate choice of questions that go into the surveys. Third, the community of researchers is encouraged (and its members are not shy!) to communicate ideas, problems and proposals to the Board, with the goal of improving the survey and making it more relevant to current research needs. The combination of these elements creates an environment of continual renewal and longitudinal continuity.

My vision is to use the APSA Comparative Politics Section as the springboard for a similar organization, and I have urged Phil Shively to create a Board of Overseers in consultation with our membership. ICPSR has shown willingness, even enthusiasm, to ally with us as it has with NES in archiving our core data.

To be sure, comparative politics has its own practices so that the NES organizational model cannot be appropriated without considerable adjustment. For one, the enormous problems of translation, and of indicators having different meanings in different cultural environments, make the notion of a 'core' set of variables somewhat quixotic.

Perhaps more important is that intellectual culture of comparative politics differs from that of election studies in America. Election studies are driven by process questions (How did Perot break through party duopoly? Are voters more effected by a declining economy, or by a failed foreign policy?). The hypotheses addressing these process questions can be handled both on the right and left side of their equations with data supplied by NES or comparable data. In contrast, many of us in comparative politics are driven by puzzling outcomes (why one country has a democracy, and others do not; why there were revolutions in one set of countries, but not in others; why there is ethnic warfare in one region of a country, but not in another). Our dependent variables often are compound categories reflecting boxes in complex matrices (and are therefore not really dimensions that can be captured in large data sets), and our explanations are often so closely linked to our particular cases that data organized to include all countries (or even regions) are hardly useful. The model for a comparative 'core' data set must therefore emerge from discussions within our community rather than be imposed upon us due to the impressive successes in a neighbor sub-discipline.

#### **What Is the Purpose of an Archived Data Set?**

An archived data set is not meant to diminish the importance of field work in comparative politics. If this were my goal, I would not have diligently (but admittedly, with only partial success) studied Somali, Yoruba, Spanish, Catalan, Russian and Estonian, and lived for extended periods in countries in which these languages are spoken. The joy of being a comparativist is, for me, to experience politics in vastly different settings. (I often tell my students my 'onion principle': never write about a society where you cannot buy an onion at market clearing prices.) The purpose of this gargantuan initiative in collecting data sets is to free us to do field work, and to encourage us to develop creative individual research projects without getting bogged down in data collection efforts that are best provided as a collective good.

I hope that the members of the Comparative Politics section, in all our diversity become a community of scholars that will support this initiative, and work diligently to constitute and reconstitute our core data set in a contentious yet disciplined manner.

**Laitin (continued  
from page 1)**

**McKean** (continued from page 27)

MPs' willingness to vote for changes that would eradicate their current districts. Some party activists obviously expect to rank high enough on their party's PR list to win a seat in the PR segment of the Diet. Others with good connections among party and Lower House officers expect to be able to influence district design so as to keep their supporters in one district and assure themselves of a seat in the single-member segment of the Diet. My guess is that the rest, however fearful, predicted the following consequences if they were to vote against reform. If coalition members did not support the coalition's electoral reform package, and the package failed, then the coalition would fall, and there would be another general election using the old electoral system. The coalition parties would withhold nominations from their anti-reform renegades, and any who tried to run as independents would be finished off by angry voters, who have demanded drastic reform for years. In the end, only five MPs in the coalition — five left-wing Socialists who could not stomach any change that incorporated single-member seats where the LDP could be expected to

do well — voted against the coalition's reform package. Thirteen current members of the LDP voted against the LDP and with the coalition; another four LDP members abstained rather than vote with their party and against the reform bills. These LDP rebels may well be individuals who plan to bolt from the LDP and join the coalition (as Revival party members?) before the next election anyway.

When legislatures voluntarily change their own underpinnings in this way — when individual legislators appear to risk political suicide to benefit the collective interest of the party they belong to — comparativists ought to take a good look. This kind of drastic institutional change is rare, and we could learn much about collective decision-making from examining episodes like this. What circumstances embolden (or force) parties and individual actors to undertake changes of this kind? What factors influence the traits of the new arrangement that is selected? What role does voter pressure play in the timing of such change, and in the nature of the new institutions that are adopted?

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**APSA-CP**

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