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The political effects of crises have long been a concern of scholars studying domestic politics around the world. A crisis, as Weyland explains in this issue, is a “high-stakes, time-compressed situation when a serious, acute challenge causes a grave disruption of the status quo.” Authors such as Theda Skocpol have focused on the potential for crises to produce transformative change; more recently, scholars have looked at how crises generate instability, theorizing crises as exogenous shocks that are causally related to both global and domestic changes.

For students and scholars, the year 2020 provided ample new opportunities for investigating the consequences of crises. To borrow Staniland’s typology from this issue, 2020 saw crises that fit into numerous categories. The COVID-19 crisis was an external one, caused by a novel virus in humans that spread across the globe. Populist leaders generated systemic, endogenous crises that challenged both domestic and international orders. Fires and other natural disasters occurred; these may be either external or systemic, depending upon how their causes are understood. Natural disasters can appear to be external bolts out of the blue, yet be driven by long-term processes such as global warming or deforestation.

In the United States, the 2020 election and its aftermath fit the definition of a systemic crisis, too. Like most of us who teach comparative politics at institutions of higher learning, one of us has devoted class time over the last decade to explaining to students in an introductory CP course why democracy can be difficult to sustain and why backsliding occurs. In a lecture drawing on Przeworski’s (2003) article “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense,” she stressed to her students that alternation in power cannot be taken for granted; in many countries, elections are not free-and-fair and incumbents do not always accept loss. As Przeworski (2003, pp. 15-16) writes in that piece “the miracle of democracy is that conflicting political forces obey the results of voting.” Before 2020, this lesson was not easy for students in the United States to grasp. Multiple examples of elections whose results were contested – such as the 1991 parliamentary elections in Algeria that precipitated a civil war, or more recently, the fraudulent 2020 elections in Belarus that have been challenged by the opposition – were required to make the point.

For American students, the norm of peaceful elections followed by a smooth alternation in power was something that could be taken for granted. There was a well-established pattern...
to American politics: elections were held; they were deemed reasonably free and fair; the losers conceded; and political life continued in its regular (and for many students, boring) path. After 2020, explaining the fragility of democracy will not require this much effort. The contest between Joe Biden and Donald Trump cast doubt not just on the election result, but on the democratic institutions in the U.S. themselves. The legitimacy of voting procedures, reporting procedures, and the electoral college have all been called into question, and (at the time of writing) the incumbent president has, for the first time in modern U.S. history, refused to concede. This crisis may not be solely a domestic one either; in his contribution, Weyland conceptualizes the category of “diffused crises,” or crisis whose effects extend and diffuse to other settings. The 2020 U.S. election may prove to be one of these, if its effects extend to leaders and parties in other parts of the world.

It is an opportune moment for the study of crisis, and our contributors in this issue offer insights that can help us to understand the diverse set of crises that states currently face. Our issue begins with contributions on the crises created by the COVID-19 pandemic. We also have contributors who address populism and its relationship to economic crises, financial crises, political party conflicts, crisis triggered by leaders and internal instability, and natural disasters.

Several authors discuss the COVID-19 pandemic crisis and its broader sociopolitical effects. Anna Boucher and her co-authors analyze the impact of the pandemic on borders and the movement of people. COVID-19, they argue, likely affected migration patterns and policies for years to come. Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage focus on the impact the pandemic might have on economic and social inequality. COVID-19, they argue, might lead to reduced inequality, but the connection is not predetermined. Only if the crisis generates new fairness-based arguments will we see lower inequality in its wake.

Mala Htun and Francesca Jensenius show that the pandemic created a crisis of caregiving, caused predominantly by the closure of schools and child care centers. By focusing on the United States, Norway, and Japan, they discuss how this caregiving crisis is differentially impacting men and women, and how these effects result from policies adopted by each state. Jennifer Pan analyzes the rise in xenophobic discourse and attitudes caused by COVID-19. She finds that when undergraduate Chinese students in the US are exposed to xenophobic rhetoric their support for authoritarianism in China increases.

Other authors analyze different contemporary crises. Beatrice Magistro and Victor Menaldo move beyond the political effects of populism and study its economic features and outcomes. Populist leaders on the left and the right, they forcefully conclude, have one thing in common: they usher in economic collapse. Dorothea Bohle analyzes how countries on the European periphery responded to the EU’s financial crisis. While a variety of policy responses were offered in the wake of the crisis, neo-liberal policies were surprisingly resilient and common responses whereas left-wing alternatives failed to attract substantial support.

Sebnem Gumuscu’s contribution demonstrates how and under which conditions intra-party conflicts might undermine democracies. By focusing on Islamic parties in Turkey and Tunisia, Gumuscu discusses how the intra-party struggle between “liberals” and “electorasists” helps to better understand the fate of democra-
FROM THE EDITORS: COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF CRISIS (CONTINUED)

cy in each state. Erica Frantz and Joseph Wright study personalist parties and their role in contemporary democracies. Personalist parties, they show, is an increasingly common phenomenon and such parties are detrimental to democratic systems’ stability and very survival.

Archie Brown focuses on political leadership and on how Mikhail Gorbachev’s transformative change of the Soviet political system led, as an unintended consequence, to the crisis of Soviet statehood. The latter crisis, though it had roots that long preceded Gorbachev, was a consequence of perestroika, not its cause. Irina Soboleva zeroes in on the connection between civic and political activism in endangered democracies. In challenging environments, she shows, politically and civically sophisticated individuals are running not for, but from political offices, thus potentially deepening the crisis even further.

Valerie de Koeijer and Sarah Parkinson and Mara Revkin expand the discussion of crisis beyond political and economic realms. Mara Revkin analyzes security services during periods of social crisis. The contribution focuses on police in Iraq and argues that two factors—decentralization and fragmentation of state security institutions—explain the patterns of police violence. Valerie de Koeijer and Sarah Parkinson explore the politics of natural disasters, a topic largely overlooked by comparative politics scholars. Studying natural disaster and the responses to them, they argue, will offer comparativists new insights on topics such as race, inequality, migration, governance and political behavior more broadly.

Finally, Kurt Weyland and Paul Staniland center their respective contributions on crisis as an analytical category. Weyland focuses on a new and increasingly widespread type of crisis, namely one provoked by the external offer of a novel, promising solution. This “diffused crisis,” the contribution argues, became more common as a result of globalization and help explain the recent transnational wave of populism. Staniland offers a different typology and shows how the understanding of crises is shaped by political actors’ arguments and framing.

In this issue of the Newsletter we include short Q&As with the most recent Section Awards winners. Dawn Teele (Luebbert Book Prize), Robert Braun (Luebbert Book Prize Honorable Mention), Isabela Mares and Lauren Young (Luebbert Book Prize Honorable Mention), Junyan Jiang (Luebbert Article Prize), David Rueda (Luebbert Article Prize Honorable Mention), Marcus Kreuzer (Luebbert Article Prize Honorable Mention), Nirvikar Jassal, (Sage Paper Prize), Rory Fitzgerald (Lijphart/Przeworski/Verba Dataset Award), David Laitin (Powell Graduate Mentoring Award), and Yuen Yuen Ang (Theda Skocpol Prize for Emerging Scholars) answer our question about their research process and findings.

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If you have comments, suggestions, or ideas for future issues and new features please contact Eugene Finkel: efinkel4@jhu.edu
2020 has been a year of interlocking crises, the like of which most of us have not known in our lifetime. The public health crisis of COVID-19 has impacted on the pre-existing crises of democratic stability and effective administration and governance, culminating in significant debate about the ability of developed democracies to respond effectively to emergencies confronting their citizens (see Allen et al 2020, Bermeo and Pontusson 2012, King and Le Gales 2017). These crises, much discussed in recent political science, have now been joined by a further crisis which both complicates and reinforces many of them: a migration crisis.

Is migration over?

The long-term economic consequences of radically diminished immigration programmes will be enormous and demand nuanced discussion about the shape and size of migration regimes of different nations into the future. The winding road to recovery ahead has led some to ask the question: Has immigration ended? In just a few months, the largest and fastest decline in global human mobility in modern history has been instigated by widespread and, in most cases, instantaneous travel and immigration restrictions. Borders reopened within Europe in mid-June but by September, cases have spiked again (Costagliola, López-Goñi and Panovska-Griffiths 2020) and further European Union closures and quarantine and testing requirements for travellers are to be expected including on the Schengen travel area (Cook 2020; see also European Union 2020). Barriers to restrictions of American citizens to most parts of Europe remain. Canada has strict quarantine requirements on its citizens returning from the US. Borders remain closed in countries like Australia and New Zealand indefinitely at present, with strict limitations even extending to Australian citizens right to leave their own country. These border closures are currently expected to extend well into 2021 (Fox Koob and Calligeros 2020). Across the OECD, visa issuances plummeted 46% in the first semester of 2020 and 72% in the second semester, compared with the same period in 2019 (OECD 2020a, 18).

Even in countries that have not introduced specific barriers, one could speculate that the short-term mobility on which parts of the global economy depend such as international education, agriculture, business and tourism will be drastically reduced. Highly skilled potential immigrants may reconsider their options, and firms may sponsor fewer international transfers and placements. Potential graduate students cannot currently easily acquire visas to such traditional locations as Australia or the United States; Australian student visa applications are

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COVID-19 may also fundamentally change immigration over the longer term. With global travel and resettlement disrupted and limited access to public funds for vulnerable migrants in many countries, longer term security in the form of permanent residency will become an even more sought after premium. And as a global recession takes hold, support for proactive immigration policies is likely to reduce still further, with alarming negative effects for the integration of current and future immigrants (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2020b, 9; hereafter OECD).

As the pandemic spread from February of this year, and contrary to the prevailing wisdom of pandemic response prior to the event, many countries acted quickly to restrict international movements, with exemptions to travel bans varying across different countries for nationals and residents, seasonal workers and health professionals. The migration crisis heightens three crucial concerns already present within immigration policy: the role of visa design; the status of undocumented migrants and relatedly those other migrants with no recourse to public funds; and the interaction of immigration and the labour market policy. This contribution considers each of these points in turn and concludes with some consideration of how this migration crisis could in turn exacerbate the more established forms of political crisis.

The crisis of borders and visa policy

Changes in visa rules and delays in visa processing since the advent of COVID-19 have led to a crisis of borders. In general, these changes have been justified on the basis of public health considerations. In some cases, this crisis of borders has also been securitised. In the United States, for example, the Trump administration swiftly introduced a new policy under which it began quickly deporting people who illegally cross the southwest border, as opposed to taking them to a detention centre where they could seek asylum and due process. This has also meant that some newly arrived immigrant children in the United States, even once they test negative for COVID-19, have been deported rather than afforded the protections that would permit them to seek asylum before the pandemic (Lind and Kriel 2020). Some high-skilled workers holding H1-B visas have also been targeted in Trump’s attempts to protect the jobs of US workers (Control of Communicable Diseases, Foreign Quarantine, 85 Fed. Reg. 16559, 2020; see also Chishti and Pierce 2020).

In other countries, permanent residents have been granted different rights and privileges from temporary ones. For instance, a dichotomy has been set up in Australia whereby permanent residents have largely been allowed to return while temporary residents have not. That said, even the processing of new permanent visas has slowed in Australia and there has been separation from family members in some instances (Ryan 2020). Temporary migrants, who make up the bulk of global immigration flows (Boucher and Gest 2020, Chapter 5), have been denied entry to many host countries (International Air Transport Association 2020). There are some exceptions, Ireland, Portugal, France, Greece,
Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy still accept permanent and temporary visa holders to enter or re-enter (OECD 2020b, 3), and most of them have permitted temporary visas to be extended during the pandemic.

The crisis has also severely slowed or halted the processing of asylum seekers and refugees around the world; in the US this hesitancy complemented an existing opposition and reduction in the number of refugees admitted annually under the Trump administration (Smith and King 2020). In theory, asylum applications should still be processed in most OECD countries given the continued operation in law of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), but personal interviews have been postponed and only pending or priority applications are being processed in many countries (OECD 2020b, 6). It is perhaps too early to tell what the full toll of COVID-19 upon the rights of asylum seekers and refugees globally will be.

Looking forward, as economies continue to suffer and poverty, food shortages, job loss rise, the drive among the neediest to relocate will probably increase not decrease, raising the likelihood of high rates of economic asylum. Supporting this fact, the International Labour Organisation estimates that nearly half of the world’s workers are at risk of losing their livelihoods due to COVID-19 (International Labor Organisation 2020, 1; hereafter ILO), raising the risk of an increase in economic refugees. The extent to which the economic effects of COVID-19 will persist after a vaccine is found, leading to new forms of displacement, is difficult to predict, but there will be at least some pressure, even if this is countered by heightened border security. Only an exceptional vaccine, available to large swathes of the global population, would facilitate significant return to previous levels and patterns of economic activity, meaning reduced activity in many sectors will likely persist with flow-on effects for global unemployment levels.

The crisis of the emerging undocumented populations and others with no recourse to public funds

While countries have legislated differently on visa extensions, there is a growing subcategory of migrants who are overstaying short-term visas, which have expired during the crisis, because there are no mechanisms for visa renewal or they are unable to travel home. A number of countries, such as Ireland and Portugal (Department of Justice and Equality 2020, Schmitt and Massimino 2020), have offered relief measures through changes to visa policy, such as the easing of employment restrictions, or the possibility to remain to such migrants. However, these relief measures have not been a feature of welfare policy more broadly. Temporary migrants in different countries have found themselves with no entitlement or recourse to public benefits, as in Australia, the UK and the US. With great uncertainty through and beyond lockdown periods in individual countries, many migrants, regardless of status, may be left with limited prospects either to return home or to extend visas that they have since overstayed.

COVID-19 may also fundamentally change immigration over the longer term.
Do migrants in an irregular situation have access to free health care if they contract COVID-19?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Access to health treatment for COVID-19 for migrants in an irregular situation in OECD countries (OECD 2020b, 18-19)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>The decision to charge Medicare ineligible patients remains a matter for each State and Territory Government. Victoria, New South Wales and Western Australia decided to waive out-of-pocket expenses for Medicare ineligible patients for COVID-19 related diagnosis and treatment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Only absolutely necessary medical treatment may not be denied to anyone, otherwise a claim to treatment exists in principle only for persons who are compulsorially insured in Austria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Access to healthcare and the provision of healthcare services is determined by provincial and territorial health authorities. Provincial and territorial governments have put in place special provisions to ensure that all residents have access to testing and treating for COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Migrants in an irregular situation infected by COVID-19 will be provided with appropriate healthcare but may have to reimburse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>Migrants in an irregular situation infected by COVID-19 will be provided with appropriate healthcare but may have to reimburse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Yes. Access to emergency health services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Yes. Free access when urgently admitted for hospitalisation and full access to minors (under 18).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>All persons, irrespective of status, have free access to the necessary treatment related to COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>n/a and low immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>No cost but access to testing may be difficult.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Access to emergency health services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Testing for COVID-19 available for everyone, including migrants in an irregular situation. Fees for testing/treatment same as for citizens. No requirement to provide identity for testing. Government suspended in January 2020 the requirement for medical facilities to report migrants in an irregular situation to immigration office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Access to emergency health services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>No confirmed contracted foreigner in a guarded centre yet. But, in case of a foreigner who has contracted the virus, appropriate sanitary services should be informed and examinations carried out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>N/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Access to emergency health services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Access to emergency health services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>N/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>N/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. We thank the OECD Migration Section for permission to republish this table.
The situation of undocumented migrants is of great concern, not least because such migrants are rendered especially vulnerable to the public health and related crises. In addition, there are other migrants, still on valid visas but often of a temporary or fixed time period, that are ineligible for access to public services. In Australia, there are currently over 60,000 people overstaying their visas (Acharya 2018), as well as 2.1 million people with temporary migrant status who are not entitled to access the welfare system (Stayner 2020). In the United Kingdom, the number of people without recourse to public funds is estimated to be close to 1.4 million, and thousands of immigrants have been denied access to income support and free school meals over the summer since the pandemic struck (Global Exchange on Migration & Diversity 2020). Furthermore, access to welfare can provide a ‘ticket to service’ to other essential government services. To draw out one example of the repercussions of a lack of documentation or recourse to public funds, in Australia, a person who is not eligible for social security is also ineligible for domestic violence services. Around 1.8 million temporary visa holders in Australia are ineligible for government support services and payments (Houghton 2020).

This differential access to welfare can also affect access to health services. Governments have paid particular attention to healthcare rights for migrants, given the major public health risk that COVID-19 could spread undetected among groups of migrants without access to diagnosis or treatment, or deterred from seeking support due to their insecure status. In Australia, those on temporary visas are required to obtain their own health insurance, meaning that there is a population that does not have access to public healthcare, although see the exceptions listed above in Table 1. Some international students, for example, go so far as to avoid even charitable support because they are fearful that their visas have expired.

In the UK – and across most of Europe – there are infectious diseases exemptions to the National Health Service which ensure that treatment for COVID-19 and other infectious diseases is available to all, but migrant knowledge of or willingness to trust such exemptions may be limited (Global Exchange on Migration & Diversity 2020). France and Belgium already offered free universal access to healthcare for migrants before the pandemic. Unfulfilled promises have been made to immigrants in the UK; all temporary migrants pay a special NHS surcharge and under great pressure the government reluctantly promised in May to waive this surcharge for anyone working in healthcare, though this is yet to be seen (Gower 2020). Italy and Portugal have temporarily regularised all undocumented migrants so as to facilitate access to healthcare, but many countries have not been nearly so generous (Amante 2020, Schmitt and Massimino 2020). With the impending rolling out of Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union, many Europeans resident in the United Kingdom could lose both their right to remain and access to benefits if they do not apply for settled status before the end of the year (O’Carroll 2020).


The crisis of the workforce/labour market

Given that COVID-19 also presents a wholesale upheaval of the labour market in most countries, it is clear that this will also affect migrant workers, who comprise a not insignificant proportion of workers in many of the countries most impacted by COVID-19. For instance, tem-
Temporary migrant workers comprise a relatively high 8-10% of all workers in the Australian labour market, based on best estimates (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2019; hereafter ABS). With an estimated 164 million migrant workers globally, migrant workers are an essential component of contemporary workplaces (ILO 2018, ix). Key industries that rely upon temporary migrant workers will now suffer shortages, such as in logistics, delivery, horticulture and agriculture, given the lack of mobility of these individuals.

Where does immigration fit in the context of rising unemployment? How should policy-makers reconcile enduring skills shortages with the limitations of redeploying the domestic workforce – logistics, delivery, horticulture, agriculture, hospitality and tourism – and with new forms of labour market displacement? The narrative of “migrants taking our jobs” remains a popular one for politicians seeking election, but to what extent are they actually, and how well can domestic redeployment function, if at all? How important is immigration to projections of future surplus, particularly if temporary migration is an integral component of those countries economic success stories? Answering these questions will be crucial for governments globally in navigating the effects of COVID-19 upon their labour markets and their economies.

At the same time as unemployment is rising globally, it is also likely that this issue will play out differently in the skilled and unskilled labour space. In the area of low skilled seasonal agricultural work, there is evidence of enduring skills shortages even during the first six months of COVID-19 and challenges in mobilising domestic workers: the UK and Germany for example have both continued to rely on workers from Eastern Europe for their agricultural and meat processing sectors despite the pandemic and in several cases these clustered groups of workers have tested positive for COVID-19 (Pitu and Schwartz 2020).

The UK and Germany are not alone in this regard. A number of countries have implemented special measures for seasonal workers, enabling people on short-term visas to remain in their host country to work, or in some cases, to obtain a new permit and enter the host country. Greece, Italy, the United States, Canada, Norway and Australia have taken measures to permit seasonal agricultural workers to stay and work (OECD 2020a, 2020b, 4). Elsewhere mechanisms have been developed to allow categories of migrants not otherwise authorised to work to undertake agricultural work, including in Belgium, Spain, Ireland, Austria and Greece. Germany reauthorised the entry of foreign seasonal workers in April, largely from Romania and Bulgaria, after a failed effort to supplement labour shortfalls with unemployed Germans (Alderman, Eddy, and Tsang 2020; see also Rising 2020). Following Germany, the United Kingdom has chartered flights for seasonal agricultural workers including Albania, Romania and Bulgaria. The European examples suggest that without low-cost mobile labour from Eastern Europe, the wealthier economies risk losing their harvests. The question of whether nationals may soon be prepared to take on jobs or move for work where they previously were not, is important, as new forms of labour market displacement could be occurring by extending working rights to temporary migrants across other sectors as well (Boucher 2020).
Conclusion

The unprecedentedly quick closure of borders meant that many migrants internationally found themselves unable to leave countries when their visas expired, were often forced to enter the labour market in ways that their current visas prohibit in order to survive, and stood ineligible for existing social security systems and emergency support payments. Consequently, there is a clear danger that this may lead to the rapid expansion of the number of people effectively living as undocumented migrants. Finally, as countries start the long process of economic recovery, the potential opening up of immigration will quickly assert itself as a primary political question, closely linked both to the labour market and to intensified political debates about culture and identity. It is already an intense issue in many countries such as the United State and Brexit Britain, before the pandemic arrived, because linked to longstanding racial divisions revigorated by populist parties (King and Le Gales 2017, Smith and King 2020).

In our view, these events in turn could reinforce a dangerous set of pre-existing political crises if not carefully managed by policy-makers and politicians.

First, there is a concern about a rising tide of nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment, with historical resonance from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (King 2000). Prior to the pandemic, there was already significant global concern about the rise of nationalist populism and the politics of xenophobia (Lonergan and Blyth 2020). Emerging in this context, the new migration crisis could quickly see governments conflating COVID-19 risk with overseas arrival or work in low-skilled sectors, rather than considering the social inequality that influences differential transmission risk. This has already been seen in the United States in the ways that COVID-19 has been used as a rationale for changes to immigration policy as explained above. There is a possibility that anti-immigrant parties across immigrant heavy countries could use such rhetoric to push their agendas in future elections, especially if a vaccine is not universally distributed.

Second, as documented earlier, a familiar “natives first” sentiment can reinforce existing protectionist sentiment within labour market policy debates, even when domestic workers do not necessarily exist. Most governments will need to carefully model the extent to which domestic workers wish to and can be redeployed into sectors previously dominated by migrant workers and what implications these changes hold for wage and welfare settings. Without astute management, political crises over labour market and industrial relations policy could emerge in coming months. The short-term responses in agriculture may therefore not be indicative of future trends, especially as the the recovery time from the pandemic extenuates.

Last, in terms of the solutions to the crisis, it appears that long standing political institutional differences in comparative health policy have also proved fundamentally as the contrast between Germany’s remarkably low death toll and the US’s carnage death levels reveals. In this regard, the gaps in health coverage experienced by migrants appears to result in higher rates of transmissions in those populations, compounding inequality in health systems globally and placing pressure for reform upon those systems.
References


COVID-19: A CRISIS OF BORDERS (CONTINUED)


ECONOMIC CRISSES AND INEQUALITY IN LIGHT OF COVID-19

by Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage

There is a widespread idea that major crises lead to major changes in socioeconomic inequality, typically with an emphasis on inequality declining. Empirically, it is thought that the major crises of the twentieth century—two world wars and an economic depression—led to a substantial reduction in both income and wealth inequality (Piketty 2014). Some argue that major crises and cataclysms are, in fact, the only events that produce major reductions in inequality (Scheidel 2017). The obvious question we might then ask is whether COVID 19 might have a similar impact by leading to someone doing something about rising inequality in western democracies.

In what follows we will suggest that the historical record fails to point to a general trend for crises to reduce inequality; it is instead the case that the effect of a crisis depends on what a society makes of it. This may in turn depend on whether a crisis creates new fairness-based arguments that construct a societal consensus for policy change. Our research suggests that this does happen—just not very often.

The Record on Economic Crises and Inequality

A first way to look at crises and inequality is to consider commonly used measures for each of these phenomena. Crises like COVID almost always result in a drastic drop in gross domestic product (GDP). In 2020, the median forecast surveyed by the US Federal Reserve suggests that real GDP will shrink by 3.5%—a deep recession. With this as a benchmark, we can look at history and see what happened in other societies that experienced a similar economic contraction. As a measure of inequality, we can look to the well-known top one percent income and wealth measures popularized by Piketty (2001). We recognize that COVID is first and foremost a crisis involving the loss of human lives. Also, simply looking at top one percent measures cannot capture all the relevant dimensions of inequality. We see this as a first step in the analysis, and to do it we will use the sample of countries from our previous book (Scheve and Stasavage 2016).

If we look at other moments during which democracies have experienced a contraction equivalent to 3.5% of real GDP or more, we see...
some evidence of a tendency for crises to be associated with lower subsequent inequality. Based on simple descriptive statistics, ten years after a major contraction of real GDP, the top one percent income share is on average 2.1 percentage points lower compared to where it stood at the outset of a crisis. That is a reduction in this measure by about ten percent; in other words, nothing earth shattering. It makes sense to look at a ten-year horizon here, because if a crisis prompts a society to address inequality, the policies to do this will, in many cases, take some time to have an effect. If we look at the top one percent wealth share, we see that ten years after a crisis, this measure is on average 3.9 percentage points lower ten years after a crisis. This, again, is an important reduction, but not a transformative one.

It is possible that the average “effect” of crises that we observed above would be different if we controlled for broader temporal trends. Most of the growth crises in our data set occurred during the first seven decades of the twentieth century, and this was a period where income and wealth inequality were on a general downward trend across the industrialized world. When we employed a two-way fixed effects model to look at the relation between past crisis and present inequality, we actually failed to see statistically significant results for either income or wealth.

Rather than dig deeper into investigating the average effect of crises, we would like to emphasize something different — the incredible range of country experiences. To see the variable effects of a crisis, consider Figure 1, which shows two overlaid kernel density plots. The solid line shows the distribution of changes in the top one percent income share for all cases in which there had been an economic contraction of 3.5% of GDP or more ten years previously. We see that the mean is negative, but there is considerable spread around the mean. Now consider the dashed line in the same figure. This shows the distribution in changes in the top one percent income share for all cases in which a country did not experience a contraction of 3.5% of GDP or more ten years previously. The mean for this variable is now very close to zero (-0.25), and we see also that there is now considerably less spread, as the immense majority of the observations are clustered around zero.

**Changes in The Top One Percent Income Share in Crisis and Non-Crisis Countries**

Figure 1 suggests that a country that experiences an economic crisis is more likely to experience a sizeable reduction in inequality when compared to a no crisis case, but this outcome is far from assured. A country that experienced a crisis is three times more likely to experience a reduction in the top one percent income share of four percentage points or more. However, even in this case, the likelihood of experiencing such a reduction is only about one in five. This may suggest that crises can have major effects on inequality, but only relatively rarely.

So, what determines whether a crisis has a major influence on inequality? Much of this variation must certainly be driven by unobserved, apolitical factors that we have not taken account of in our simple analysis. Some might suggest that what really matters is the depth of the crisis, as in perhaps it takes a contraction in GDP of more than 3.5 percentage points to make a reduction in inequality more likely. We found no evidence in the data that this was the case.

In what follows we suggest another possible explanation for the variation in inequality outcomes after a crisis; the effect of an economic crisis on inequality may depend on what a society makes of it.
New Crises and New Fairness Arguments

The immediate effect of crises can sometimes be to either create new inequalities or to cast existing inequalities in a new light. When it comes to COVID-19, it is not hard to think of how this may happen; some people have had the means to protect themselves both in terms of health and work, whereas others have been much more vulnerable. These inequalities have lain at the intersection of class, race, and gender. The crisis-induced creation of new inequalities or reframing of old inequalities can change assessments of whether economic inequality is just and whether policies that seek to reduce inequality are viewed as fair. This should prompt us to ask what the historical record suggests about how and when such arguments are generated, and when they actually gain traction.

The First World War

Experience with World War provides a prime example from our 2016 book where a major crisis led to a dramatic reduction in economic inequality, and it arguably did so thanks to new arguments about fairness.

In the decades before 1914, technological developments — especially the extension of railroad networks — allowed European nation-states for the first time to mobilize armies numbering in the millions, in other words a very substantial portion of the adult male population of a certain age. Mobilizing armies on this scale also required universal conscription, as reliance only on volunteers or on promises of high pay would prove less effective.

Mass mobilization of labor for the war effort after 1914 gave rise to a new — heretofore unemployed — argument for taxing the rich. If labor was to be conscripted, then the same should be true for capital. Prior to the First World War, fairness debates in democracies involved those who thought taxation should be proportional because this treated the rich and the poor the same, and those who thought taxation should be progressive because this induced equal sacrifice between the rich, who had a greater
ability to pay, and the poor, who did not. With no consensus over what was fair, pre-World War tax systems were hardly progressive at all. Mass mobilization for World War I created a societal consensus in favor of progressive taxation based on the compensatory logic of a conscription of income and wealth. This gave rise to the adoption of highly progressive taxes on income and capital, leading to a durable reduction in inequality.

The Great Depression

The Great Depression of the 1930s was a second type of crisis that again led to the adoption of more progressive tax policies as well as other reforms that reduced inequality. The reasons that the Great Depression had an equalizing effect are many, and certainly include the depth of the crisis, which led to a widespread reconsideration of laissez-faire capitalism. However, we want to focus attention on how the Great Depression helped build a societal consensus about the fairness of progressive policies in a way that echoed World War I.

The initial economic policy responses to the Great Depression involved fairly orthodox (for the time) fiscal and monetary policies. On the fiscal side this, in part, meant a search for revenue to balance government budgets, but this did not dictate whether tax increases should be progressive or not. This was a subject of significant debate and that contest was in many but not all countries won by progressive arguments. Once again, this all hinged on how the crisis affected views of tax fairness.

The Great Depression tax debates were shaped by prior wartime experience. In our sample of eighteen countries, the average peak to recovery increase in top income tax rates for countries that mass mobilized for the war was 14.7 percentage points compared to 0.5 percentage points for countries that did not mass mobilize. The U.S. debates over the Revenue Act of 1932 — adopted under the Hoover administration and before the New Deal — are illustrative. The Revenue Act raised the top rate of income tax from 25% to 63%, and Congress explicitly debated and voted on rates that corresponded with World War I policy. In the Senate, a key debate was between 1918 and 1921 rates, with the latter being adopted (Blakey and Blakey, 1932). The experience of the war provided a model for policymakers to draw on. Moreover, Congress seriously considered adopting a national sales tax to close the deficit. The debate hinged on considerations of economic efficiency, industry and regional self-interest, and fairness.

Interestingly, World War I loomed large, not just as an example of what was possible, but also of what was fair. For example, in one of his speeches debating the bill in the Senate, Robert M. La Follette, Jr. started with standard ability-to-pay arguments against a sales tax, but he then highlighted the continued importance of war debt to the budget and argued:

That burden must be paid; and we are fighting here in opposing the sales tax, not only over the question how revenue shall be raised to achieve an alleged “balanced Budget” in this emergency but we are fighting to determine whether the cost of the war shall be borne in proportion to ability to pay, or whether we shall put that burden upon those who were called to fight this war on foreign soil, 3,000 miles away, and upon their children and their children’s children. (Congressional Record, May 28, 1932, pp 11499-11500).

This quote shows how the conscription of wealth argument of the prior crisis continued to give
policymakers a fairness repertoire for building a majority in favor of progressive policies.

Another key feature of the Great Depression—mass unemployment—also influenced fairness considerations in the debate. Members of Congress regularly referenced the injustice of imposing costs through a national sales tax on the millions of unemployed and their families. A great deal of debate time was spent on whether the exemptions in the proposed sales tax adequately reduced the force of this argument.

The Great Recession of 2008

If the great crises of the twentieth century created new fairness-based arguments for doing something about inequality, what about the first major crisis of the twenty-first century? The Great Recession, which began in 2008, certainly had some of the makings of crises past. In this instance one sector—banking—benefitted from loose regulation prior to the crisis and then from bailouts once the crisis hit. These bailouts were necessary for reasons of systemic risk in the financial sector, and its potential consequences for the banking sector, but they were of particular benefit to a few, and it seemed like rewarding bad behavior. Talk grew in the United States of Wall Street being privileged over Main Street.

At the end of the day, in the United States and other countries there was no massive plan to heavily tax Wall Street on compensatory fairness grounds. However, careful empirical work by Julian Limberg (2019, 2020) has shown that there was an aggregate effect of the crisis across countries, amounting to a hike in top marginal rates of income taxation by about four percentage points. Also, the arguments made for these tax increases were indeed compensatory in nature; it was not just “we need money and we’ll take it where we see it.” At the end of the day these were compensatory fairness arguments in a new guise, but they did not have the same impact as in the crises of the twentieth century. Ultimately, this may point to the fact we saw in the data earlier: Crises sometimes lead societies to do something about inequality, but not often. The crisis itself must have a feature that lends itself to new fairness arguments that produce a societal consensus to address inequality.

What Happens to Inequality After COVID-19?

It is not hard to imagine that the economic and societal crisis that is COVID-19 might lead to important new fairness-based arguments for policies that reduce inequality. But what would these arguments look like? We suggest two possibilities that are not mutually exclusive. The first—something that has been seen in past crises—would be to shift opinion away from the idea that those who suffer are in that position because of their own lack of effort or foresight. The second, more novel, possibility would be if new arguments emerge that take explicit account of the intersectional nature of inequalities that COVID-19 has made apparent across race, gender, and class.

Just as was the case in the Great Depression and in the Great Recession of 2008, the economic crisis triggered by COVID-19 has led to a great many people losing their jobs, and it is hard to argue that it is their own fault. While personal choices like failing to wear a mask influence whether one gets the virus itself, at the individual level they cannot protect against the economic fallout. Likewise, no one in the Fall of 2019 thought that opening a restaurant was a risky decision because of the possibility of a global pandemic. Econometric evidence from
the Great Recession shows that unemployment experience shifted attitudes in favor of social spending, but the duration of this effect was not very long (Margalit 2013). After COVID-19, we may see a shift in favor of greater social spending. Once the fiscal bills for this crisis start to come due, there may be arguments that those who made windfall profits should be the ones to pay and not those who lost their jobs.

It is also possible that we will see a second type of fairness argument emerge after COVID-19, and this would take explicit account of the nature of inequalities across class, race, and gender. If we compare 1914 and 2020, then the striking feature of the former instance is that this was a crisis about and within the white male electorate. Other groups suffered massive inequalities, but they were largely excluded from politics. It was also an era with a simple class structure: there were those with wealth and those without. In the United Kingdom on the eve of World War I the top one percent of the population is estimated to have held 69% of private wealth in the country. The vast majority of soldiers who fought in the war would have had no wealth apart from small household effects.

When we think about the inequality fault lines of 2020, they are much more intersectional. It is true that some of the very rich have, by virtue of their position, profited from the COVID-19 crisis in a way that resembles those manufacturers who earned “war profits” in 1914. But even more importantly, the coming political debates about inequality after COVID — and rightly so — have the potential to focus on a range of different inequalities. Instead of simply being a story of the very rich and the rest, the COVID-19 crisis has shown how people of color have suffered much more in terms of health and wealth when compared to others. The pandemic has shown further how the lives of women are challenged by the pandemic, something that is clear from recent US data on labor force participation for men and women. Finally, there is another critical cleavage between those who have jobs that allow them to work from home and those for whom this is not an option. This is an “us versus them” of a very different sort from the very rich versus the rest.

The big question is what new fairness-based arguments to reduce inequality will look like in the coming years given the range of different inequalities that COVID has revealed and exacerbated. One thing that seems clear is that 1914 style arguments that only emphasize a cleavage between the rich and the rest will probably fail to win the day. What would be needed instead is a compelling, concise, and unifying argument that succeeds in capturing the multiple inequalities that COVID-19 has exacerbated. Such an argument might still emphasize that those who have done well out of this crisis should pay more, but it would need to simultaneously emphasize what can be done to elevate the status of those who have been marginalized.
References


COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE CAREGIVING CRISIS, WELFARE STATES, AND MEN’S ROLES

by Mala Htun and Francesca R. Jensenius

Historically, care work—the reproductive labor involved in maintaining healthy human beings and workers—was performed primarily in the family and by women. Assumptions of familism and women’s traditional roles still prevail in many places. In advanced democracies, however, public and market provision of care work has increased as welfare states adapted to growing participation in the paid labor force, especially among women. Today, most families depend on public support for care giving or arrangements with market providers.

In the context of greater reliance on extra-household supports, the Covid-19 pandemic created a crisis in caregiving. By the “caregiving crisis,” we refer to the reduction in social supports typically available to help families care for dependents of all ages. The crisis was triggered most dramatically and universally by the closure of schools and childcare centers. Other contributing factors include restrictions on senior residential facilities, reduced help from extended families, and reduced access to babysitters and home health aides.

Due to the caregiving crisis, as well as gender differences in occupational segregation and stratification, the pandemic will likely produce different effects on men and women. How these differences play out will in turn depend on the various ways that countries have attempted to provide for care work and the different degrees to which they have attempted to change the historic gender division of labor.

Some countries have opted for public provision, others rely on the market, and others continue to presume a major role for families and women, regardless of women’s actual levels of participation in the paid labor force. A gender gap in care work persists across countries but varies significantly. 2018 data from OECD shows women do 11 more hours of “informal labor” per week than men in the U.S., 7 more hours in Norway, and 21 more hours in Japan.\footnote{“Informal labor” includes primarily care for dependents and housework, but also volunteering. We calculated the gap from data available at stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TIMEUSE}

In this essay, we attribute these differences, in part, to the United States’ gender-neutral, laissez-faire approach, the financial incentives created by Norway for men’s participation in parental leave, and Japan’s inability, thus far, to
change men’s roles and the culture of overwork. Our essay implies that the way out of the caregiving crisis, related not only to COVID-19 but in the longer term, involves the greater valuation of care work and greater gender equality in the division of care labor, arguments long advanced by feminist scholars of the welfare state (see, e.g. Folbre 1994; Fraser 2014; Gornick and Meyers 2003, 2008; Orloff, 1993). It is also important to support a diversity of caregiving arrangements and to recognize the variety of individual preferences and choices vis-à-vis care work.

**Caregiving in the United States**

In the U.S.’s liberal welfare state, market-provision characterizes care work and social support more generally. People tend to buy care work, health care, retirement pensions, and the like on the market. State programs compensate for market failures, for example, when people have too little money to pay (Htun and Weldon 2018; O’Connor et al. 1999).

As is well known, the U.S. is the only advanced democracy that does not offer publicly paid family leave, though it does not prevent companies and individual states from creating their own leave provisions. As of 2018, four states offered paid leave, funded primarily through payroll deductions for disability insurance. At the federal level, the Family and Medical Leave Act, enacted in 1993 after two presidential vetoes and opposition from business groups, requires companies with more than 50 employees, as well as all public sector employers regardless of size, to grant employees 12 weeks of unpaid leave per year. The FMLA was framed as a pro-labor and pro-family policy and its language is gender-neutral, in contrast to policies in many countries that offer maternity leave to women only (Bernstein 2001).

FMLA coverage is not universal. 2018 surveys estimate that only around 56% of workers are eligible for the leave. The policy covers 10% of private sector workplaces, though these workplaces account for some 59% of employment (Brown et al. 2020). In 2018, some 15% of employees reported taking leave in the past 12 months, with no statistically significant difference between women and men leave takers. Some 29% of workers in single-parent households reported taking leave, compared to 19% of workers in dual-parent households (Ibid).

FMLA surveys show that less educated workers are also more likely to take FMLA leave than educated workers: 23% of workers with less than a high school degree report taking leave in the past 12 months, compared to just 12% of college educated workers (Brown et al. 2020). Many educated workers do not need to use the FMLA, since they work for public and private organizations that offer paid parental and medical leave.

When it comes to childcare, workers with resources are able to hire care workers, including nannies and au pairs, on the private market or pay childcare centers. For many women, the ability to outsource care work has enabled them to advance professionally as men historically did, by distancing themselves from care giving. Often, women can “lean in” by “leaning on” the work of other women, often women who are disadvantaged by class, race, and immigration status (Gutting and Fraser 2015).

Women with fewer resources rely on state support or family members. State governments offer vouchers to people who qualify, usually by earning no more than 150 percent of the federal poverty level (around 36,000 USD in 2015), so they can pay private providers. People who earn more have to pay out of pocket, which consumes a giant share of family income. In most
places, childcare is expensive—some $10,000 a year, and double or triple that amount in big cities. Childcare workers tend to be more poorly paid than other workers with similar levels of education and experience, and childcare centers operate on slim margins. During the pandemic, many centers closed, and others suffered revenue declines (Rexrode 2020).

Women dominate care giving professions such as health care and elementary education, in addition to domestic work. In part due to women's greater presence, these professions are viewed as lower status and less valuable than professions such as engineering and computer science. Though people are aware of the gender imbalance in both woman-dominated care-giving professions and male-dominated STEM professions, they express greater support for changing male-dominated professions than woman-dominated occupations (Block et al. 2019) due to the higher status associated with these jobs.²

Even many feminists tend to imagine women's emancipation as public sphere achievement: becoming a CEO, senator, or scientist. When they explain women's lower presence in power and among prominent people than men, academic feminists tend to identify caregiving as a major obstacle. Women's care giving duties, choices, and balancing struggles often figure into accounts of women's low numbers in elected office, for example (see, e.g. Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010; Keohane 2020; Sanbonmatsu 2020; Teele et al. 2018). Successful women, like successful men, distance themselves from care giving. As one 30-year-old new mother in the U.S. told us, “I would love to stay home for one or two years with my baby. But don’t tell anyone that.” As with many of her generation, she noted, “I’ve been taught to look down on the traditional mother’s role.”³

Though care giving tends to get devalued financially as well as culturally, there is evidence that men in some groups are doing more care work than before. For example, men’s parenting investments tend to be positively associated with women's labor force participation. Among upper income couples with both parents working for wages, there have been shifts toward a more egalitarian distribution of labor (Esping-Andersen 2009).

What is more, some studies show that men have assumed greater responsibilities for housework and childcare during the pandemic. Carlson, Petts, and Pepin's April 2020 survey of some 1000 U.S. parents finds that both women and men report that men are doing more child care and more housework during the pandemic than before, and that more couples say they share housework and child care equally (Carlson et al. 2019a). These changes are likely attributable to teleworking, as fathers who work from home engage in significantly more childcare than fathers who do not work from home (Carlson et al., 2020b).

Men’s participation may respond less to an ideology of egalitarianism, or to state policy or incentives, than pragmatism. Several men interviewed by the Wall Street Journal in the fall of 2020 said that staying home with their kids during the pandemic’s school closures made financial sense, and one added that “making

². Block et al. (2019) attribute the asymmetry in support for social change to people's assumptions about the reasons for gender imbalance: they tend to perceive women's scarcity in engineering, for example, as a function of external factors such as bias and discrimination, and men's low numbers in care giving due to low motivation.
³. Interview in New Mexico, February, 2018.
this jump has kind of been freeing” (Feintzeig 2020). A Las Vegas-based father interviewed by the *New York Times* said that “As much as this pandemic has brought me some hardship and uncertainty, it’s kind of a blessing — it’s let me focus more on parenting” (deParle 2020).

In summary, the lack of public support for care giving in the U.S.’s liberal model corresponds to a financial, cultural, and status devaluation of care giving. Care giving tends to be a low-paid and woman-dominated profession, and people with few resources have long struggled to gain adequate supports for care. As this suggests, the Covid-19 caregiving crisis is not new for many low- and middle-income people, as they have long struggled to combine work and family. Attention to caregiving during the pandemic reflects the relative novelty of the crisis among upper-income and professional classes, who had relatively more resources to outsource care work before the pandemic.

At the same time, however, many people in the U.S. use and support diverse caregiving arrangements. When it makes financial sense for men to stay home, they sometimes do. Many men do care work and some survey and anecdotal data show that men have assumed greater care responsibilities during the pandemic. As men’s participation grows, the status of care giving may rise, which would benefit women, families, and everyone.

**Public support for care giving in Norway**

In contrast to the United States, Norway provides extensive public support for care giving. There is generous parental leave of about one year, “daddy quotas”—the non-transferable parental leave reserved for fathers, workers’ right to take up to two years of additional unpaid leave without losing their position in the work place, universal and heavily subsidized child care beginning at age 1, cash-for-care benefits for people who choose to care for children at home rather than in public kindergartens, monthly child allowances, universal health care, free and excellent public education, and so on.

Whereas the dominant influence on women’s rights policies in the U.S. has been liberal feminism, maternalist feminist tendencies shaped the Norwegian welfare state’s care policies. According to Torild Skard, one of Norway’s most influential women politicians in the 1960s and 1970s, Norwegian feminism of that era “was rooted in recognition of women’s essential difference from men, and a celebration of that difference.” Women saw good mothering and good child well-being as feminist projects.4

The maternalist women’s movement produced great policy successes, including the Day Care Act of 1975, which made childcare a municipal responsibility, and the introduction of 18 weeks of fully paid parental leave in 1977 (Leira 1992). In the beginning, priority for childcare was given to children with special needs and children from families deemed unable to care for them. Though the Day Care Act helped some women combine work and family (which was an issue, since the labor force participation of women increased from about 28 percent in 1960 to more than 50 percent in the mid-1970s),5 that was not its primary intention. Rather, the parliamentary discussion was focused almost exclusively on child well-being and children’s interests.

The goal of the Day Care Act and other policies is to help women and men combine work and

4. Interview in Oslo, June 2016.
family. The goal is not to help women rule the country or become CEOs. As historic feminist Hege Skjeie put it, “feminism in Scandinavia is not the feminism of the career woman.”

Norway, like other Scandinavian countries, tends to have higher levels of occupational segregation than the U.S. and fewer women in senior management positions (Estevez-Abe 2006; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010). The government’s most recent equality report found that men make up 70 percent of leaders, and women only 30 percent. The private sector is even more male dominated, and CEOs are 90 to 95 percent male. To promote greater diversity in leadership, the government introduced quotas in corporate board of directors in 2007. As a result of the policy, the share of board positions held by women grew from 6 percent in 2002 to 42 percent in 2016.

The state has long prioritized increasing men’s participation in caregiving. As early as the 1970s, the government gave Norwegian men the right to unpaid and then paid leave in relation to childbirth. With the exception of the six week period after the birth, which was reserved for mothers, parental leave could also be split between the parents.

In 1993, Norway introduced the “daddy quota,” a revolutionary care policy intended to alter the gender division of labor in the home. Sweden adopted a similar policy in 1994. The goal behind the daddy quota was to reconceptualize and reconfigure masculinity. In 1986, Norway’s labor government established a commission to examine men’s gender roles and aspects of maleness and masculinity, including fatherhood. The commission, headed by a young male Labor Party politician (Jens Stoltenberg, later the Norwegian PM and the head of NATO), argued for an extension of parental leave to 18 months, with 6 months reserved for each parent (Leira 1992; Leira 2002). The Labor-dominated parliament adopted a scaled-back version of the original proposal, cutting the 3 months reserved for the father back to 4 weeks and making the father’s right to care conditional on mother’s employment. Subsequently, the mother’s work requirement was relaxed and the fathers’ leave period was extended several times. Since 2018, the daddy quota has been set at 15 weeks.

Data show that the policy has produced a massive increase in father’s roles in infant caregiving. Before the daddy quota, fewer than 3% of fathers took paternity leave. This share grew to 25% in the month after the law was changed, and then to 60% in 2006 (Cools et al. 2015). As of 2018, more than 70% of men use this quota, and a large share of men additionally take some of the rest of the parental leave that can be used by either parent.

Culturally, paternal caregiving has been normalized. It is common to see dozens of men with strollers in parks and playgrounds in the middle of the workday. Commercial advertisements target male caregivers. People see fathering as manly and as sexy. What is more, the daddy quota has helped to equalize other as-

6. Interview in Oslo, June 2016.
9. See the full report at https://www.nb.no/nbsok/nb/060e4ce6a85ca54517a0399c28bc45902?lang=no0
10. The leave is split into a part reserved for the mother, a part reserved for the father, and a part that can be taken by either parent. In 2015, 37% of men took more of the leave than the daddy quota (see https://www.ssb.no/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/teidevakten-mer-populaer-enn-noengang-289200)
pects of the gender division of household labor and improved child well being (Cools et al., 2015; Kotsadam and Finseraas, 2011; Kotsadam and Finseraas 2013).

For some parents with dual career ambitions, however, the government’s care policies are not enough. The system “does not add up.” As one woman we interviewed put it, “one can’t have a career and also take good care of kids.” As a result, most people with demanding jobs maintain multiple private arrangements with babysitters and family members. Not everyone has the resources and connections to create these support networks, however, and many people complain. Some careerist parents who hire au pairs or house cleaners downplay this fact in public. There is widespread reverence for the social democratic tradition of equality and cultural expectations that people should manage all types of work themselves. These tendencies inhibit public recognition of, and open debate about, the fact that many families actually need to outsource care work to maintain two full-time jobs.

In addition, there is little cultural acceptance of parents who want to stay home to care for their own children. The cash-for-care policy that allows parents, mostly mothers, to stay at home has been controversial. Women from ethnic and cultural minority groups are overrepresented among people who make this choice, which has generated concerns that staying at home prevents women from successfully assimilating into Norwegian culture.

Though the Norwegian model values care, the culture tends to be conformist, and women who make non-typical choices often get stigmatized and isolated. What is more, the greater participation of fathers has been achieved through government policy. Though attitudes and norms seem to have changed, we don’t know whether these changes will endure without the daddy quota. In fact, the increase of the daddy quota to 15 weeks in 2018 was a direct response to the reduction in time fathers took after the policy was scaled back from 14 to 10 weeks in 2014.12

Care policies and gender roles in Japan

Like Norway, the Japanese government has made focused efforts to encourage men’s greater participation in caregiving, which marks a change from past policies. Historically, the Japanese welfare state did little directly to support caregiving. It was based on the male breadwinner model, the assumption of lifetime employment, and the understanding that reproductive labor—care of children, elderly, and the household—would be performed by women in the home, though many companies offered their married male workers benefits such as child allowances and housing (Osawa, 1994; Peng, 2002).

Beginning in the 1990s, the state changed its approach in order to combat the decline in fertility and the aging population. The government introduced greater supports to encourage women to work and promote greater work-life balance, including parental leave for both men and women, expanded access to child care, and universal child allowances (Boling 2015; Rosenbluth 2006). These efforts accelerated as the birthrate continued to slide.

By the 2010s, the government began to focus on men. The Ikumen project, launched in 2010

11. Interview in Oslo, June 2016.
by the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, is one example of an effort to change men’s roles. As explained by the Minister at the time, *ikumen* is a play on the word *ikuji*, which means child rearing, and *ikemen*, which means good-looking man. The concept of *ikumen* thus conceptualizes men who are involved in child rearing and housework as “cool” and attractive, creating an alternative masculine ideal to that of the absent salaryman and financial provider. The project aims to project a fresh ideal of masculinity to combat the shrinking population and to persuade more men to take parental leave (Dominguez, et. al. 2018).

Though both men and women have the right to take up to 12 months of paid leave, very few men take any leave at all. Data from 2018 show that 6% of working fathers, but 82% of working mothers, took parental leave. In 2016, only 3% of men took leave. Men who do take leave tend to take only a little time off—usually just a few days (Siripala, 2020).

A giant obstacle to the emergence of more *iku-men*, as well as gender equality in the workplace generally, is Japan’s culture of long working hours, among the worst in the OECD (Nemoto, 2013). Working overtime, seven days a week, and past midnight is common, and overtime work is poorly regulated. Feminist activists had for years identified work culture as a barrier to women’s advancement and changes in men’s roles, and in the 2000s, a broader coalition of men’s movements, work-life balance consultants, private sector corporations, and government bureaucrats began to mobilize around the issue (Ishii-Kuntz, 2002, 2013). In 2016, then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe created a workstyle reform commission, which proposed modifications to the Labor Standards Law (LSL), approved in 2018, to cap overtime hours. Critics allege that the new regulations are still far too lax.

Many men say they want to be more involved in care work than they actually are. According to a survey of 1000 men conducted by the trade union confederation Rengo, less than 6% of men with children say they had taken any paternity leave at all, while 45% say they had wanted to take leave but felt they could not (Dominguez et al., 2018). None of the men we interviewed in Tokyo in 2017 had personally taken paternity leave, though most knew of at least one male colleague who had taken leave. None of the men interviewed by Mizukoshi et al. (2016, 223) had taken parental leave either, though some had taken a few days of annual paid leave around the births of their children. When we asked men why they hadn’t taken leave, many replied that it never occurred to them to do it. One executive at a large multinational corporation told us: “I’m 50. I have three daughters. I have never taken paternity leave.” When we asked him if he would have liked to take leave, he replied: “I didn’t think about it.”

Enduring institutions in Japan, including the tax system, pension system, and household registration system also contribute to reinforce the norm of the male breadwinner and woman caregiver and reduce incentives for greater male involvement in care work (Boling 1998; Peng 2002; Shin 2008). What is more, though the government succeeded in boosting women’s labor force participation overall, around half of women are in irregular or part-time employment, which gives them little power to bargain for more egalitarian arrangements.

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13. Workers are paid 67% of their salary during the leave period.
Conclusions

Existing caregiving regimes shape governmental approaches to the Covid-19 pandemic. Decisions states make during the pandemic, in turn, will have long-term consequences for gender roles, children’s well-being, and economic performance.

The United States’ heterogeneous and piecemeal care regime has the benefit of accommodating a diversity of care-giving choices, though most caregivers suffer financial penalties and the system is characterized by extreme social inequality. The high degree of privatization of care creates conditions and opportunities for flexible adaptation to the crisis. However, schools and childcare centers across much of the country have closed. Without in-person K-12 education, children’s advancement and well-being depends largely on family resources and ingenuity. As a result, class differences will likely increase.

Norway’s centralized approach to education may be more vulnerable to external shocks, such as the pandemic, as there are few alternatives when state-run care regimes close down.

On the other hand, the government has made it a priority to keep schools and child care centers open. Senior political leaders make the hard decision to emphasize children’s education and activities, even at the expense of businesses run by adults. In addition, decades of efforts to involve men more in child care means that Norway has succeeded far more than the United States and Japan in promoting gender and class equality, making it more logical for men and women to share the extra burden of care work that the Covid caregiving crisis has brought on.

In Japan, in spite of government efforts, there are far fewer institutional, economic, and social incentives for men to participate in care work. The aging population puts strain on caregiving support, and the culture of long working hours makes it impossible for anyone to “have it all.” Even though many men say they would like to do more care work, changing the gender distribution of care labor will require a much more comprehensive institutional transformation. Though recent years have seen many more women joining the paid labor force, the Covid crisis is likely to reverse these trends, which will harm the country’s economic growth.
References


Social and political crises often impact inter-group and inter-ethnic relations. They can increase exclusionary attitudes toward racial minorities, and it is important to understand their impact not only on the majority but also on targeted minorities. Indeed, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, anti-Chinese sentiment in the United States, already on the upswing in the past few years, has ratcheted up significantly. Reminiscent of the attacks faced by American Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Chinese Americans, Chinese living in America, and other Asians perceived as Chinese have been subject to growing racism and discriminatory attacks. The FBI has warned that “hate crime incidents against Asian Americans likely will surge across the United States, due to the spread of coronavirus disease...endangering Asian American communities.” But unlike in 2001, when President George W. Bush called for tolerance toward American Muslims, President Trump and other US politicians have inflamed racist attacks by calling COVID-19 “the Chinese virus” and “Kung Flu.”

What happens when Chinese overseas students who come to the United States experience xenophobic, racist rhetoric? Scholars and policy makers have long thought that the cross-border flow of people for educational exchange in the democratic West may be a way to transfer democratic values and ideas to non-democratic regions of the world (e.g., Coombs 1964). Some consider it an important element affecting the strength of a country’s linkage to the West and its prospects for democratization (Gift and Krcmaric 2017).

However, the large body of research on discrimination shows that experiencing discrimination can lead to a retreat from or a backlash against the dominant group, often as a way of coping with the psychological distress—anger, decreased self-esteem, stress—of experiencing discrimination. Among immigrants, discrimination has been shown to diminish integration and assimilation, increase attachment to ethnic identity, and make radicalization more likely (Abdelgadir and Fouka 2020; Adida, Laitin and Valfort 2010; Gould and Klor 2016; Mitts 2019; Schildkraut 2005). Experiences of racism among minority groups have also been associated with social exclusion and political disenfranchisement (Hajnal and Lee 2011; Kim 2007; Kuo, Malhotra and Mo 2017; Segura and Rodrigues 2006).

If we extend these results to discrimination on the basis of national identity, then Chinese students studying in the United States may increase their support for the political values associated with the national affiliation – authoritarian rule – when they encounter discrimi-
Experiencing anti-Chinese racism increases students' support for preserving authoritarian rule in China.

Survey of Chinese Students in the US and in China

As part of a longitudinal project to understand the lives and perspectives of Chinese undergraduates studying in the United States, we surveyed over 300 first-year Chinese students from 62 US colleges in the spring of 2020. With research partners in China, we also conducted the same survey at three top universities in China. Students in our study were recruited through student networks and a social media platform.

We asked respondents a battery of policy questions to measure their attitudes on nationalism and political liberalism. For example, to measure nationalism, we ask them the extent to which they agree that “national unity and territorial integrity should be defended at all costs.” To measure political liberalism, we ask whether they agree or disagree “The government should allow people to express their positive or negative views toward government policies.” Based on these questions, we create a nationalism ideology index and a political liberalism index. In a separate paper, we show that indices based on these policy questions represent two distinct dimensions of preferences and exhibit high inter-temporal stability (Pan and Xu 2020). We also collect information on demographic and educational background and ask respondents about their evaluations of how well governments around the world, including China, the United States, Japan, and South Korea, have handled the COVID-19 pandemic.

Chinese Students in the US are Less Nationalistic and More Liberal than Their Peers in China

First-year students in the United States are much more likely to come from affluent families, have grown up in a large city, have college-educated parents than students at top universities in China. Compared to students at top universities in China (light gray distribution in Figure 1), Chinese students studying at US colleges (dark gray in Figure 1) are less likely to support nationalistic policies (-0.82 standard deviation, or SD). Chinese students studying in the US are also more likely to subscribe to liberal political values (+0.51 SD). Finally, Chinese students in the US are less supportive of the Chinese regime (-0.79 SD). For both nationalism and regime support, respondents in the US exhibit a large left tail, suggesting that there exist a proportion of Chinese students in United States who are strongly against nationalistic policies and who do not support China’s current political system when compared with other students. These findings are consistent with prior findings that people of high socio-economic economic status in China are more likely to subscribe to liberal political values and less likely to support nationalistic policies (Pan and Xu 2018).
While we think the differences between Chinese students in the US and those in China reflect differences in opinion, one caveat is that Chinese students in the US may also be less likely to self-censor when responding to questions about politics compared to students in China who may feel greater pressure to answer in a politically correct manner.

An Experiment of the Effects of Racist Rhetoric

For students studying in the US, we embedded an experiment in our survey to measure whether exposure to racially derogatory comments changes students’ views toward the need to reform China’s current political system. Students were randomly assigned to three groups. All three groups were exposed to criticism of the Chinese government, but we varied whether respondents were exposed to criticism from US social media and whether that criticism was racially derogatory.

In the first group (Control group), students read a Chinese news article about the death of Dr. Li Wenliang, a Chinese doctor from Wuhan who was silenced for speaking out about COVID-19 and who subsequently died of the disease. Students then read 10 comments we collected from Chinese social media criticizing the Chinese government for its handling of COVID-19.

In the other two groups (Treatment A and Treatment B, respectively), students read a similar article about the death of Dr. Li Wenliang — this time, written by a mainstream US media outlet. Students in Treatment Group A then read 10 comments we collected from US social media criticizing the Chinese government for its handling of COVID-19. Students in Treatment Group B also read actual comments from US social media: 5 were critical of the Chinese government, and 5 contained racially derogatory comments blaming Chinese people for the spread of COVID-19. One of the racist comments says: “The Chinese have disgusting dietary habits. If something moves, they consider it food. Not to mention they’re destroying habit, polluting the skies and waters and just making a mess of everything they touch...”

We then ask respondents in all three groups how they feel about what they have read, and what, if anything, they would want to say to the online
HOW RACIST RHETORIC PUSHES CHINESE OVERSEAS STUDENTS' TOWARD AUTHORITARIANISM (CONTINUED)

We coded their open-ended responses for 1) opinions about China’s challenges and shortcomings, 2) criticisms of the United States government in general and its handling of COVID-19, and 3) other comments (e.g., comments responding to an individual commentator, profanity).

To measure the main outcome variable, support for reforming authoritarian rule in China, we ask respondents a set of four questions related to support for China’s current political system. These include, for example, “Nothing in particular needs to be improved about our country’s current political system” and “It now seems that our country’s political system is not inferior to that of Western developed countries.” We construct a simple additive index of regime support based on these statements. We estimate the average treatment effects (ATEs) of Treatments A and B relative to the Control condition following Lin (2013).

Racisms Boots Support for the Status Quo Chinese Regime

Reading comments critical of the Chinese government from US social media (Treatment A) did not change respondents’ support for the Chinese regime compared to the Control group who read critical comments from Chinese social media. However, Treatment B – reading comments critical of the Chinese government and racist toward Chinese people – increased, on average, respondents’ support for China’s current authoritarian system by about 0.2 standard deviation, which is statistically significant at the 5% level (see Figure 2).
HOW RACIST RHETORIC PUSHES CHINESE OVERSEAS STUDENTS’ TOWARD AUTHORITARIANISM (CONTINUED)

Because our sample size is relatively small, the uncertainty estimates based on large sample theories may be misleading. To account for this potential issue, we conduct a permutation test as a robustness check on the regime support index by randomly reshuffling the treatment assignment among all respondents and re-estimating the effects 2,000 times. The two-sided p-values under sharp nulls is 0.9 for Treatment A and 0.033 for Treatment B (see Figure 3). This means the chance the positive association between Treatment B and regime support is due to a statistical fluke are as small as 3.3%.

The Least Nationalistic are the Most Affected

We find that the broad-brush characterization of Chinese overseas students as nationalists defenders of China may be off the mark. Not only are Chinese overseas students in the US less nationalistic than their peers in China, across the board, students in the US who read highly critical comments of the Chinese government written by Westerners do not show more support for China’s current political system compared with students in the Control group.

However, when we look at who is most affected by the racist attacks, we find that students who are least supportive of nationalistic policies exhibit the biggest increases in support for Chinese authoritarianism. Figure 4 shows the marginal effects of Treatment B (relative to the Control condition) by nationalism ideology (in percentiles) using kernel estimation with bootstrapped confidence intervals. Marginal effects of racist rhetoric are greater for smaller values on the x-axis, which represent respondents who are less supportive of nationalistic policies. This may be because racist comments are novel to less nationalistic students or because those who hold strongly nationalistic views are already highly supportive of Beijing.

Social Comparison Is Not The Main Story, Racism Is.

A potential, alternative explanation for our results is that they are driven by social comparison rather than racism. How people evaluate their own country is often relative to evaluations of other countries and contexts (Duch 1993; Huang 2015; Kayser and Peress 2012; Rose, Mishlerand, and Haerpfer 1998) Experiencing racist attacks while abroad may negatively affect an individual’s evaluation of the country in which discrimination occurred. If the site of discrimination is a democracy and the individual’s home country is autocratic, an individual’s support for authoritarianism may increase because of declining evaluations of democracy. This effect may be exacerbated because our study takes place during the COVID-19 pandemic, where the dismal performance of the United States in handling COVID-19 relative to China is seen by some as a setback for democracy (Diamond 2020).
Our results do not support this explanation. Although it is the case that across all treatment groups, respondents evaluate the Chinese government’s handling of COVID-19 much more positively than the US government’s response, if social comparison were at work, we should observe that respondents in Treatment B are more likely to criticize the US response to the COVID-19 pandemic than respondents in Treatment A. Instead, we find that respondents in Treatment B are not more likely to criticize the US response to the COVID-19 pandemic than respondents in Treatment A. The likelihood of criticizing the US handling of COVID-19 is 8.6% in Treatment B and 14.7% in Treatment A; this difference between Treatment B and Treatment A are not statistically significant. This suggests that the alternative explanation of social comparison is not sufficient to explain the effects of racism on support for Chinese authoritarianism that we observe.

Implications

While prior research on discrimination has shown how discrimination can increase ethnic attachments, we extend this argument to show how discrimination based on attacks on a person’s country of origin (xenophobic attacks) can also increase attachments to the political values of that country of origin. When we integrate this insight into theories of linkage, our results suggest that discrimination on the basis of nationality blocks and perhaps unravels the mechanisms through which education can increase acceptance of liberal democracy. Without discrimination, education abroad may make individuals more likely to want to support liberal democratic values in their home context, but when that time abroad is accompanied by experiences of xenophobia, this become much less likely.

More practically speaking, these results suggest that the rise in anti-Chinese sentiment in the US, which impacts Asian Americans and Asian American communities, may also have implications for political reform in China. Xenophobic rhetoric, including what is spouted by senior US political leaders, may be a boon for the Chinese regime. Racist rhetoric pushes a new generation of Chinese students who are most likely to subscribe to democratic values away from wanting to see political change in China.

More broadly, these results have implications for American politics in a multi-racial country. It suggests different ways in which we can think about minority engagement in politics and belief in democracy in the face of racism. While previous research has shown how racism can lead to social exclusion and political disenfranchisement among minority groups, these results suggest that racism has the potential to shape liberal attitudes and potentially decrease support for democratic values among minorities targeted by racism.

1. In our sample, 89% of respondents said the US government has handled the COVID-19 pandemic badly or very badly, while 89% of respondents said the Chinese government has handled the COVID-19 pandemic well or very well.
References


POPULISM: A Tale of Political and Economic Catastrophe

by Beatrice Magistro and Victor Menaldo

Argentina has cycled between populist democracies and military dictatorships over its modern history. This has catalyzed countless economic crises and catastrophes. The same is true of other Latin American countries. By contrast, Europe’s liberal democracies and the US have largely avoided this predicament, at least since World War II. That is, until now. Their political-economic equilibrium seems to have unraveled since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis; with citizens increasingly questioning the legitimacy of incumbent institutions, including the media and higher education, researchers fear liberal democracy itself is under threat (e.g., Albertus and Menaldo 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).

In today’s populist reincarnation, demagogues exploit preexisting crises and ride waves of uncertainty, fear, and dissatisfaction with the status quo; this has been the case in Hungary with Orbán, Greece with Tsipras, Italy with the Lega and Five Star Movement, and Turkey with Erdogan.

In this essay, we consider the following questions in turn: What is the economic playbook used by populists from both the left and the right, across time and place? Why does the populist playbook lead to economic crises? And how do economic crises themselves foster populism, in a vicious circle? Are Europe and the United States dangerously close to the path taken by Argentina under populist governments in the post-World War II era? To answer these questions, we use both historical and contemporary examples that include Argentina, Italy, Greece, and the US. Finally, given the economic collapse engendered by the Covid-19 pandemic, we forecast what might be in store for populism and liberal democracy.

Populism is the idea that the time-honored institutions that undergird liberal democracy and welfare state capitalism, and the experts who help them function, should be ignored in favor of the so-called will of the people, usually represented by a charismatic leader. The opposite is pluralism, which sees the opposing interests and opinions of the people as a strength, favors diversity, and espouses the view that politics is about compromise, not absolute victory.

While the institutions that populists rail against vary from place to place, populism almost always threatens both liberal democracy and welfare state capitalism. It also threatens the legitimacy and independence of the professional bureaucrats, scientists, economists, and diplomats who run and regulate the modern state and regulatory apparatus that make this system work. The protectionism and mercantilism that...
accompanies populism also weakens the fabric of liberal democracy and welfare state capitalism in more subtle ways.

This has important normative and policy implications. The marriage of these two institutions explains why millions upon millions of people are more prosperous and secure than ever before (McCloskey 2016). Liberal democracies are more likely to foster industrial capitalism: to provide public goods that reduce transaction costs and promote arm’s length exchange, deep and sophisticated capital markets, and Schumpeterian creative destruction—the churn of ideas, firms, and industries that drive economic dynamism (North, Wallis and Weingast 2009). They also adopt policies that reduce risks associated with market exchange (Albertus and Menaldo 2018).

**The Populist Political-Economic Playbook**

The troubled economic and political history of populism is rooted in the logic of economic populism and the fact that populists representing either the left or the right tend to converge on a similar political economic model based on protectionism, crony capitalism, and inveterate rent seeking. Rather than seeing most economic interactions as “win-win” situations, which is the traditional economic perspective – namely, that there are always mutual gains from voluntary exchange – populists are obsessed with the idea that market exchanges are invariably characterized by “win-lose” situations. Moreover, populists are wont to stigmatize an outgroup: a convenient scapegoat blamed by them for the losses. Populists also eschew some of the other key tenets of economic thinking, such as weighing tradeoffs and future consequences. Finally, and ironically, the economic policies that populists pursue, whether they emanate from the left or the right, are equally tragic and invariably end up harming the groups they claim to champion.

The economic policies that populists pursue, whether they emanate from the left or the right, are equally tragic and invariably end up harming the groups they claim to champion.

The checkered development history of populism should therefore give us pause. Whether they are governed by politicians on the left or the right, these political experiments share one thing in common: they usher in economic collapse. Populists spend too much too quickly, expropriate property from the wealthy, corporations, and banks, and engage in trade protectionism and mercantilism. The upshot is economic volatility and stagnation induced by chronic balance of payments problems, sovereign debt defaults, financial crises, and hyper-inflation. The ultimate result is a reactionary countermovement expressed in either a coup or internecine violence and rampant political instability – consider today’s Turkey, for example. Conversely, liberal democracy and welfare state capitalism have worked together, at least since the end of World War II, to promote political stability.

**Populism and Crisis: A Vicious Circle**

What is the relationship between crisis and populism? While in Latin America populism has unfailingly led to economic and political crises, in today’s populist reincarnation the relationship is often reversed: political entrepreneurs take advantage of preexisting crises and dissatisfaction with the status quo to rise to power. Let us start with one of the most notorious cases, Argentina, and then move on to the new wave, including European cases and the US.
From populism to economic and political crises: The case of Argentina

Consider Peronism’s disastrous track record in Argentina, which was one of the world’s richest countries at the turn of the 20th century and is now a relatively poor one. President Juan Perón consolidated his power during the 1950s by gutting democratic institutions, replacing Argentina’s liberal constitution with one that codified the notion that the state was in charge of managing private property to advance the “general” needs of the national economy and promote social justice. He purged the Supreme Court and then packed it with his political lackeys. The Peronist Party and its political allies came to hold large majorities in both the Argentine Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Perón also vitiates the media and the universities.

Perón put together an urban coalition of domestic industrialists and unionized workers and indulged in policies with a considerable urban bias, hammering agricultural interests in the process. Perón’s policies boosted real wages for skilled and unskilled workers by 35%. Yet his subsidies to coddled industries, transfers to labor unions, and public sector hiring spree proved very expensive. Because Perón discouraged Foreign Direct Investment while devastating the export-based cattle and wheat industry and also incentivized heavy industry to import expensive machinery, Argentina suffered a huge foreign exchange shortfall, culminating in a massive devaluation, sovereign debt default, and hyperinflation.

This triggered a coup that unseated Perón; and while he returned to power decades later, his interregnum was marked by a rash of short-lived elected governments succeeded by coups. And his second turn at the wheel was followed by a brutal military dictatorship and a return to democracy marred by new and equally devastating populist experiments. Since 1983 they have been marked by serial currency, sovereign debt, and banking crises, followed by stagflation, immiseration, inequality, and political instability.

The cases of Italy and Greece in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis

The new wave of populism that has recently visited Europe is mainly a result of two crises: the Eurozone crisis starting in late 2009, and the refugee crisis starting in the summer of 2015. One example is Greece’s populist experiment in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis. In 2009, the newly elected Socialist Prime Minister George Papandreou revealed to the world that Greece had been distorting its government debt and budget deficit figures. Disillusioned and angry about the economic situation, Greeks catapulted Alexis Tsipras, from the fledgling Syriza Party, to the prime ministership in 2015 on an anti-austerity platform.

When Tsipras won his first term at the start of 2015, he did so by pledging that he would keep Greece in the Eurozone while making its partners concede much better terms for a new bailout plan. Instead, not only did he not keep his promise, he exacerbated the crisis by forcing Greek citizens and businesses to live with punishing capital controls that further harmed the economy. Tsipras was forced to sign an agreement where Greece hardly won any concessions. By calling a referendum impulsively, he protracted the economic crisis for years. Tsipras was eventually voted out of office in July 2019, marking the end of Greece’s populist experiment.

Italy’s experience with populism in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis came much later...
than Greece’s. After a technocratic government from 2011 to 2013, which kept Italy out of any formal agreements with the Troika but at the cost of harsh austerity measures, and after the Democratic Party’s failure to deliver reforms that would put Italy on a more sustainable fiscal and economic path, Italy’s economy remained stuck in neutral and it was hit by a refugee crisis of unprecedented proportions. This set the stage for the electoral success of populism.

Immigration and the economy were two of the key issues for voters during the 2018 election and the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (FSM) and Lega parties successfully fed off of citizens’ increasing anger and disillusion. Both the FSM and Lega ran on a similar populist platform during the 2018 elections. These were centered on promises to reintroduce early retirement, deport migrants, institute a guaranteed minimum income, and cut taxes. The two parties then formed an unlikely coalition government in May of 2018. In September 2019, as the Lega was riding high in the polls and its coalition partner, the FSM, was collapsing, Matteo Salvini (the leader of the Lega) pulled the plug on Italy’s government. However, rather than calling new elections, the FSM and Italy’s Democratic Party managed to form a new coalition government, leaving the Lega on the political sidelines.

Populism is far from dead, however, as the Lega continues to be beholden to a constituency that opposes economic reforms and is hostile to immigration, and is now polling at close to 30%, while Brothers of Italy, a far-right nativist and Eurosceptic party, polls at close to 15%, up from 4% in the 2018 elections.

The two faces of populism in our own backyard: The case of the US

To witness the recent ascendance of political and economic populism, we do not have to go further than the United States. For all of the hand-wringing about President Trump’s political populism and flirtation with authoritarianism between 2016 and 2020, it seems like pundits and academics voiced fewer concerns about his alarming economic populism. This may be because the following actions have—rightly perhaps—sucked up all the oxygen: his ham-fisted attempts to goad foreign governments to interfere in the 2020 election on Republicans’ behalf; harassing the media; threatening the post office with drastic budget cuts in the middle of a pandemic in which voting by mail became an insurance policy against mass disenfranchise-ment; calls to supporters to vote twice; rampant interference with the Department of Justice; and his prevarications about respecting the results of the Presidential Election, as well as claims that it was despoiled by fraud.

Serial violations of the rule of law on behalf of neo-mercantilism intended to help Trump’s friends and hurt his perceived enemies are deeply concerning as well though. Yes, pundits voiced outrage over the conspicuous corruption implied by the American President’s attempts to steer business towards his properties—including The Trump International, Mar-a-Lago, and Doonbeg Resort—by holding official state functions there (Graham 2020). But other actions, many of which he undertook right after winning office, loom large too. In 2017 he jawboned Carrier, an HVAC maker, to keep an inefficient plant open in Indianapolis, ostensibly in order to save jobs. Or take his steel and aluminum tariffs: they might have benefitted a smattering of American steel and aluminum manufactures that don’t also import some of
these metals themselves, but they hammered the aerospace industry, automobile makers, appliance makers, canned goods manufacturers, and the construction industry. These industries inevitably passed on their higher costs to consumers. Or take his browbeating of Harley Davidson over their foreign plants.

Furthermore, Trump’s fixation with Jeff Bezos has been particularly disconcerting. Against all logic and evidence, he repeatedly contemplated bringing antitrust measures against Amazon, as well as directed the Post Office to investigate whether it’s being taken to the cleaners when delivering Amazon packages, even though Amazon related business has been a godsend that has helped it staunch its losses. This defies common sense, since the purpose of antitrust is to stop firms from using market power to hurt competition and discourage innovation. However, prices on Amazon goods and services keep falling like a stone as its costs keep declining. Plus, the company keeps plowing its profits into research and development, which has allowed it to innovate across its various divisions, including e-commerce, cloud computing, entertainment, and retail. This promises even better products and services and lower prices in the future. One can add to this a dubious case brought by the Department of Justice against the merger of Time Warner and AT&T that the government lost in federal court and that may have reflected President Trump’s resentment against CNN more than any legal or economic merits (Morris 2019).

Finally, President Trump treated some of America’s most productive farmers as his dependents: handing out aid to them to redress their losses from Chinese retaliation for tariffs he slapped on Chinese imports. This means Americans have paid for these tariffs twice, in the form of both higher prices and higher debt and taxes. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic hit, triggering sweeping stimulus spending, the United States was registering record budget deficits as a share of the economy under Trump (CRFB 2020)—thus reflecting one of the most commonly called plays in the populist playbook: spending way beyond your country’s means.

The COVID-19 Pandemic: A Crossroads For Populism?

The COVID-19 pandemic represents a crossroads for populism. As economic activity plummeted everywhere in the wake of the spread—and attempted containment by governments—of the Covid-19 pandemic, unemployment skyrocketed. The length and depth of the current economic decline remains a source of great uncertainty; it may ultimately depend on whether COVID-19 will continue to represent a public health threat (OECD 2020). According to the IMF World Economic Outlook 2020, the EU’s economy is expected to shrink by 7.5 percent in 2020, with Greece and Italy expected to be the worst affected countries (seeing respective declines in GDP of 10 and 9.1 percent). That source also projects that the US economy will shrink by 5.9 percent.

In the most optimistic scenario, in which the pandemic’s threat to public health recedes in the second half of 2020 and governments gradually lift restrictions, the US and EU economies are projected to grow by 4.7 percent in 2021, in a V-shaped fashion. However, there is great uncertainty over whether the most optimistic scenario will indeed materialize and during July of 2020 Covid-19 outbreaks significantly worsened in many US states, including in California, Texas, and Florida (Partlow and Miroff 2020). The same was true in November 2020 as well.
If these current trends continue and the virus crests as a “second wave”, the likely economic fallout is projected to be much worse: the recovery will look more like a U or an L (Derby 2020). The upshot could be another huge increase in joblessness as lockdowns and quarantines follow new COVID-19 surges (OECD 2020).

The biggest sources of future damage are likely to be human made, however. In the wake of the pandemic, populism and its attendant crises may become self-reinforcing: the ongoing economic crisis associated with COVID-19 might fuel more populism and populism, in turn, may make the economic situation worse, as well as stoke political crises.

When COVID-19 hit, the EU had just emerged from the worst economic crisis in the bloc’s history, as well as a refugee crisis of epic proportions, and the United Kingdom’s secession. Unexpectedly, 400 million people were forced into lockdowns and almost 180,000 people died. The result? European politicians began to attack each other with ferocity and turned inward, rather than cooperating (The Economist 2020). To speed up the EU recovery, a group of countries led by Spain suggested a grant of about euros 1.5trn, which would be funded by debt backed collectively by the EU as a whole. However, this plan was opposed by small northern countries from the get go since this recovery fund would mostly help collapsing southern European economies (The Economist 2020). On May 27th 2020, the European Commission issued its proposal for a recovery fund of about 750 billion Euros, mostly made up of grants, rather than loans, and a revised long-term EU budget of €1.100 billion for 2021-2027.

The recovery fund (“Next Generation EU”) involves raising funds through bonds guaranteed by the EU budget and distributing them as grants and loans, conditional on whether expenditures are aligned with EU priorities (Leigh 2020). The EU and its member states have debated for months over how to allocate the recovery package. The Commission’s proposal included both an insurance feature, where countries hit harder get more EU funds, and a redistributive feature, where countries with lower per capita incomes receive more EU funds (Darvas 2020). The Commission’s plan was supported by Europe’s four biggest economies, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, but not by the “frugal four”: The Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark (Leigh 2020).

After four days of negotiation, EU leaders finally reached a deal on July 21st 2020. These talks pushed the bloc’s ability to overcome internal political divisions to the limits. However, this is a historical agreement, possibly the bloc’s Hamiltonian moment, which should bring the EU closer to a fiscal union, since it would give the bloc the unprecedented power to borrow funds on the financial markets and allocate it to member states (Norman 2020). In the final version, the frugal four succeeded in reducing the overall amount of grants (from €500bn to €390bn) and increasing the amount of loans (from €250bn to €360bn); furthermore, they managed to secure rebates against their normal budget contributions. In terms of conditionality, member states will need to prepare national recovery plans, where in exchange for their allocated share of funding, which they will receive between 2021 and 2023, they commit to reform their economies (Brunsden, Fleming and Khan 2020).
As a result of the fierce battle between Italy and the Netherlands, they decided to introduce a governance mechanism that would allow a member state to ask for referral to the Council if they consider that there are serious deviations from the fulfilment of a country’s promises in return from the EU funds. This kind of “emergency break” would allow any member state to temporarily block the EU’s transfers while the EU investigates whether commitments are being respected. This however can only slow down the disbursement process, but cannot halt it, since the Commission retains the final say (Brunsden, Fleming and Khan 2020).

This historical agreement seems to ward off more exits like Britain’s; yet, the burden of the latest crisis will once again fall heaviest on the peripheral countries. To be sure, this may help deepen European integration—but it may also fuel the ongoing backlash against the distributional consequences of a stronger political and fiscal union. While the jury is still out, recent history suggests that Europe will continue to be ripped asunder by the basic economic and political imbalances between northern and southern countries; these divides may, in turn, be magnified by populists and used to fuel campaigns of resentment, revanchism, and scapegoating in both blocs.

Italy is in perhaps the most precarious position. It was not only one of the European countries that was hardest hit by the pandemic in terms of deaths from the virus, but its economy suffered a devastating blow. Although growth had just started to pick up slightly when Covid-19 hit, Italy’s GDP is slated to experience a 9.5 percent contraction in 2020 according to EU forecasts. This may put further strain on Italian government debt as budget balances will likely deteriorate further in light of the pandemic induced downturn, leading to lower tax revenues and higher unemployment benefit payments. In order to afford its generous safety net and produce enough jobs for Italy’s youth the country needs growth, a difficult task in light of the fact that its productivity effectively flatlined twenty years ago. Where this growth will come from is unclear.

What is not in doubt, however, is that the EU, rooted in the tenets of liberal democracy and welfare state capitalism, has delivered more than half a century of peace, stability and prosperity, raising living standards for over 300 million people. The Eurozone and refugee crises, and the economic and cultural struggles that ensued, fueled a populist upsurge in Europe; the ultimate scope of the COVID-19 crisis, and the individual response of member states, whether cooperative or unilateral, will determine the future of the EU, with consequences for prosperity, liberty, and stability.

The situation in the United States is unlikely to be much different. In a context where deglobalization, inequality, and populism were already on the rise before 2020, the ongoing economic crisis and spike in unemployment that has accompanied it may make the situation much worse. Anti-globalization feelings may increase further as restrictions on travel and cross-border investment continue apace. Populists are likely to take advantage of rising fears over legitimate national security concerns. They make seek to renationalize and on-shore industries that produce “essential goods” such as antibiotics, masks, and ventilators—and are unlikely to stop just there. It also remains unclear whether the GOP will decide to change political direction, away from its current nationalist, nativist, and
populist drift. Maybe there is no going back to liberal internationalism, globalization, and free markets, however; the American electorate has changed, both demographically and ideologically, perhaps circumscribing the Republican Party’s ability to maneuver politically (see Brownstein 2020).

Furthermore, in addition to all the uncertainty surrounding the pandemic and its political consequences, another financial crash might be around the corner. The reforms passed in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, although well intentioned, have not kept banks from falling back into old habits: while cheap mortgages fueled economic growth in the 2000s, easy and risky corporate debt issued at high levels of leverage has been juicing the US economy over the past ten years. Loan defaults are already on the rise in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis — and it may only get worse in the next few months. But if banks were to find themselves on the edge of the precipice once again, facing the possibility of going insolvent and taking the global economy down with them, this time around the political response may be much different than in 2008. Both populists on the left and right have been highly critical of handouts to big banks and bailouts in general. It is also unclear if the US Federal Reserve can continue to keep its foot on the liquidity and stimulus gas pedal, which it has done since March of this year in response to COVID-19, without triggering an adverse reaction in the sovereign bond markets and stoking high levels of inflation. This would in turn fuel higher interest rates, making it more difficult for an economic recovery to take hold.

Finally, there is the effect of potential future populism in Europe and the US on the world. If deglobalization accelerates beyond essential medical supplies to include ordinary industries and the nationalization and vertical integration of supply chains, this is likely to have devastating consequences on the standard of living in developing countries. It basically risks putting hundreds of millions of people back into poverty (Rogoff 2020).

Are Europe and the United States dangerously close to the path taken by Argentina under populist governments in the post-World War II era? Is rampant crony capitalism and protectionism masquerading as industrial policy around the corner? What about serial balance of payments crises, sovereign debt defaults, and stagflation?

Populism preceded the COVID-19 nightmare and polarization; inequality, and a breakdown in the norms of liberal democracy in the context of an economic depression and unemployment crisis may accelerate the march to dysfunctional and less accountable governments across the west. Plus, the payoffs to demagoguery are higher when the tradeoffs are costly and the solutions to problems complicated. It goes without saying that COVID-19 has increased those costs and complications to the nth degree. ●
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RESILIENT NEOLIBERALISM? The politics of policy responses to the Great Financial Crisis on Europe’s Periphery

by Dorothee Bohle

In the decade since the outbreak of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), European societies have struggled to find answers to two major conflicts: first, how to distribute the costs of the financial crisis while restoring growth, and second, how to reconcile national political and economic preferences with requirements stemming from international markets, institutions and actors. European societies have found four answers. The first attests to the resilience of the pre-crisis neoliberal and pro-integrationist policy consensus, and is supported by mainstream political forces. The second answer, promoted by right-wing nationalist forces pushes for selectively restoring national sovereignty and heeds particularistic economic interests, without however breaking with the distributorial priorities and the competitiveness agenda of neoliberalism. The third, left-wing nationalist answer seeks a decisive break with the distributorial priorities of neoliberalism by promoting a return of the state able to provide social cohesion within the national society, and opts for a modification of international integration to increase the room for maneuver for domestic policies. Finally, a fourth, pro-integration answer from the left seeks to combine a pro-social, anti-neoliberal agenda with a strong commitment to international integration.

These answers have not been distributed equally. Existing literature has established a surprising resilience of neoliberalism, despite the heavy social costs that it entailed, and even though neoliberalism was at the origin of the GFC (e.g. Schmidt and Thatcher 2013). With time, however, right-wing nationalism has become a successful challenger in Europe as elsewhere, as witnessed among others by the pursuit of such policies under Viktor Orbán in Hungary (e.g. Appel and Orenstein 2018). In contrast, both left integrationist and left nationalist answers have so far been comparatively weak.

In light of historical experiences, this is puzzling. Major economic crises have also always been turning points for mainstream policies. Crises were moments for critical choices, when established policies collapsed and alternatives were tested (Gourevitch 1986, Blyth 2002). The Great Depression sounded the death knell for economic liberalism. The victorious policy alternative, Keynesianism, saw itself discredited half a century later, when the end of Fordism undermined its foundations and brought a new version of economic liberalism – neoliberalism – to the fore. In this light, the resilience of main-
stream neoliberal policies in the wake of the GFC is surprising. Historical patterns also suggest that left-wing forces can offer convincing and popular answers in the wake of a major economic crisis (e.g. Luebbert 1986, Roberts 2017). Instead, after the GFC, it seems that right-wing nationalism has emerged as a stronger challenger to mainstream neoliberalism.

In my ongoing research, I seek to explain the surprising resilience of neoliberalism, and the different capacity of right-wing versus left-wing nationalist answers to challenge the pre-crisis neoliberal and integrationist consensus. My focus is on European peripheral countries that have been hardest hit by the GFC, and had to ask for external financial assistance. In these peripheral countries, the post-crisis conflict lines and the trade-offs involved in the answers have been particularly sharp, threatening at times to tear the societies apart. While the social costs of the crisis and disenchantment with the pre-crisis growth models have been very high and consequently, demands for putting the costs of adjustment on those perceived as responsible for the crisis have been strong, governments had at the same time very narrow policy space to embrace these demands. Furthermore, while the dependency on markets and international conditionality favors mainstream neoliberal policies, it also provides fertile grounds for a nationalist backlash. In this sense peripheral countries are paradigmatic cases, as they show generalizable trade-offs and policy choices in sharp relief.

In the remainder of this essay, I will briefly characterize the four policy responses, discuss how they are distributed among my cases, and present my argument. I will conclude with an outlook of how the preliminary findings hold up in the Corona crisis.

Conceptualizing responses to the GFC

The crisis that started in 2008 and returned to Europe in 2010 was primarily a financial crisis in the wake of which banks and with them states got into serious troubles. To be sure, countries differed in what exactly triggered their troubles. Some countries were vulnerable to an external financing gap because they had high public debt - Greece being the prime example, but also Hungary – some had hugely overleveraged banking sectors – Ireland or Iceland – and in some countries, banks were vulnerable because of their links to foreign countries – such as the Cypriote banks’ exposure to Greek government debt. However, almost all European crisis ridden economies had to cope with the fall-out from liquidity or solvency crises in their banking sector, resulting in a “weakening economy, and overburdened fiscal authorities” (Schelkle 2017, 159).

The fallout from the crisis confronted European societies with tough questions, around which political conflict arose. A first line of conflicts concerned substantive policy and distributive questions. How should banks be stabilized and who would pay the costs? How urgent a task was fiscal consolidation and how should it be achieved? How to protect vulnerable members of society from the fall-out of the crisis, and how to restore growth?

A second line of conflict concerned how to reconcile national political and economic preferences with requirements stemming from the international markets, institutions and actors.
In the wake of the crisis, international requirements seemed to put unduly restrictive conditions on domestic policy choices. Should these restrictions be accepted, or should policy makers try to carve out increased domestic policy space?

I identify four answers to these questions that are structured along two dimensions. The first is a social-economic left-right dimension. Commonly, the literature understands this as opposing state intervention and free markets. However, it is not very correct to argue that state intervention is exclusively left-wing (e.g. Polanyi 2001, Esping-Andersen 1990). I therefore follow a different approach in defining the left-right axis by focusing on the substantive ends towards which state policies in general and state intervention in particular are geared. Building on Bobbio (1996) and his application by Jahn (2011), I argue that leftist policies are those that ultimately aim at greater equality among residents of a country, whereas right-wing policies exhibit greater tolerance for inequality. This tolerance can be justified on conservative or liberal grounds. Conservatives endorse what they see as given inequalities and hierarchies and expect that if individuals take the place in society that is “naturally theirs”, harmony will ensue. Liberals, on the other hand, see inequality to a large part stemming from individual capabilities and industriousness.

The second dimension is the position on international integration, pitting pro-integration against national sovereignty. In the literature on party positions, this conflict line is variously known as “integration-demarcation” (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2008), or “transnational” conflict (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2018). It is seen as a reaction against globalization, European integration and immigration and is often conceptualized as a cultural rather than socio-economic conflict. However, this integration/sovereignty dimension has a clear socio-economic content. It concerns the fact whether governments try to push back against the constraints that international markets and organizations exert on their domestic social and economic policy choices, or whether they accommodate these constraints.

Based on these two dimensions, four ideal typical responses can be identified (Figure 1).

Left-wing policy packages include a mixture of policies that protect (weaker) members of society by decommodifying their income streams and compensating for loss of income in case of unemployment, old age and sickness, enforcing social rights and seeking to tackle inequality of opportunities. In terms of growth policies, left-wing answers prioritize public investment over supply side policies. Typical left wing policies therefore seek to strengthen social protection such as unemployment benefits, or social housing, and foster skill formation and workforce participation by investing in public childcare and education. Left-wing answers can be divided by their integrationist or nationalist outlook. Integrationists try to

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**Figure 1:** Policy responses to the crisis
combine their agenda with the requirements of international organizations and markets, while left-wing nationalists seek a modification of international conditions to increase the room for maneuver for domestic policies.

On the right, two answers can be distinguished as well. The first attests to the resilience of the pre-crisis neoliberal and pro-integrationist policy consensus. Neoliberalism is concerned with empowering private capital and initiative through privatization, deregulation and international integration with the aim of fostering competitiveness and growth. The state is not absent: on the one hand, it creates and secures the “encasement” (Slobodian 2018) by international and more generally non-majoritarian institutions that removes economic policy making from the short-term political arena. On the other hand, in hard times, it acts as the savior of systemically important corporations and private property (e.g. Tooze 2018). Typical neoliberal policies include fiscal consolidation, the deregulation of labor, product and financial markets, and the privatization of public enterprises.

A second right wing response to the crisis is nationalist. It is characterized by two distinct features. First, right-wing nationalists push for restoring a degree of national sovereignty. Politically, they question the legitimacy of international obligations and their repercussions on domestic policies and politics. Economically, restoring national sovereignty manifests itself in an economic nationalist agenda, which selectively pushes back against globalization and regional integration of trade, finance and/or labour markets. Right-wing nationalism is not a wholesale rejection of neoliberalism. Rather, it combines neoliberal, unorthodox statist and nationalist conservative policies (Becker 2015). The corporate sector is seen as the motor of growth, and right-wing nationalists embrace the private appropriation of economic resources and an agenda of competitiveness and deregulation. However, instead of markets, it is the state that picks winners and punishes losers, hence the significance of unorthodox economic policies. Further, social policies are embedded in a nationalist conservative ideology. In terms of typical policies, right wing nationalism thus adopts a combination of neoliberal, heterodox and conservative policies, for instance austerity and fiscal consolidation combined with tax policies that privilege uncompetitive domestic enterprises, and conservative family policies geared towards rising fertility.

Mapping the responses

Which of these policies have prevailed in Europe’s periphery after the GFC? Figure 2 maps the distribution of responses across the cases. Overall, and quite surprisingly, neoliberalism has been very resilient. Among the countries that applied for external financial assistance, only Hungary has successfully carved out and sustained over time an alternative to mainstream neoliberalism by consciously embracing a combination of neoliberal, heterodox and conservative policy elements. As well known, Greece had a very short-lived experiment with nationalist left policies in 2015 that spectacularly failed, before reverting to neoliberalism. Further, after a sustained period of neoliberal

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2. To be sure, there have been ample debates about whether neoliberalism is a useful concept at all (e.g. Boas and Gans-Morse 2009). Yet, if applied with greater precision, the concept certainly stands for crucial policy responses to the GFC. In the recent past, neoliberals themselves have started to define the concept (see Peck and Theodore 2019: 252). I follow this self-definition.
reforms, since 2015, Portugal has embarked on a left-integrationist path. In contrast, Iceland’s experiment with left-wing integrationist policies was short-lived.

What explains the resilience of neoliberalism in so many countries? Why has a durable policy alternative to mainstream neoliberalism made its showing only on the southeastern quadrant of the matrix, namely the Hungarian right-wing nationalist answers? What might explain why Iceland’s experiment with a left integrationist answer at the height of the crisis was short-lived, while Portugal’s answer seems more durable?

The argument

Crises, as Boin et al. (2016, 5) argue, “are critical junctures in the lives of systems – times at which their ability to function can no longer be taken for granted”. In such a situation of threat, urgency and uncertainty, how political leaders make sense of the crisis and build coalitions to push their solutions through matters hugely. For European countries, a critical instance of sense making was the EU’s understanding of the financial crisis as a sovereign debt crisis, which put austerity and structural reforms at the core of adjustment. Instead of targeting primarily the instabilities that had developed in Europe’s banking systems, EU policy makers believed that the high sovereign debt levels that countries had amassed (mostly) as they bailed out their banks had to be brought down, as high debt impairs growth. To bring public debt down, countries had to pursue neoliberal reforms, such as austerity policies to consolidate public finances, and the deregulation of labor and product markets, or the privatization of key industries to restore growth and competitiveness.

Unequal adjustment, which pushed the costs of adaptation largely on the more vulnerable countries, reinforced the political woes of left-wing political forces, which had already been weakened before the GFC. Many centrist labor parties have bought into the third way social democracy, accepting mainstream neoliberal policy solutions. In the light of the crisis, centrist labor parties thus had lost much of their credibility. They were seen as the problem, rather than the solution. Two and a half decades of neoliberalism prior to the crisis have also chipped away at once powerful collective organizations such as trade unions (Baccaro and Howell 2017). In contrast to neoliberal or right-wing nationalist forces, left-wing political forces would therefore have to reinvent themselves.

The focus on austerity and competitiveness in the wake of the crisis, and the disciplining effect of international market forces makes redistrib...
utive policies very difficult. The most likely policy option therefore is neoliberalism, which is my explanation for the surprising number of countries that pursued neoliberal policy reforms after the GFC.

The framing of the crisis as sovereign debt crisis however is also conducive to the rise of nationalist policy solution, as it pits debtors against creditor countries, allowing to frame economic conflicts in nationalist terms (e.g. Kriesi and Pappas 2015, 8; Streeck 2014) Whether or not a nationalist answer emerges depends on prior cleavages and political entrepreneurship. Whether it prevails, depends on whether it resonates with voters, and is economically viable. Here, my contention is that it is easier for right-wing than for left-wing nationalists answers to prevail. This is because right-wing nationalists have no issues combining nationalism with austerity and competitiveness. Further, in contrast to traditional or radical left-wing forces, national conservatives also have their “international enablers” (Johnson and Barnes 2015). Financial markets, international investors and EU institutions have been much more lenient with right-wing nationalist than with their left wing counterparts. This is partly the flipside of the fact that these political forces selectively embrace economic neoliberalism (Barta and Johnston 2018, Szabolcs 2020). The short-lived experiment of the Greek nationalist left wing policy experiment compared to the resilience of Hungary’s nationalist right wing is a case in point (Bohle forthcoming).

Finally, there is also a temporal dimension. During the hot phase of the crisis, when markets break down and creditors run the shots, pushing through left wing alternatives to mainstream neoliberalism comes with huge costs. Under these circumstances, alternatives are unlikely to generate growth, and to satisfy popular expectations. However in the longer term, when growth is restored and policy learning can set in, left-wing alternatives might stand a better chance. This temporal factor might explain why Iceland’s left-integrationist experiment was short-lived, while the Portuguese one has survived.

**Outlook: Covid 19 - a reversal of fortunes?**

The COVID 19 crisis gives a glimpse into the long-term dynamics of Europe’s crises politics, and the policy learning that might or might not have taken place. Indeed, the fall-out from the COVID-19 crisis has made starkly visible the weakness of European and national responses to the GFC. A decade of neoliberalism and austerity has left public sectors, especially health and education in many countries in dire straits. It has also exposed deep flaws of the European competitiveness agenda. Northern competitiveness relies extensively on exploiting Eastern Europe’s comparative advantage: its abundance of comparatively cheap and skilled labor. While there is some benefit associated with Eastern Europe’s integration into Northern commodity chains, this is not the case for those who work in Northern (or southern) agriculture, food production and healthcare sectors.

At first, the European response to the crisis was eerily reminiscent of the response to the GFC. European Central Bank (ECB)’s president Christine Lagarde spooked bond markets...
RESILIENT NEOLIBERALISM? (CONTINUED)

when she said that she was “not there to close spreads” in regards to sovereign debt markets (Amaro 2020). Later, however, Lagarde’s ECB had its own moment of “whatever it takes”, when it announced its Pandemic Emergency Purchasing Program (MacNamara and Matthijs 2020). As in the GFC, member states have a difficult time to agree on a European fiscal response. Discussions on Eurobonds to tackle the crisis are being framed in the same moralizing terms as during the GFC, with Northern countries suggesting instead to use existing facilities for bailout loans with strong conditionality attached (MacNamara and Matthijs 2020).

However, the July 2020 agreement of EU leaders on a €750 billion recovery fund, together with the temporary suspension of the EU’s fiscal rules, and the flexibility in terms of state aid rules marks a more significant departure from earlier policies. They point to a new politics of European solidarity, attesting to some learning from the multiple political crises the EU has gone through since the GFC. At this point, it is however difficult to tell whether this goes beyond buying time. As long as structural imbalances within the EU are not being addressed, economic conditionality not being abandoned, and public investment not being made a priority, Europe’s current policy reversal does not create conditions for a genuine alternative, while leaving the fault lines created by the GFC intact.

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INTRA-PARTY CONFLICTS AND DEMOCRATIC CRISSES: Lessons from Islamist parties

by Sebnem Gumuscu

Democracy is in crisis. Increasing number of elected officials seek aggrandizement and prolonged power at the expense of democratic rules. From Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey and Victor Orban in Hungary and to Donald Trump in the US, aspiring autocrats have abused their executive power to unlevel the playing field. Although they are at the forefront of this concerted effort, autocrats rarely act alone. They rise on the back of their political parties. Without explicit or tacit support of the party machines, autocrats cannot succeed. So, what role do parties play in democracy’s current crisis? Some parties enable autocratic leaders and facilitate democratic backsliding and even breakdown. Others, by contrast, keep autocratic tendencies within their organization at bay. And yet others serve as the last exit, when all other checks fail, before democratic breakdown by ousting their autocratic leader. So, why do some parties enable democratic backsliding, while others safeguard democratic principles? The answer to this puzzle, I argue, lies in intra-party dynamics. Here is why.

No political party is a monolith. Instead, they are a grand coalition of factions. Each faction has distinct political preferences, and all factions strive for dominance within the party organization. Depending on an autocrat’s ability to build and sustain a dominant alliance by co-opting other factions, a party may follow different trajectories. Neither personalist accounts of democratic backsliding nor group level explanations, which assume parties to be monolithic entities, help us decipher the role parties play in democratic crises. A refined understanding of when a political party becomes an enabler of or an ultimate check on democratic backsliding requires a study of intra-party dynamics.

Understanding of when a political party becomes an enabler of or an ultimate check on democratic backsliding requires a study of intra-party dynamics.

Democracy is in decline

Since Puddington (2007) rang the early alarm on democratic retreat, scholars have debated intensely if a new wave of democratic decline was ashore. After 20 years of intense debate, there emerged a consensus that a third wave of democratic reversal has indeed arrived (Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019). Today more countries are experiencing democratic decline than those undergoing democratization.

For instance, the 2020 V-dem democracy report registered the lowest number of democracies in the world since 2001. Several democracies have backslid into electoral autocracies, which have
become the most common regime type in the world, with 40 percent of all countries (67 countries) fitting the criteria. Meanwhile, ongoing autocratization affected one third of the world population in 2019. Restrictions on the freedom of expression and information is on the rise in all world regions; freedom of association is threatened, and rule of law is eroding. The current democratic crisis is hitting not only recent democracies but also long-lasting and/or what appeared to be relatively stable democracies such as India, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Brazil, and the United States.

In this new wave, unlike previous crises of democracy, democratic decline is incremental and is mostly driven by elected officials. Specifically, sudden democratic breakdown in the form of executive coups and coup d’etats took backseat to gradual democratic backsliding driven by the executive (Bermeo 2016; Waldner and Lust 2018; Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019; Svolik 2019). In short, elected officials, instead of generals or monarchs, are hijacking democratic regimes (Schepele 2018; Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019).

**Political parties and democracy**

Aspiring autocrats rarely act alone. They come and stay in power with the organized support of a political party. The BJP in India, Fidesz in Hungary, the AKP in Turkey, and the GOP in the US, for instance, provided the cadres, resources, manpower, and organizational capacity essential to electoral victories and political battles after the elections. So, are political parties friend or foe to democracy?

Political parties are central to modern democracy as facilitators of responsiveness, effectiveness, accountability, and representation. They may also form the gravest threat to democratic rule by spreading, organizing, and mobilizing extreme ideas. Indeed, the ‘paradox of democracy’ has occupied scholars for decades with respect to the nature of the relationship between parties and democracy (Przeworski and Sprague 1986, Kalyvas 1998, Stokes 1999). Many expected external factors to tame political parties. Electoral pressures (Downs 1957), institutional constraints embedded in the system (Huntington 1991; Kalyvas 1998), daily challenges of governance (Berman 2008) and political learning processes and democratic habituation (Bermeo 1992; Wickham 2004) took center stage in scholarly analyses. Accordingly, political parties accepted democratic rules so they could participate in elections, moved towards the center to win electoral races, adapted to the realities of governance rather than subverting democracy, and internalized democratic norms as they repeatedly play the game. The socialist and Catholic parties of Europe in late 19th and early 20th centuries or left-wing parties in third wave democracies are cases in point. This teleological reasoning with heavy emphasis on external factors, however, is faulty and often do not stand empirical scrutiny. Parties may enjoy significant support even without moving towards the center and maintain their autocratic agenda in power – like fascist parties did in interwar era in Europe – or may reverse their course even after sustained participation in the system as right-wing parties have done in recent years.

Right-wing populist parties, whereby populism and extremism/far-right merge (Heinisch 2003), proved to be immune to pressures of electoral competition and governance. They successfully build electoral coalitions without foregoing their authoritarian tendencies, as we see in the case of Fidesz in Hungary and the AKP in Turkey. In fact, these parties turn extremist po-
sitions into mainstream by capitalizing on their ideological flexibility and popularity (Heinisch 2003). Many right-wing parties also resist moderation after coming to power (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015; McDonnell and Cabrera 2018). For instance, the BJP under Modi’s leadership sustained its inflammatory and discriminatory politics in government and triggered democratic backsliding in India, the largest democracy in the world.

Besides, the recent democratic crisis proved how ephemeral and ineffective institutional constraints can be in shaping party behavior. In most cases, elected officials politicize referees and pack autonomous institutions with their loyalists (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018), change the rules of the game through constitutional amendments to empower the executive (Huq and Ginsburg 2018; Scheppele 2018), and manipulate electoral laws and processes to secure future electoral victories (Bermeo 2016, Corrales 2020). Seemingly strong institutions, for instance, crumbled before popular governments of Chavez in Venezuela, Erdogan in Turkey, Orban in Hungary, and Kaczyński in Poland.

Parties played a critical role in this process. Rather than being the victims of their environments (Berman 1997), they defined, articulated, and aggregated interests, signaled what is important to their constituency, and shaped their worldviews (Iversen 1994). Many of them have chosen polarization, majoritarianism, and power maximization over compromise, mutual tolerance, and forbearance (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Hence, they undermined democracy.

**Intra-party politics and party behavior**

So, why do some parties adhere to democratic principles and others do not? The answer to this puzzle, I argue, lies in intra-party dynamics. No political party is a monolith. Members with different political views, preferences, interests, and visions come together to form sub-groups within the party organization. In other words, individuals form constellations of rival groups, and a party turns into “a loose confederation of sub-parties” (Sartori 2005, 72).

Factions may be motivated by different goals. Elites often form factions “to change (or maintain) the values, norms, ideas, expectations, and rule of the political game” (DiSalvo 2012, 6). They carry certain policy preferences, interests, and ideological convictions. Factions may also rally around a leader and take a personalist turn.

A single faction is often too weak to control the entire organization, so they form alliances with other factions, careerists, or fence-sitters and strive for dominance. But how are dominant coalitions formed? Panebianco’s (1988) seminal work on party organizations offer key insights. To build a dominant coalition, factions need to control organizational resources such as recruitment, rules, finances, internal communication, expertise and competency, and environmental relations (Panebianco 1988, 33). These “trump cards” tilt the playing field in favor of a group over others by providing a leading faction with a pool of selective and collective incentives it can offer to its actual and potential supporters.

Control over the incentive structure allows factions to build alliances and co-opt rival factions and fence-sitters. Electoral success expands the incentive structure considerably through access to executive office and its leverage over key appointments, nominations, and other public resources. Selective incentives like electoral nominations, cabinet appointments, or particularistic favors and privilege as well as collective
incentives that advance a partisan agenda in bureaucratic appointments (including the judiciary) and policy formulation (all policies from tax cuts to foreign relations) are indispensable in defining members’ preferences. It is a combination of such incentives that deliver a faction the ability to build and sustain dominant coalitions. Once a dominant alliance forms and captures the party, it also charters its course (Bille 1997; Hermel et al 1995).

Islamist parties and democracy

My research on Islamist parties reveals noteworthy results and illustrate these points.1 Islamism, political activism in the name of Islam, is often treated as essentially an anti-democratic ideology (Tibi 2008). Yet, a closer look at Islamist parties reveal a complex reality. Almost all mainstream Islamist parties in countries like Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia have accepted and internalized electoral politics, like Catholic or socialist parties had done earlier in Europe.

As Islamists formed political parties and channeled their resources to electoral races, some turned to right-wing populism to fuse Islamist messages with populist politics. Interestingly, not all Islamist parties became populist—they maintained pluralism and a liberal democratic line. Herein lies the puzzle. While some Islamist parties have adhered to democratic norms and advanced democracy in collaboration with other stakeholders, others adhered to majoritarianism and triggered democratic backsliding. Why?

The AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey and Ennahda (Renaissance Movement) in Tunisia are two contrasting cases. Having roots in Islamism dating back to the 1970s, the AKP came to power in 2002 signaling its commitment to liberal democracy. Operating within the secular political framework, the party leaders took several democratizing steps to improve political rights and civil liberties in the country (Fisher Onar 2011). For many, the AKP proved Islamists’ democratic habituation. Ennahda traced the AKP’s steps as the 2011 revolution triggered a democratic transition in Tunisia and promised to advance democracy after ascending to power.

Over the course of a decade, Tunisia emerged as the only Arab democracy, while Turkish democracy collapsed. Why has Ennahda adhered to democratic principles, while the AKP pivoted towards hegemonic, majoritarian, and exclusionary politics? In 113 interviews with more than a hundred high-ranking and mid-level leaders I found that external factors played a secondary role in molding the trajectory of the two parties. Intra-party dynamics took primacy and filtered the impact of external pressures on party behavior.

To start with, both parties hosted factions with different political preferences and ideological convictions. What different factions perceived of democracy, political pluralism, exercise of power, and extent of civil liberties markedly differed. Such differences crystallized into two main wings, namely liberals and electoralists. While both wings converged on the centrality of elections, they diverged on what electoral victories signified. Electoralists carried majoritarian and exclusionary tendencies, while liberals committed to pluralism, checks and balances, mutual tolerance, and forbearance. Electoralists’

1. This section is built on my unpublished manuscript titled Islamist Pendulum: Democracy and Authoritarianism in Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia.
understanding of democracy relied on what Pahwa (2017) calls ‘righteous majoritarianism’ and their claim to moral superiority over other political parties. Liberals by way of contrast rejected ‘righteous majoritarianism’ and advocated a pluralist democratic system with safeguards for civil liberties for all groups and individuals. They posited that Islam was inherently democratic and pluralist. The two groups hence formulated Islamism in divergent ways; electoralists enmeshed Islamism with populism, while liberals merged Islamism with pluralism.

Individual Islamists developed (and changed) such predispositions through a myriad of experiences. Sometimes, sustained political participation or frequent encounters with their ideological rivals played a key role (Wickham 2004). At other times, regime repression (Nugent 2020; Cavatorta and Merone 2013), prolonged prison sentences (McCarthy 2018), or being in exile (Grewal 2020) altered their political calculus or taught Islamists the value of democracy. The same experience has rarely generated a uniform effect on Islamists though. The magnitude and direction of attitudinal change under certain circumstances varied for each individual. Although existing accounts of individual level change offered key insights, idiosyncratic factors such as personality traits or one’s upbringing led to under-theorization of why Islamists adopt electoralism or liberalism or under what conditions they switch positions. As a result, individual preferences remained largely overdetermined. Although we may still not know how an Islamist becomes an electoralist or a liberal, we do know how they build and sustain alliances.

In both the AKP and Ennahda, Islamists’ individual attitudes informed factional alignments, while the balance of power among two tendencies charted the course of these Islamist parties. More specifically, the liberal wing in the AKP held significant leverage in the early years of the party. They left an imprint on the party platform, shaped organizational rules, and exercised partial control over nominations. They designed and enacted many of the democratic reforms the AKP was known for in its first term in power. Thanks to their efforts, Turkey started accession negotiations with the European Union. Yet liberals lost their influence in the party to electoralists led by Tayyip Erdoğan after 2007. As electoralists gained greater control over the party rules, nominations, and finances, they also took the country into a competitive authoritarian direction (Esen and Gumuscu 2016).

Erdoğan’s growing access to organizational and public (and private) resources allowed him to co-opt his rivals (including some liberals) within and outside the party. Many careerists and opportunists joined his faction, while Erdoğan’s increasingly partisan distribution of resources allowed him to expand his ruling coalition (Esen and Gumuscu 2020). In addition to such selective incentives, electoralists’ heavy emphasis on righteous majoritarianism also generated collective incentives for more conservative circles within and outside the party. Thanks to the incentive structure Erdoğan tightly controlled many inside the party bandwagoned with, instead of balancing against, him.

Likewise, Ennahda has hosted competing political visions. Splits within the movement pulled it in opposite directions in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the aftermath of the 2011 revolution such disagreements consolidated into a new factional split between liberals and electoralists. The latter pushed for a maximalist and he-
gemonic line over the democratic transition to leave an ideological imprint on the new system. Liberals, in contrast, pursued a national consensus through deliberation and compromise as the basis of the new regime.

The dominance of liberals within the party apparatus at the time of the revolution pulled Ennahda towards liberal democratic commitments during the transition. Specifically, the party drafted a liberal and democratic constitution with other stakeholders, vetoed several key ideological demands of electoralists, agreed to resign from government amidst popular pressure, and most importantly, left power in 2014 in a peaceful manner. Since then, give and take of democratic politics has become a habitual act for Ennahda.

Liberals surely encountered resistance from the electoralists during this process, but they leveraged key incentives to neutralize such internal resistance. Selective incentives through recruitment and nominations served to co-opt fence-sitters while sanctioning opponents. The leadership also used collective incentives by redefining party identity as a democratic force in Tunisia and the Arab world. Liberals’ control over internal communication and changing organizational rules at the 2016 party congress fortified their dominance, as they purged many electoralists from leadership positions by separating the religious and political functions of the party.

Parties and democratic crises elsewhere

How does this framework travel to other cases? The GOP in the US is a very recent and important example. Indeed, as DiSalvo (2012) finds, factions in American politics serve as a “conveyor belt of ideas” shaping party ideology and effecting policy change. They also exercise significant leverage over recruitment and promotion through their influence over nominations. One could read the recent democratic crisis in the US in light of factional realignment in the Republican Party. The illiberal wing captured the party through a set of alliances among pro-Trump factions and the new right, and they pivoted towards an anti-liberal direction. Today, the GOP is in the league of anti-liberal parties along with the AKP in Turkey and the PiS in Poland (Global Party Survey 2019). Expanding selective and collective incentives that accompanied Trump’s 2016 victory (appointments to the Supreme Court and regional courts as well as reversal of several policies of the Obama administration) helped the emerging dominant alliance solidify its grip over the party. Today, the illiberal alliance dominates the GOP, and through their control of the party they pose a threat to American democracy.

Factional alliances do not always threaten democracy though. They may also serve as democratic safeguards when everything else fails. Factional rivalry may stop an autocrat on their anti-democratic track. The African National Congress in South Africa is a case in point. Twice in South Africa’s relatively brief democratic history, factions within the ANC interfered to prohibit a strong man from taking over the party. First, in 2008, the largest trade union in the country (COSATU) allied with the Youth League of the ANC against Thabo Mbeki and replaced the would-be autocrat with Jacob Zuma. When Zuma, a few years later, sought to assert his own dominance within the party via a populist agenda, the balancing act of rival factions once again returned in 2017 to replace him with Cyril Ramaphosa. A year later, the party recalled Zuma as president. Factional rivalry within the ANC kept the country on a democratic path.
Conclusion

Parties are central to democratic politics. They may also pose a threat to it with their directional, organizational, and mobilizational capacity. Indeed, the most recent autocratic wave is driven by political parties that enable aspiring autocrats, who can subvert institutional guardrails of democracy with relative ease. To make sense of these recent developments we need to study intra-party dynamics, specifically, how different factions with authoritarian (or liberal democratic) tendencies capture political parties at the expense of their liberal-democratic (or autocratic) rivals. For factions not only dictate party behavior; they also affect a country’s political trajectory (DiSalvo 2012). Without a better understanding of intra-party dynamics, the study of democratic crises is incomplete.

References

INTRA-PARTY CONFLICTS AND DEMOCRATIC CRISSES: LESSONS FROM ISLAMIST PARTIES (CONTINUED)


DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS: The Role of Personalist Political Parties

by Erica Frantz and Joseph Wright

Prior to Hugo Chavez’s election as president in 1998, Venezuela had a decades-long history of competitive electoral contests between two dominant parties, an exception in a region known for its challenges with authoritarianism. Chavez was elected president in free and fair elections in 1998 with the support of the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR), an offshoot of the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement that he formed in 1982, which became an official political party in 1997 just after Chavez declared his candidacy. In the years that followed, Chavez’s supporters in the MVR began to dominate Venezuelan institutions. Starting in 2004, the MVR-controlled parliament passed laws increasing the size of the Supreme Court and enabling the dismissal of judges by majority vote. MVR loyalists had full control of the Supreme Court by the year’s end. The media encountered new legal restrictions as well, including the strengthening of “insult laws” that gave authorities greater latitude to punish those who criticized high public officials (Atwood 2006). The government supplemented these laws with a larger campaign geared toward silencing and sidelining Chavez’s opponents, so-called “anti-revolutionaries.” Amid an opposition boycott and substantial government intimidation of its opponents, MVR and its supporters won nearly all seats in the 2005 legislative elections. The precise moment Venezuela’s democracy broke down could be debated, but by the end of 2005 Chavez had firmly consolidated control and the opposition has been unable to mount a credible electoral challenge to the Chavez and Maduro governments.

The decline in democracy and gradual authoritarianization of the Chavez regime is now well-documented, yet the process of democratic unravelling may have begun even before Chavez was elected. Indeed, Chavez’s predecessor, Rafael Caldera, abandoned traditional parties in Venezuela to form his own personal political machine in the run-up to the 1994 election, despite Caldera’s history as a leading figure in a long-standing establishment party.

Venezuela’s trajectory is not unique. In countries as diverse as Benin, El Salvador, Hungary, Italy, Mali, Sri Lanka, and Turkey, personalist parties have paved the path to democratic erosion. Identifying this dynamic is important, given that today’s democracies appear to be in crisis. The watchdog organization Freedom

1. Even in democracies where coups ousted leaders elected in fair and free contests, such as Bolivia (2019), Mali (2012), and Thailand (2006), the ousted leaders had all created the parties that propelled them to power.
House, for example, documented this year that 2019 marked the 14th consecutive year of declines in global freedom (Freedom House 2020). While many of the setbacks during this period occurred in places already authoritarian (such as Azerbaijan, Burundi, and Rwanda), others occurred in democracies considered established (such as India, Poland, and the United States). Some of these democracies remain fragile but intact, while others have collapsed to authoritarianism, including Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Serbia.

To better understand the conditions underpinning the contemporary democratic crisis, we are part of a collaborative project (with Andrea Kendall-Taylor at the Center for a New American Security and Jia Li at Pennsylvania State University) addressing the role of personalist political parties. Personalist political parties are those where the party exists to promote and further the leader's personal political agenda, as opposed to advancing policy and personnel choices. We posit that when democratic leaders come to power backed by personalist parties (as opposed to established parties that have a purpose beyond furthering their leader’s career), the democracies they govern are at a greater risk of collapse.

To evaluate the impact of personalist political parties on democratic breakdown, we gathered original data from 1991 to 2020, capturing levels of personalism in the political parties of democratically-elected leaders. Though the concept of personalist parties is intuitive, our data collection effort offers a systematic method for differentiating parties on this dimension across countries and over time. We find that the average level of party personalism in democracies worldwide has increased over time, particularly since 2012. Importantly, we also find that party personalism decreases democracy levels and predicts the start of democratic declines. In this way, the rise of personalist political parties in democracies is facilitating the erosion of global democracy.

In this contribution, we explain what we mean by personalist political parties, elaborate on the ways in which they contribute to democratic decline, summarize our data collection effort and basic findings, and offer some concluding remarks.

**What are personalist political parties?**

We define personalist political parties as political parties that democratically elected leaders create, which are used as vehicles to advance leaders’ personal political careers or instead further party power over policy and personnel choices. At the most basic level, personalist political parties feature a dominant leader and a weakly structured organization (Kostadinova and Levitt 2014), where the leader has more control over the party than do other senior party elites. Such parties often exist solely as a means for the leader to win an election and gain power (Gunther and Diamond 2003). We see personalism within political parties as continuous, meaning that levels of personalism in political parties can vary across parties and within them over time. A personalist political party is therefore a party with high levels of personalism.

Our interest in party personalism in democracies draws from literature on related themes, such as research on leaders who are “political outsiders,” “anti-system candidates,” or “populists” (Gunther and Diamond 2003; Mainwaring...
and Torcal 2006; Barr 2009; Kostadinova and Levitt 2014). Some leaders of personalist parties certainly fit one or more of these categories, though not all do. Likewise, we build off of the literature on party institutionalization, where scholars have identified clear indicators of parties that are *not* institutionalized, such as the absence of strong societal roots (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1998; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). Not all parties that lack institutionalization are personalist, but personalist parties by definition lack institutionalization. Our definition of personalist political parties emphasizes the importance of incumbent leaders *creating* their own political party. This extends research on party creation in autocracies, which shows that the leader's creation of a support party is a signal of greater concentration of power (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018).

**Personalist political parties and democratic erosion**

We build off of theories of parties in democracies and personalism in autocracies (e.g. Laver 1981; Strom 1990; Aldrich 1995; Geddes 1999; Gehlbach and Keefer 2011; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014) to argue that democratic erosion is more likely when leaders are backed by personalist political parties. The risk of democratic decline is higher with greater party personalism because incumbent power grabs are more likely to be successful in these contexts. This is important given that such power grabs can pave the way for transition to dictatorship. Most frequently, this occurs via authoritarianization, when democratically-elected leaders bring about authoritarianism by chipping away at democratic institutions slowly over time, as occurred in Venezuela (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018). Authoritarianizations have increased since the end of the Cold War and are currently the most common way that today's democracies collapse (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright 2017). In rarer instances, it occurs via military intervention, such as in Niger in 2010, when the military ousted President Mamadou Tandja in a coup, following his decision to push through constitutional changes that extended his legal term limit. Similarly, the military ousted President Evo Morales' government in Bolivia in 2019 to prevent a second-round election – which Morales was likely to win – after Morales changed the constitution to run for a third term.

Incumbent power grabs are more likely to be successful when leaders govern with the support of personalist parties for numerous reasons. For one, greater party personalism means greater bargaining power of the leader vis-à-vis the rest of the party elite, such that elites are less likely to resist the leader's efforts to consolidate power. Elites in personalist political parties face higher collective action costs in organizing incumbent moves to concentrate control than do elites in more established parties. In the latter, elites and senior office holders have a history of repeated interactions with one another that facilitates the cooperation necessary to act as a collective. These experiences are absent in parties that are highly personalist.

Second, leaders in personalist parties are more likely to eschew appointments from the political establishment. Instead, they fill positions of high government office with individuals from their personal networks, such as family members and other loyalists, who generally lack government experience. These individuals, in turn, are less likely to push back against incumbent power grabs because their future positions are closely tied with the fortunes of the incumbent leader. In contrast to elites in established parties, those affiliated with personalist parties are
less likely to win power without the leader, giving them a stronger incentive to maintain the leader’s rule, even if comes at the cost of subverting democracy.

Finally, there is reason to expect that leaders backed by personalist political parties are less likely to be as committed to democratic institutions as are their counterparts from established parties. Leaders affiliated with established parties often rise to power by working through the party’s lower ranks, working in local government, and/or serving party elites in appointed positions. They typically have more exposure to how democratic politics works and, as a result, learn valuable skills in negotiating with the opposition, compromising on policy, and building broad coalitions. This is likely to also shape their normative preferences. Levitsky and Cameron put forth, for example, that parties play a key role in socializing and recruiting democratic elites; those leaders who do not come from such party institutions are going to be less likely to have the same commitment to democratic institutions (2003, 4). Together, democratic experience and a normative preference for democracy should make leaders less likely to attempt to consolidate individual power in the first place.

In sum, we argue that party personalism increases the chance of democratic erosion by improving the chances of successful incumbent power grabs.

**Empirics**

To evaluate our argument, we compiled an original data set measuring party personalism. The data capture the relationship between democratic leaders (who held power in January in each calendar year) and the political party that supported their electoral candidacy, from 1991 to 2020. We define a leader as the de facto chief executive (i.e. president or prime minister) of a national-level democratic government but exclude chief executives who were technocratic appointments following resignations (e.g. Ertha Pascal-Trouillot in Haiti and Shahabuddin Ahmed in Bangladesh) because they were not elected. We include appointed prime ministers backed by leading parties in a parliamentary government and vice presidents who are elected to their vice-presidential positions but who are constitutionally appointed chief executive following incumbent resignations (e.g. Alejandro Maldonado in Guatemala). In both of these types of cases, the chief executive was either selected by a government-leading party that was elected or elected to a position that is part of the constitutional succession (i.e. Vice President). Our sample includes 593 leaders in 106 countries with democratic governments. Additional information about this data set is offered in Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, Li, and Wright (2020).

The first step in collecting the data entailed writing individual narrative descriptions for each leader that document the relationship between the leader and the support party, enabling us to capture the complexity of real-world politics in a range of formal institutional settings and party systems. From the qualitative material in these narratives, we extracted quantitative data that record information on objective, systematic indicators of party personalism: whether the support party existed prior to the leader’s first executive election campaign; whether the leader created a new political party to campaign for national executive office; and whether (and in what capacity) the leader held national-level (e.g. legislator or cabinet member) and...
local-level political positions (such as elected mayor or appointed local council member) in the party prior to candidacy in the election.

Using these indicators and a 2-parameter logistic (IRT-2PL) model, we construct a latent measure of party personalism. Importantly, this measure uses objective information on the history of the leader’s relationship with the party prior to the leader’s assumption to power; thus it does not incorporate information about the leader’s strategic behavior once in office as chief executive. This means that it captures things that occurred causally and chronologically prior to observed political events we seek to explain. For context, countries such as Mali, Indonesia, and Ukraine have high levels of party personalism, countries such as the United States, Argentina, and Italy have mid-range levels, and countries such as Norway, Australia, and the United Kingdom have low levels. Looking within a single country, party personalism was quite low in Venezuela under Carlos Andres Perez but substantially higher under both Rafael Caldera and Hugo Chavez. Looking across a variety of Latin American countries shows that party stalwarts such as Michelle Bachelet (Chile), Danlio Medina (Dominican Republic), and Julio Maria Sanguinetti (Uruguay) all have relatively low scores. Meanwhile, joining Chavez and Caldera with some of the highest party personalism scores in the region are Rafael Correa (Ecuador), Alberto Fujimori (Peru), and Nayib Bukele (El Salvador). This all suggests that our measure of party personalism is capturing the underlying construct, both across countries and within them over time.

In the left plot of Figure 1, we show the distribution of party personalism by electoral system: unsurprisingly, party personalism is higher on average in presidential systems than in parlia-

Figure 1: Party personalism distributions and time trend

2. Because we focus on pre-electoral relationships between leaders and their support parties, we only identify leaders who create parties before they are elected to office as the chief executive – not leaders who create a new party while in office.
mentary ones. In the right plot, we present the time trend in party personalism. The solid line offers the raw level of average party personalism every year: after the end of the Cold War party personalism decreases, in part because many democracies were still very young, having just transitioned from autocracy. But party personalism begins to tick upwards in the late 2000s and has been increasing in the last decade. The dashed line in the right plot shows the time trend in party personalism once we adjust for democratic age, accounting for the fact that many democracies in the 1990s were still quite young. Again, the trend in party personalism starts moving upwards in about 2005.

We evaluate the extent to which party personalism influences the likelihood of democratic erosion. While acknowledging that there exist many conceptual dimensions to democracy and thus democratic erosion, we operationalize the concept in three related ways. First, we simply examine how personalist parties shape the level of democracy, while accounting for country-specific determinants of both, as well as potential confounders from unobserved time trends. Second, we examine whether personalist parties influence the risk of large declines in democracy levels. And last, we look at a smaller number of democratic collapse events. In the second and third type of analysis, we adjust for the initial level of democracy and the initial level of party institutionalization in a country that each leader inherits from their predecessor. This approach rules out the possibility that countries with lower levels of democracy or under-institutionalized party systems are more likely to select leaders backed by personalist parties. Further, we account for country-specific factors—such as inequality, electoral rules, autocratic legacies (e.g. prior military rule), and a long-history of democracy—that might influence both selection into personalist parties and democratic stability. This means we are comparing parties with more or less personalism within the same country.

An initial look at the raw data previews the main findings. First, we show how the three outcomes we test vary by party creation, which is one item in the more comprehensive latent measure of party personalism and perhaps the most straightforward way to capture it. As Table 1 demonstrates, democracy levels are lower when leaders create their own parties relative to cases where they do not. The probability of a substantial democratic decline or democratic collapse is significantly larger for leaders who create their own parties, as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader created party</th>
<th>Leader did not create party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy level</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr(Drop)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr(Collapse)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: The risk of democratic erosion, by incumbent party type

3. We measure the level of democracy using the Varieties of Democracy polyarchy score: v2x_polyarchy, V.10 (Coppedge et al. 2020; Pernstein et al. 2020).
4. We operationalize a substantial democratic decline as a decrease in the level of democracy score by 0.10 since the start of the leader’s tenure as chief executive.
5. A democratic collapse event marks the transition from a democratic regime to a fully autocratic one, which we measure using our own updates to the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) autocratic regime data.
6. This is a two-way fixed effects linear probability model that adjusts for initial levels of democracy.
7. All differences of means are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
After testing a series of models that account for country-specific confounders and time trends in the outcome, we find evidence that personalist parties lower the level of democracy and increase the risk of substantial democratic decline during a leader’s tenure.\(^8\) This latter finding is illustrated in Figure 2.\(^9\) The horizontal axis displays the legislative seat share of the ruling party, and the vertical axis shows the estimated marginal effect of party personalism on the risk of decline. The baseline incidence of democratic decline is 3.7 percent of country-years and the estimated average marginal effect is 5.9 percent (depicted as the horizontal green dashed line). The blue curve and confidence interval show how the estimated marginal effect varies across ruling party legislative seat shares in presidential systems, while the gray curve and interval show the same for parliamentary systems.

On average, the marginal effect of party personalism on the risk of democratic decline is much higher in presidential than in parliamentary systems. However, once ruling parties gain legislative majorities, the estimated effects converge at roughly 6 percent, the full sample average. Put another way, party personalism increases the risk of democratic decline irrespective of legislative seat shares, but in parliamentary systems it only increases this risk when the ruling party holds a legislative majority.

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8. We find that while both party creation and party personalism increase the risk of democratic collapse by roughly 1.5 percent, only the estimate for party creation is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

9. Result obtained from a kernel regression that estimates pointwise marginal effects. The specification includes unit mean values of all explanatory variables to proxy for fixed effects; Covariate adjustment for democratic age (log), initial levels of democracy and party institutionalization at the start of the leader’s tenure as chief executive; and a non-linear time trend. Nonlinear plot is a local polynomial of the pointwise marginal effects, with confidence intervals.
To summarize, our analysis shows that greater party personalism is associated with a greater chance of democratic erosion. This suggests that the rise of personalist political parties we have witnessed in recent years has played a role in the increasing vulnerability to dictatorship that today’s democracies face.

Concluding remarks

In this contribution, we provide evidence linking personalist parties with democratic erosion: those countries where a leader comes to power with the backing of a personalist party hold an elevated risk of democratic decay. From a policy perspective, the election of such leaders is therefore an objective red flag of potential democratic decline. This finding is particularly valuable given that most warning signs of democratic deterioration—such as leaders’ sidelining of traditional media or politicization of the judiciary—are endogenous to behaviors once in office. Our measure of party personalism, by contrast, incorporates information that predates the leader’s assumption to power.

Importantly, our measurement approach enables us to disentangle the relationship between party personalism and other factors that often seem to overlap with democratic decay, such as populism, political polarization, and citizen disenchantment with democracy. As part of this project, we also show that when leaders backed by personalist parties win office, we subsequently see greater populism and political polarization, though no meaningful impact on citizen support for democracy.

Our findings therefore suggest that better understanding the contemporary democratic crisis requires better understanding the conditions increasingly leading to the election of leaders supported by personalist parties. Such parties hold clear appeal to aspiring leaders, given that they enable them to secure a party’s nomination for office with ease, rather than having to work their way up an established party ladder. Why leaders backed by personalist parties have grown more attractive to voters, however, is less obvious. It is possible that societal changes have made voters disillusioned with traditional parties or weakened their attachments to them. It is also possible that economic constraints have decreased state subsidies for political parties, facilitating the rise of those personally funded by their leaders. With the availability of our data set on personalism in democratic political parties, future research can explore these and other important relationships.

10. This paper shows that while personalism predicts both subsequent populism and political polarization, neither of these factors endogenously influence selection into personalist parties. We thus argue that populist rhetoric and strategies as well as political polarization may be post-treatment phenomena.

11. The global COVID-19 pandemic potentially creates additional challenges for democracy, given that restrictions in the name of public health offer opportunities for disguising clampdowns on freedoms. That said, most declines in freedoms in the wake of the pandemic appear to be happening in countries that were already autocratic (Kolvani et al. 2020). Moreover, at this juncture there seems be little relationship between the effectiveness of democratic governments’ pandemic responses and levels of party personalism (Lu 2020). For example, both Ireland and Australia currently have low levels of party personalism, yet Ireland has struggled more in its response than Australia has. Likewise, both France and Lithuania have high levels of party personalism, but France’s response is seen as less effective than Lithuania’s.
References


LEADERSHIP AND CRISIS: The last years of the Soviet Union, 1985-91

by Archie Brown

In its strictest medical sense, a crisis is the point at which change takes place that is decisive for recovery or death. Applied to politics, such a stringent criterion for calling a set of problems a crisis is clearly applicable to the final years of the Soviet Union, although there is no consensus on whether the country was in crisis already in the mid-1980s or whether that term should be reserved for the last two years of the Soviet state, 1990-91. Discussing the concept of crisis, Adam Przeworski uses the medical analogy but adopts a broader interpretation of it when he writes, “Crises may be more or less acute: in some a turning point may be imminent but some crises may linger indefinitely, with all the morbid symptoms” (Przeworski 2019, 10). However, persistence of problems is better understood as relative failure than as political crisis. If, at a historical “turning-point,” history fails to turn, the crisis for the regime has passed.

A political system is in crisis when the government is no longer able to govern. The most obvious sign of crisis is the breakdown of public order. Thus, democracy experiences crisis “when fists, stones, or bullets replace ballots” (Przeworski 2019, 12-13). An authoritarian regime is in crisis when its laws and commands are no longer obeyed, when it is confronted by large-scale peaceful demonstrations or by violent unrest and especially when these phenomena are accompanied by open splits within the ruling elite. None of those manifestations of crisis prevailed in the Soviet Union in the first half of the 1980s or when Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Konstantin Chernenko as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in March 1985.

That the USSR no longer existed after the end of 1991 has made it all too easy to assume that the system and the state were already in crisis when Gorbachev took over as Soviet leader. But that is to embrace “the fallacy of retrospective determinism” (Dallin 1992, 297; Bendix 1964, 13). Even under the lackluster Chernenko in 1984-85, the Soviet Union remained quiescent. Economic growth had slowed to a trickle and Chernenko and the ageing party oligarchy offered uninspiring leadership. People grumbled, but the authority of the Communist party-state was still largely taken for granted. The overt dissident movement, never large, had been thoroughly repressed.

Relative failure in comparison with Western democracies, whether the inferior quality of goods and services or the absence of political...
freedoms, was nothing new. And relative failure does not necessarily generate crisis. A system which provided a hierarchy of rewards for loyalty and a range of sanctions and punishments for political deviation lasted for seven decades in the Soviet Union.

It was not unreasonable for Seweryn Bialer to conclude soon after Gorbachev came to power that insofar as the Soviet Union at that time faced a crisis, it was a “crisis of effectiveness” rather than a “systemic crisis” or a “crisis of survival” (Bialer 1986, 169-170). Soviet citizens could speak critically among trusted friends, but they continued to observe the rules of the game. To say that the Soviet Union was in crisis in 1985 is to project backwards knowledge of what happened in 1990-91. The crisis – especially the crisis of statehood – was much more a consequence of perestroika than its cause. It had, of course, deeper roots, but dormant discontent is one thing and a crisis something else.

I argue that the coming to power of a leader who, alone in the Soviet top leadership team at the time of Chernenko’s death in March 1985, could contemplate fundamental change of the Soviet political system, created preconditions for the dissolution of the Soviet state. Gorbachev was an outlier within the Soviet political elite in the mid-1980s, and his increasingly radical reforms changed the balance of forces in Soviet society in ways both intended and unintended.

Setting the bar high, I have defined a transformational political leader as “one who plays a decisive role in introducing systemic change, whether of the political or economic system of his or her country or (more rarely) of the international system” (Brown 2014, 148). It follows that such transformational leaders are rare, and their agency is not just, or necessarily primarily, a matter of their personal qualities. Time, place, and circumstance have placed them in a position where they have at least a chance to initiate historic change. In Gorbachev’s case, the great institutional power of the office of CPSU general secretary enabled him to embark on a process which not only undercut his own power, but led to a crisis of Soviet statehood.

During the period of less than seven years he led the USSR, Gorbachev, at different times and at different speeds, sought or supported five transformations, every one of which was a remarkable break with the past. Analytically distinct, they were politically interconnected, and success in the first three exacerbated the problems of realizing the last two:

1. To embrace freedom of opinion, of speech and, before long, of publication, jettisoning, in the process, the unchallengeable status of Marxism-Leninism;
2. To liberalize, pluralize and democratize the political system;
3. To transform Soviet foreign policy – in particular, by ending the Cold War with the West, making clear, inter alia, that the ‘Brezhnev doctrine’, whereby the Soviet Union reserved the right to intervene militarily to ensure the loyalty to Moscow of the East European states, had been abandoned;
4. To replace the centralized command economy by a regulated market economy (notwithstanding the tension between making the existing system work better and supplanting it by one operating on different principles);
5. To endow Soviet federal forms with federal substance through the negotiation of a
new Union Treaty whereby all (or, failing that, most) of the fifteen Union Republics would voluntarily sign up to membership of a federal state in which each republic would enjoy far greater autonomy than hitherto but foreign and defence (and some economic) policy would remain under the jurisdiction of the federal authorities.

The most dangerous time for an authoritarian regime is when it embarks on reform. A new openness evolved into freedom of speech and, increasingly, of publication,¹ and liberalization evolved into democratization. Addressing a closed meeting of regional party officials in April 1988, Gorbachev posed the rhetorical question, “On what basis do 20 million [members of the CPSU] rule 200 million?”, and answered: “We conferred on ourselves the right to rule the people!” (Brown 2020, 225). That was a hint at what was to come. Two months later, Gorbachev proposed to the Nineteenth Conference of the CPSU a resolution – which he hurriedly pushed through – authorizing contested elections to take place the following spring for a new all-Union legislature with real powers (Brown 1996, 175-184; Gill and Marwick 2000, 47-60).

Competitive elections in 1989, 1990 and 1991, albeit multi-candidate rather than multiparty, were a massive step in the democratization of the Soviet Union but, by providing a legitimate outlet for the institutional expression of ethno-nationalism, they contributed to its crisis of survival. The elections enabled citizens in the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to elect advocates of the national cause, and they provided a way for Boris Yeltsin, who had been first promoted and then sidelined by Gorbachev, to make a comeback and emerge as Gorbachev’s principal rival from a purportedly more radical position. By playing the Russian card against the Union (as a way of getting himself into the Kremlin and Gorbachev out of it), Yeltsin also emboldened national movements in other republics, among them Ukraine.

Pluralism and Priorities

The sluggish economy was the most obvious manifestation of Soviet relative failure in comparison with other European states, but radical economic reform came lower on Gorbachev’s agenda than pluralizing political reform, the transformation of Soviet foreign policy, and (in the last three years of the USSR) the attempt to hold the Union together by turning a pseudo-federation into a genuinely federal state (or, even as a last resort, something closer to a confederation).

Gorbachev’s priorities make it clear that crisis did not force him and the Soviet leadership to embark on perestroika. Political reform – which by 1988-89 became systemic change – made Russia a freer country than it had ever been, but it did little or nothing to improve the economy. In many respects, the economy got worse. By 1990 it was in limbo – no longer a functioning command economy (commands could now be ignored with impunity), but not yet a market economy.

Pluralization of the Soviet political system was combined with dramatic steps to end the Cold War (Brown 2020, 218-309). Dependent as such fundamental change was on the general secretary’s ability to reduce the influence of some institutional interests and opinion groupings and

¹. George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four and Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago were among the previously banned works published in Moscow in large print runs by 1989.
enhance the opportunities for others, it would have made little headway had there not been a constituency for change in Soviet society and within the CPSU. Behind the monolithic façade that the party of almost twenty million members presented to Soviet society and the outside world, there was a wide diversity of opinion. Aside from the national sentiments and aspirations of non-Russian ethnic groups, there was a major division in the Russian intelligentsia, which had roots in nineteenth century Russia, between Westernizers and Russian nationalists, and further diversity within each of those categories.

Among those attracted by the greater freedoms, as well as the material prosperity of Western Europe or North America, were free market enthusiasts who admired, for example, the economic policies of Margaret Thatcher’s Britain, but a greater number were drawn to the social democracy of the Scandinavian states, or the German social market economy, or to a democratic socialism which retained a larger measure of public ownership than was to be found in the smaller democracies of Northern Europe but which would likewise be accompanied by competitive elections and democratic accountability.

Russian nationalists, who also had notable internal differences, were a larger presence within the party apparatus at various levels of the hierarchy than were liberals or social democrats. If one of their number, or a sympathiser, had succeeded in becoming general secretary, the history of subsequent years would have been very different. Such a leader would have stifled at birth any emergence of political opposition in the USSR and the Soviet bloc and would have enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the military-industrial complex.

Initially, though, Gorbachev had broad support from Westernizers and Russian nationalists alike. But from quite early in his tenure of the Soviet leadership, he gave more encouragement to Westernizers than to the proponents of Russian nationalism. The “pluralism of opinion” Gorbachev embraced enabled voices from different parts of the political spectrum to be heard. Within a period of five years, Gorbachev himself evolved from Communist reformer to socialist of a social democratic type. His favourite and most like-minded foreign interlocutors were the Spanish Socialist prime minister Felipe González and the president of the Socialist International (and former West German Chancellor) Willy Brandt (Brown 2013).

### The Crisis of Soviet Statehood

Gorbachev was a leader with an unusually open mind, startlingly so for a general secretary of the CPSU. By the summer of 1988, he had embraced the first three of the five objectives outlined earlier, and by the end of 1989 all three had been realized. The Cold War ended in its ideological dimension with a remarkable Gorbachev speech to the United Nations on December 7, 1988, in which he spoke of the need to seek consensus on a “new world order” which must not

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2. A well-connected Russian nationalist, Aleksandr Baygushev, who published a book entitled “The Russian Party inside the CPSU”, has noted disconsolately that “we, Russian nationalists, welcomed the coming to power of Gorbachev and, in turn, of Yeltsin. “Alas”, he added, “it’s bitter, but the truth” (Baygushev, 2005, 401). Baygushev’s book is permeated by antisemitism. Those I have termed Westernizers are for him the “Jewish Party within the CPSU”.

3. During the eighteen-year Brezhnev era, in contrast, Russian nationalist deviation from Marxism-Leninism was accorded a greater tolerance than was liberal democratic dissent.

4. Democratization, however, is a process and not identical with fully-fledged democracy which was achieved neither during perestroika (when, however, it was consciously pursued) nor in post-Soviet Russia.
be at the expense of “the rights and freedoms of the individual or of nations or at the expense of the natural world”, for the “worldwide ecological threats” had become “simply frightening”. Calling for a “deideologization of interstate relationships”, he argued that “freedom of choice” was a universal principle, from which there must be no exceptions (Brown 2020, 241-246).

When Gorbachev remained true to that principle in 1989, as one East European state after another became independent and non-Communist, the Cold War ended on the ground. That outcome, however, along with the pluralization of the Soviet political system, contributed massively to the crisis of Soviet statehood. If Poles, Czechs and Hungarians could peacefully remove their Communist rulers and become more fully independent states, why, asked many Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, Georgians and Western Ukrainians, could not they?

Most dangerously for the survival of a Soviet state, Russians in increasing numbers switched support from Gorbachev – and from identification with the all-Union authorities – to Yeltsin, accepting the argument that they, too, were entitled to national autonomy, and that this was the way to get marketizing reform and improved living standards. Strikes of coal miners, outraged by shortages of such essentials as soap, added to the pressure on the all-Union authorities (though miners themselves had more to gain from the old state-controlled economy with its selective subsidies than from a move to the market).

Yet, Gorbachev and the political changes he had introduced were, until at least the end of 1989, popular with a majority of Soviet citizens. As late as December 1989, according to the data of the most professional of Soviet survey research institutes, VTsIOM, 84 percent of the Soviet population wholly or partly approved of Gorbachev’s activities (Brown 1996, 271). It was not until May-June 1990 that Yeltsin overtook Gorbachev as the most popular politician both in Russia and in the Soviet Union. In the last two years of Gorbachev’s time in office, his popularity was in steep decline (Brown 1996, 271).

Making the Soviet state a freer country, achieving a qualitative improvement in East-West relations and removing the threat of war more than compensated between 1985 and 1989 for the lack of economic progress. When, however, the economy went from bad to worse during the last two years of the Soviet Union’s existence, while national unrest accelerated, raising the distinct possibility of the breakup of the Soviet Union, support for Gorbachev and the perestroika process plummeted. Soviet statehood was now unquestionably in crisis.

A renewed Union could have survived the loss of the three Baltic republics (whose secession was always likely to the extent that the state was democratized), but without the Russian republic, which occupied three-quarters of the territory of the USSR, the Union was unthinkable. Yeltsin’s insistence from May-June 1990, that Russian law had supremacy over Soviet law played a big part in undermining the Union. Next to Russia, the republic whose loss would be most damaging to the state’s survival was Ukraine. Their citizens had voted in a referendum held in March 1991 to remain within a renewed Union, but in a referendum held on 1 December, in the aftermath of the failed hard-line August 1991 coup, which

5. 52 percent of them wholly approved. The numbers for the Russian Republic, as distinct from the USSR as a whole, were only slightly lower. There 49 percent wholly approved and 32 percent partly approved.
changed the political climate and the balance of political forces within the USSR, Ukrainians opted overwhelmingly for independence.

For most of Soviet history, the fifteen union republics of the USSR had not enjoyed the rights of the component parts of a genuine federation, but their institutional existence helped to sustain national consciousness where it already existed (as in the Baltic republics, Georgia or Armenia) and to develop it in republics (especially those of Central Asia) where it had very little pre-Soviet resonance. Albeit to a vastly varying extent, citizens of the union republics became increasingly receptive to the appeal of their local nationalisms. Political – especially electoral – reforms provided new opportunities that were seized by growing movements for national self-determination, whether greater autonomy or even outright independence (Beissinger 2002, 320-459; Brown 2009, 481-573; Brubaker 1996, 23-54; Bunce 1999, 127-164).

Conclusions

Leadership was of decisive importance in bringing about the political transformation that, however, led to crisis. It also profoundly influenced the manner in which the Soviet Union fell apart. In the first of these processes, Gorbachev was overwhelmingly the most important political actor. In the second, his role was crucial in determining that disintegration, which he strenuously opposed, occurred with a minimum of bloodshed. Other leaders, especially Yeltsin, were extremely important in promoting the breakup of the Soviet state. The part played by foreign leaders – most notably, US President George H.W. Bush, but also British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, French President François Mitterrand and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl – was also of some significance. Through their restraint and continuing support for Gorbachev, so long as he eschewed violent suppression of local nationalisms, these Western leaders contributed to keeping the fissiparous process peaceful (especially in comparison with the civil wars which accompanied the breakup of the Yugoslav federation).

It is important to distinguish the “crisis” and dismantling of the Communist political system from the crisis and disintegration of the Soviet state. Indeed, it is inappropriate to apply the term “crisis” to the transformation of the political system. The abandonment of “democratic centralism” within the CPSU and Soviet society, and the removal of the guaranteed “leading role” of the Communist Party (a euphemism for its monopoly of power) from the Soviet Constitution, and from everyday political reality, were policies consciously pursued by Gorbachev. Writing in 1995, Richard Pipes inaccurately portrayed Gorbachev as “a typical product of the Soviet nomenklatura, a man who to this day affirms his faith in the ideals of communism” (Pipes 1995, 158).

In the same year, Gorbachev described himself as a product of the nomenklatura “and at the same time its antiproduct – its ‘grave digger’, so to speak” (Brown 1996, 316). In a book called in Russian “Understanding Perestroika”, Gorbachev noted that as the USSR had been a “party state”, and as “the CPSU and state institutions were ineluctably interwoven”, it followed that “a weakening of the party” (which, by embracing competitive elections, he initiated) automatically entailed “a weakening of the state” (Gorbachev 2006, 373).

Nevertheless, Gorbachev remained commander-in-chief of the armed forces and until very late in the day he could have used the KGB, Ministry
of Interior troops or the army to crack down on separatists and restore by force the unity of the Soviet state. That was the policy that the heads of those institutions wanted him to pursue. The Chairman of the KGB, the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defense were leading figures in the group which in August 1991 attempted to seize power, putting Gorbachev under house arrest in his holiday home on the Crimean coast. The coup plotters’ general aim was the restoration of the status quo ante but their immediate imperative was to prevent the signing of a draft Union Treaty scheduled to take place a day or two later. The putschists saw this Treaty as an unacceptable surrender of central state power and a fateful step toward disintegration.

Their projected crackdown would have had a far greater chance of success if it had been organized with the support of the president of the USSR, a post to which Gorbachev had been indirectly elected by the new legislature in March 1990, while remaining general secretary of the CPSU. Neither in the Kremlin in the months leading up to the coup nor, under pressure, during his days of house arrest, was Gorbachev prepared to support violent repression and halt the process of negotiation with the autonomy-seeking republics. During the coup itself, the leadership of Yeltsin, with the democratic legitimacy he had acquired through popular election to the Russian presidency a little over two months before the coup was mounted, was of equal importance in frustrating the putschists’ attempt to seize power.

The attempted August coup achieved the opposite of what the plotters intended. Although they had failed to seize power, they had shown that the armed force at the disposal of the federal centre could be used to restore the old order. The realization of how close they had come to losing their recent gains in national autonomy, and any prospect of expanding them, gave a huge boost to those in several republics – including, significantly, Ukraine – who wished to press ahead with separate statehood. Yeltsin’s paradoxical demand for Russian independence from a Union which Russians had dominated (explicable mainly in terms of his personal ambition) made it all but certain that a Union, in a loosely federal or even confederal form, could not survive.

Leadership agency was crucial at every stage of the transformation of the Soviet polity and in the way the subsequent crisis of statehood was managed with minimal bloodshed. Increasingly constrained, Gorbachev still had choices. The Soviet Union’s big battalions, in the most literal sense, were on the side of crackdown to preserve the existing boundaries of the Soviet state. Secession would not have emerged as an issue in the first place, but for the liberalizing and democratizing policies Gorbachev pursued. Alongside a new tolerance, they provided institutional mechanisms for the advancement of nationalist and separatist agendas.

Russia emerged from the disintegration of the USSR still as the world’s largest state, with a wider range of freedoms and more democracy than ever before, and as the inheritor of the Soviet Union’s permanent member seat on the UN Security Council. How Russia’s gains in freedom and democracy (leaving aside the issue whether they would subsequently be consolidated or eroded) are weighed against the territorial losses – and whether Gorbachev’s leadership is judged to have been foolish, treasonous, enlightened or visionary – ultimately depends on the values of the observer.
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WHEN CIVIC ACTIVISM REDUCES POLITICAL AMBITION: Unpacking Political Participation in Democracies during Crisis

by Irina Soboleva

Democracies in crisis demand a lot from their citizens. Political science wisdom assumes that some citizens are better prepared than others for the challenges of political participation and engagement. These citizens typically have higher educational attainment, stronger civic identities, and elevated self- and political efficacy.

This profiling of the Engaged Citizen, however, emerged mostly from observational data collected in advanced democracies. Growing research on new democracies, as well as hybrid and non-democratic regimes, suggests that typical predictors of political engagement might not be as universal as they seem. Specifically, collective efficacy and civic experience do not predict political ambition beyond the institutional context of Western democracies, as research on ideological attitudes and preferences in East Asia and Eastern Europe suggests (Beattie, Chen, and Bettache 2020; Soboleva 2020).

This review contributes to a better understanding of micro-level behavior during democratic crises and regime transitions. Specifically, I focus on psychological drivers of political ambition. I demonstrate that in challenging political environments, individual self-evaluation adversely affects political participation and political ambition: politically and civicly sophisticated individuals are put off from political office when reminded of alternative non-political ways of achieving collective goals. This running from office creates a trap of declining political ambition, widen the divide between civil society and the political establishment in unstable political contexts. In other words, unconsolidated democracies would be less likely to generate a ‘new Barack Obama’ – the experience of civic engagement would rather dissuade a community organizer with exhaustive experience in civic action from running for office.

The review proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the results of my analysis of demographic predictors of political ambition in contexts of instability. Second, using experimental data, I explain why prior civic experience might suppress, rather than encourage, individual political ambition. Third, I review the implications of these findings for democracies in crisis. Finally, I conclude with broader implications.
Observational Predictors of Political Ambition during Crisis

In democracies in crisis, individuals are less likely to run for office, for reasons ranging from the presence of a corrupt and precarious electoral system to low political trust, post-authoritarian legacies of political disengagement, poor political knowledge, and unstable electoral legal frameworks (Aslund 2015; Herron, Boyko, and Thunberg 2017; Pisano 2021). These conditions, in turn, affect political ambition at the individual level.

When individuals lack political ambition, they become less likely to run for office. This results in a shortage of quality political candidates at the local and regional levels in settings where low political ambition is widespread (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007). This relative absence of quality candidates hinders democratic development in a number of ways: it distorts the descriptive representation of women and minorities, impairs the accountability of political institutions, and prevents elite rotation.

Who runs for office in the face of these challenges? My data on political ambition in Ukraine shed some light on candidates’ profiles in democracies during crisis (Soboleva 2020,124). On the one hand, some individual predictors of political ambition mirror those observed in advanced democracies. Female respondents in Ukraine are less willing to run for office at all levels of government and slightly less likely to join a political party. The magnitude of this gender gap, however, is larger than the one detected in advanced democracies (Fox and Lawless 2004; 2011b; Thomas 2012; Preece 2016; Crowder-Meyer 2018). Members of the linguistic majority (Ukrainian speakers) demonstrate a higher interest in running for regional and local office than those in the linguistic minority (Russian speakers) – this effect is consistent across other countries as well (Lawless 2012; LeRoux and Langer 2018). Much like we see in US data (LeRoux and Langer 2018), people with previous experience in social activism and volunteerism are more interested in running for local parliament or joining a political party. Finally, educated Ukrainians are more likely to express an interest in running for office, consistent with previous studies (Leighley 1995; Oliver, Ha, and Callen 2012; Pruysers and Blais 2018b).

At the same time, there are two notable deviations. The first one is age. Unlike their peers in advanced democracies, younger Ukrainians are much more willing to run for office for the national and regional parliament. This effect is likely to be cohort-based, since this particular generation of young Ukrainians is more politically savvy than their parents and grandparents. Previous studies detected similar effects in other post-Soviet nations (Robinson et al. 1993; Meirowitz and Tucker 2007; Shyyan 2008; Dowle, Vasylyuk, and Lotten 2015; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017). Older people who socialized under communism have been shown to be less satisfied with democracy and less supportive of the new Ukrainian political regime (Neundorf 2010; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017).

The second deviation is more puzzling. It seems that prior experience, whether with serving as an electoral observer, running for office, or leading a civil society association, does not predict intention to run for office in the future. This finding contradicts much of the evidence linking prior experience with civic engagement to nascent political ambition (Fox and Lawless 2005,2011a; Lawless 2012; Pruysers and Blais 2018a; LeRoux and Langer 2018), and instead supports a recent finding that neither the experience of community participation nor civic efficacy have a direct
WHEN CIVIC ACTIVISM REDUCES POLITICAL AMBITION... (CONTINUED)

effect on one’s individual decision to run for political office (Crowder-Meyer 2018).

These observational data suggest that some individual predictors of political ambition are more context-dependent than others. Like in the rest of the democratic world, Ukraine’s political candidates are more likely to be male, well-educated, and from the ethnolinguistic majority. At the same time, the connection between civic experience and political ambition seems to be context-dependent, as individuals with past experience in electoral observation, associational leadership, and political activism are no more likely to have an interest in political elective office than the rest of the sample.

Isolating the Causal Effect of Collective Efficacy on Running for Office

Why does civic experience cause people to brush away a potential political career? To delve into the counterintuitive connection between civil activism and political ambition in unstable democracies, I organized a series of field experiments that randomly manipulated the collective efficacy of nearly 1,400 respondents in Ukraine in 2018 and measured the effect of this intervention on their interest in running for local, civic, regional, and national offices.

Because I cannot randomly assign years of civic experience, I approximate it by improving respondents’ sense of collective efficacy. Collective efficacy is a belief in the ability of ‘people like me’ to achieve political goals. Observational data on collective efficacy show that it mediates the effect of demographic characteristics on political ambition: low belief in their collective ability to achieve desirable outcomes discourages otherwise qualified individuals from seeking political office (Vecchione et al. 2011; Caprara and Vecchione 2017; Blais and Pruyser 2017). Democratic citizens tend to have both high collective efficacy and nascent political ambition (Caprara et al. 2009). Macro-level collective efficacy corresponds to various democratically-friendly outcomes and levels of political participation (Almond and Verba 1989; Cremer and Oosterwegel 1999; Watson, Chemers, and Preiser 2001; Zomeren et al. 2004; Barrett and Pachi 2019).

Collective efficacy predicts political engagement through the sense of civic duty, expressive concerns, and trust in the political system (Zomeren, Spears, and Leach 2008). Survey results from both a sample of local politicians in the US and another sample of Conservative Party MPs in the UK demonstrate that the intense feeling of civic duty and engagement in the affairs of their communities – two proxies for high collective efficacy – drove respondents to public office (Whiteley 1995; Oliver, Ha, and Callen 2012).

Other studies suggest, however, that higher collective efficacy and prior experience in activism do not necessarily predict political efficacy (Mariani and Klinkner 2009). If running for office is not perceived as a way of solving a collective problem, higher collective efficacy will not predict nascent political ambition (Barrett and Pachi 2019: 32). While collective efficacy might predict an individual’s belief about their ability to ensure a desired political change, it does not affect their perception of how suitable certain political institutions are for achieving this change.

I isolate the causal effect of collective efficacy by randomly elevating its levels among participants in a field setting. The experiment is organized as an independent large-scale democratic education campaign on a demographically representative and diverse sample of adults. The design of the experiment replicates real-life de-
WHEN CIVIC ACTIVISM REDUCES POLITICAL AMBITION... (CONTINUED)

Democracy promotion campaigns by boosting individual efficacy by sharing lessons of local civic success stories (Sieriakova and Kokoza 2019). The content of the lessons is designed to avoid political priming of any sort. The experiment has the advantage of political neutrality and avoids any interference into Ukrainian politics. Instead, it focuses on providing ordinary respondents with feasible tools of democratic participation, and increasing their efficacy as members of local communities.

The experiment is based on three separate studies. The first study includes a representative sample of respondents recruited on the streets (N=733). The second study involved civic activists whom I contacted via an announcement of the experiment in a local activist listserv (N=334). The third study recruited subjects through targeted Facebook ads (N=314), and captured engaged citizens who follow civic and political developments and engage in political protests, but may not be exposed to regular local civic activism (Onuch 2015).

The experiment shows that enhanced collective efficacy does not translate into higher political engagement. Increasing respondents’ local-level collective efficacy discouraged them, on average, from running for city parliament and did not affect their interest in other political activities. After watching videos about local civic success stories, 44.42% of the respondents categorically refused to run for office, as compared to 34.77% in the control group (in a pooled sample). The average interest in running for office decreased as well, from 2.22 out of 4 in the control group to 2.01 out of 4 in the collective efficacy condition (on a Likert scale from 1 to 4, where 4 stands for being definitely interested in running for office).

The detected effects were most pronounced in the activist sample and the Facebook sample. This finding suggests that those respondents who had better first-hand knowledge of the local political context were put off from political office when reminded of their collective efficacy.

The conditional effects reveal an interesting nuance in the way that the induction of collective efficacy interacts with prior political experience and self-evaluation. The induction of collective efficacy was most beneficial for those without prior political or civic experience but with high levels of pre-treatment self-evaluation. In other words, collective efficacy affects individual propensity towards political activism, but the exact direction of this effect depends on the specific value assigned to proposed activities and on individual expectations of available institutions of representation.

Why does being reminded of local collective successes discourage engaged citizens from political office?

City politics in troubled democracies are a dangerous matter. In Ukraine, local civic activists come to be treated as political rivals by ruling elites the moment they directly engage in local politics. The dynamics between active members of civil society groups, deputies affiliated with local and regional elites, and party representatives are violent and complicated. For example, in 2018, a civic activist in Southern Ukraine was murdered by poison for actively lobbying for the creation of civic councils to help the city head, who held limited influence over city parliament, exert greater control over city politics. For someone with no party resources, participation in local politics would entail the need to navigate these waters on their own.

Because expectations from political institutions are understandably low, sense of agency does not activate political ambition (Cohen-
Chen and Zomeren 2018). Ukrainians do not consider local parliaments efficacious enough, especially once they are reminded of alternative methods of collective problem-solving. Thus, increasing collective efficacy, on average, resulted in decreased interest in running for office, proving that individuals have low outcome expectancies from running for office, especially at the city level (Bandura 2000; Schulz 2005).

**Implications for Democracy in Crisis**

These findings have several implications for boosting political participation in crisis.

First, contrary to prior theorizing (Ottaway and Carothers 2000), individual-level civic engagement does not guarantee increased political ambition. In fact, higher civic efficacy might result in a widening gap between civic activists and the political establishment. Those with higher civic efficacy are more likely to avoid political careers altogether and instead engage in building independent institutions of representation that are efficacious and get the work done. In the hyperpolarized context of Ukraine’s domestic politics, these quasi-parliamentary structures built by civic activists create a long-term problem for democratic consolidation (Stewart and Dollbaum 2017), because, unlike normal democratic institutions, they are not equal, transparent, or accountable.

Moreover, democracy-building takes a lot of time, and one of its main challenges is finding institutional channels of communication between the active forces of civil society and the regime in power (Berman 2019). Given that civil trust does not translate into better political institutions, this tension between civil society and available opportunities in the electoral arena will further deteriorate the quality of democratic institutions (Newton 2001; Norris 2011) – similarly to the dynamic observed in new democracies in Southeast Asia (Rodan 2018; Iglesias 2020).

Second, the targeting of democratic and civic education should be more data-driven and account for prior civic experience. Previous research on democratic education programs assumes that citizens who run for office or are involved in actual policy-making know more than those who are less committed to public service (Lupia 2015). In some contexts, however, democratic educators might want to leave well-informed citizens alone, especially if the supply side of politics is of a worse quality than the demand side aspires to have. Increasing sense of efficacy without an adequate change in the quality of democratic institutions leads to further political frustration. Improved collective efficacy alone might have a limited positive effect among the least engaged groups but will not have a lasting effect on those citizens whose experience with democratic outcomes falls short of expectations.

Finally, political crisis exaggerates the tension between citizens with differential levels of political sophistication. Those with higher levels of sophistication avert from political office because their efficacy allows them to achieve public goals without being formally elected to office (Klingemann 2014; Norris 2011). Those with lower levels of sophistication do not run for office because they lack subjective potential and belief in the political system. This collective running from office creates a trap of declining political ambition. This process is similar to what Svolik calls “the trap of pessimistic expectations,” a phenomenon wherein the disappointing performance of individual politicians leads to the widespread disillusionment with democracy as a political system (Svolik 2013).

Some open questions for political theorists...
might include whether citizens should keep a normal degree of ingenuousness and political naïveté to keep democracy consolidating and whether it is unethical to demand political engagement in electoral campaigns when other forms of participation are less risky and more collectively efficacious.

Altogether, these insights shed light on the failures behind democracy promotion in societies with widespread dissatisfaction in democratic institutions. Individuals with higher levels of political sophistication are dissuaded from political office when reminded of alternative well-functioning ways of achieving public goals without being formally elected as politicians. This collective running from office creates a trap of declining political ambition in new democracies. These findings also imply that individual engagement in politics in new democracies needs some degree of political naïveté and a high – potentially, unrealistically high – belief in one’s subjective potential.

Lessons for Political Crisis Management

Altogether, this research advances our understanding of politics during periods of crisis. Political ambition is an essential component of democratic survival in challenging times. Crisis disproportionately affects those without recourses, connections, and access to political infrastructure. Existing wisdom, both in the academic community and expert circles, proposes that we address these problems by boosting civic engagement and indiscriminately educating the general population. Both of these policies, while beneficial for civic activism, ignore potential spillover effects of improved civic engagement on political ambition.

First, educated citizens do not run for office in weak and non-democratic regimes. In countries with corrupt and broken institutions, efficacious people avoid engaging in civic and political life (Croke et al. 2016; Ayanian et al. 2020). When democratic institutions are dissatisfactory, efficacious civil activists do not invest in political careers and instead build parallel structures of representation (Rodan 2018). We need to pay attention to these processes when studying democracies in crisis.

Second, civic education campaigns might have spillover effects on political ambition and, more broadly, political participation. If would-be political candidates self-select into civil society instead of pursuing a political career, those who end up running for office might be more individualistic and less engaged in civic activities. In the long run, this self-selection might widen the divide between civil society and the political establishment.

Finally, both unrealistically low and unrealistically high levels of efficacy might lead to lower political ambition (Vancouver et al. 2002). Counterintuitively, making citizens feel too efficacious might well reduce their interest in seeking political office in contexts of crisis. Crude indiscriminate exposure of target audiences to political information might hinder, rather than advance, independent political ambition.

Thus, rescuing democracies in crisis requires a change in the academic mindset. Democracy promotion campaigns emphasize the significance of civic engagement while disregarding the potential detrimental effects of these campaigns on nascent political ambition. People who run for office are not the adversaries of democratic development, and supporting political ambition in weak democracies should be a separate goal of political crisis management.
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Beattie, Peter, Rong Chen, and Karim Bettache. 2020. “When Left is Right and Right is Left: The psychological correlates of political ideology in China.” (Under Review)


When Civic Activism Reduces Political Ambition... (Continued)


Recent episodes of severe police repression and violence against protesters in diverse contexts including Hong Kong, the United States, and Iraq have brought new urgency to longstanding calls for reform and in some cases more fundamental structural changes including abolition of existing police institutions (McLeod 2018). In times of social crisis and conflict between states and opposition movements, police – as “the most visible daily manifestation of the state” (Mani 1999, 22) – are also often the most visible instrument of state repression. But the police, and state security institutions in general, are not monolithic and there is considerable variation in the extent to which individual police officers and units use excessive force against civilians who engage in mass mobilization to express political grievances. Some individuals and units are more abusive than others, while some may try to diffuse violence or intervene to protect civilians. Variation in patterns of police violence has important implications for the study of crises. Sociologists, historians, and scholars of American politics and law have made important contributions to the study of police violence (Sierra-Arévalo 2016; Soss and Weaver 2017; Butler 2018; Prowse et al. 2020), but there is a need for more research in the field of comparative politics on the determinants of excessive force as well as restraint in other contexts. In this essay, I argue that two factors – decentralization and fragmentation of state security institutions – have interacted to shape the recent pattern of police violence in Iraq, where federal-level riot police and SWAT forces used lethal force against protesters in 2019, ultimately killing more than 600 people. However, not all security forces participated in the repression. In contrast with the violent conduct of federal-level police, local community police officers visited the demonstrations to provide water and pamphlets affirming the right to peaceful protest, telling protesters that they were there to protect them. Below, I suggest that two factors – fragmentation and decentralization – help to explain this pattern of violence with data from a door-to-door household survey on perceptions of police that I conducted through a research partnership between the International Organization for Migration and Yale Law School’s Center for Global Legal Challenges (Revkin and Aymerich 2020).
Police Fragmentation and Decentralization

Patterns of police violence, like patterns of violence in armed conflict (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2017), vary across several dimensions that have been well-documented by researchers and human rights organizations including the nature of targeting (e.g. indiscriminate, selective, or targeting particular social groups – e.g., black Americans) and access to different technologies of repression (e.g., predictive algorithms, facial recognition, and advanced surveillance tools including drones). Another factor is police decentralization, or the extent to which police are controlled by local authorities and departments rather than by the central government. Research on authoritarian regimes suggests that highly centralized state security institutions with strong intelligence capabilities tend to use violence more sparingly and selectively than more decentralized systems because they are able to preemptively identify and eliminate threats (Greitens 2016, 47-50).

In contrast, decentralized police systems like that of the U.S. – which has more than 18,000 different local police agencies that operate with little federal oversight – are characterized by a high degree of localization and absence of central regulation, which creates a culture of impunity in which misconduct by individual officers as well as “rogue units” often goes unpunished. Even officers who are disciplined and fired can easily find new employment with police departments in other jurisdictions (Grunwald and Rappaport 2019). Proponents of police decentralization in the United States and other contexts have argued that devolving authority to a large number of local departments increases their responsiveness to local concerns and enhances their ability to engage in community-oriented policing, but other work has identified decentralization as a significant barrier to police reform, accountability, and transparency (Bell 2016, 2138).

In addition to these factors, a fourth dimension of variation has received somewhat less attention from scholars: security sector fragmentation, or the extent to which state security institutions compete and sometimes conflict with one another as well as with non-state actors that engage in law enforcement, security provision, and dispute resolution. Research suggests that security sector fragmentation tends to increase the likelihood of violence and instability. A cross-national study of more than 100 developing states found that police fragmentation is associated with an increased risk of civil conflict recurrence and suggested that this relationship might be driven by decreased information-sharing and coordination that tend to occur when fragmentation makes it easier for individual officers and units to pursue their own interests, which often diverge from the interests of the state and the public (Arriola et al. 2020, 3).

In Tunisia, fragmentation of the state security apparatus hindered intelligence collection in ways that made the regime’s repressive strategy more violent and indiscriminate (Nugent 2020, 73).

In Iraq, security sector reform has been particularly difficult because the police are both decentralized (controlled by local authorities)

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and fragmented (internally divided and challenged by strong militias and other non-state actors that operate largely outside of the central government’s control), in addition to being hindered by the enduring historical legacy of authoritarianism (Dodge 2017; Blaydes 2018).

In this essay, I discuss some of the difficulties of police reform in contexts where police are both decentralized and fragmented with insights from Iraq. The occurrence of powerful anti-government demonstrations – during which more than 600 protesters were killed by state and non-state security forces – in between two waves of cross-sectional surveys that I conducted with the International Organization for Migration in July 2019 and December 2019 provided an unexpected opportunity to descriptively compare perceptions of police before and after a major episode of state repression. Before discussing the results of this research, I first provide a brief overview of the recent history and current state of the Iraqi police.

A Brief History of Police Reform in Iraq Since 2003

After the U.S. invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s authoritarian regime in 2003, the task of reconstructing state security institutions that were originally designed for repression to serve a new function as protectors of public safety and rights in an emerging democracy was a daunting one. The Iraqi police was the only one of the former regime’s security institutions that was not completely disbanded during the “de-Ba’athification” process – unlike the Army, Ministry of Defense, and other state security and intelligence services – because the police, in comparison with these more repressive institutions, were perceived by the U.S. and interim Iraqi government as relatively more professional and capable of reform (Perito 2011). Out of an estimated prewar police force of 20,000, around 7,000 police officers were fired for their affiliation with Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party, but most officers (around 65 percent) were allowed to keep their positions (Bensahel et al., 2008). Although in general, the post-2003 de-Ba’athification process has been criticized for collectively punishing Sunni Iraqis and gutting state institutions of competent technocrats whose expertise would have been valuable for reconstruction and democratization, the decision to leave the police mostly intact has arguably made it difficult for the institution to fully shed its authoritarian legacy.

Police Militarization After 2003

In the years after 2003, the Iraqi police became increasingly militarized as a result of significant assistance and training from the U.S. Department of Defense (Perito 2011). The U.S. train-and-equip program was originally supervised by the State Department, but as the al-Qaeda insurgency intensified and Iraqi police were increasingly deployed in counter-insurgency operations, the program was transferred to the Department of Defense (Perito 2011). In the years since, Iraqi police have continued to perform quasi-military and overtly military functions, including during the recent conflict against the Islamic State. Several divisions of federal police officers armed with assault rifles and improvised rocket-assisted munitions (IRAMs) participated in the battles to recapture...
Mosul and other cities controlled by the Islamic State. An estimated 19,000 civilians were killed in Islamic State-related violence between 2014 and 2017 (Revkin 2018). Although much of this violence was perpetrated by the Islamic State, individual members of Iraqi security forces including police were accused of committing numerous human rights abuses against civilians in Sunni-majority areas who have been widely stigmatized for their perceived collaboration with the Islamic State, including extra-judicial executions, rape, and torture.

Separation between military and police has been identified as one of the most important features of healthy democracies (Hall 1998). The heavy involvement of Iraqi police in military operations against the Islamic State and the use of military-grade tear gas against protesters have prompted calls for demilitarization of the police. Iraq’s own Ministry of Interior has acknowledged the need to “transition from ‘green’ to more ‘blue’ policing” (Ministry of Interior 2018, 8)—a reference to the traditional colors of military and police uniforms, respectively. Toward this end, the Ministry of Interior has been working with the International Organization for Migration since 2015 to train local police officers in principles of community-oriented policing. However, this and other reform efforts have been hindered by continued violence against civilians by Iraqi state security forces.

Different Regions and Social Groups Share Common Grievances with Police

Grievances with state security forces are not limited to Sunni-majority areas. In recent years, Shia-majority areas of southern Iraq have seen significant protest movements calling for reforms to address state corruption, economic inequality, the poor quality of public services, and most recently, human rights abuses by security forces. Qualitative evidence from our surveys on perceptions of the Iraqi police in three communities with very different demographic compositions—the Sunni-majority city of Fallujah in the western province of Anbar, the Christian-majority town of Hamdaniyah in the northern province of Ninewa, and the Shia-majority city of Basra in the southern province of Basra—illuminates some common themes and concerns. In response to a free association, open-ended question that we asked our survey participants (“What are the first few words that come to mind when you think about the police in your community?”), responses were mixed—some positive and some negative. Among the negative responses, the following stood out as examples of recurring themes. One respondent improvised some poetic idioms to express frustration with the insufficient presence and inefficacy of the police (Basra):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The absent guard</th>
<th>الحارس الغير مكلف</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ineffective savior</td>
<td>المنتشط الغير مكلف</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coat rack for evil deeds</td>
<td>شماعة المعاشر</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other responses included “oppressing the
youth and arrests” (Fallujah),6 “fear, distrust, tension” (Nineva),7 “military cars and weapons” (Fallujah),8 “fighters and soldiers” (Basra),9 “corruption, sectarianism, discrimination” (Fallujah),10 “unfair, biased, and disrespectful” (Nineva),11 “protecting thieves without any morals” (Basra),12 “wasting resources and nepotism” (Fallujah),13 and “inequality, bribery, injustice” (Fallujah).14 Although sectarianism and particularly the political marginalization of Sunnis after 2003 is a factor in negative public opinion toward the police in Sunni-majority communities, grievances about police corruption, inefficacy, and misconduct as well as perceptions of the police as an extension of the military are consistently expressed across different regions and ethnoreligious groups.

Police Decentralization in Iraq

After 2003, the Iraqi police were largely decentralized from the federal to the provincial government level, which has had the effect of giving local police commanders significant authority over hiring, discipline, and training with minimal oversight by the Interior Ministry (Pfaff 2008, 9-10). The Iraqi police are organized into two main branches: federal and local. The federal police are the highly militarized police force that participated in the battle for Mosul and other counter-insurgency operations. The federal police, who wear military-style camouflage uniforms, respond to security incidents that exceed the capabilities of the police but are not severe enough for army intervention including riots and protests. The local police are responsible for enforcing domestic laws and maintaining order. The local police include sub-divisions of traffic police as well as “community police officers” who receive special training in community-oriented policing methods from the International Organization for Migration. Community police officers are unarmed and wear vests that clearly identify them as community police.

Another important difference between the two major branches is that local police are usually recruited from and deployed in their home communities and are therefore relatively representative of the demography of the areas in which they work, but federal police go through a centralized training process in Baghdad and are deployed to areas where they are needed regardless of where they are from. As a result, local police tend to have stronger social ties to and empathy with civilians.

Police Fragmentation in Iraq

In addition to being decentralized, Iraqi state security institutions are also fragmented in two ways. First, under Iraq’s informal sectarian power sharing agreement, the Ministry of Defense has traditionally been headed by a Sunni and the Ministry of Interior has been headed by a Shia, contributing to sectarian
POLICE DECENTRALIZATION, FRAGMENTATION, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE (CONTINUED)

tensions and competition between different state security institutions. A second factor contributing to fragmentation is the presence of powerful non-state actors—tribes and militias—that coexist uneasily with state institutions and often challenge their authority (Gaston and Derzsi-Horváth 2018). In Iraq, many Iraqis prefer to resolve interpersonal disputes and criminal accusations through tribal justice mechanisms and only resort to police and the court system as a last resort. In some areas, tribal and state authorities coordinate to resolve disputes, but the relationship between these parallel justice systems is not always cooperative and sometimes antagonistic. In some cases, tribal authorities resist and retaliate against efforts by police to intervene in what they consider to be internal tribal affairs, which has had a chilling effect on law enforcement. As one police officer in Baghdad explained in 2017, “Whenever we try to arrest anyone caught in the act or on suspicion, the tribe can always find us. If I see anyone breaking the law, I don’t intervene.”

In addition to tribes, police coexist with strong militias—some of which receive funding and training from Iran—that operate largely outside of the state’s control. At times, these militias have interfered with the work of the Iraqi police by blocking roads and taking over or even sabotaging police stations.17 The formerly independent Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a predominantly Shia militias supported by Iran, was formally integrated into Iraq’s state security apparatus and placed under the oversight of the Office of the Prime Minister in 2016, but in practice, the PMF continue to operate with significant autonomy, contributing to fragmentation by further blurring the lines between state and non-state security actors.

Perceptions of the Iraqi Police Before and After Repression of 2019 Protests

Between October-December 2019, Iraq saw a powerful wave of protests over corruption, economic inequality, and bad governance among other grievances. Federal riot police, SWAT forces, and militias aligned with Iran used excessive and lethal force to disperse the protests, killing at least 600 people with live bullets and heavy tear gas cannisters that caused fatal head injuries.18 Importantly, local police officers—including unarmed community police officers—did not participate in the repression of protests. Instead, many community police officers visited the public squares and streets where demonstrations were occurring to provide protesters with water19 and pamphlets affirming their right to peaceful protest and free speech,20 telling protesters that they were there to protect them. In some cases, community police stood

or marched alongside protesters in solidarity. Arguably, the demonstrations revealed a divide between local community police, who appeared to sympathize with protesters and at times explicitly supported their demands, and federal police who violently repressed them on behalf of the state. This pattern suggests that police decentralization may have helped to mitigate repression, since the violence was perpetrated by federal-level riot and SWAT officers while local police either stayed on the sidelines or expressed support for protesters. However, police fragmentation probably exacerbated repression. Iran-backed militias, whose presence the Iraqi government tolerates, fueled the violence by assassinating prominent activists, firing live bullets at protesters, and burning down their tents. Not only did federal-level state security forces decline to intervene to stop these militias, but many joined them in committing human rights abuses against protesters as the violence escalated.

Data from two waves of door-to-door household surveys that I conducted with the International Organization for Migration in the southern city of Basra, one of the centers of the protest movement, provides some insights into perceptions of the police at these two points in time: before and after a period of severe repression in July and December 2019. Importantly, these were cross-sectional random-sample surveys (N=300 x 2 rounds) rather than panel surveys of the same respondents, so any changes between the two waves may be explained by sampling error rather than external events. Still, there were some striking changes between the baseline and endline surveys that are unlikely to be the result of sampling error alone. We found significant increases in respondents’ concerns about violence against civilians by “state security forces” 21 (a 14 percentage point increase in the number of respondents who were “very concerned”) and arbitrary arrests (a 21 percentage point increase) in Basra (Figures 1 and 2).

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21. Given the sensitive nature of questions of these questions, we could not ask which specific security forces were responsible for arbitrary arrests and violence (only about “state security forces” in general), nor could we ask questions about respondents’ attitudes toward or participation in the protests.
Despite these sharp increases in concern about violence and arbitrary arrests by “state security forces” in general, perceptions of local police based on an eight-point scale of legitimacy did not become significantly more negative and if anything, improved slightly for some indicators including feeling respected by police and willingness to report crime to the police (Figure 3).

* Bars represent combined percentage of respondents who had somewhat or very favorable views of police on each round of the survey.
Conclusion

Given the observational nature of the survey data, the small sample sizes, and potentially confounding events including the Prime Minister’s resignation a few weeks before the endline survey, it is not possible to make causal claims about the effects of police repression on public opinion. Nonetheless, we can descriptively compare these two snapshots of public opinion at different points in time: before and after the onset of protests and repression. The findings—an increase in fear of violence and arbitrary arrests by federal state security forces but no significant change in perceptions of local police—may have been driven by the fact that federal-level riot police and SWAT forces were heavily involved in repression of the recent protests, but local police were not (and some local community police officers positioned themselves as protectors of the protesters). The findings suggest that civilians distinguish between the conduct of different actors in a decentralized, fragmented security apparatus and attribute blame individually rather than collectively blaming the state security apparatus as a whole, consistent with research in Uganda finding that police repression negatively affects public opinion toward police but not the government as a whole (Curtice 2020).

Our research in Iraq provides insight into the difficulty of reforming a decentralized and fragmented state security apparatus where different security actors—local and federal, state and non-state—vary significantly in their incentives, training, chains of command, and social ties to the communities where they work. Future research should further examine how these two dimensions of variation, decentralization and fragmentation, interact to shape patterns of police violence and misconduct.

Studying police and other security institutions is crucial for improving our understanding of periods of acute social and political crises and mitigating the human rights abuses that often accompany such upheavals, but doing so raises important ethical concerns. When researchers are confronted with unexpected episodes of state repression during data collection, the safety of human subjects and bystanders must be prioritized over our interest in documenting and collecting data on the unfolding violence. As political scientists increasingly partner with police departments—often the only way to survey or interview significant numbers of police officers—we must prepare for the real possibility that the police we are studying might commit human rights violations during a study that implicate our moral and professional responsibilities to do no harm.

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Bibliography

As climate change intensifies, extreme weather events’ frequency will increase on a global scale. Processes such as deforestation and erosion will expose more people, property, and resources to threats such as floods and landslides. Development trends mean that more people will live and work in inadequately-regulated construction and traverse poorly-built or decaying infrastructure. As a result, many populations are increasingly vulnerable to disasters, which disproportionately affect lower- and middle-income countries as well as people living in poverty and people of color living in high-income countries (Davies et al. 2018; Cutter and Finch 2008; IPCC 2012). Disasters of any origin are deeply political (Olson 2000), shaping, for example, electoral processes and amplifying racial and ethnic inequalities. Politics determine whether a population can cope with an “extreme weather event” or, conversely, whether a community is “struck by disaster.” That is, ostensibly “natural” disasters (henceforth: disasters) occur due to policies (or lack thereof), not due to unavoidable environmental processes (Stivers 2007, 49–50; Gould, Garcia, and Remes 2016).

As a broad subject of inquiry, disaster serves as a lens onto core political relationships and processes. That is: “disaster provides a revealing moment of transparent, raw clarity into social realities which are otherwise obscured” (Venugopal and Yasir 2017, 425, see also Elliott and Pais 2006, 296). A fuller integration of disaster studies into comparative politics opens intellectual space for political scientists interested in contributing new analytical insights on issues such as race and ethnicity, migration, participatory politics, conflict, gender, law, and inequality while also highlighting issues of critical public concern and relevance. In this vein, we first identify three core trends in the extant politics of disaster literature: 1) studies that examine the effects of natural disaster on public opinion and trust in government; 2) research that explores how disasters influence conflict; and 3) scholarship that evaluates disaster governance. Second, building on interdisciplinary literature in disaster studies, we suggest both trajectories for future research and note potential challenges that comparativists may face.

1. Disasters are events that cause large-scale infrastructural and environmental damage, significant socio-economic disruption, and mass casualties (J. Xu et al. 2016).
Public opinion, blame, and trust in government

The effects of disaster on voting patterns and public opinion are one of the most developed areas of disaster politics research. While much of this research has been conducted in the US context, there is significant potential for its further development in the comparative realm. For instance, a finding that constituencies reward US elected officials for assistance post-disaster, but not for money spent on preparing their communities to better withstand disasters’ effects, may be of particular importance to test comparatively, given the implications for casualties, damage, and subsequent blame associated with lack of preparation (Healy and Malhotra 2009). Scholars have also identified numerous dynamics that affect post-disaster voting behavior and public opinion: media’s role in framing disaster outcomes and shaping emotional responses to them (Atkeson and Maestas 2012); interactions between prior partisanship and disaster exposure (Heersink et al. 2020; Hazlett and Mildenberger 2020); and assignment of responsibility to local governments for preparation and/or damage (Malhotra and Kuo 2008). Gasper and Reeves (2011) find that post-disaster damage is negatively related to voting for incumbents, while requests to declare the event a disaster have a positive effect on state governors, and, when granted, on US presidents as well.

There is immense potential for comparativists to expand these themes to more diverse contexts, approaches, and questions, especially in varying regime and governance contexts. For example, Grossman (2020b) argues that emergency declarations—usually necessary for international aid to be deployed—are not automatic. Rather, they are the products of both facts on the ground and of states’ strategic political decisions vis-à-vis domestic politics. Carlin et. al. (2014) examine how Chile’s 2010 earthquake and tsunami shaped public opinion, finding that personally suffering damage had a negative effect on people’s support for democratic institutions and practices. Focusing on a series of wildfires in Russia, Lazarev et. al. (2014) argue that people who were affected by the fires and received assistance from the government showed higher levels of support for Putin’s regime. Yet, researchers should also extend the bases for comparison far beyond voting behavior, public opinion, trust, and blame. For example, examining when political parties adopt preparedness to their platforms or push preparedness when in office might offer broader insight into how political parties conceive of and use narrative to frame their disaster-related efforts and to perform accountability (Sorace 2016).

Disaster and Conflict

A significant portion of comparative scholarship on disaster addresses potential relationships between disasters and conflict. Nel and Righarts (2008), for example, find that natural disasters have a statistically significant, positive effect on the risk of intrastate conflict, particularly in low- and middle-income countries with low economic growth, high inequality, and mixed political regimes. Brancati (2007) similarly finds that high-magnitude earthquakes lead to intrastate violence due to resultant resource scarcity. This effect is greater in areas

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2. This line of inquiry is closely related to the literature that links climate change to armed conflict (Mach et al. 2019; Hendrix and Glaser 2007; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; J. Xu et al. 2016). There is still extensive debate regarding the links between climate change and specific wars, e.g., the Syrian Civil War (Châtel 2014; Kelley et al. 2015; Selby 2020; Selby et al. 2017).
with higher population density and lower GDP per capita. However, opposite findings also exist. Bergholt and Lujala (2012) argue that while climate-related disaster negatively affects economic growth, it does not lead to an increase in conflict. Slettebak (2012) likewise finds that countries affected by natural disaster are at a lower risk of civil war.

Scholars who leverage in-depth, qualitative, case study research present nuanced pictures of the mechanisms that link disaster to conflict dynamics. Their work points to complex processes generated by the combination of disaster and conflict, indicating a future need to parse such dynamics with methodological care and contextual awareness. Mampilly (2009) finds that a post-disaster spike in foreign aid in Sri Lanka following the 2004 tsunami rendered the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) increasingly reliant on flows of overseas aid, which undermines the group’s cooperation with the Sri Lankan government and fueled further violence. Other research questions why natural disaster exacerbates or potentially causes conflict in some cases, but mitigates it in others. Comparing conflicts in Sri Lanka and Indonesia post-tsunami, Beardsley and McQuinn (2009) find that rebel groups’ perceived return on investment and territorial investments shape the relationship between natural disaster and conflict. This dynamic, they contend, helps to explain a successful peace process in Aceh, versus the conflict escalation witnessed in eastern Sri Lanka.

**Disaster Governance**

Literature on disaster governance—that is, on disaster risk reduction and management by state and non-state actors (Tierney 2012, 342)—is also directly relevant to broad debates in comparative politics. Specialized disaster response agencies often work extensively with public actors such as health and infrastructure ministries as well as civil society and private corporations. Disaster governance is thus embedded in broader institutional structures, serving as a lens onto overarching comparative political processes. Extant case study research on disaster governance and its aftermath hints at the depth of these dynamics by examining, for example, events such as Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (Howe and Bang 2017; Salazar 2015), the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in China (P. Xu et al. 2014; B. Xu 2017; Sorace 2015; 2017; Gao 2019; 2020), the Indian Ocean tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka (McGilvray and Gamburd 2013; Jauhola 2013) and Hurricane Matthew in Haiti (Marcelin, Cela, and Shultz 2016).

This particular research thematic carries broad potential for policy-relevant research at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations. Specifically, it provides a lens through which to understand the interface between local politics, national governments, and the international community. Current work focuses tightly on relief outcomes: shifting political power to subnational rather than national level authorities carries positive effects (Tselios and Tompkins 2017) as do instances of co-production between national and local authorities (Dolley, Kinoshita, and Yamazaki 2019). These shifts also make disaster response more complex and can inhibit positive results (Srikandini, Hilhorst, and Voorst 2018).

The long-term effects of these interventions, the politics they engender, and their unexpected effects remain essential but unanswered questions that should undergird a robust realm of inquiry. Of particular interest to comparativ-
ists, there has been a push to shift from a top-down state-centered approaches to disaster governance to include more non-state and local state actors. While path-breaking literature on local-national-international dynamics in humanitarian response and peacebuilding exists (Jurkovich 2020; Autesserre 2010; Campbell 2018; Grossman 2020a; Lake 2018; 2017), the nature of rapid-onset disasters such as storms and tectonic events presents a new cluster of analytic puzzles that necessitate attention.

Putting Disaster Into Relief

These research threads provide a strong foundation for a more expansive study of disasters in comparative politics. However, these prospects also surface challenges. Disasters do not affect people or populations randomly (Wisner et al. 2004). Rather, their impacts are directly related to pre-existing vulnerabilities, that is, “the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard (an extreme natural event or process)” (Wisner et al 2004, 11). Policy, politics, and history shape vulnerability. They affect where people live and the quality of their homes; the ability to implement and enforce regulations; and politicians’ feelings of accountability to different populations. Twenty thousand children’s deaths in the 2008 Wenchuan, China earthquake, which collapsed hundreds of poorly-built government schools, were associated with a party system that incentivized big, quickly-built, local infrastructure projects (and thus corruption) in order for cadres to advance out of rural districts such as Wenchuan (Cary 2012).³ Disasters expose and deepen already existing cleavages rooted in racial and colonial legacies (Bonilla 2020). In Peru, politicians expressly ignored scientists’ warnings of an unstable mountainside above the now-obliterated, predominantly Quechua (indigenous) town of Yungay, where a landslide buried approximately 25,000 people following an earthquake in 1970. Black citizens were not randomly clustered in sub-par housing in Vanport, Oregon in 1948 that was swept away when a dike above the town burst (Geiling 2015); race covenants prohibited them from living in cities such as Portland where their homes would have been safe from inundation.

These realities necessitate methodological innovation in a field that often relies on as-if random strategies and exogenous shocks in research designs. However, this variation does imply potential for productive comparative subnational research (Giraudy, Moncada, and Snyder 2019; Snyder 2001) given wide variation in community-level vulnerabilities (Cutter and Finch 2008). In the United States, for example, communities of color are 50% more vulnerable to wildfires than white communities (Davies et al. 2018). The complexities of disaster-affected contexts also encourage the deployment of interpretive research designs (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006; Wedeen 2010; 2002; Schaffer 2018) that leverage creative casing strategies (Soss 2018; Simmons and Smith Forthcoming) and lines of analytic sight (Pachirat 2011). Moreover, the technical and descriptive language associated with disasters and disaster response (e.g., “500-year storms” that occur every few years; the use of terms such as “act of God;” war metaphors) point to the leverage to be gained by both interpretive

³ We thank John Yasuda for helping us to clarify this point.
(Schaffer 1998; Scott 1990; Lakoff and Johnson 2003; Johnson 1995) and positivist (Lucas et al. 2015; King, Lam, and Roberts 2017; King, Pan, and Roberts 2013) research designs that focus on the role of language in politics and policy.

**Beyond the “Covid-19 opportunity”**

In comparison to other social science disciplines and interdisciplinary fields, political scientists have not extensively grappled with theoretical, methodological, or empirical approaches to studying disasters. Research trajectories in disaster politics share obvious synergies with research on environmental politics, public health and politics, and humanitarianism, and invite comparativists to examine core themes of race and ethnicity, economic inequality, gender, security, and migration in new ways. Political scientists can benefit immensely from interdisciplinary conversations as they delve further into these topics, as well as from US-centric scholarship that critically examines the broader politics surrounding events such as Hurricane Katrina (Marable and Clarke 2008; Stivers 2007; Elliott and Pais 2006; Frymer, Strolovitch, and Warren 2006).

While the COVID-19 pandemic has sparked a wave of new research on topics that intersect with disaster politics (Lipscy 2020), there are also concerns that a narrow focus on pandemic-themed research will unduly restrict political scientists’ imaginations and grant opportunities (Christia and Lawson 2020). Bisoka (2020) emphasizes that thinking of “Covid-19 as an opportunity” (for example) masks colonial dynamics in knowledge production and encourages exploitative research practices that place local research teams at risk; others have emphasized pandemic and disaster research must necessarily examine the ethics of its timing, design, and data-gathering approaches (Bond, Lake, and Parkinson 2020). Comparative disaster studies takes the impetus from, but moves beyond the immediacy of Covid-19, leveraging political scientists’ theoretical, conceptual, and methodological strengths and providing an essential view onto the critical moments that will drive much of 21st century politics.
References


One of scholars’ favorite terms is “crisis.” After all, serious problems that call for urgent solutions seem to arise in many spheres of modern life. In fact, a leading expert on the concept of crisis, Reinhart Koselleck (2006, 372-74), saw crisis as constitutive of modernity. Especially after the French Revolution dramatically shook up longstanding structures of economy, society, and politics, the resulting sense of precariousness, yet also malleability, has deeply shaped human consciousness. Just as some sectors fear threatening changes as imminent, others believe in the feasibility of major improvements, a hope that spurs them to activism. Indeed, to justify their demand for reform or revolution, progressives deliberately depict the existing system as wracked by problems and headed toward crisis; for instance, Marxists derived their push for socialism from the alleged unsustainability and crisis proneness of capitalism (Wright 1993, 22-23).

Yet although “crisis” is commonly invoked, the term is rarely used with much precision. Instead, this notion seems to be a prime victim of conceptual stretching à la Sartori, applied to a vast range of problems that have different severity and acuteness. Building on the seminal discussion of Koselleck (2006) and embracing a fairly strict notion of “crisis,” this essay develops a classification that highlights a hitherto under-appreciated type of crisis. In this way, it tries to elucidate the logic of decision-making and political conflict during these high-stakes situations.

My classification starts with the straightforward notion of a serious status-quo disruption that is reversible and can be overcome through a simple restoration of normality. By contrast to such conjunctural crises, which recur in the economy, for instance, a structural crisis results from a problem of such magnitude and severity that a simple return to the (pre-)existing system is no longer feasible. A solution thus requires innovation and re-founding, which involves a greater diversity of options and more complex and often conflictual decision-making. France, for instance, struggled for decades over how to cope with the revolution of 1789.

While these two types of crisis are well-known, there is a third type that is becoming more common in the era of globalization, namely a crisis provoked by the external offer of a novel, promising solution.

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that internal forces on their own would not have initiated. Starting with France in 1789, for instance, a revolution in a high-profile setting can stimulate contentious emulation efforts in many other polities that would have remained stable without this external spark. The resulting “diffused crises,” caused by foreign impulses that outshine and thus undermine domestic structures, entail particularly fierce conflicts. They also yield paradoxical outcomes as the attempts to imitate the triggering precedent or model mostly fail, suppressed by reactionary backlash, as this essay explains below.

Crisis: Conjunctural or Structural

A crisis is the high-stakes, time-compressed situation when a serious, acute challenge causes a grave disruption of the status quo (a major reduction in systemic functioning) that threatens further drastic deterioration and thus quickly pushes the affected system toward divergent outcome possibilities ranging from a full recovery and resumption of systemic functioning to a total meltdown and collapse (Vierhaus 1978, 320-22; Hasse 2012, 32-34). Thus, the problem is so virulent and pressing that it opens up a fork in the road, with a stark difference in possible results, as captured in Historical Institutionalism’s concept of “critical juncture” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007).

The simplest type of crisis, derived from the medical field, is a conjunctural disruption. Caused by an exogenous disease vector, such as the suddenly spreading coronavirus, an illness brings an unsustainable negative deviation from normality. Accordingly, the doctor tries to help the patient return to health by combatting the invasive disease agent. The goal is recovery of the status quo, with simple loss avoidance as the driving motivation. The assumption and hope is that after elimination of the external danger, the system resumes its prior functioning and returns to normality.

The social sciences encounter this simple type of crisis in economics, with conjunctural problems such as spikes in unemployment or inflation. For many countries, these crises have an exogenous origin; both in the Great Depression of 1929 and the Great Recession of 2008, for instance, shocks that erupted in the US had global repercussions that threw a wide range of other nations into serious downturns as well.

The resulting problems massively disrupt production and exchange and threaten to throw large population sectors into poverty. Thus, there is a clear fork in the road, pointing toward – often painful – recovery or, in severe cases such as hyperinflation, utter meltdown (as in Zimbabwe after 2007). In most cases, the demand for relief, “whatever it may take!” reaches such intensity that the government imposes drastic adjustment, which can restore stability quickly (Weyland 2002, Ch. 5). There is widespread agreement on the goal, namely a return to normality, despite frequent disagreement on the means, especially the allocation of adjustment costs.

Major terrorist attacks can also cause disruptive, conjunctural crises. Governments try hard to prevent a proliferation of assaults, which could threaten a descent into civil war (as in Peru in 1990/91). The main goal is the restoration of public safety. Interestingly, these attacks are often supported or executed by foreign forces, and the targeted government deliberately highlights this external dimension; consequently, its main task consists in defending the existing system by eliminating the destructive forces. The assumption is that this system remains viable.
and that a return to normality, maybe with some reinforcements such as intrusive TSA controls in airports, is feasible.

The more that problems causing a crisis are – and are seen as – internal, however, the more the viability of the existing system becomes questionable, and the simple restoration of the status quo ante turns inadvisable or infeasible. When worsening difficulties reveal inherent flaws, a return to the old order is insufficient; instead, a thorough overhaul or major renovation is required (Vierhaus 1978, 318, 328-29). Thus, if a crisis has profound structural roots, solutions require forward-looking proposals and new projects.

Such a structural crisis thus has different outcome scenarios from a conjunctural crisis. Because the status quo ante is unviable, the only options are substantial improvement (Hasse 2012, 38-39) or decay and eventual collapse. Where, for instance, “the social question” leads to escalating redistributive conflict, potential outcomes diverge starkly, ranging from reformist solutions, such as a social-democratic welfare state, to a violent, destructive revolution or a repressive counterrevolution.

Due to this variety of options, which affect sociopolitical forces differently and therefore cause conflict, decision-making in structural crises is much more complex than in conjunctural crises. Doctors have a clear goal, the restitution of health. By contrast, structural crises open up possibilities for improvement – but of what kind and for whom, and who pays the cost? Moreover, risks of breakdown also diverge starkly, ranging from a revolutionary breakthrough to a counterrevolutionary crackdown.

Throughout modern history, powerful actors’ different positions on these options have led to complex and shifting political alignments and innumerable conflicts. For instance, is an ambitious but risky transformation to be avoided, or do the prospects of founding a much better system justify the experiment? Actors’ stances have often depended on their worldviews. Whoever adopted a teleological view of history was more hopeful that crises would produce improvements. Where these expectations of progress accompanied a more consensual view of politics, as in modernization theory, the predicted and preferred process was reform (e.g., Binder, Coleman, et al. 1971). Alternatively, a conflictual view of politics brought calls for revolution, most prominently in Marxism, which depicted structural crises as the necessary self-destruction of the old, exploitative and oppressive mode of production and the decisive stepping stone for the redemptive quantum leap to a new, qualitatively better system (cf. Griewank 1969, 214-15).

The higher these progressive hopes, the stronger the push for radical overhauls – but also for reactionary counter-measures (Griewank 1969, 195-209). Countries that experienced major structural crises therefore had agitated histories, especially after the French Revolution of 1789 established the feasibility of profound radical change. France itself underwent decades of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary efforts. Thus, structural crises provoke debates and conflicts that are vastly more complex and controversial than discussions over conjunctural crises tend to be. Rather than converging on a return to normality, these debates involve enormous disagreements about the ultimate goals of politics and the best ways of achieving them “in the real world.”
**Diffused Crises**

Whereas this distinction between conjunctural and structural crises is well-known, there is a third type of crisis that has not been highlighted so far, yet that is increasingly common and relevant due to advancing globalization. When a new, promising option or model appears on the international agenda, this exciting offer can stimulate drastic challenges to established systems. Diffusion thus causes a crisis that does not arise from the domestic development trajectory. What makes the system shake are not worsening endogenous problems, but a new, exogenous solution. Thus, foreign supply can call into question existing structures, which – left to their own devices – would have remained stable. Internal problems or conflicts were not prompting a structural crisis. Instead, the example of another country that initiated an apparently promising transformation raised expectations (cf. Hasse 2012, 34-35), made the established system look deficient and outdated, and suggested the need and feasibility of a major overhaul. Such an external input, which outshines and thus degrades the old order, can trigger an intense quest for change and produce escalating conflict that assumes crisis proportions.

The French Revolution was the first major political event that had this crisis-inducing impact on many other countries. By suddenly demonstrating the possibility of dramatic change, it inspired political forces in numerous polities to initiate emulation efforts, while scaring status-quo defenders and prompting them to squash these imitative uprisings. This external impulse thus threw a wide range of countries into serious turmoil. While these crises certainly had internal contributing and facilitating factors, their eruption resulted from the striking precedent in Paris. External supply detonated these crises; on their own, internal problems would not have blown up. Outside France, domestic developments were not ripe for a contentious overhaul; only the external spark lit the fire. No wonder that these fires – the emulation efforts inspired by the French Revolution – suffered uniform extinction (Weyland 2019, 222-26).

Thus, diffused crises arise from the demonstration effects that striking precedents unleash. Accordingly, the unexpected overthrow of long-ruling autocracies in France in 1848, in Russia in 1917, and in Tunisia in 2011 set in motion wide-ranging riptides of regime contention. These stunning examples of “people power” inspired massive crowds in a multitude of other countries to defy their own authorities. Nothing suggests that without these foreign stimuli, Austrians and Prussians in 1848, Bavarians and Finns in 1918, or Syrians and Yemenis in 2011 would have risen up.

Yet precisely because these unforeseen crises are detonated by diffusion, “go beyond” domestic regime developments, and erupt in settings that lack internal preconditions and that are actually unpropitious for transformations, they almost uniformly end in failure. After overcoming their initial shock and surprise, status-quo defenders marshal their ample power capabilities and prove the externally inspired protesters wrong. Consequently, externally inspired hopes are crushed in reactionary backlashes. Because the foreign precedent or model outshines the old system so much, its adoption proves infeasible. Therefore, riptides of imitative contention suffer containment and defeat (Weyland 2019, Chs. 4-6, 8).

Political conflicts during these diffused crises tend to be at least as multifaceted and fierce as in structural crises, yet with lower chances
for progressive breakthroughs and greater risks of stagnation or regression. After all, the foreign origin of diffused crises means that in the eyes of conservative forces, the status quo remains viable; therefore, efforts at simple restoration through determined counter-attacks against the externally inspired challengers are common (an option unavailable in structural crises). These conservative attempts can fail, however, as indicated by the disastrous civil wars in Syria and Yemen. Consequently, diffused crises open up a variety of outcome options, ranging from emulative improvements, as in Denmark’s abolition of absolutism and adoption of universal suffrage in 1848, to simple restoration, as in Austria in 1848 or Bahrain in 2011, clear regression, as in Egypt after 2013, and utter chaos, as in the just-mentioned cases of state collapse.

The High Point of Diffused Crises: The Interwar Years

Diffused crises had the greatest variety of outcome possibilities during the interwar years, the beginning “age of extremes” (Hobsbawm 1996) with its clash among hostile ideological visions and millenarian projects. After all, the Russian Revolution posed such a comprehensive, profound challenge to the sociopolitical order that it helped provoke the emergence of an equally radical counterrevolutionary model, namely fascism. Lenin’s violent takeover and the brutal imposition of Soviet totalitarianism sent shock waves across the world. As extreme left-wingers quickly sought to imitate the Soviet precedent, these precipitous uprisings created diffused crises in a range of countries. Because status-quo oriented forces also inferred from the Bolshevik “success” that the established order was precarious, they cracked down hard on these ill-considered adventures. As a result, the novel model of Communism did not spread (Weyland 2021, Chs. 3-4).

Indeed, radical-left challenges prompted the rise of fascism: Mussolini’s movement won support by battling urban and rural labor contention inspired in part by Lenin’s precedent. The Duce’s developing dictatorship then turned into a model of its own, as did Hitler’s fiercer version of fascism after 1933. Establishment forces ranging from the social-democratic left to the conservative right thus faced a dual threat, from Communism on the radical left and from fascism on the radical right. Two drastically divergent, yet equally bold options thus claimed to transcend the status quo. Compared to the Communist paradise of classlessness or the fascist “people’s community,” liberal democracy looked drab and unambitious, if not exhausted and decadent. The messianic projects exerted particular appeal because they did not remain mere ideological visions, but were instituted in major countries and thus demonstrated their apparent feasibility, if not success (in the eyes of certain sectors).

The danger arising from the two extremes pushed many countries into serious crises. After the early attempts to imitate the Russian Revolution brought a first wave of bloodshed, the rise of fascism caused another upsurge of conflict, especially after Hitler’s Machtergreifung (Weyland 2021, Chs. 7-8). This fighting along several political fronts turned very costly, with many lives lost and numerous democracies toppled. Especially in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, the boots of Communists and fascists, of government forces and conservative militaries, trampled liberal pluralism to death.

Thus, the diffused crises of the interwar years had the widest gamut of outcome options, rang-
ing from Communism on the far left, to Social Democracy à la Sweden, liberal democracy as in Britain, battered democracy as in Finland, and National Socialism as in Germany. The most common result, however, was conservative authoritarianism, which emerged in many countries from the backlash by powerful establishment sectors against the radical left and/or the radical right (Weyland 2021, Chs. 7-8). Thus, these diffused crises were prompted by bold regimes embodying redemptive ideological visions, but they often resulted in stodgy, stifling dictatorships that focused on simply maintaining stability and that combated and suppressed the advocates of all these ambitious projects.

Conclusion

This essay has tried to elucidate a type of crisis that deserves more scholarly attention, namely acute conflicts prompted by diffusion. Whereas conjunctural crises are straightforward disruptions of normality and structural crises result from grave internal problems and pressures, diffused crises have crucial external causes, namely exciting foreign precedents and novel models, which provoke unexpected challenges to an otherwise viable system. While the resulting conflicts hold the possibility of substantial improvements (something a conjunctural crisis does not); and while their wave-like proliferation therefore elicits high hopes; actual outcomes are mostly disappointing. Like many earlier such sequences, the Arab Spring quickly ended in a frosty winter, and sometimes a hellish inferno (Weyland 2019, Ch. 8). The main reason is that contrary to a structural crisis, domestic conditions are not ripe for a contentious breakthrough; instead, once status-quo defenders recover from the surprise of facing externally inspired challenges, they muster their ample resources and power capabilities and outmaneuver or repress their opponents.

With advancing globalization, diffused crises have become more frequent, as the recent example of the global wave of populism suggests. While populist experiences have crucial domestic roots, there has also been inspiration, learning, and even cooperation across cases, as the contacts between President Trump and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, England’s Nigel Farage, and France’s Marine Le Pen show. This wave-like momentum has further energized populist leaders and their followers. But it has also served as a warning for liberal democrats concerned about populism’s authoritarian tendencies. By helping to realign political debate and conflict along a new cleavage and by firing up both sides of this deepening divide, the spread of populist impulses has fueled a growing crisis in Western democracies. The novel concept of crisis discussed in this essay thus holds considerable relevance.

1. According to Linz (1978: 87-90), however, democratic crises that create a serious risk of breakdown can be resolved through “re-equilibration,” a term with homeostatic connotations implying a return to normality.
CRISIS: CONJUNCTURAL, STRUCTURAL – OR DIFFUSED? (CONTINUED)

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Violence and its threat are often accompanied by claims of crisis, signaling a breakdown in a previously-stable order. New forms of contention, conflict, and claim-making can emerge that challenge the status quo. Governments, security forces, opposition forces, and the media may all seek to define the emergent situation. These situations can often be plausibly characterized in a variety of ways, from a fundamental threat to state and nation to a minor irritant that can be handled with little disruption to a disagreement about whether there is actually a crisis at all.

Crisis is not a monolithic category. Instead, different types of crises can be perceived, articulated, and argued about. Here I offer a typology that capture the varieties of crisis that can accompany violence and its threat. The four types are not mutually exclusive, and a context can shift from one to another over time, but they offer useful analytical purchase on what it can mean for a crisis to occur. The types are systemic, peripheral, external, and hybrid. While there can certainly be objective material indicators of each type, I argue that they are also importantly political, constructed, debated, and consolidated (Boudreau 2004; Straus 2015; Staniland 2022).

Systemic and peripheral crises are internal, but reflect different scopes of threat and levels of perceived danger. External crises are seen to emanate primarily from outside a country’s borders. Hybrid crises fuse systemic with external crises, generating a politics that links violence and dissent within to claims of broader international subversion.

I then consider how contestation over the characterization of crisis can play out, arguing that cleavages can powerfully shape the nature of political competition and crisis framing – at some times, the contestation is over the existence and nature of a crisis, while at others, it is over the appropriate response given a shared assessment. There is nothing obvious, natural, or given about what counts as a crisis, the type of crisis, or what response is seen as appropriate.

This typology is inductively derived from interstate and intrastate crises in South and Southeast Asia. I focus on internal insurgencies, dissident movements, and interstate disputes (primarily territorial), but also refer to other kinds of violence and coercion that can create similar dynamics. This is not intended to be a comprehensive typology, but instead a generative one that can refine our analysis of what it actually means when we refer to a “crisis.”
Systemic Crisis

Systemic crises are those in which threats are perceived to be endemic, wide-reaching, and potentially affecting fundamental structures of state and politics. The crisis is thus seen to cut to the core of the regime’s political project with an expectation of a long and far-ranging struggle. This perception may, of course, be objectively wrong, wildly exaggerated, or politically instrumentalized, but regardless of its “truth,” such a framing has major effects.

The framing of a crisis as systemic can create “lock-in” around the expansion of the state security apparatus, reduced formal and informal constraints on repression, the creation and re-configuration of institutions aimed at domestic surveillance, and a set of political justifications for this posture (Slater 2010; Greitens 2016).

These crises can involve both center-seeking/revolutionary and separatist revolts, depending on how the groups, politics, and aims in question relate to the reigning project of the government and its political and media allies. In Indonesia under the New Order, both communist and separatist insurgencies were framed as systemic threats requiring drastic, costly actions. Even after the 1965-66 massacres of communists, the Suharto regime continued to use the specter of the left as a justification for repression and authoritarianism (Anderson 2001). Marcos justified his “New Society” by deploying the alleged systemic threat of the left, seeking to legitimate the dismantling of democracy as a necessary tool for holding subversion at bay.

In South Asia, we have seen systemic crises being portrayed in Ne Win’s Burma, Sri Lanka in the face of escalating Tamil insurgency, Pakistan’s military establishment in its characterization of ethno-linguistic mobilization, and India’s government at a sub-national level in response to the Kashmir insurgency and nationally in response to a wave of Islamist terror attacks starting in the early 1990s. Some of these were communist, center-seeking insurgencies (like the Communist Party of Burma) but others have been separatist insurgencies or terrorist groups.

For instance, in Sri Lanka both the two Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, or People’s Liberation Front) revolts – center-seeking, ultra-left rebellions – and separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam insurgency generated discourses and policies framing them as systemic threats to the fundamental essence of nation and state (Alles 1990; Wilson 2001). Even non-violent movements can be framed as generating systemic crises, as the Thai military-monarchy nexus has sought to frame political party and student movements as deeply threatening at various points.

In Burma, the military coup of 1962 was accompanied by a set of wildly exaggerated claims by Ne Win and the Burmese military: it claimed that it intervened to stave off a disintegrative crisis that could not be prevented by civilian rule. This was objectively a very dubious claim, as the intensity of insurgencies had declined since the worst period of the late 1940s-early 1950s, and since the military’s political project was actually an accelerant to further revolt. Nevertheless, Ne Win framed Burma’s political situation as a crisis touching all aspects of state and society, and requiring a firm and disciplined hand to guide the country through the tumult. This articulation was used to justify a brutal crackdown and decades of subsequent authoritarianism. The entire edifice created from 1962-1988 rested on the argument that it was the needed bulwark against disintegration and subversion.
In general, systemic crises are accompanied by creation of a far-reaching state of exemption from the prior rules of politics, with security force crackdowns, rhetoric from the government and its supporters that emphasizes the need for strength and lack of interest in dissent or ambiguity, and the growth of institutions and technologies of internal security and social control. Leviathan is strengthened, often to an extent that systematically facilitates the violation of rights and the extension of state power into new domains.

Peripheral Crisis

Other internal crises are framed as having limited reach and political impact. They can be sites of repression and intense conflict, but are seen as being “sealed off” from the political heartland. Rather than being portrayed as affecting everyday citizens and fundamental cleavages in society, they are instead out of sight, occurring in distant social and/or geographical peripheries. Instead of demanding the mobilization of vast resources, reconfiguration of core state institutions, and changes to common political practices, they are left to security and intelligence forces and to a scattered array of marginal pro-state political entrepreneurs.

Here we can see radically divergent experiences of crisis: a grinding, lethal daily reality on the periphery but barely-known in the metropole. India’s Northeast and Naxalite conflicts both have largely been framed and experienced as peripheral crises. The Northeast is simultaneously a geographical and political periphery, nestled between Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, and Myanmar, and with a small and very heterogeneous population that is mostly irrelevant to the core battles of Indian politics. Insurgencies of various kinds have existed since the mid-1950s, and tens of thousands have died over the decades. The war zones themselves have experienced heavy militarization and, in some cases, a nexus of “mainstream” politics with insurgency, as well as various ceasefires and peace deals (Bhaumik 2009; Baruah 2020). Almost all of these dynamics are marginal to the core electoral contests of Indian politics – leading politicians rarely discuss these conflicts, many citizens know little or nothing about them, and they do not centrally figure in mainstream national media coverage.

Similarly, the Naxalite insurgency in India, characterized by a resilient Maoist revolt, has been fought over a substantial swath of Indian territory and touched the lives of millions. Yet it is waged in poor and distant interior areas (Shah 2010; Sundar 2016), and communist insurgency lacks the political salience and electoral-mobilization potential of the Kashmir conflict or Islamist terrorism.

In both cases, the central government deploys its internal security forces alongside state police, and the main political actors are local politicians. These local politicians vary in their autonomy from the state and insurgents, and are often characterized by a certain powerlessness in the midst of these conflicts. The security forces themselves often are not very accountable for abuses of power and rights, but these are geographically concentrated to the peripheries in question, rather than the more expansive remit that accompanies systemic crises.

Burma’s peripheries have taken on these characteristics in recent decades. They were the object of intense, vicious counterinsurgency under Ne Win (Smith 1999). However, a wave of ceasefires emerged after his fall from power that reconfigured the periphery into zones of
state-armed group collusion and bargaining (Callahan 2007; Buchanan 2016). There is ongoing conflict, often of high intensity and with tragic human consequences, but that is mostly firewalled off from most of the political system. Wars in Shan and Rakhine states, for instance, do not centrally feature in electoral campaigning or media coverage, even though they involve substantial insurgencies and campaigns of state repression.

One major exception to this pattern shows the value of thinking critically and comparatively about “crisis.” Despite being on a geographic periphery, similarly located as the ethnic Buddhist Rakhine insurgency of the Arakan Army, the Rohingya were linked by the state and much of the media to a broader Muslim tide of demographic transformation threatening Myanmar (International Crisis Group 2017). This helped to consolidate public support for the military’s bloody crackdown in 2017, de facto ethnically cleansing hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, and strategy of political exclusion since. The difference between the Rohingya crisis and the various others that occur on the Myanmar periphery is in its political construction and meaning, not its “objective” attributes, like the size or potency of the rebel threat.

**External crisis**

In southern Asia, internal warfare is vastly more common than direct interstate conflict. Nevertheless, there have been international tensions that have triggered an external crisis framing, with the threat articulated as primarily emanating from a foreign state. This does not mean there is not some element of linked internal threat (which is a crucial component of the hybrid crises discussed below), but that it is fairly secondary. This can be an impetus for a nation to pursue capacity-building, in the classic Tillyian theorization of the relationship between war-making and state-making (Tilly 1992; Desch 2001). After the 1962 India-China war, India pursued a major build up in its defense capabilities. This had a domestic component, as some Indian Communists were targeted, but was primarily framed as an external threat from China rather than representing domestic subversion. 1962 marked a major shift in India’s external security orientation and its willingness to build tools for maintaining that new posture.

This framing of a crisis, however, does not necessarily lead to this is outcome. Instead, it can provide a grim pretext for expanding state power and coercion. The Burma Army used the threat of clashes between the PLA and KMT remnants in the late 1940s/early 1950s and then the heightening tensions of the Cold War in Asia in the 1950s/1960s to justify its expansion of power within Burmese domestic politics (Callahan 2004). This reveals the complex, non-linear relationship between perceptions of external threat and actual outcomes (Staniland 2008; Centeno 2000; Herbst 2000) – such perceptions can help build state capacity or provide justifications for bolstering taking power or bolstering regime security.

Some cases combine both strands of response to an external threat (Slater et al, 2005). Pakistan’s security establishment has for decades pointed to India as presenting an existential threat to Pakistan, allowing it to justify its own domestic political activities as being necessary for holding India at bay while also providing a genuine spur to expanding its war-fighting capabilities, both at home and via international alliances (Shah 2014).
Hybrid crisis

The most dramatic, and potentially lethal, crises are those that are framed by powerful actors as combining external threats with internal actors seen as fundamentally systemic threats (Staniland 2022). Here we see rhetoric that brings together the external enemy with a powerful fifth column operating within, a combination claimed to pose a particularly threat to both the state and the nation. The external enemy is used as a reason to crack down on internal enemies, who are in turn a justification for the expansion of internal security surveillance, monitoring, and control at a growing scale, up to the point of intense violence.

The Pakistani security establishment’s view of Bengalis and Hindus in East Pakistan in the run-up to the 1971 insurgency, crackdown, and India-Pakistan war took on this character: Bengalis were seen as too linked to India and unduly influenced by their sizable Hindu minority of East Pakistan (Butt 2017). The security establishment has tried to offer a repeat performance in suggesting that Baloch insurgency is mixed up with Indian meddling and proxy war.

Sub-nationally, this is how Kashmir’s insurgency is generally portrayed by the Indian government and its sympathizers – in their framing, while there may have been some legitimate local grievances, now the insurgency is largely a fusion of Pakistani meddling and an Islamist fifth column. While security force operations are restricted to Jammu and Kashmir, the broader narrative of Pakistani irredentism mixed with suspect Muslim populations within India has become a core pillar of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s ideological project (Vaishnav 2019).

The New Order linked Indonesian Communists among other framings, as a way of characterizing them as simultaneously alien and subversive (Robinson 2018; Roosa 2006; Melvin 2018). One of the reasons that the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict escalated was the way that the Tamil minority was seen, and characterized, as the thin wedge of broader Indian designs in the region.

The overlap between hybrid and systemic crises is where this typology is least mutually-exclusive – at some points in a systemic crisis, international factors may be more prominent, creating a hybrid crisis, while at other points the international is distinctly secondary or irrelevant.

To show the relevance of this context beyond southern Asia, the US response to 9/11 and China’s actions in recent years in Xinjiang (Greitens et al. 2020) – while obviously very different in many ways – are examples of a “hybrid” crisis framing, in which internal threats of uncertain size and duration combined with claims of transnational connections required major institutional changes.

Contesting Crisis

The discussion so far has taken for granted that a powerful state actor, possibly joined by a coalition of supportive media, public opinion, and/or other political figures. Yet one will notice the nature of the actors has varied dramatically, and often centers on the ruling government and/or its security apparatus. There can be circumstances under which these framings of crisis are contested: Is there actually a crisis or not? What type is it? How severe is it? What is the best response?

In some cases, a de facto consensus holds, whether by imposition or actual agreement, perhaps with critiques coming from civil society or intellectuals lacking a major political base.
Yet these debates can also exacerbate existing political cleavages, even in autocracies that allow some degree of dissent and debate. For instance, there was a noticeable escalation in tension over the course of the late 1960s and into the early 1970s as Bengali political leaders asserted an alternative narrative to that of the ruling political establishment (Raghavan 2013).

In Sri Lanka, despite a shared macro-narrative about the dangers of Tamil separatism, there was variation over time in how Sinhalese Buddhist politicians thought about solving the problem, with several trying to pursue peace negotiations. These efforts failed as a result of both LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) intransigence and “outbidding” by other Sinhalese Buddhist parties over who would pursue a harder line (Horowitz 1985; DeVotta 2004).

Such debates also may help to build new political cleavages and forms of social mobilization. The Burmese military’s long period of repressive political hegemony bred growing resentment and opposition from within, helping to spur the anti-regime mobilizations of 1988-1990 and 2007. While direct challenges to the military are not a key cleavage in post-transition Myanmar, the ability of anti-regime movements to contest the military’s framing of the political arena did have enduring effects in encouraging a transition away from direct military rule. Though uncertain and risky, pressures from below do have the potential to shift both elite incentives and the dominant conventional wisdom about the nature of crises (Wood 2003).

**Conclusion**

Crises rarely speak for themselves – they are products of politics (Krebs 2015). We see this very clearly across much of the contemporary world. Crisis politics are likely to be especially important for understanding populism and demagoguery, which hinge on the claim that matters have gotten so bad that only a decisive break from prior norms and institutional constraints can save the polity. In the United States, Donald Trump rose in 2015-16 by advancing an apocalyptic vision of a hybrid crisis, with disloyal elites and demographic fifth columns colluding with sinister outside forces (variously, China, transnational cosmopolitan elites, global capital, and Mexico, among others) to target everyday Americans. Though Trump benefited from broad structural trends, his particular political skill was turning them into a constant projection of siege that demanded extraordinary responses. While this vision did not appeal to a majority of Americans, it did appeal to enough of them to deliver him the 2016 election.

The Biden-Harris campaign in 2020 sought to offer a counternarrative that dropped the external component of a crisis framing and reframed the internal crisis as centering not on insidious subversive forces from the left but instead on a Trump administration undermining core American values and botching its response to a real, objective medical crisis in COVID-19. Both campaigns articulated and based their campaigns on very different crises, setting up a clear battle of narratives over the existence and nature of crisis.

Thinking systemically about crisis politics can help us make sense of security policies as well. Whether for sincere reasons, or due to opportunism that then becomes “locked in,” governments can pursue policies that seem wildly disproportionate or even counterproductive when targeting perceived enemies and without. Myanmar’s military has been waging some form of counterinsurgency since 1948, with surpris-
ingly limited efforts at major political bargaining; this seems oddly costly, yet the narrow and chauvinist nationalist visions of the Tatmadaw may help us understand why they so deeply distrust even the prospect of meaningful bargaining with ethnic minorities that have been portrayed as disloyal, historical collaborators with foreign forces, and threatening to the Bamar ethnic majority. The Assad regime in Syria has similarly worked to generate a constant sense of crisis and uncertainty that has grimly worked to its advantage in holding together a ruling coalition. International efforts to settle conflicts that do not take seriously these kinds of perceptions may over-estimate the malleability of conflict and the influence of outside actors.

Crisis, and perceptions thereof, generate fears, anxieties, and justification that are central to political life. Yet we need to move beyond this general claim to both systematically parse out types of crises and examine the politics of contestation around them. In a world of climate change, income inequality, dramatic new political movements, and challenges to post-1945 conventional wisdoms, understanding when and how crises are deployed will be essential for understanding politics.

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LUEBBERT BOOK PRIZE


What caused you to embark on this project?

I started thinking about the project while I was taking Libby Wood’s field seminar in comparative politics. I was really drawn to the books we read on political development and democratization because they had big theories and interesting historical narratives. But I was struck by the fact that very few of the classic works on transitions to democracy and on the extension of the franchise took women seriously as political agents. Women’s suffrage was relegated to the footnotes, treated as an inevitable development whose time eventually came, without the kind of mobilization, strategic interactions, or conflict that were emphasized in explanations of European monarchies’ initial concessions of democratic rights to their subjects, or in accounts of the extension of the right to vote to working-class men.

That depiction did not square with the work I was reading about the history of women’s suffrage, which described women who were active in the struggle for the universal franchise, that described women who were nationalist and anti-imperial activists, and described women that did lots and lots of work on elections, as staff and as volunteers with political parties and grass-roots organizations. I wanted to show that women were not political bystanders who were invited to become full-fledged citizens, but strategic actors who did the hard work they had to do to win the right to vote.

What is one main thing you want the project to be remembered for ten years from now?

I am torn. I am tempted to say that I would be happiest if the present-day impediments to women’s equal participation in politics have been so completely demolished by 2030 that a comparative study of the history of women’s enfranchisement seems like a quaint thing to remember at all.

But I confess that I do not hold out much hope that that is where we will be in ten years, so I hope that people will take two things away from the book. First, the argument that there was a strategic logic underlying the extension of the franchise to women, and that suffragists understood that logic and worked, successfully, to turn it to their advantage. I think that is an interesting story in and of itself but it also demonstrates that the study of women in politics, though it certainly benefits from the resources and community that come from specialist working groups and journals, should not be something
that is only done in specialist settings. Women as voters and activists, women as candidates and elected officials, women in households and in the public sphere should all be central topics of interest for political scientists generally, not just specialists in women and politics.

Second, I hope the book will be remembered for its tables and graphs. My partner gave me a copy of Edward Tufte’s *Visual Display of Quantitative Information* when we were in grad school, and I was really impressed with the aesthetic sensibility that Tufte brought to a medium that most people think of as dry and boring. When I was writing this book, I thought a lot about how to present the historical data I was using to make my arguments in a way that was clear and compelling.

**What in your data or findings surprised you the most? Why?**

I went into the project assuming that the more left-wing and radical a political party was, the more likely it would be that its members supported women’s suffrage, while, conversely, right-wing and traditionalist parties would be the most stalwart opponents of extending the right to vote. I was surprised that in a number of cases, conservative parties threw in their lot with the suffragists, especially when they thought that they were going to lose the struggle they were waging against extending the franchise to working-class men. Meanwhile, a lot of radical leaders were wary of suffragism, because they believed that women would be conservative voters, and liberal and centrist parties assumed they would lose women’s votes to both the left and the right. The fascinating story I was able to tell, after I had learned all this, is that suffragists sought to shape politicians’ expectations about their partisan leanings in order to attract support for their project. They were willing to work with parties across the ideological spectrum, if it brought them closer to the right to vote.

**You’re having a dinner party, which three political scientists, living or dead, would you invite?**

The amiable and humble Bob Dahl, whom I ferried to and from a lecture at Reed College long before I knew how important his work would be for mine. Inez Goltra, who in 1919 co-authored a paper on women’s voting patterns in Oregon, which was perhaps the very first paper that used ecological inference techniques. And Dorothy Swain Thomas, a sociologist who co-authored the famous dataset used by Simon Kuznets, and whose 1940 demographic history of Sweden deserves a read if only for its beautiful graphs.
What caused you to embark on this project?

My interests are closely intertwined with my family history. Growing up, I heard many heroic stories of family members who fought or escaped the Nazis during WW2. However, I was always more intrigued by family who told me that they refrained from stepping up. People who confessed they were afraid to do so. People who chose their own lives over that of others. This led me to ask a simple but important question: Why do some local communities protect victims of genocide while others do not?

Can you explain some of your book’s main findings?

The book argues that local religious minorities are more likely to save persecuted groups. Two reinforcing mechanisms link minority status to rescue operations. First, religious minorities are better able to set up clandestine organizations because their members are more committed. Second, religious minorities empathize with targets of purification campaigns, imbuing their networks with preferences that lead them to resist genocide. A geo-referenced dataset of Jewish evasion in the Netherlands and Belgium during the Holocaust is deployed to assess the minority hypothesis. Spatial statistics and archival work reveal that Protestants were more likely to rescue Jews in Catholic regions while Catholics facilitated evasion in Protestant areas. Post-war testimonies and secondary literature demonstrate the importance of minority groups for rescue in other countries and Genocides, underlining that it is the local position of church communities - and not something inherent to any religion itself - that produces networks of assistance to threatened neighbors.

What surprised you most in your research?

The original research was set up to explore differences in Jewish-Christian relationships between the Netherlands and Belgium. I anticipated that Belgian Catholics would behave differently than Dutch Catholic because of their distinct state-society relationships. However, after a year of research I discovered I had the comparison all wrong. It was the border between Rome and Reformation which transcended the Low Countries that was much more important in shaping the emergence of empathy and social networks.

What would you do differently?

Two things. A. I lost too much time collecting data and did not spend enough time refining
my theory. As a result, the final product is a bit repetitive, showing the same process over and over again using multiple data sources. If I would have made use of smarter sampling strategies, I would have had more time developing my main arguments. B. My book is very good at explaining how major historical transformations impact local communities and micro-dynamics. The books I admire myself, however, tend to also link community dynamics back to the macro-level. In my future work I hope to go full circle.

**What are you working on now?**

I am currently working on a book manuscript tentatively titled “Bogeyman”. It explores the relationship between the rise of the nation-state and the production of fear in modern societies. Based on archives of folklorists I am mapping the geographic and temporal spread of bogeyman in Central-European children stories through the 19th and 20th century. Bogeymen can take many different forms. They can be gendered (witches), ethnic (Jews or Gypsies), urban (the man in the suit), religious, animals, hybrid or rooted in fantasy altogether. Why do some bogeymen cluster in some times and places but not others and what does this tell us about society? The analysis so far reveals that children’s fright (1) is largely shaped by and located at major social cleavages that constitute the nation and (2) has long lasting effects on political behavior, long after the original social fault lines producing fear have been transformed.

●
LUEBBERT BOOK PRIZE HONORABLE MENTION


What caused you to embark on this project?

**IM:** I started this project after completing a book examining electoral irregularities in nineteenth century Europe, *From Open Secrets to Secret Ballots*. In completing that study, I learned that the modal form of clientelism at the time involved state employees – such as mayors, policemen, etc. – as brokers. The book also documents the importance of economic coercion, in other words, clientelistic exchanges where candidates relied on employers as their brokers. I was always suspicious of the clientelism literature, which exclusively examined vote-buying, leaving out coercive clientelistic strategies and strategies that politicize state resources. At the time we fielded our first survey in Hungary, we wanted to measure clientelistic exchanges that do not involve vote-buying.

**LY:** I joined Isabela on this project as a 4th year graduate student. I had just started to feel like I understood (although I didn’t yet!) the issues around electoral coercion in Zimbabwe, where I was doing my dissertation research. When Isabela invited me to join her on a research scoping trip to Hungary, it seemed like a fantastic opportunity to get a glimpse of how electoral coercion might work in a very different context.

As a graduate student, I was also very interested in getting exposed to as many research methods and styles as possible, and building a set of diverse influences that I hoped would make my dissertation research more original.

What is one main thing you want the project to be remembered for ten years from now?

**LY:** For me, the heart of the project is the idea that voters perceive some forms of clientelism as coercive threats. Political scientists have tended to treat clientelism as offers of goods or favors that voters can take or leave at will, but when people form expectations of future benefits or receive durable goods that can be taken away they perceive the threat to take them away as threats. In some cases, they don’t think they can survive if the goods or favor – welfare benefits, or land, or jobs – are taken away, and the transaction becomes coercive. In the book we explore where clientelism based on positive offers and negative threats occurs, and illustrate how these different strategies are carried out, but I think there’s still a lot to investigate around coercive forms of clientelism.

**IM:** I think we put many new theoretical ideas on the table. As Lauren said, electoral coercion
is a central concept of the book. We also were struck by the intense distributional conflicts in these low-income communities we are studying, which we call the “poor-versus-poor” conflict which are exploited by local politicians in different ways. This conflict has not been well theorized in the literature on comparative social policy. Finally, we also advance the idea that, at least in the East European context, politicians use different forms of clientelism to signal their policy position. Coercion is used by politicians to signal their opposition to the ‘undeserving’ welfare beneficiaries and thus as a signal of an anti-welfare position.

What in your data or findings surprised you the most? Why?

**LY:** I was honestly surprised that we found such a prevalence of clientelism in European Union member states. As someone who studies primarily African politics, I’ve heard African scholars lament that scholars only look for evidence of electoral malfeasance in Africa. We found that between 6 and 8 percent of voters in rural localities had experienced each of the four types of clientelism that we measured. As democracy is under attack in many parts of the world, I think we need to invest more resources into systematically measuring electoral integrity – not only in the low-income “usual suspects,” but also in cases in the global north.

**IM:** I was surprised by the similarity in clientelistic practices across the two countries of the study -- Hungary and Romania -- that are dissimilar on so many variables. Party organization and national level electoral competition varies significantly across the two cases. At the onset of the study, I expected these variables to matter more. Yet once we analyzed both the quantitative and qualitative data at the locality level, these national level variables were unimportant in explaining levels and mixes among different forms of clientelism.

**What would you change or do differently if you went back and did this project again?**

**LY:** We collected an enormous amount of data for this project, but I wish that we could have collected even more. I would have loved to do an additional round of ethnographic research at the very end of the writing process. It is difficult to sequence different components of data collection in a multi-methods project because each one can give you new ideas for the others.

I also wish that we had compared our list experiment measures of clientelism with direct questions. We did a lot of piloting and qualitative work to determine whether clientelism was sensitive enough in Hungary and Romania to require list experiments, despite their efficiency loss, but I am convinced by arguments that list experiments may be over used.

**IM:** I agree with Lauren.

**What is the biggest still unanswered question that emerges from your research?**

**LY:** One of the findings from our survey experiments is that people can use motivated reasoning when it comes to judging politicians who use forms of clientelism that are in line with their policy preferences. Most voters don’t like politicians who use clientelism, and view them as worse across a range of characteristics. But voters who have strong preferences that the welfare state should be expanded or reallocated are more forgiving when politicians use forms of clientelism that are positive or negative, re-
spectively. So the question is, can those voters be made more clear-eyed about violations of electoral integrity? Are there interventions or circumstances that can make people more likely to prioritize the quality of democracy over their policy preferences?

**IM:** How can one reduce the incidence of clientelism? As we show in our study—using the example of Romania—that the strong prosecution of one strategy, such as vote-buying, creates incentives for actors to substitute into other strategies—such as welfare coercion—that are punished less stringently. Ultimately, we do not provide a typology of policy interventions that reduce opportunities for substitution among different types of clientelism.

**If another scholar does the same project ten years from now, do you think their findings would be different from yours? And if yes, in which ways?**

**LY:** During the time of our fieldwork, Hungary, in particular, was going through a period of dramatic democratic decline, fueled in part by inter-group conflict over state benefits. I hope that we’re in a particularly dark period in terms of democratic decline and conflict over the state, and that these results wouldn’t hold in ten years. If inter-group conflict over state resources was less salient, our results suggest that you might see less of the most normatively objectionable form of clientelism based on welfare coercion. And if domestic and international election observers are able to more systematically monitor the types of electoral irregularities that we observed, instead of only what happens right around the time of an election, then they might be able to more effectively deter them. This is of course a very rosy picture but I do think there’s some hope that this period of global democratic decline might end up being relatively short due to collective efforts of citizens to get involved in efforts to reverse it.

**IM:** I would love to share Lauren’s optimism. I see very little possibility for far-reaching economic and political change in these deindustrialized regions in Europe’s periphery, I see very little possibility for change. Migration -- and return migration -- creates opportunities to dislodge these local political barons. It might be interesting to do a follow up study in these communities ten years from now to understand the consequences of migration for electoral clientelism.
What caused you to embark on this project?

I have always been interested in how hierarchical organizations work and what makes them work. When I was in graduate school, I read a lot of work about the importance of state and bureaucracy in economic development. For those studies, the ideal bureaucracy is usually one with strong Weberian characteristics—impersonal, meritocratic, and professionally run. This Weberian model clearly does not fit with the Chinese reality, but the Chinese bureaucracy is nonetheless still a reasonably capable and effective one. This contradiction has puzzled me for many years and it prompted me to write a dissertation – of which this article is a part – to better understand factors that can contribute to bureaucratic effectiveness but are often overlooked by the Weberian paradigm.

What is one main thing you want the project to be remembered for ten years from now?

I hope that it will be this: bureaucracy requires a personal input to work well. An effective bureaucracy is not a soulless machine in which every agent is a cog, but one that combines impersonal rules with human emotions and relations. The human aspect can be accounted for in a number of different ways, but it needs to be there.

What in your data or findings surprised you the most? Why?

It would be the result that patron-client ties to the higher-ups can make local leaders do a better job. The received view in our discipline is that patronage only leads corruption and perverse incentives, but my project suggests that under the right circumstances, it can also be used to achieve more benevolent outcomes.

What would you change or do differently if you went back and did this project again?

I wish that I could have a better measure of local economic performance. In the article, I used the official GDP growth as the main measure. The advantage of the official data is that they are systematic and extensive, but there is the well-known problem of statistical falsification, which could bias the finding if we think that having a connection may intensify the incentive to falsify data. I did several tests in the paper to address this problem and the evidence so far suggests that falsification, even if present, is unlikely to be driving the main results. However, I still wish...
that I could have a more direct way to gauge cities’ actual economic performance net of the falsified component. Luckily, there are methods and data to do that now, and my collaborators and I are working to construct such a measure. If I were to write this paper now, this would be an area that I would make some changes.

What is the biggest still unanswered question that emerges from your research?

If you buy the paper’s main argument, which is that intra-elite patronage can somehow be a good thing for bureaucratic performance, then it opens up a number of interesting new questions. For instance, what would be the optimal political structure for promoting development and governance? The common prescription from the international development agencies is to build a meritocratic, Weberian-style civil service system, but this may not be the most ideal one if we think that the personal element is also important in making a bureaucracy work. Another question is: What exactly is the cause of underdevelopment? We social scientists tend to see underdevelopment mainly as a problem of bad institutions. But if a conspicuously “bad” institution like patron-client ties can still sometimes be good for development, then it suggests (1) we may need to rethink our criteria for classifying the “good” versus the “bad” institutions, and (2) the root cause of underdevelopment may go much deeper than the mere lack of certain institutions.

If another scholar does the same project ten years from now, do you think their findings would be different from yours? And if yes, in which ways?

I honestly do not know, but it would be very interesting to see. In the case of China, I do not think the way the government does things will be fundamentally different in ten years’ time, so my results will probably hold. However, it would be fascinating to see projects investigating similar phenomena in other countries in other historical periods. Many of episodes of economic growth in history—England in the 17-18th century, the U.S in the 19th century, and South Korea in the 1960s and 70s, just to name few—actually happened under the watch of bureaucracies that contained significant patronage elements. I am curious to know what effect political patron-client networks have had on the economy in those cases and whether the effects are similar or different to those in the Chinese case.
What caused you to embark on this project?

The political causes and consequences of economic inequality have been the focus of my work since the beginning of my career. But soon after completing my first book (and the related articles), I became interested in the reasons why some individuals demand redistribution while others do not (as the beginning of a causal chain affecting voting, party strategies, policy, etc). Exploring the effects of income and population heterogeneity (whether measured as immigration, race or ethnic diversity) was a promising strategy that a number of other scholars had been thinking about.

What is one main thing you want the project to be remembered for ten years from now?

The main finding in the paper: that the poor do support redistribution consistently and are not significantly affected by population heterogeneity, while it is the affluent who become less likely to support redistribution when population heterogeneity increases. There is a common scholarly and popular view about industrialized democracies that those in the lower half of the income distribution have become less likely to support redistribution as a reaction to increases in immigration or racial/ethnic diversity (parties on the Left have used this argument to justify de-emphasizing redistribution, social policy or the welfare state). This article shows that this perception is not accurate.

What in your data or findings surprised you the most? Why?

The thing that surprised me the most emerged when I compared the findings in this article with those in my book with Daniel Stegmueller (Who Wants What?). The analysis in the article looks at immigration in Western Europe, the book also looks at race in America. The fact that the main relationship looks so similar in both contexts and with different measures of population heterogeneity was very interesting, given the expectation of American exceptionalism.

What would you change or do differently if you went back and did this project again?

There is a limit to what one can do within the space limitations of any article, but in an ideal world I would have wanted to add some initial analysis of the two issues I bring up in the answer to the following question.
What is the biggest still unanswered question that emerges from your research? There are two main questions that come to mind, but the article is, in many ways, a good starting point for further research so I am sure that there are others. The first one is whether these findings about redistribution preferences matter... and I have done some work with Daniel Stegmueller showing that the relationship that is the focus of this article matters to voting for redistributive parties. The second question is about the nature of redistribution. The article analyses support for a very general kind of redistribution, while we know that the politics of redistribution is partly about redefining redistribution (what is more relevant redistribution in general or redistribution for people like me?)

If another scholar does the same project ten years from now, do you think their findings would be different from yours? And if yes, in which ways?

I am sure that the findings would be different, but I would hope they are complementary! I am also sure that other arguments about the main relationships in the article will be produced and supported by evidence, but I cannot predict which ones.
What caused you to embark on this project?
I think that current methodological writings place too much emphasis on the technical questions of causal inferences and pay insufficient attention to matters of exploration, description and figuring what is actually going on. I am completing a book on comparative historical analysis, where exploration plays an essential part in disentangling macro-historical phenomena to the point where it is possible to identify the relevant questions. Even those scholars who recognize the importance of description treat it too often as something pre-methodological that cannot be evaluated and where it is impossible to differentiate between valid and invalid descriptions.

What is one main thing you want the project to be remembered for ten years from now?
Description can be evaluated and plays a crucial role in theorizing. It is a primarily inductive activity that helps improve understanding and this understanding is essential for identifying a wide range of confounders that existing theories overlook. Description, in other words, is less theory laden and thus essential for addressing issues of endogeneity, specifying historical boundary conditions, elucidating causal mechanisms, and, for scholars engaged in comparative historical analysis, paying attention to temporal dynamics and historical processes.

What in your data or findings surprised you the most? Why?
This is a methodological paper and thus does not report findings that could have been surprising. However, it illustrates the ability of evaluate description by drawing on the controversy between the political scientist Daniel Goldhagen and the historian Christopher Browning. Both use almost identical archival materials in an effort to describe what motivated ordinary Germans to participate in killing Jews on the Eastern Front. The two scholars drew very different descriptive inferences from those shared sources which generated a huge debate that could be viewed as a collective replication of their two descriptions. This debate almost unanimously sided with Browning and thus underscores that descriptions can be evaluated. I also used the debate to explicate my criteria for evaluating descriptive inferences.

What would you change or do differently if you went back and did this project again?

The effort to elevate the methodological standing of description ran up against the conventional orthodoxy of limiting methodology to questions of research design (i.e. causal inference). I consequently had a hard time getting the article published because many reviewers did not know what to make of it. It took me a long time to place the importance of description in the broader methodological landscape and thus communicate more effectively how it contributes to, rather than being antithetical, to existing methodological orthodoxies.

What is the biggest still unanswered question that emerges from your research?

Will comparative politics be able to withstand the physics envy that drives the recent trend towards ever more complex strategies of causal inference that leave less and less room for description, theorizing or other pretesting activities? It seems as if we get better and better producing ever more complex results without having much confidence whether they also provide us with some actual answers. All of a sudden, we are calling independent variables treatments as if the world ontologically has become more clock-like. You can put new, fancier methodological lipstick on a pig, but in the end, it still is a pig – smart but messy and noisy.

If another scholar does the same project ten years from now, do you think their findings would be different from yours? And if yes, in which ways?

Again, this project did not produce empirical findings and thus is not replicable in the conventional sense of the term. So let me answer this question in a slightly different way. Hopefully, the COVID crisis will provide a methodological reset. The current pandemic is one of those macro-historical events so complex that it will require descriptions to disentangle it, figure out how this crisis unfolded over time and across countries, and what causal mechanisms are driving it. Time plays a particularly important role in such macro-historical events. The timing of when the pandemic started in one country relative to another, the sequencing of such timing with the first public health interventions, and tempo of the pandemic’s spread all involve incredibly complex temporal processes that need first to be described before they can be analyzed. Just in the past, history invariably comes to the rescue when we stray methodologically too far from the questions that ultimately matter.
SAGE PAPER PRIZE


What caused you to embark on this project?
In 2015, I came across a newspaper article that the Indian state of Bihar was expanding its program to create segregated police stations for the Scheduled Caste/Tribe community. The goal of the police stations was to facilitate access to justice for marginalized groups such that victims of crime could be accommodated by in-group police officers. That article raised a number of questions in my mind, and I became interested in probing whether such group-specific measures serve their stated goals. India was undertaking other novel reforms in this domain such as through the implementation of mandatory gender quotas as well as the largest expansion of women-only police stations in the world. I thought that such bodies could on the one hand improve access to justice for marginalized groups, yet on the other hand reify ethnic and gender-based disparities. Ever since I arrived in graduate school – some years following a gruesome event in which a New Delhi student was raped and killed – I was intrigued by the puzzle as to why sexual and gender-based violence remains such a prevalent problem, and was encouraged by my advisor (Pradeep Chhibber) to delve into the largely understudied topic of policing.

What is one main thing you want the project to be remembered for ten years from now?
Often, policymakers come up with an idea, and social scientists may try to evaluate that policy vis-à-vis a narrow set of outcomes tied to the intervention’s main goal. I try to show how policies that may look good on paper, or are initiated with sincere intentions, may occasionally clash with existing cultural norms or bureaucratic arrangements that were not or could not have been foreseen. I also hope that the discussion of ‘inclusive’ and ‘enclave’ representation, which I intend to flesh out in a book project, energizes academic conversations not only about the impacts of varied designs of representation policies, but also the urgency in evaluating measures that can address gender-based violence.

What in your data or findings surprised you the most? Why?
Some of the findings about ‘enclaves’ or segregated bodies incentivizing other institutions to deflect responsibility was unsurprising to me because of my prior exposure to the functioning of public agencies in settings of weak state capacity. What was surprising was how the institutionalization of enclaves diminished the
formal responsibilities for agents. Initially, I had assumed that if women – who would otherwise be marginalized within the police bureaucracy by male officers – had control over their own police stations, this would expand both their responsibilities and influence. However, what was surprising but later intuitive when considering all the data, was that institutions that match agents to tasks based on identity and may ultimately be constraining rather than empowering.

What would you change or do differently if you went back and did this project again?

Because of ethical guidelines of research, I was unable to interview or speak with victims of sexual and gender-based violence that I saw coming forward at police stations. If I could do anything differently, I would try to think of a way that allowed the voices of those victims to be front and center in the project. In the article, the qualitative components of the research are restricted to interviews with serving police officers and observations inside Indian police stations. If I could go back, I would try harder to convince the reader – through the words of the victims themselves – not only about the prevalence of gender-based violence in the region, but also the hurdles citizens face in being recognized by the criminal justice system, even after they have taken the courageous step of coming forward for help.

What is the biggest still unanswered question that emerges from your research?

An important question is whether the insights gleaned from the empirical analyses, which are restricted to a relatively short time horizon of a few years, continue to hold in the long-term. What are the external validity and long-term implications of enclaves? Do the findings about group-specific institutions in North India travel to other contexts within the same region (e.g., Tamil Nadu), let alone other countries such as Brazil or Peru? Literature about patriarchy in India from the fields of development economics and political science suggests that the entrance of women into traditionally male occupations or policy domains may be initially seen unfavorably, but that with increased exposure citizens may change their priors. It will be important to test to what extent this applies in the context of group-specific institutions.

If another scholar does the same project ten years from now, do you think their findings would be different from yours? And if yes, in which ways?

There are innumerable ways in which another scholar, carrying out the same research, may arrive at different conclusions in a decade. Enclaves may continue to operate in their current form, in which case the researcher may see dissimilar long-term effects. Further, enclaves may be reformed (e.g., women-only police stations may be tasked with all forms of crime rather than gendered cases), in which case the researcher may again see different outcomes. Moreover, the transferring of cases or ‘burking’ from one police station to another may gain renewed political attention, thereby altering bureaucratic incentives. Or, enclaves may be accompanied by the hiring of more minorities in existing state institutions in which case otherwise overstretched and under-resourced police personnel may have no need of turning complainants away. In fact, with greater gender-sensitization programs, a researcher carrying out the study in a decade may find that junior provincial-level officers---who carry out
the brunt of policework in South Asia yet have less education than senior officials---are no longer products of their cultural or social environments. Indeed, I cannot confidently say that a researcher in a decade may not see different effects simply because the number of inputs within the larger chain that may be added or subtracted are so great. India is rapidly modernizing, and local governments, including Haryana state, are initiating a number of policies to change patriarchal attitudes. Even the current era of COVID is bringing to fore the structural deficits in law enforcement agencies, which may serve as a catalyst toward a new emphasis on police reform.
LIJPHART/PRZEWORSKI/VERBA DATASET AWARD

European Social Survey
RORY FITZGERALD, University of London

What caused you and your colleagues to embark on this data project?

Sir Roger Jowell and Max Kaase began developing the case for a comparative European Social Survey at the European Science Foundation (ESF) in 1995. Under the leadership of Jowell and Kaase, committees were established to produce an ESS Blueprint. The ESF would eventually ask Jowell to assemble a core team and apply to the European Commission for central funding to be matched by the participating countries. That was successful in 2001 and the project started in 2002. Following an application to the European Commission which was submitted by the UK on behalf of 14 other countries, the ESS was awarded European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC) status on 30 November 2013. ESS ERIC now has 25 members. This means that the project is now funded by all participating countries directly and relies only on Commission funding for additional projects that work in tandem with the biennial data collection.

What is one main thing you want the project to be remembered for?

The survey data we produce is accessible by anyone for free for non-commercial use. This commitment to open data means that the main project output – survey data collected in over 425,000 face to face interviews across Europe since 2002 – is used in many different ways. The data is used by a large number of academics - more than 4,417 academic articles that include substantial use of our data have been published across a wide range of disciplines (2004-18) - and it is a great teaching resource for quantitative methods and survey research. In terms of our greatest achievements, though, this is when there is a significant impact outside of academia. For example, when our Bulgarian data led to a change in the law; when the Polish national team were able to improve the data collection methods of Poland’s Central Statistical Office; or when the training of judges and public prosecutors in Portugal was enhanced by data measuring attitudes towards the judiciary. That is the sort of legacy that we can be really proud of.

What in your data or findings surprised you the most? Why?

It is difficult to pinpoint one single finding from the data which is surprising because we have over 425,000 people around 200 questions. Following the publication of each round of data,
we are always really impressed with the different ways in which the data is analyzed - the statistical analysis techniques, the combination of data, the use of external datasets. The surprising thing is that even after almost 20 years of data, the analysis of this can be so varied, complex and comprehensive. It helps challenge us to keep producing the highest quality of data that is possible, but in a way that is still highly comparable to previous rounds of our data. Perhaps, sadly, one of the most surprising findings is the relatively high proportion of people who feel that different races and ethnic groups are either harder working or born more intelligent than others.

What would you change or do differently if you went back and restarted the data collection from scratch?

At no point in the history of the European Social Survey have we made decisions about the data collection in isolation. We are very lucky to have involvement from a range of survey methods experts based in seven institutions across Europe (City, University of London, UK; GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Germany; NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway; SCP - The Netherlands Institute for Social Research, The Netherlands; Pompeu Fabra University, Spain; University of Essex, UK; and University of Ljubljana, Slovenia). These cover all aspects of the survey lifecycle – survey and questionnaire design, translation; sampling and weighting; fieldwork including interviewer behavior; data archiving and quality assessment – so it is difficult to think of anything we would have done differently. Additionally, we have national teams in each participating country who also collaborate so we can conduct the survey using the highest methodological, yet practical, standards. If we were being hyper critical – and with the benefit of hindsight – perhaps we could have been more prepared for a situation whereby an event (such as a global pandemic) may restrict our ability to conduct face to face fieldwork! But even then, the team’s ability to consider alternative modes of data collection in our upcoming round - should face to face interviewing not be possible - has been very impressive to oversee. If we were to start from scratch, spending more time on the initial translation process would have been helpful as we have learnt a lot about better ways to get this right as the infrastructure developed.

What is the biggest still unanswered question that emerges from your data?

Our questionnaire is so long and so varied that there are continuously new research questions that analysis of the data can answer. The complexity of our questionnaire means that in each round of our survey, we include questions on two topics that have not always been included before, and this means that our data is becoming more useful to academic disciplines other than the social sciences. For example, our Round 7 (2014/15) module on the social determinants of health has provided academics and researchers with internationally comparative data that has some really clear policy implications, in terms of behaviors that contribute to differences in people’s health. The same can also be true of our climate change and energy module fielded in Round 8 (2016/17). Climate scientists have been clear about the effects of climate change for several years, but this data can show where public attitudes need to change to help address this grand societal challenge we face. There are always methodology questions that we are continuously trying to answer to ultimately provide
the most robust survey data we can. One topic that has been missing will finally be included in ESS Round 11, however - a module on gender attitudes.

If another scholar initiates the same project ten years from now, do you think their data and findings would be different from yours? And if yes, in which ways?

We are always very proud when we read an academic article and it refers to someone having created a survey or question using the methods we have employed. The wonderful thing about people’s attitudes and behaviors is that they are never static, so in ten years a scholar may ask a representative sample of a European country’s population exactly the same question, in exactly the same way yet the datasets could look completely different. But if the same methodological rigor is employed in that survey’s specifications, then their data and findings might be different, but they will be comparable. And that’s the main thing. If they did the same project in parallel now however using the same methods we are very confident they would find the same results.
POWELL GRADUATE MENTORING AWARD

DAVID LAITIN, Stanford University

What for you is the most important thing in mentoring graduate students?

Drawing out from students their own insights on topics that originally brought them into our discipline. I like to think of myself as having the same life goal as Holden Caulfield, my boyhood idol, in wanting to be a catcher in the rye, in his case watching children playing happily in the rye field but occasionally needing to push them back if they were about to fall off. In my case, what is important is to listen carefully to students who feel undirected, and flexibly to design a route back onto the rye field. In so doing, it is crucial to remind students the “nub” of the idea that drove their dissertation research, something that often gets lost when they deviate onto a tangential issue of no consequence for their research programs.

And the most challenging?

Given that I received a Ph.D. without knowing what constitutes an equilibrium or how to compute a standard error, the most substantial challenge is in keeping up with the technical and methodological advances in the discipline. In this way, I can credibly push students to the frontiers of research rather than have them reproduce what had come before. Moreover, I am less likely to direct students to fancy models that teach us nothing.

The discipline has evolved since you started mentoring graduate students. How did these changes affect your mentoring, if at all?

Mentoring today, as in publishing, is no longer a task for a single professor in a neo-feudal relationship. Students at Stanford now rely on a team of advisors, generally from two or three sub-fields, who jointly meet to coordinate their advice.

What in your graduate mentoring career surprised you the most? Why?

What surprised me the most, and continues to surprise me, is that graduate students who are way smarter than I am, ask me to serve as their advisor. (Perhaps this is because I see the “nub” of their contribution sometimes years before they do). Chicago and Stanford rejected my Ph.D. applications. So I have been in some awe of those students who made the cut in a much more competitive era than when I entered the discipline. And that I serve as their advisor in the two great universities that rejected me has been an irony worth savoring.
What would you change or do differently if you went back and restart your graduate mentoring from scratch?

I would insist my students read things that I have written; it would have been good for my citation count.

What is one main thing you want David Laitin to be remembered for as a mentor twenty years from now?

Challenging the area studies domination of the comparative politics field, Laitin’s students complemented area expertise with formal and statistical analyses, helping to induce the field to provide more generalizable answers to substantively important real world questions.
What made you to become a comparative politics scholar?
I did not make a single conscious decision to become a comparative politics scholar. It is the result of curiosity and a series of accidents.

What is one main thing you want your research to be remembered for ten years from now?
It is hard to name one “thing.” I hope instead that my research may offer an alternative way of thinking. By questioning the conventional focus on linear causation, Western-centric benchmarks, and the assumption that people have clear, fixed goals, we can open up a new approach to political economy: from a risk-filled world obsessed with control to an uncertain world of possibilities that necessitates learning and adaptation.

What in your research surprised you the most? Why?
In one section of *How China Escaped the Poverty Trap*, I compared “snapshots” with “a moving picture”— if you observe only a snapshot, you arrive at a certain narrow conclusion; but if you string the snapshots from beginning to end and observe the whole sequence, the conclusions change entirely. One implication is that we only know the true conclusion when a sequence ends and the conclusions that we draw in the process can be misleading. In life, it makes you wonder which snapshot you’re now observing and what the punchline will be at the end of the sequence.

What would you change or do differently if you went back and restart your research trajectory from scratch?
It depends on whether one returns with or without knowledge of the future! If I knew the future, why would I change only my research trajectory? I would change many things, such that I may end up on a completely different path. On the other hand, if I returned to the past without remembering the future, then I will likely repeat the same mistake of wasting time on detours and aborted projects.

What is the biggest still unanswered question that emerges from your research?
How should and can we measure adaptive capacity? Even measuring “state capacity” — the ability to execute plans — has proved difficult. Measuring adaptive capacity is even harder.
The concept of “adaptive” has multiple dimensions, and governments and organizations can be adaptive in some ways but not others. And unlike state capacity, it does not necessarily correlate with income levels: rich countries can fail to adapt, as we see today.

If another scholar does the same research you did ten years from now, do you think their findings would be different from yours? And if yes, in which ways?

I would be thrilled if future scholars extend any of the themes highlighted in my research: mutual causation, decision-making under uncertainty, meta-institutions that facilitate collective learning, and repurposing normatively weak institutions to kick-start entrepreneurial activities. In fact, I have only scratched the surface.

I cannot imagine what future scholars will find—but that is precisely what makes scholarship exciting: the conversation can go on for generations. This, I would like to think, is what compensates for our profession’s lack of quick gratification.
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ABOUT

The Organized Section in Comparative Politics is the largest organized section in the American Political Science Association (APSA). The Section organizes panels for the APSA’s annual meetings; awards annual prizes for best paper, best article, best book, and best data set; and oversees and helps finance the publication of this newsletter, APSA-CP.

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